DocketNumber： 06-06-00115-CV
Filed Date： 1/23/2007
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/7/2015
Appellant, Richard C. Watts, filed a notice of appeal November 20, 2006, from the trial court's order signed October 24, 2006, regarding a hearing held October 19 in which the trial court granted Jerry L. Gentry and Kimberly D. Gentry's motion to compel discovery and for sanctions.
The trial court's order is not a final, appealable judgment. We have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a final judgment or from interlocutory orders as expressly authorized by statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012 (Vernon 1997), § 51.014 (Vernon Supp. 2006). This order does not fit either criteria, and we thus have no authority to consider the appeal.
We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Jack Carter
Justice
Date Submitted: January 22, 2007
Date Decided: January 23, 2007
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In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
______________________________
No. 06-10-00171-CR
______________________________
IN RE:
COURT OF INQUIRY
On Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District Court
Cass County, Texas
Trial Court No. 08-C-563
Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
Opinion by Justice Carter
O P I N I O N
John Wayne Charleston attempts to appeal the ruling of the Fifth Judicial District Court of Cass County made in connection with a court of inquiry conducted pursuant to Chapter 52 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Because the Legislature has not provided a right of appeal, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
On April 14, 2010, the Fifth Judicial District Court convened a court of inquiry to investigate whether the assistant district attorney of Cass County had modified the indictment entered in the cause. On June 1, 2010, the court found there was no modification or fraudulent alteration of the indictment and dissolved the court of inquiry. That is the order from which Charleston appeals.
A court of inquiry is a criminal proceeding authorized by and conducted according to Chapter 52 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 52.01.09 (Vernon 2006). When a district judge, acting in his capacity as magistrate, has probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed against the laws of this state, he or she may request that the presiding judge of the administrative judicial district appoint a district judge to commence a court of inquiry. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 52.01(a).[1] The appointed judge may summon and examine any witness in relation to the offense in accordance with the procedural rules established in Chapter 52. Id. If it appears from a court of inquiry that an offense has been committed, the judge shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the offender as if the complaint had been made and filed. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 52.08. However, Chapter 52 does not provide for an appeal from the judges determination. In re Court of Inquiry, 148 S.W.3d 554, 555 (Tex. App.El Paso 2004, no pet.). A party may appeal only that which the Legislature has authorized. Olowosuko v. State, 826 S.W.2d 940, 941 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992); McCarver v. State, 257 S.W.3d 512 (Tex. App.Texarkana 2008, no pet.).
In the absence of statutory authorization for an appeal from the magistrates determination made in connection with the court of inquiry, we conclude that Charleston does not have a right of appeal. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Jack Carter
Justice
Date Submitted: October 5, 2010
Date Decided: October 6, 2010
Publish
[1]A court of inquiry is authorized when a judge of a district court has probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed. Before requesting the appointment of a judge to conduct a court of inquiry, the judge must file a sworn affidavit stating the substantial facts establishing probable cause that a specific offense has been committed. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 52.01(b)(1). Here, the judge appointed to conduct the court of inquiry implicitly found that no such affidavit was filed; therefore, Charleston did not have standing to raise or file such a complaint. We agree. Even if an appeal were authorized, without a district court finding of probable cause and an affidavit establishing such, Charleston had no standing to require a court of inquiry proceeding.