DocketNumber： 06-08-00054-CV
Filed Date： 7/22/2008
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/7/2015
The appellee, Housing Authority of Texarkana, Texas, filed a motion July 11, 2008, to dismiss this appeal due to appellant, Faye Marie Angel's, failure to timely file a brief.
The notice of appeal was filed May 1, 2008. The clerk's record was filed May 5, and the reporter's record was filed June 2, 2008. Therefore, Angel's brief was due on or before July 2, 2008. It is now July 22, and neither a brief nor a motion for extension of time to file said brief has been filed by Angel. Further, over ten days have elapsed since the filing of the Housing Authority's motion. Angel has, therefore, had the time required by Rule 10.3 to file her response to this motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 10.3.
Therefore, in accordance with Rule 42.3(c) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, we grant the motion and dismiss this appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(c).
Bailey C. Moseley
Justice
Date Submitted: July 21, 2008
Date Decided: July 22, 2008
at the Barry Telford Correctional Facility in Bowie County, Texas. Wolf alleged in his petition that he sustained injuries due to the alleged negligence of James Cleveland Brown. While being transported by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice in a bus being driven by Brown, Wolf alleges he sustained injuries in an accident. Wolf brought suit against Brown and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
An appeal may be taken only from a final judgment. A judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it disposes of all parties and all pending claims, except for matters necessary to carry out the decree. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). The trial court signed the order granting "Defendant Rupert's Chapter 14 Motion To Dismiss" April 6, 2004. However, this motion did not dispose of the lawsuit against Brown. An order that disposes of claims by only one of multiple plaintiffs or against only one of multiple defendants does not adjudicate claims by or against other parties. Id. at 205. We note that a final, appealable summary judgment may consist of a series of piecemeal orders. Hervey v. Flores, 975 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, pet. denied). On May 3, 2004, Wolf filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that no genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether Brown's negligence caused Wolf's injuries. On November 19, 2004, the trial court denied Wolf's motion for summary judgment because Brown was "not a party to this cause of action due to defective service of citation." That order only denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and is not a final judgment. See Novak v. Stevens, 596 S.W.2d 848, 849 (Tex. 1980).
Interlocutory appeals are permitted only in limited instances. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (Vernon Supp. 2004–2005). The statute authorizing interlocutory appeals is strictly construed because it is a narrow exception to the general rule that only final judgments and orders are appealable. Montgomery County v. Fuqua, 22 S.W.3d 662, 664–65 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, pet. denied). Because an appeal from a denial of a motion for summary judgment under these circumstances is not permitted under the statute, we have no jurisdiction over this appeal.
We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Jack Carter
Justice
Date Submitted: January 5, 2005
Date Decided: January 6, 2005