Humble Surgical Hospital LLC v. Christy L. Traynor

ACCEPTED
01-15-00718-CV
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
12/14/2015 11:40:32 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
NO. 01-1500718-CV
FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
In The First District Court of Appeals HOUSTON, TEXAS
Houston, Texas 12/14/2015 11:40:32 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
HUMBLE SURGICAL HOSPITAL L.L.C., HUMBLE SURGICAL
HOSPITAL SERVICES, L.L.C., HUMBLE SURGICAL HOLDINGS, L.L.C.,
HOUSTON HUMBLE SURGICAL, P.L.L.C., HUMBLE SPINE SURGERY,
P.L.L.C.,
Appellant,
v.
CHRISTY L. TRAYNOR,
Appellee.
On Appeal from Cause No. 1044724
in the County Court of Law No. 2, Harris County, Texas
APPELLEE’S BRIEF
HOULETTE & GRAY, P.L.L.C.
Jacqueline M. Houlette
State Bar No. 00787718
440 Louisiana, Suite 900
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 236-7740
Facsimile: (713) 583-3010
E-mail: jhoulette@houlette-gray.com
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
i
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellee requests oral argument. See Tex. R. App. 39.1.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ................................................................ ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................... iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ iv
ISSUES PRESENTED .......................................................................................... vi
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................... 8
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .................................................................... 9
STANDARD OF REVIEW .................................................................................. 10
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES ............................................................... 11
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .......................................................................... 24
iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios,
46 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Tex. 2001). .............................................................. 10, 19, 24
Baylor All Saints Med. Ctr. v. Martin,
340 S.W.3d 529, 534 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, 2011, no pet.)............................ 20
Bowie Mem'l Hosp. v. Wright,
79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002) ............................................................................... 10
Certified EMS, Inc., v. Potts,
392 S.W.3d 625, 632 (Tex. 2013) ................................................................... 22, 23
Christus Spohn Health System Corp. v. Sanchez,
299 S.W.3d 868, 877 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi, pet. denied.) ......................... 21
Gray v. CHCA Bayshore L.P.,
189 S.W.3d 855, 858 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) ................. 11
Keo v. Vu,
76 S.W.3d 725, 732 (Tex. App. —Houston [1st Dist.] 2002) ............................... 14
Packard v. Guerra,
252 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008) ................................... 12
Pediatrix Med. Grp., Inc., v. Robinson,
352 S.W.3d 879, 884 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) ..................................... 13
Rittger v. Danos,
332 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) ................. 14
Tawa v. Gentry,
01-12-00407-CV, 2013 WL 1694869, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr.
18, 2013, no pet.) ............................................................................... 13, 14, 18, 19
iv
Taylor v. Christus Spohn Health Sys. Corp.,
169 S.W.3d 241, 244 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) ........................ 10
Walker v. Gutierrez,
111 S.W.3d 56, 62 (Tex. 2003) ............................................................................. 10
Statutes
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code § 74 ..................................................................... vi, 23
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code § 74.351 ................................................................. 8, 9
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code § 74.351 (i)......................................................... 11, 12
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code § 74.402 ............................................................. 13, 17
Rules
Tex. R. App. 39.1 ..................................................................................................... ii
Tex. R. App. P. 9.4 ................................................................................................. 25
v
ISSUES PRESENTED
Whether the trial court erred when it refused to dismiss this action based on
Appellant’s objections under Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies
Code.
The trial court did not err when it denied Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss
because:
a. The expert reports and curriculum vitae of Priscilla Ray, M.D. and
Cathy L. Miller, R.N., Ph.D. establish that both are qualified to opine
on Appellant’s standard of care in this case;
b. The expert reports of Priscilla Ray, M.D. and Cathy L. Miller, R.N.,
Ph.D. inform the Appellant of the specific conduct that Traynor has
called into question and provide a basis for the trial court to conclude
that the claims have merit.
c. The expert reports of Priscilla Ray, M.D. and Cathy L. Miller, R.N.,
Ph.D. establish the bases for their opinions that Appellant is culpable
in this case based on a direct theory of liability as well as vicarious
liability.
d. The expert report of Dr. Cathy L. Miller provides information as to
how Appellant’s lack of adequate policies and procedures was a
substantial factor in causing Traynor’s injuries.
e. Appellant cannot limit, as a matter of law, Traynor’s basis for
vicarious liability based solely on its interpretation of Traynor’s
allegations.
vi
NO. 01-1500718-CV
In The First District Court of Appeals
Houston, Texas
HUMBLE SURGICAL HOSPITAL L.L.C., HUMBLE
SURGICAL HOSPITAL SERVICES, L.L.C., HUMBLE SURGICAL
HOLDINGS, L.L.C., HOUSTON HUMBLE SURGICAL, P.L.L.C.,
HUMBLE SPINE SURGERY, P.L.L.C.,
Appellant,
v.
CHRISTY L. TRAYNOR,
Appellee.
On Appeal from Cause No. 1044724
in the County Court of Law No. 2, Harris County, Texas
APPELLEE’S BRIEF
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
COMES NOW, Christy L. Traynor (“Appellee” or “Traynor”), Appellee in
the above-entitled and numbered appeal and submits this her Appellee’s Brief in
response to the brief filed by Appellant, Humble Surgical Hospital L.L.C., Humble
Surgical Hospital Services, L.L.C., Humble Surgical Holdings, L.L.C., Houston
Humble Surgical, P.L.L.C., Humble Spine Surgery, P.L.L.C. (“Appellant”).
7
Traynor requests this court affirm the decision of the County Court of Law No. 2
of Harris County, Texas, denying Appellant's Motion to Dismiss under Section
74.35l of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and in support thereof,
would respectfully show this Court as follows:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 19, 2011, Christy L. Traynor (“Traynor”) underwent back
surgery at Humble Surgical Hospital (“Appellant”). (CR 3).That night as she
recovered, she was under the care of Humble Surgical Hospital and its employee,
Nurse Kelly Bunyard. During the course of the night following her surgery, Nurse
Kelly Bunyard entered Ms. Traynor’s room repeatedly and fondled and groped Ms.
Traynor. (CR 53). Ms. Traynor filed this lawsuit on March 6, 2014, asserting
negligence claims against Nurse Kelly Bunyard and his employer, the Appellant.
(CR 4). Traynor asserted both direct and vicarious liability claims against
Appellant. (CR 6-7). With regard to her claims against Appellant, Traynor has
brought a direct cause of action against Appellant for the following:
(a) Failing to properly hire and retain the nursing care provided to Plaintiff;
(b) Failing to properly supervise the nursing care provided to Plaintiff;
(c) Failing to monitor the nursing care provided to Plaintiff; and
(d) Failing to properly treat the Plaintiff.
(CR 6-7).
8
In addition, Ms. Traynor has brought a case against Appellant for vicarious
liability, asserting that:
Defendants are vicariously liable for the acts or omissions of their
respective employees and agents who were employed by or in agency
or contractual relationship with them all times material hereto and
Plaintiff hereby invokes the doctrines of agency, ostensible agency
and/or agency by estoppel with respect to those relationships.
(CR 6-7).
Traynor timely served expert reports upon Appellant on August 26, 2014, to
satisfy § 74.351 requirements. Appellant objected to Traynor’s expert reports and
moved to dismiss the case. (CR 172-73). The Court then granted Traynor a thirty
day extension of time for Traynor to cure the alleged deficiencies in Traynor’s
expert reports. (CR 34).
Traynor subsequently filed amended expert reports, which included the
January 10, 2015, report of Cathy L. Miller, R.N., Ph.D. and the December 22,
2014 and January 12, 2015, reports of Priscilla Ray, M.D. (CR 78-165). Appellant
again objected to the sufficiency of the reports and moved to dismiss the case.
The trial court denied that motion, which led to this appeal.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Traynor has served Appellant with expert reports of Cathy L. Miller, R.N.,
Ph.D. and Priscilla Ray, M.D. that meet the requirements of Chapter 74.
9
The expert reports and attached curricula vitae identify each expert’s
qualifications. Dr. Miller and Dr. Ray identify the standard of care applicable to
Nurse Bunyard, and his conduct which clearly breached that standard. Dr. Miller
identifies the standard of care of the Appellant’s hospital at which Bunyard
worked, and the conduct which breached that standard of care. Dr. Ray identifies
and explains how the above-referenced breaches of duty proximately caused the
injuries sustained by Traynor.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss under section 74.351 of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Am.
Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Tex. 2001).
The trial court abuses its discretion only if it acts unreasonably or arbitrarily or
without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Walker v. Gutierrez, 111
S.W.3d 56, 62 (Tex. 2003). The trial court's ruling is arbitrary and unreasonable
only if “the appellant establishes that the trial court could reasonably have reached
only one decision.” Taylor v. Christus Spohn Health Sys. Corp., 169 S.W.3d 241,
244 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.).
When reviewing matters committed to the trial court's discretion, an
appellate court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court.
Bowie Mem'l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002). A trial court does not
10
abuse its discretion merely because it decides a discretionary matter differently
than an appellate court would in a similar circumstance. Gray v. CHCA Bayshore
L.P., 189 S.W.3d 855, 858 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.).
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
A. Plaintiff’s Expert Reports Must Be Considered in the Aggregate
Appellant attempts to suggest that the Court erred in denying its Motion to
Dismiss because of alleged deficiencies in each expert report served by Traynor,
suggesting each report has to independently meet all of the law’s required elements
regarding liability and causation. This is simply not the law. The Texas Medical
Liability Act requires that all of the expert reports and all of the experts’
curriculum vitae be cumulatively considered when evaluating reports for
sufficiency. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE § 74.351 (i). The statute is clear
regarding this culmination, stating:
(i) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a claimant
may satisfy any requirement of this section for serving an expert
report by serving reports of separate experts regarding different
physicians or health care providers or regarding different issues
arising from the conduct of a physician or health care provider, such
as issues of liability and causation. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to mean that a single expert must address all liability and
causation issues with respect to all physicians or health care
providers or with respect to both liability and causation issues for a
physician or health care provider.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE § 74.351 (i).
11
All of Traynor’s reports must be taken together in determining the liability
and causation of any one Defendant. All of Dr. Ray’s reports, curriculum vitae,
and supplements must be aggregated with all of Dr. Miller’s expert reports,
curriculum vitae and supplements in order to meet the minimum Chapter 74 expert
report requirements Put simply, the statute allows Dr. Miller and/or Dr. Ray to
opine regarding the standard of care, its breach, and the actions which each
Defendant should have taken to prevent that breach and then allow Dr. Ray to
discuss how that breach caused injury to Traynor and the resulting damages. No
single report must contain each and every element.
Any attempt by Appellant to individually parse each particular component of
each expert report rather than considering them in the aggregate must fail under §
74.351 (i) above. When evaluating Chapter 74 expert reports, all reports must ne
considered in the aggregate to determine whether a party has met the statutory
requirements. Packard v. Guerra, 252 S.W.3d 511 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2008).
B. Christy Traynor’s expert reports reflect that Dr. Ray and Dr. Miller
are qualified to render expert opinions on Appellant’s conduct in this
case
Section 74.402 of the Texas Medical Liability Act states:
(b) In a suit involving a health care liability claim against a health care
provider, a person may qualify as an expert witness on the issue of
12
whether the health care provider departed from accepted standards of
care only if the person:
(1) is practicing health care in a field of practice that involves
the same type of care or treatment as that delivered by the
defendant health care provider, if the defendant heath care
provider is an individual, at the time the testimony is given or
was practicing that type of health care at the time the claim
arose;
(2) has knowledge of accepted standards of care for health care
providers for the diagnosis, care, or treatment of the illness,
injury, or condition involved in the claim; and
(3) is qualified on the basis of training or experience to offer an
expert opinion regarding those accepted standards of health
care.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code § 74.402. [NOTE: Section 74.402(b)(1) is not
applicable since Defendant Humble Surgical Hospital is not an individual as is
required by the statute.]
As established in Tawa v Gentry, in assessing an expert’s qualifications,
“The relevant issue is not the physician’s area of practice but the stated familiarity
with the issues involved in the claim before the court.” Tawa v. Gentry, 01-12-
00407-CV, 2013 WL 1694869, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 18,
2013, no pet.) (citing Pediatrix Med. Grp., Inc., v. Robinson, 352 S.W.3d 879, 884
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.)). “Where a particular subject of inquiry is
common to and equally developed in all fields of practice, and the prospective
medical expert witness has practical knowledge of what is usually and customarily
13
done by a practitioner charged with malpractice, the witness is qualified to testify.”
Id. at *7 (emphasis added) (citing Rittger v. Danos, 332 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.)). Such is the case here where the conduct
at issue so clearly falls outside the standard of care.
Courts use a common sense approach to determine whether an expert is
qualified as to the familiarity of the “field of practice.” Keo v. Vu demonstrates the
common sense approach to be used in considering the “field of practice” by the
expert witness. Keo states:
Courts of appeals have also recognized that an expert witness
need not be a specialist in the particular branch of the medical
profession for which the testimony is offered. See Hernandez v.
Altenberg, 904 S.W.2d 734, 738 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ
denied); Simpson v. Glenn, 537 S.W.2d 114, 116 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Indeed, trial courts may qualify a
medical witness of a different specialty to testify if the witness has
practical knowledge of what is usually and customarily done by
other practitioners under circumstances similar to those confronting
the malpractice defendant. Blan, 7 S.W.3d at 745; see Marling v.
Maillard, 826 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1992, no writ) (citing Bilderback v. Priestley, 709 S.W.2d 736, 740
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
Keo v. Vu, 76 S.W.3d 725, 732 (Tex. App. —Houston [1st Dist.] 2002) (emphasis
added).
14
1. Dr. Cathy L. Miller has set forth her qualifications to render an
opinion in this case
Doctor Miller’s qualifications are evident within the four corners of her
expert report as well as her curriculum vitae. In the second sentence of Dr. Miller’s
report she states as follows:
“I am qualified to render expert opinion on the standard of care
required of nurses in the medical setting in addition to those
experiencing sexual assault. I hold a PhD in Nursing. I have 20
years’ experience as an emergency department, level 1 trauma,
CVICU, and critical care flight nurse, and multiple administrative
positions such as Director over multiple units in addition to adult and
pediatric Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner didactic certificates.
Furthermore, I have 6 years’ experience in Baccalaureate and
Graduate level nursing education. Past positions held include
director, assistant director, lecturer, assistant clinical professor, and
flight nurse. My current position is as an Adjunct Lecturer at a private
school of nursing. I have published twice in a peer reviewed scholarly
journals on emergency nursing care of sexual assault victims and
psychological complex trauma. I have presented on these topics both
nationally and internationally.”
(CR 115).
Dr. Miller’s curriculum vitae reflects her skill, knowledge, training and
experience, including:
1) Clinical Instructor, August 2011-August 2012
a. University of Texas Health Science Center San Antonio School of
Nursing
b. San Antonio, Texas
c. Courses: Adult 1: Clinical Instructor Disease Management III
2) Clinical Assistant Professor, August 2010-August 2011
Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi, Corpus Christi, TX
a. Courses: Fundamentals of Nursing Practice
15
i. Clinical Instructor-Medical Surgical Nursing II
ii. Clinical Instructor-Fundamentals in Nursing
iii. Burn/Trauma Guest Lecturer
iv. Coordinator Drug Calculations Exam Program
3) Adjunct Assistant Clinical Professor, August 2009-August 2010
Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi, Corpus Christi, TX
a. Courses: Clinical Instructor-Fundamentals of Nursing Practice
i. Health Assessment-Lab Instructor
4) House Supervisor, March 2008-July 2009
Kindred Hospital, Corpus Christi, TX
5) Staff RN-CVICU, January 2007-March 2008
Doctors Regional Medical Center, Corpus Christi, TX
6) Coordinator-Emergency Department, June 2004-April 2005
Driscoll Children’s Hospital, Corpus Christi, TX
7) Director- Emergency Department, Outpatient Surgery, and CVICU
a. October 2003-June 2004 TexSan Heart Hospital, San Antonio, TX
8) Staff RN- Emergency Department-June 2001-October 2003
a. University Medical Center, San Antonio, Texas
(CR 108-110).
Dr. Miller’s qualifications are evident from both her expert report as well as
her curriculum vitae. She details her experience as a nurse and as a nursing
supervisor.
In addition, Dr. Miller elaborated on her qualifications to issue opinions
regarding Defendant Humble Surgical Hospital, stating:
“I am qualified to render these observations based on a doctoral
level of education with extensive knowledge of nursing best practices
16
as well as having been published in peer review nursing journals on
the topics of sexual assault and psychological complex trauma. My
20 years of clinical and administrative experience including
experience as Director over multiple acute care units, House
Supervisor over multiple hospital campuses and having been the
immediate supervisor to over 200 nurses at one time qualifies me to
render these observations, citations of Texas Board Nursing rules and
regulations, and breaches in standards of care in nursing.”
(CR 115).
2. Dr. Priscilla Ray has set forth her qualifications to render an opinion in
this case
Dr. Ray’s qualifications contained on the curriculum vitae include, but are
not limited to:
1. Board certified since 1980 by the American Board of
Psychiatry and Neurology;
2. Medical Director, Methodist Hospital Psychiatry Unit for
the last six years;
3. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital Vice Chairman Credential’s
Committee;
4. Baylor College of Medicine – Associate Professor of
Psychiatry
5. University of Texas Health Science Center – Clinical
Associate Professor
(CR 79-81).
As the current Medical Director, Psychiatry Unit, at The Methodist Hospital,
she fully understands and interacts with the workings of the entire department—
including the nursing staff. Dr. Ray fully meets the requirements of §74.402 as she
17
manages, guides, and/or orders the entire medical staff at her unit including the
nursing staff. As such, she is qualified to “opine” about the standard of care.
Further, Dr. Ray clearly establishes in her report that she is qualified to
testify as to a nurses conduct based on the fact she has “worked as a physician in
hospitals, including General/Medical-Surgical hospitals, for over 35 years. I am
generally familiar with the standards for nurses in caring for patients in terms of
behavior and deportment.”
Appellant relies on Tawa as binding authority to suggest a physician is not
qualified to “opine” on the standard of care for a non-physician. Through
Defendants’ “extension” and not the Court’s, Defendants would apply this
statement to all non-physicians. Unfortunately, Defendants fail to inform this
Court that Tawa quotes from Christus Health Southeast Texas and concerns a
physician attempting to “opine about the hospital’s decisions related to the
complainant’s discharge from long-term care.” Tawa v. Gentry, No. 01-12-00407,
2013 WL 1684869 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 18, 2013, no pet.).
Specifically, Tawa involves the hierarchy of administrative decisions to “prevent
implementation of another physician’s order.” Id. The case at hand is clearly
distinguishable as it involves a Doctor commenting on the breach of care involved
in a nurse’s care of a patient.
18
B. Christy Traynor’s expert’s opinions are not conclusory and
meet the requirements of Chapter 74
Pursuant to Tawa, a proper expert report must (1) inform Defendants of the
specific conduct that the plaintiff has called into question; and (2) provide a basis
for the trial court to conclude that the claims have merit. See Tawa v. Gentry, 01-
12-00407-CV, 2013 WL 1694869, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 18,
2013, no pet.) (citing Am. Transitional Care Centers of Texas, Inc. v. Palacios, 46
S.W.3d 873, 879 (Tex. 2001)).
In this case, Dr. Miller identifies the standard of care applicable to Nurse
Bunyard, Appellant’s employee, and identifies his breaches in that regard. In doing
so, she cites, in part, to the Texas Board of Nursing Nurse Practice Act. (CR 113-
114). In addition, she opines on the conduct of the Appellant and its lack of
policies and procedures. She identifies with specificity the Appellant’s conduct of
which she complains as follows;
1. The organizations were negligent in adequately screening applicants prior
to hire as evidenced by lack of pre-hire comprehensive background
check.
2. The organizations were negligent in adequately training staff on sexual
misconduct, reporting and prevention as evidence by a lack of employee
handbook or other training materials prior to the date of incident;
3. The organizations failed to have policy and procedures in charge for the
supervision of nursing care as evidence by no record of charge nurse or
hose supervisor rounding on Ms. Traynor.
19
4. The organization filed to have adequate policy and procedures in place of
the monitoring of telemetry patients, as evidenced by Ms. Traynor being
off monitor for 30 minutes or more. The removal of Ms. Traynor from
the telemetry monitor coinciding with the time of the nurses’’ hourly
rounding documentation as evidenced by a) no rhythm strip in medical
records for the time and b) “0” showing on the vital signs systems
generated vital signs record.
(CR 116-117).
Dr. Miller’s expert report explains the standard of care and the basis for her
opinions and supports her opinion with facts regarding Appellant’s actions.
Appellant relies on Baylor All Saints Medical Center v. Martin, to suggest
that Dr. Miller’s report is insufficient. That expert report at issue in that case,
however, is distinguishable. In that case, which also involved a patient who was
the subject of mistreatment while recovering from surgery, the expert report under
scrutiny offered no detail. Specifically, in that case, the expert report stated simply
that “Baylor was expected to adhere to “specific standards of care” for its patients
that there must be policies in place to safeguard patients from assault including
employing a sufficient number of security personal [sic] to insure that no
unauthorized persons assault patients and training staff to identify persons not
authorized to enter patients room and prevent them from doing so.” Baylor All
Saints Med. Ctr. v. Martin, 340 S.W.3d 529, 534 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth, 2011,
no pet.). The court held that the report was insufficient because it did not establish
what specific polices and safeguards should have been in place. Id. at 534.
20
On the other hand, in yet another similar case involving a patient who was
the victim of sexual misconduct by a nurse while recovering from surgery, the
court found that an expert report that stated the hospital “[f]ailed to provide
adequate supervision to the CNA [DeJesus] and the RN [Njoh], [f]ailed to protect
Ms. Sanchez from sexual harassment and sexual abuse, and [f]ailed to provide
safety to Ms. Sanchez in her immediate post operative [sic] when the CNA lifted
Ms. Sanchez up and began dancing with her” met the Chapter 74 standards. See
Christus Spohn Health System Corp. v. Sanchez, 299 S.W.3d 868, 877 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi, pet. denied.).
In this case, Dr. Miller has identified five specific acts or omissions of
Appellant of which she complains. Accordingly, the report meets the requirements
of Chapter 74.
C. Traynor is not Required to Provide an Expert Report for Each
Pleaded Liability Theory
Appellant argues that the Court erred in declining to dismiss this case based
on Appellant’s allegation that Traynor has not provided an expert report on each
theory of liability pled in her petition against Appellant. This argument fails for
two reasons. First, Traynor has offered expert opinions on both direct liability and
vicarious liability against Appellant. Second, even if she had not, or if one of those
opinions were to be found insufficient, the Texas Supreme Court has ruled that
“when a health care liability claim involves a vicarious liability theory, either alone
21
or in combination with other theories, an expert report that meets the statutory
standards as to the employee is sufficient to implicate the employer’s conduct
under the vicarious theory. And if any liability theory has been adequately
covered, the entire case may proceed.” Certified EMS, Inc., v. Potts, 392 S.W.3d
625, 632 (Tex. 2013) (emphasis added).
In Potts, which involved claims placed against both the employee and
employer in a health care liability claim stated “[n]o provision of the Act requires
an expert report to address each alleged liability theory.” Id. 631. Potts opined on
the Legislature’s intent and this State’s application of the Texas Medical Liability
Act. Specifically, “[i]f a health care liability claim contains at least one viable
liability theory, as evidenced by an expert report meeting the statutory
requirements, the claim cannot be frivolous. The Legislature’s goal was to deter
baseless claim, not to block earnest ones.” Id. (emphasis added).
Potts involved the exact same fact set contained in the present cause—a
nurse who sexually molested a patient and a responsible hospital. The Defendant
unsuccessfully argued that the “reports omitted any explicit reference to [their]
direct liability for [the nurse’s] conduct.” Id. The Texas Supreme Court stated that
“[t]o require an expert report for each and every theory would entangle the court
and the parties in collateral fights about intricacies of pleadings rather than the
merits of a cause of action, creating additional expense and delay as trial and
22
appellate courts parse theories that could be disposed of more simply through other
means as the case progresses.” Id. (citing Scoresby v. Santillan, 346 S.W.3d 546,
556 (Tex. 2011) (applying a lenient standard to cure a deficient report, noting that
approach avoids the expense and delay of multiple interlocutory appeals and
assures a claimant a fair opportunity to demonstrate that his claim is not frivolous).
Appellant attempts to argue, briefing the issue for the first time in this
appeal, that Traynor is not entitled to assert a claim for vicarious liability against
Appellant, therefore the Court should ignore expert opinions in that regard. In
doing so, Appellant attempts to entangle the court in the very sort of collateral fight
described by the Texas Supreme Court in Potts. Asserting a summary judgment
argument regarding vicarious liability, before discovery has even begun, is
premature and inappropriate. The fact of the matter is that the issue of whether
vicarious liability will ultimately succeed is not before this Court. According to
Chapter 74, and Palacios, the only issue before the Court at this phase in this
proceeding is whether Traynor has presented expert reports which inform the
Appellants of the specific conduct that Traynor has called into question and
provide a basis for the trial court to conclude that the claims have merit. See Am.
Transitional Care Centers of Texas, Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Tex.
2001).
23
Traynor has done so, and this Court should affirm the trial court’s decision
denying Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
Respectfully submitted,
HOULETTE & GRAY P.L.L.C.
/s/ Jacqueline M. Houlette
Jacqueline M. Houlette
TBA No. 00787718
440 Louisiana, Suite 900
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: (713) 236-7740
Facsimile: (713) 583-3010
jhoulette@houlette-gray.com
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the undersigned certifies
this brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4.
1. This brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4
because:
This brief contains 4720 words, as determined by the computer software's
word-count function, excluding the parts of the brief exempted by Tex. R.
App. P. 9.4(i)(1).
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4
because:
This brief has been prepared in a conventional typeface using Microsoft
Word 2013 in 14 pt. Times New Roman (Footnotes in 12 pt.).
___/s/Jacqueline M. Houlette__________
Jacqueline M. Houlette
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Appellee’s Brief was served
upon the counsel below via the methods identified below on December 14, 2015.
Joshua C. Anderson Via Electronic Service
Horne Rota Moos L.L.P. and E-mail
2777 Allen Parkway, Suite 1200
Houston, Texas 77019
(713) 333-4500 Telephone
(713) 333-4600 Facsimile
Chastiti N. Horne Via Electronic Service
Horne Rota Moos L.L.P. and E-mail
2777 Allen Parkway, Suite 1200
Houston, Texas 77019
(713) 333-4500 Telephone
(713) 333-4600 Facsimile
_____/s/Jacqueline M. Houlette__________
Jacqueline M. Houlette
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