Christopher Joseph Hadley v. State

NO. 07-05-0407-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL B
FEBRUARY 24, 2006
______________________________
CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH HADLEY,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
_________________________________
FROM THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NUMBER FOUR OF TARRANT COUNTY;
NO. 0934195D; HON. MICHAEL THOMAS, PRESIDING
_______________________________
Memorandum Opinion
_______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.
Christopher Joseph Hadley (appellant) appeals his conviction for possessing
methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. His three issues involve the trial court’s refusal
to grant his motion to suppress evidence of the contraband. This is supposedly reversible
since the methamphetamine was discovered as a result of an illegal stop. We overrule the
issues.
The methamphetamine in question was discovered after an officer spied appellant
driving from a wooded area onto Highway 360. To get there, according to the officer, “you
actually have to jump a curb.” Furthermore, the officer knew of complaints about people
dumping in that vicinity. Consequently, he stopped appellant. Appellant contends that the
stop was improper because his conduct was as consistent with innocent activity as it was
with guilty activity. We reject the contention for several reasons.
First, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the construct to which appellant refers
is no longer viable. Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38-39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Thus,
and contrary to appellant’s supposition, innocent activity may give rise to reasonable
suspicion if the totality of the circumstances, and rational inferences therefrom, nonetheless
permit an officer to reasonably conclude that the detained individual actually engaged in,
was engaging in, or was about to engage in criminal conduct. Id.
Second, statute generally prohibits one from driving over or across a physical barrier
constructed to impede vehicular traffic. TEX . TRANS. CODE ANN . §545.063(b) (Vernon
1999). Furthermore, the obstruction need not be impassible for it to be a physical barrier.
Kindell v. State, 407 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966). Here, the officer noticed
that to arrive at the location where appellant was first seen, appellant would have had to
jump a curb adjacent to Highway 360. Furthermore, a curb can be considered a physical
barrier designed to impede vehicular traffic. Given this and §545.063(b) of the
Transportation Code, we conclude that circumstances existed upon which an officer could,
at the very least, reasonably suspect that appellant had engaged in unlawful conduct, i.e.
the violation of a traffic law. And, that would have justified appellant’s stop.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in holding that the stop was lawful. So, we
affirm the judgment.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
Do not publish.