Ex Parte Nii-Otabil Nelson

Opinion issued October 15, 2019
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-19-00401-CR
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EX PARTE NII-OTABIL NELSON
On Appeal from the 182nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1372073-D
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Nii-Otabil Nelson, appeals from the trial court’s order with
findings of fact and conclusions of law, signed on June 7, 2019, denying his fourth
application for a writ of habeas corpus, filed under article 11.072 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure. We affirm.
Background
On April 15, 2014, after being charged with injury to a child, a third-degree
felony, Nelson, with counsel, pleaded nolo contendere or no contest to the reduced
charge of assault—bodily injury, a class A misdemeanor. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§
22.04(a)(3), (f), 22.01(a)(1), (b); see also Ex parte Nii-Otabil Nelson, 546 S.W.3d
742, 743 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 15, 2018, no pet.). On the same day,
the trial court signed an order of deferred adjudication of Nelson’s guilt and placed
him on community supervision for eighteen months. See id.
On April 28, 2015, the trial court signed an order unsatisfactorily terminating
Nelson from his deferred adjudication community supervision. See id. at 744. This
Court affirmed the denial of or dismissed for want of jurisdiction Nelson’s appeals
from his first three habeas corpus applications challenging the same underlying 2014
order placing him on community supervision for assault—bodily injury. See id. at
744–45 (summarizing Nelson’s first three habeas corpus applications).
On January 24, 2019, Nelson, through habeas counsel, filed his fourth article
11.072 habeas application in the trial court, which was assigned to the underlying
trial court cause number 1372073-D. Nelson again alleges in this habeas application
that he is actually innocent of the class A misdemeanor charge of assault—bodily
injury involving his son, A.T.N., to which he had pleaded no contest and had been
later placed on deferred adjudication community supervision in 2014. Nelson’s
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fourth habeas application again attaches his affidavit, the police report and the same
two affidavits from his other son, O.N., one signed on May 13, 2016, and one signed
on August 10, 2016, both of which were previously attached to his third habeas
corpus application.
The State filed a first amended original answer on February 28, 2019, and first
amended proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on March 15, 2019, which
the trial court had not signed when it signed a directive order denying Nelson’s
habeas application on April 22, 2019, or when Nelson filed his April 25, 2019 notice
of appeal. The trial court certified that appellant had the right of appeal on May 21,
2019. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). The district clerk filed a supplemental clerk’s
record with the “State’s Second Amended Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order,” signed by the trial court on June 7, 2019. This Court’s July 23,
2019 order deemed Nelson’s notice of appeal to be filed on June 7, 2019, after the
findings and conclusions and order were signed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 27.1(b).
The Habeas Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Without a hearing, the habeas court adopted and signed the “State’s Second
Amended Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order” on June 7,
2019, denying Nelson’s fourth habeas application, assigned to trial court cause
number 1372073-D. The court entered the following pertinent findings and
conclusions:
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FINDINGS OF FACT
Applicant’s Instant Writ of Habeas Corpus
22. On January 24, 2019, the Applicant filed the instant writ alleging
actual innocence and collateral consequences. Applicant’s Writ at 1, 7.
23. To support the allegations the Applicant makes in the instant
writ, the Applicant attaches a typewritten affidavit from O.N. and a
handwritten affidavit from O.N. Applicant’s Writ Exhibits C and D.
24. The handwritten affidavit from O.N[.] attached to the instant writ
is identical to both the handwritten statement attached to the
Applicant’s “B” Writ [second habeas] and the handwritten affidavit
attached to the Applicant’s “C” Writ [third habeas]. State’s Writ Exhibit
E, “B” Writ at 11-12; State’s Writ Exhibit G, August 10, 2016 affidavit
from O.N[.] attached to Applicant’s “C” Writ; Applicant’s Writ Exhibit
D.
25. The trial court finds that the Applicant has alleged that he is
actually innocent in his previous two (2) habeas applications and has
used the same statement from his son, O.N[.], as evidence to support
his allegations.
26. The trial court finds that the Applicant’s instant writ application
lacks sufficient specific facts establishing that the claims in the instant
writ application have not been raised in previous writ applications.
27. Based on the existing previous writs, the trial court finds that the
claims in the instant writ application are frivolous in light of the fact
that they are substantively the same claims made in the Applicant’s
previous two (2) writ applications.
28. Based on the Applicant’s use of the affidavit signed by O.N[.]
which is dated August 10, 2016, the trial court finds that O.N[.]’s
statements were ascertainable before the date that the Applicant filed
the instant writ.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
37. The Applicant is barred from obtaining habeas relief via the
instant writ because he fails to establish sufficient specific facts
which establish that the claims in the instant writ have not been
presented in any previously considered application filed under
article 11.072. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.072, section
9.
38. The claims in the instant writ are frivolous because the First
Court of Appeals has previously affirmed the denial of the exact
claims. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.072, section 7; Ex
parte Nelson, No. 01-17-00152-CR, 2017 WL 1149214 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 28, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication).
Based on these findings and conclusions, the habeas court denied Nelson’s
fourth habeas application on June 7, 2019. This Court submitted this case without
briefing. TEX. R. APP. P. 31.2(a).
Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 11.072 establishes the procedure
for an applicant to seek habeas corpus relief “from an order or a judgment of
conviction ordering community supervision.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.072, §
1. Under article 11.072, this Court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal of such an
order denying habeas corpus relief. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.072, § 8.
Generally, an applicant seeking habeas corpus relief based on an involuntary
guilty plea must prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Kniatt v. State,
206 S.W.3d 657, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (citation omitted). When reviewing
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the trial court’s ruling on a habeas corpus application, we view the facts in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling and will uphold it absent an abuse of
discretion. See id. However, the generally applied abuse of discretion standard is not
appropriate “when the decision does not turn on the credibility or demeanor of
witnesses.” Ex parte Martin, 6 S.W.3d 524, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also
Ex parte Aguilar, 501 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no
pet.). Statutory construction is a question of law that we review de novo. Spence v.
State, 325 S.W.3d 646, 650 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Ex parte Aguilar, 501
S.W.3d at 178. We will uphold the trial court’s decision on any theory of law
applicable to the case. Ex parte Evans, 410 S.W.3d 481, 484 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth
2013, pet. ref’d).
B. Applicable Law
Article 11.072 normally restricts habeas applicants to just “one bite of the
apple.” Cf. Ex parte Santana, 227 S.W.3d 700, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
(describing Article 11.07, which is similarly worded). However, the statute provides
a limited exception for subsequent applications:
If a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus is filed after
final disposition of an initial application under this article, a court
may not consider the merits of or grant relief based on the
subsequent application unless the application contains sufficient
specific facts establishing that the current claims and issues have not
been and could not have been presented previously in an original
application or in a previously considered application filed under this
article because the factual or legal basis for the claim was
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unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.072, § 9(a).
After a trial court considers and rejects an applicant’s initial article 11.072
habeas corpus application, that court may not consider subsequent article 11.072
applications unless the new application contains sufficient specific facts
“establishing that the current claims and issues have not been and could not have
been presented” in a previous application “because the factual or legal basis for the
claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application.” Id.
And, with respect to a factual basis, the only basis alleged by Nelson here, “a factual
basis of a claim is unavailable on or before a date described by that subsection if the
factual basis was not ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence on
or before that date.” Id. § 9(c). Thus, the rejection of an initial article 11.072 habeas
corpus application is the trigger event for section 9’s subsequent application of
abuse-of-the-writ restrictions. See Ex parte Salazar, 510 S.W.3d 619, 625 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2016, pet. ref’d) (citation omitted).
C. Analysis
Nelson’s fourth habeas corpus application, filed by counsel, begins by stating
that it “is being filed to replace the Third Actual Innocen[ce] Application for Writ
of Habeas Corpus that was filed pro se in December 2018.” Nelson claims that he is
actually innocent and that there is newly discovered evidence from a new affidavit
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from his other son, O.N., dated January 5, 2019, which provides further recantation
of his first two affidavits, and one of those, the August 10, 2016 handwritten
affidavit, was also attached to this fourth application.
However, as noted above, after the habeas court denied Nelson’s first article
11.072 habeas corpus application on September 22, 2014, this rejection triggered
section 9’s subsequent application abuse-of-the-writ restrictions. See Ex parte
Salazar, 510 S.W.3d at 625. Thus, to be entitled to relief under article 11.072 after
his first three habeas applications were denied, Nelson has the burden of proving
that the claims and issues in his fourth application “have not been and could not have
been presented previously in an original application . . . because the factual or legal
basis for the claim was unavailable on the date [he] filed the previous application.”
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.072, § 9(a).
Here, the trial court found that Nelson “has alleged that he is actually innocent
in his previous two (2) habeas applications and has used the same statement from
his son, O.N[.], as evidence to support his allegations.” Thus, the habeas court found
that Nelson’s “instant writ application lacks sufficient specific facts establishing that
the claims in the instant writ application have not been raised in previous writ
applications,” and because he used “the affidavit signed by O.N[.] which is dated
August 10, 2016, the trial court finds that O.N[.]’s statements were ascertainable
before the date that the Applicant filed the instant writ.” Thus, Nelson’s fourth
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habeas application provided no new facts that “have not been and could not have
been presented previously in an original application” because his actual-innocence
claim and his son O.N.’s handwritten 2016 affidavit were previously submitted in
his third habeas application. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.072, § 9(a). Thus,
Nelson’s fourth habeas application provided no factual basis that was “unavailable
on the date [he] filed the previous application.” Id. Therefore, we hold that Nelson’s
fourth habeas application was properly denied because it failed to overcome Section
9’s new-factual-basis procedural bar. See id.
We overrule appellant’s only issue.
Conclusion
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying Nelson’s fourth
habeas application.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Goodman.
Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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