Document Info

DocketNumber: 08-18-00002-CR

Filed Date: 10/31/2019

Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/4/2019

  •                                    COURT OF APPEALS
    EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    EL PASO, TEXAS
    §
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                             No. 08-18-00002-CR
    §
    Appellant,                                                         Appeal from the
    §
    v.                                                               171st District Court
    §
    ABRAHAM CONTRERAS,                                            of El Paso County, Texas
    §
    Appellee.                                                        (TC# 20160D06093)
    §
    OPINION
    In this appeal, the State of Texas contends that the trial court erred by granting Abraham
    Contreras’ motion for a new trial. We reverse the new trial grant and render judgment denying the
    motion for new trial.
    BACKGROUND
    This is a plea bargain case. On October 4, 2017, Contreras pleaded guilty to one count of
    aggravated sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child in exchange for a
    nine-year prison sentence and the requirement to register as a sex offender. At the request of
    Contreras’ attorney, the trial court gave Contreras until November 3, 2017 (30 days) to turn himself
    in to begin serving his sentence. On October 20, 2017, the trial court, stating that it believed
    Contreras would abscond, issued a capias and ordered Contreras to surrender himself and begin
    serving his prison sentence.
    On November 2, 2017—twenty-nine days after Contreras was sentenced—Contreras filed
    a motion to substitute his first lawyer for another lawyer. The next day, Contreras’ new counsel
    filed a “Motion to Withdraw Plea and for New Trial.” The motion stated, in relevant part:
    II.
    Mr. Contreras moves to withdraw his plea and moves for a new trial because
    his plea was the product of ineffective assistance of counsel and was therefore not
    a knowing and voluntary plea. He also moves for a new trial based on newly
    discovered evidence that could have been used in his defense, if his attorney had
    investigated and discovered the evidence. Mr. Contreras pleaded guilty without
    being adequately advised of his options and his rights. He did not have effective
    assistance of counsel to investigate his defense. He pleaded guilty based on the fear
    that, without anyone advocating for him, he could face more time in jail,
    notwithstanding his innocence.
    III.
    Mr. Contreras is in his sixties has never been arrested before in his life. He
    was charged with sexual assault of and indecency with a child, with a complete
    absence of physical evidence or third-party witnesses. His defense counsel did not
    investigate the substantial basis for the alleged victim and her mother to invent the
    charges against him. If Mr. Contreras had had effective representation, he would
    not have entered the guilty plea.
    IV.
    Mr. Contreras requests a hearing before this Court where he will present the
    newly discovered evidence and further present the details of the ineffective
    assistance of counsel. [FN 1] Counsel is not able at this point in time to be precise
    about which evidence is newly discovered evidence, because she was not able to
    get access to the discovery in this case. The portal is closed to her, because the case
    is closed. Further, prior defense counsel never printed or even downloaded the
    evidence in this case, so that is not available to the undersigned.
    V.
    This Court has discretion to grant a new trial in the interest of justice.
    Taylor v. State, 
    163 S.W.3d 277
    , 282 (Tex.App.—Austin 2005)(‘For over one
    hundred and thirty years, our trial courts have had the discretion to grant new trials
    in the interest of justice.’)(citing State v. Gonzalez, 
    855 S.W.2d 692
    , 694
    (Tex.Crim.App. 1993)). The granting or denying of a motion for a new trial is
    within the sound discretion of the trial court. Lewis v. State, 
    911 S.W.2d 1
    , 7
    (Tex.Crim.App.1995). Mr. Contreras is requesting an opportunity to withdraw his
    plea and have an attorney represent him in this matter who will review the evidence
    and investigate and present his defense. Justice is served allowing Mr. Contreras
    2
    this opportunity.
    [FOONOTE 1]: Mr. Contreras will also file a proffer of evidence in support of his
    request for a hearing.
    The trial court held a status conference on November 16, 2017. The State asserts that it
    requested a reporter’s record for this hearing, but no record was taken, and the State characterizes
    this conference as being an “informal status conference.”
    On December 8, 2017,1 Contreras filed a “Supplement to Motion for New Trial.” In the
    supplement, Contreras asserted that he was not raising new ground other than those raised in his
    original motion for new trial, but rather that he was supplying the specific evidence referenced in
    the motion for new trial. He attached an affidavit from Private Investigator William Kirkpatrick.
    Kirkpatrick attested that he interviewed three witnesses who had not been previously interviewed.
    Two of the witnesses operated businesses within the same shopping center as Contreras, who
    operated a jewelry shop. According to Kirkpatrick, the two witnesses he interviewed were familiar
    with the complaining witness and her mother because the complaining witness’s mother operated
    a retail booth at the shopping center, and the complaining witness was often there with her mother.
    One of Kirkpatrick’s witnesses testified that her shop was right across from Contreras’
    shop, that she saw the complaining witness come to Contreras’ booth and offer to clean his store,
    that the complaining witness never seemed scared of Contreras, that Contreras seemed more
    annoyed than interested in the complaining witness, and that she never saw Contreras act
    inappropriately toward the complaining witness or go anywhere with Contreras.
    The second of Kirkpatrick’s witnesses saw Contreras frequently at the shopping center and
    outside of work as well. That witness never saw Contreras act inappropriately toward the
    1
    The State correctly notes that this date fell outside the thirty-day window following sentencing during which a trial
    court can entertain a motion for a new trial or an amendment to a motion for new trial that has not yet been ruled
    upon.
    3
    complaining witness, and while he had seen the complaining witness and her mother with
    Contreras, he never saw the complaining witness and Contreras alone together.
    Kirkpatrick’s third witness owned a jewelry store on Fort Bliss and had done business with
    Contreras for several years. Contreras would visit the Fort Bliss jewelry store from time to time
    to pick up jewelry to repair, but he always came alone, and the witness never saw anyone with
    Contreras when he would visit.
    The Supplement also stated:
    Further, there is documentary evidence referred to in the police reports in
    this case that was either never obtained or never disclosed by the State or the
    Defense. Specifically, police reports in this case refer to CPS reports that conflict
    with UBH records. There is no detail in the State’s file as to why the complaining
    witness was at UBH, but clearly this could be exculpatory information. There is
    also reference to medical visits by the complaining witness. There is no detail in
    the police reports regarding this information, which would clearly be relevant. The
    undersigned has requested all of this information from the District Attorney. Once
    a hearing date is set for the Motion for New Trial, Defendant will subpoena said
    information.
    On December 15, 2017, the trial court held a nonevidentiary hearing regarding the motion
    for a new trial. A transcript of this hearing appears in the record. The trial court asked the State
    and counsel for the defense if they had been able to reach an agreement regarding the new trial
    motion. The prosecutor at the hearing informed the trial court that the parties had not reached an
    agreement. Counsel for Contreras reiterated the motion for new trial arguments, including the
    arguments that there were apparently conflicting accounts given by the complaining witness.
    Counsel for Contreras then proposed that the trial court grant—without a hearing—the motion for
    new trial in the interest of justice so that the evidentiary record could be further developed in order
    to get past the 75-day ruling deadline and then allow the State to file a motion to reconsider, at
    which time the trial court could have a hearing and decide whether there had been an adequate
    basis to grant the new trial in the first place. The prosecutor stated that the State did not agree and
    4
    opposed a new trial. After hearing both sides, the trial court made the following comments on the
    record:
    THE COURT: Now, see, this is the issue that we have, is the 75 days. If there – I
    guess, can I have an agreement from the State, that if I sign this as Ms. Stillinger
    says, it gets out of the box of the 75 day limit, and if you want to file a motion to
    reconsider, or whatever motion you want to file, I will entertain that?
    I’ll just sign this right now so we don’t have to rule about the 75 days. I
    don’t want you go up to the Court of Appeals, after I have signed this, because I’m
    just – at this point, I don’t mind getting on the record saying that I’m just doing so,
    so there is no 75 day issue, and that we’ll have a full blown hearing, if indeed, that’s
    what the State wants. I’m telling you, on the record, I’ll give you a hearing on a
    motion to reconsider.
    The prosecutor again opposed the grant of a new trial.
    The trial court ultimately granted the motion for a new trial. The trial court’s order stated,
    in relevant part: “Although the Court is not reaching the issue of ineffective assistance and
    therefore does not find ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court finds that a new trial should be
    granted in the interest of justice.”
    This State’s appeal followed.
    DISCUSSION
    Standard of Review and Applicable Law
    We review a trial judge's decision to grant a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion.
    State v. Herndon, 
    215 S.W.3d 901
    , 907 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). That discretion, however, is not
    unbounded or unfettered. State v. Zalman, 
    400 S.W.3d 590
    , 593 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013). A judge
    is permitted to grant or deny a motion for new trial “in the interest of justice,” but justice means in
    accordance with the law. 
    Herndon, 215 S.W.3d at 907
    . A judge may not grant a new trial on mere
    sympathy, an inarticulate hunch, or simply because he believes the defendant received a raw deal
    or is innocent. 
    Id. A trial
    court must grant a new trial for the reasons listed in TEX.R.APP.P. 21.3,
    and it may grant a new trial on other valid legal grounds as well. 
    Herndon, 215 S.W.3d at 907
    .
    5
    As the Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Herndon, there is generally no abuse of discretion
    in a new trial grant on non-enumerated grounds if the defendant: (1) articulated a valid legal claim
    in his motion for new trial; (2) produced evidence or pointed to evidence in the trial record that
    substantiated his legal claim; and (3) showed prejudice to his substantial rights under the harmless
    error standards of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
    Id. at 909.
    The defendant need not
    establish reversible error as a matter of law before the trial court may exercise its discretion in
    granting a motion for new trial. 
    Id. On the
    other hand, trial courts do not have the discretion to
    grant a new trial unless the defendant demonstrates that his first trial was seriously flawed and that
    the flaws adversely affected his substantial rights to a fair trial. 
    Id. A defendant’s
    motion for new trial must be filed no later than thirty days after the date
    when the trial court imposes or suspends sentence in open court. TEX.R.APP.P. 21.4(a). A motion
    is a prerequisite for the trial court to grant a new trial; the court may not do so on its own motion.
    State v. Aguilera, 
    165 S.W.3d 695
    , 698 n.9 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). A trial court may not order a
    new trial on a ground for relief not alleged in the motion for new trial, even if it is supported by
    the evidence. State v. Frias, 
    511 S.W.3d 797
    , 808 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2016, pet. ref'd). Should
    the trial court refuse to limit its ruling to the original motion and grant relief on the basis of the
    amendment over the State's objection, the appellate court should consider only the validity of the
    original and any timely amended motion for new trial, and should reverse any ruling granting a
    new trial based upon matters raised for the first time in an untimely amendment. 
    Id. The accused
    is required to allege sufficient grounds to apprise the trial court and the State as to why he believes
    he is entitled to a new trial. 
    Zalman, 400 S.W.3d at 594
    (explaining that the motion must contain
    enough detail to give the other party notice of what is being complained of so that it can properly
    prepare for the hearing); State v. Gonzalez, 
    855 S.W.2d 692
    , 694–95 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). The
    6
    general rule is that a trial court's ruling will be upheld if it is correct on any applicable legal theory
    presented in the motion for a new trial, even if the court articulated an invalid basis for granting a
    new trial. See 
    Herndon, 215 S.W.3d at 905
    n.4. This is the “right ruling, wrong reason” doctrine.
    
    Id. Interest of
    Justice Grounds
    The bulk of Contreras’ new trial motion presented an ineffective assistance of counsel
    claim against his previous trial counsel. Although we should uphold a new trial grant where a trial
    court relies on the wrong ground in its order but another ground presented in the motion would
    support the grant, 
    Herndon, 215 S.W.3d at 905
    n.4, here the trial court explicitly stated that it was
    not relying on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds in granting a new trial. As such, we must
    discount those disavowed grounds as a basis for the grant and turn instead to the remaining grounds
    upon which the trial court’s ruling could have rested. The only remaining ground timely raised in
    the motion for new trial is an interest-of-justice ground.
    Based on our review of the record and the trial court’s stated reasons for granting the new
    trial, it appears that the trial court granted this motion for new trial on interest-of-justice grounds
    in an effort to get past the 75-day deadline before the motion would be overruled by operation of
    law. The trial court explained that it would grant the motion and thereby provide Contreras with
    more time to obtain evidence, and if Contreras failed to provide evidence in support of his claim,
    the trial court would rescind the new trial grant and reinstate Contreras’ conviction.
    We do not believe a trial court has the discretion to grant a new trial for the purpose of
    allowing a defendant time to gather evidence that was not presented in a timely-filed motion for
    new trial. The standard is clear: a defendant who files a motion for a new trial must offer valid
    grounds and evidence in support of those grounds in the motion within thirty days of conviction
    7
    in open court. See TEX.R.APP.P. 21.4(a); cf. Mercier v. State, 
    96 S.W.3d 560
    , 562 (Tex.App.—
    Fort Worth 2002, no pet.)(evidence attached to an amended motion for new trial filed outside the
    thirty-day filing period could not be considered). Further, a motion for new trial can only be
    granted as a matter of discretion if it is supported by sufficient evidence.
    Given the compressed timelines involved in resolving a motion for a new trial, claims
    requiring the development of more evidence are often more appropriate for resolution in habeas
    proceedings. However, based on the record before us, we do not believe the trial court could have
    granted a new trial under the circumstances.
    The State’s sole issue is sustained.
    CONCLUSION
    The judgment of the trial court is reversed. We render judgment denying the motion for
    new trial.
    October 31, 2019
    YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice
    Before Alley, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
    (Do Not Publish)
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