State of Texas and Railroad Commission of Texas v. Steven Lynn Hale

NO. 07-07-0343-CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL C
JANUARY 23, 2008
______________________________
STATE OF TEXAS AND RAILROAD COMMISSION OF TEXAS, APPELLANTS
V.
STEVEN LYNN HALE, APPELLEE
_________________________________
FROM THE 31ST DISTRICT COURT OF ROBERTS COUNTY;
NO. 1948; HONORABLE STEVEN R. EMMERT, JUDGE
_______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellants, State of Texas and Railroad Commission of Texas (hereinafter
collectively the “Commission”), appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction in
favor of Appellee, Steven Lynn Hale, and a separate order denying their plea to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. By two issues, the Commission contends (1) the trial court
erred in denying its plea to the jurisdiction, and (2) in granting the temporary injunction. We
dissolve the temporary injunction, reverse the order denying the plea to the jurisdiction, and
render judgment granting the plea to the jurisdiction.
Background
Hale owns an eight thousand (8,000) acre ranch in Roberts County. Kim Flowers
owns a ranch directly south of the Hale ranch. The Commission intends to perform an
environmental remediation project to clean up a saltwater disposal pit at an abandoned gas
well site on the Flowers ranch. The project will involve the removal and replacement of
approximately three thousand eight hundred (3,800) cubic yards of contaminated soil. Soil
removal will require heavy-duty dump trucks to make over six hundred (600) trips across
a road on Hale’s property.
The Commission informed Hale that pursuant to its authority granted pursuant to
§ 91.113(c) of the Texas Natural Resources Code Annotated (Vernon 2001),1 the
Commission’s employees or agents were authorized to enter Hale’s property for the
purpose of conducting the cleanup operation on the Flowers ranch. Section 91.113(c)
states as follows:
The commission or its employees or agents, on proper identification, may
enter the land of another for the purpose of conducting a site investigation
or environmental assessment or controlling or cleaning up oil and gas wastes
or other substances or materials under this section.
1
All section references herein are references to the Tex. Nat. Res. Code Ann.
(Vernon 2001) unless otherwise expressly designated.
2
On June 22, 2007, Hale filed the underlying declaratory judgment action contending
the Commission was improperly applying § 91.113(c) to gain entry onto his property, or,
alternatively, the statutory provision is unconstitutional because it violates the Due Process
Clauses of the Texas and United States Constitutions. Hale sought a temporary
restraining order, temporary injunction, declaratory judgment, permanent injunctive relief
and attorney fees. The lower court issued an ex parte temporary restraining order
preventing the Commission from utilizing the road on Hale’s ranch for the remediation
project. Following a hearing, the trial court issued a temporary injunction enjoining the
Commission from utilizing the road on Hale’s ranch for the remediation project and denied
the Commission’s motion to transfer venue and its plea to the jurisdiction.
Discussion
At the outset, this Court is obligated to determine, sua sponte, issues affecting our
jurisdiction over an appeal. New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2d 677,
679 (Tex. 1990). As a general rule, a judgment must be final before it can be appealed.
Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex 2001). A judgment is not final for
purposes of appeal unless it disposes of all parties and issues. North E. Indep. School
Dist. v. Aldridge 400 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1966). There are, however, statutory
exceptions permitting interlocutory appeals. See, e.g., Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §
51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2007) (allowing interlocutory appeal of denial of a plea to the
jurisdiction by a governmental unit). Because this appeal pertains to the denial of a plea
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to the jurisdiction filed by the State of Texas and the Railroad Commission of Texas, this
Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
§ 85.241 (Vernon 2001) states as follows:
[a]ny interested person who is affected by the conservation laws of this state
or orders of the commission relating to oil and gas and the waste of oil or
gas, and who is dissatisfied with any of these laws or orders, may file suit
against the commission or its members in a court of competent jurisdiction
in Travis County to test the validity of the law or order.
A suit to test the validity of an oil and gas conservation law or order is required to
be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction in Travis County. This statute is jurisdictional,
and not a venue statute. Ex parte Lee, 127 Tex. 256, 93 S.W.2d 720, 723 (1936); Alpha
Petroleum Co. v. Terrill, 122 Tex. 257, 59 S.W.2d 364, 367-68 (1933); Terrell v.
Community Natural Gas Co., 117 S.W.2d 838, 843 (Tex.Civ.App.–Dallas 1938, writ
dism’d). The jurisdiction of a competent court in Travis County is exclusive. State v.
Novall, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 589, 590 (Tex.App.–Austin 1989, writ denied); Humble Oil &
Refining Co. v. Railroad Commission of Texas, 85 S.W.2d 351, 352 (Tex.Civ.App.–Austin
1935, no writ). This is true for declaratory judgment actions testing a conservation law or
Commission order. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bivins, 423 S.W.2d 340, 345-46
(Tex.Civ.App.–Amarillo 1967, writ ref. n.r.e.). Moreover, when a court of competent
jurisdiction in Travis County acquires jurisdiction, it may do whatever is necessary for a
final determination of the issues involved, 56 Tex. Jur. 3d Oil and Gas § 641 (2004);
4
Humble Oil, 85 S.W.2d at 352-53, including ancillary relief by way of injunction. Lee, 93
S.W.2d at 723.
Hale’s petition indicates he is, or will be, “affected” by the Commission’s proposed
action and conservation laws related to the cleanup on the Flowers ranch. He is
“dissatisfied” with the applicable conservation laws and Commission orders, and by his suit
seeks to “test the validity of the law(s) or order(s).” As such, Hale’s action is plainly subject
to the jurisdictional strictures of § 85.241, and may only be heard by a court of competent
jurisdiction in Travis County.
Conclusion
Issues one and two are sustained. Because the court below was without
jurisdiction, the temporary injunction is dissolved, the order of the trial court denying the
Commission’s plea to the jurisdiction is reversed and judgment is rendered granting that
plea.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
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