Aztec Systems, Inc. and Glendon Todd Capital, LLC v. Nick Prevett

Affirm in part; Reverse and Render in part; Opinion Filed March 29, 2019.
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-18-00183-CV
AZTEC SYSTEMS, INC. AND GLENDONTODD CAPITAL, LLC, Appellants
V.
NICK PREVETT, Appellee
On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-15-13630
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Myers, Osborne, and Nowell
Opinion by Justice Osborne
After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment for appellee Nick Prevett on his claim
for breach of contract against appellant Aztec Systems, Inc. The trial court also rendered judgment
against appellant glendonTodd Capital, LLC, based on the jury’s finding that glendonTodd was
engaged in a joint enterprise with Aztec. Aztec and glendonTodd appeal, arguing that the evidence
was legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s findings, and that the trial court erred
by overruling their motion for directed verdict, objections to the charge, motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and motion for new trial. We conclude the evidence is legally and
factually sufficient to support the jury’s findings against Aztec, but not against glendonTodd.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, and reverse and render in part.
BACKGROUND
Aztec sells and implements information technology packages and provides hosting services
for businesses. Aztec hired Prevett in July 2013. Prevett had experience working with “NAV”
software for businesses, one of the products Aztec sells. Prevett’s duties for Aztec included selling
products and consulting with clients. His salary was $85,000 annually plus commissions. For the
first few months of his employment, Prevett’s responsibilities were in sales. But when Aztec
decided to implement the NAV system for its own internal use, Prevett began spending
approximately half of his time working on the implementation. David Boone joined Aztec in
October 2014 as its chief executive officer, and became Prevett’s direct supervisor.
Prevett is a citizen of the United Kingdom. At the time he was hired by Aztec, Prevett was
living and working in the United States under an H1B visa that was due to expire on February 21,
2015. Prevett and Aztec agreed that Aztec would sponsor Prevett to obtain a green card after his
visa expired so that Prevett could continue his employment with Aztec.
Prevett’s visa expired on February 21, 2015. He stopped working at Aztec’s offices.
According to Boone, he and Prevett “had discussed [Prevett’s] role as a contractor and how he
would continue and how possibly he could make money while he was not an employee.” Prevett
testified that he became a consultant to Aztec, working on a contract basis. According to Prevett,
his duties did not change. He worked on the NAV implementation and visited clients. But Boone
testified that his discussion with Prevett was limited to the possibility that Previtt could be paid a
commission if he brought new business in to the company and could be reimbursed for his
expenses incurred on sales calls.
Aztec did not pay Prevett for his services or reimburse his expenses after February 21,
2015. Prevett sued Aztec and glendonTodd for breach of contract, seeking $33,825.33 for services
provided and $8,267.06 in “unreimbursed out of pocket expenses incurred.” In the alternative,
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Prevett alleged a cause of action in quantum meruit for the value of his services. Prevett also
alleged that Aztec and glendonTodd “were acting as a joint enterprise at all relevant times.” The
case proceeded to trial before a jury in July, 2017.
The jury found:
(1) Prevett and Aztec agreed that Prevett would provide consulting services in exchange
for reasonable compensation after February 21, 2015 (Question 1 of the jury charge);
(2) Aztec failed to comply with that agreement (Question 2);
(3) Prevett “perform[ed] compensable work” for Aztec “for which he was not
compensated” (Question 3);
(4) the sums of $33,825.33 for services rendered and $8,267.06 for expenses would fairly
and reasonably compensate Prevett for his damages resulting from Aztec’s failure to
comply (Question 4);
(5) the reasonable value of Prevett’s compensable work at the time and place it was
performed was $33,825.33 (Question 5); and
(6) Aztec and glendonTodd were engaged in a joint enterprise “[w]ith regard to services
provided” by Prevett “and the failure to pay for those services.” (Question 6)
The trial court overruled Aztec’s and glendonTodd’s motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and rendered judgment for Prevett on the amounts found by the jury plus attorney’s
fees found by the court, interest, and costs. The court denied Aztec’s and glendonTodd’s motion
for reconsideration or for new trial. This appeal followed.
In five of their six issues, Aztec and glendonTodd challenge the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s answers to Questions 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the charge.
In each issue, Aztec and glendonTodd also contend the trial court erred by overruling their
objections to the charge; by submitting each question to the jury; by overruling their motions for
directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and new trial; and by granting judgment in
Prevett’s favor. In their remaining issue, Aztec and glendonTodd challenge the trial court’s award
of attorney’s fees on the ground that Prevett was not entitled to judgment on his underlying breach
of contract and quantum meruit claims.
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW
When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an adverse finding on
which it did not have the burden of proof at trial, it must demonstrate there is no evidence to
support the adverse finding. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C., 348 S.W.3d 194, 215
(Tex. 2011); Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983). In determining whether the
evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding, we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. City of
Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). We must credit favorable evidence if a
reasonable factfinder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could
not. Id. at 807, 827. “The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at
trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.” Id. at
827.
A complaint that the evidence is legally insufficient will be sustained when: (a) there is a
complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence
from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to
prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the evidence establishes conclusively the
opposite of the vital fact. See id. at 810; King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex.
2003). “Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding.”
Formosa Plastics Corp. v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998).
There is more than a scintilla of evidence “when the evidence as a whole rises to a level enabling
reasonable and fair-minded people to have different conclusions.” Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v.
Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142, 156 (Tex. 2014). “However, if the evidence is
so weak that it only creates a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, it is regarded as no
evidence.” Id.–4–
In a factual sufficiency review, we consider and weigh all of the evidence, both supporting
and contradicting the finding. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406–07 (Tex. 1998).
We may set aside the finding only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence
as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Id. at 407; Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 Tex. 1986) (per
curiam).
The factfinder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given
their testimony. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819 (legal sufficiency review); Golden Eagle
Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003) (factual sufficiency review). We may
not substitute our own judgment for that of the factfinder merely because we might reach a
different result. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819, 822; Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 116 S.W.3d
at 761.
We review a trial court’s rulings on motions for directed verdict and for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict under a legal sufficiency standard. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at
825.
We review a trial court’s submission of jury questions for an abuse of discretion. Janga v.
Colombrito, 358 S.W.3d 403, 408 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). A trial court has wide
discretion in submitting instructions and jury questions. Id. The trial court must submit a question
that is raised by the written pleadings and the evidence, and may refuse to submit a properly
requested question only if there is no evidence in the record to warrant its submission. Id.We also review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. Dugan
v. Compass Bank, 129 S.W.3d 579, 582 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). A trial court abuses its
discretion when it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner, or acts without reference to any
guiding rules or principles. Id.–5–
DISCUSSION
1. Sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s answers to Questions 1, 2, 4 and 5
In its first, second, third, and fifth issues, Aztec argues the trial court erred by overruling
its motions and objections regarding Questions 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the jury charge and by rendering
judgment for Prevett based on the jury’s answers to those questions. As detailed above, these
questions inquired whether Aztec and Prevett had an agreement, whether Aztec failed to comply
with that agreement, and the amount of damages resulting from Aztec’s failure to comply.
Prevett testified at length regarding the services he provided to Aztec after February 21,
2015. Among other activities, he made sales calls and worked on issues that arose with the NAV
system. He testified about more than thirty emails admitted into evidence that he sent or received
between February 21 and late May, 2015. The emails were sent to or from his Aztec email address
and revealed that he was included in discussions with others at Aztec on a variety of issues,
including problems with the NAV implementation. Many of the emails were from or copied to
Boone. Prevett also testified to the expenses he incurred on Aztec’s behalf, including trips to San
Antonio and fees for company subscriptions that were charged to his credit card. Prevett calculated
the amount due for his services by prorating his $85,000 annual salary for the dates he worked
after February 21. He provided an itemized list of his expenses that was admitted into evidence.
The jury was instructed that in deciding whether Prevett and Aztec reached an agreement,
“you may consider what they said and did in light of the surrounding circumstances, including any
earlier course of dealing.” See Thornton v. Dobbs, 355 S.W.3d 312, 316 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011,
no pet.) (“In determining the existence of an oral contract, the court looks to the communications
between the parties and to the acts and circumstances surrounding the communications.”). Aztec
asserts there is no evidence the parties agreed that Prevett would provide consulting services to
Aztec for reasonable compensation. Aztec argues that Prevett never used the word “reasonable”
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in describing the amount he claimed to be due for his work. But there was evidence from which
the jury could conclude that prorating Prevett’s previously-negotiated salary as compensation for
similar work after February 21 was reasonable.1 Prevett testified that his salary was negotiated and
reflected his work experience in the industry and his experience with NAV. He also testified that
he performed the same functions before and after February 21. There was also evidence that
Aztec’s normal practice was to rescind an employee’s email upon termination of employment, but
Prevett retained and used his Aztec email after February 21 and used it in his communications with
Boone and others.
Aztec contends the evidence does not support the jury’s conclusion that Prevett’s pre-
February 21 salary was reasonable compensation after that date because “[c]ircumstances were
different.” Aztec argues that (1) there was no negotiated agreement; (2) Aztec was under new
management; (3) Aztec was in dire financial condition; and (4) Prevett could no longer come to
Aztec’s offices. But the jury heard this evidence and was the sole judge of its credibility. City of
Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819–20; Jackson, 116 S.W.3d at 761. The jury also heard evidence that
Boone decided to keep Prevett as an Aztec employee in the fall of 2014 even as he was terminating
other Aztec employees due to concerns about Aztec’s financial viability.
Boone conceded that after February 21, Prevett made “two or three trips” “that I had told
him he could be reimbursed for.” He testified, “In fact, I accompanied him on at least two sales
calls that he made.” Boone testified to his understanding that if Prevett incurred legitimate
expenses on Aztec’s behalf, Aztec would reimburse Prevett. Boone also testified that Prevett was
“helping with issues that would come up with the NAV system.” He explained, “[w]e converted
to NAV in December of 2104, and Nick [Prevett] was one of the few people who actually knew
1
See EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Jones, 252 S.W.3d 857, 869 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (op. on reh’g) (where term “unreasonable” was
not defined in jury charge, jury could make its determination based on common understanding of word).
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the system and helped kind of put it together. And so I think he was providing some support for
that as well.” He testified that the type of communications he had with Prevett did not change after
February 21.
Boone testified that “I did rely on Nick over the course of [t]his period when he was no
longer an employee to, A, help sell NAV business and, B, give thoughts on the business going
forward.” He “did not expect [Prevett] to do this for free.” He said, “I would have expected him to
get compensated something for this.” Boone complained, however, that Prevett did not submit any
invoices for payment before May, and then only submitted single-line item invoices for
“consulting services” without any itemization or detail. Consequently, Prevett’s invoices were not
paid.
We conclude the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s findings
that (1) Prevett and Aztec agreed that Prevett would provide consulting services in exchange for
reasonable compensation after February 21, 2015; (2) Aztec failed to comply with that agreement;
(3) the sums of $33,825.33 for services rendered and $8,267.06 for expenses would fairly and
reasonably compensate Prevett for his damages that resulted from Aztec’s failure to comply; and
(4) the reasonable value of Prevett’s compensable work at the time and place it was performed was
$33,825.33. Prevett offered testimony and documentation to support his claims. There was no
evidence that Aztec paid Prevett for his services or expenses after February 21, 2015. Although
Boone testified that Prevett and Aztec did not reach an agreement regarding Prevett’s
compensation after February 21, 2015, Boone conceded that Prevett provided at least some
services and incurred expenses for which he should have been compensated.
Because the evidence at trial was sufficient to “enable reasonable and fair-minded people
to reach the verdict under review,” City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827, the trial court did not err by
submitting Questions 1, 2, 4, and 5 to the jury or by overruling Aztec’s motions for directed verdict
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and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 825 (rulings on motions for directed verdict
and judgment notwithstanding the verdict reviewed under legal sufficiency standard); Janga, 358
S.W.3d at 408 (trial court may refuse to submit properly-requested question only if no evidence
warrants its submission). Further, considering all of the evidence, the jury’s findings in response
to Questions 1, 2, 4, and 5 are not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be
clearly wrong and unjust. See Ellis, 971 S.W.2d at 407; Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176. Nor did the trial
court act without reference to guiding rules and principles by overruling Aztec’s motion for new
trial where there was legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings. See
Dugan, 129 S.W.3d at 582. We decide Aztec’s and glendonTodd’s first, second, third, and fifth
issues against them.
2. Attorney’s fees
In their fourth issue, Aztec and glendonTodd argue that “if [appellants] prevail on this
appeal, [appellee] would not be entitled to recover his attorneys’ fees.” By agreement, the parties
submitted the issues regarding attorney’s fees to the trial court, and Aztec and glendonTodd do not
challenge the trial court’s findings regarding the amount of fees. Their only complaint is that any
award of fees is improper if Prevett is not the prevailing party on his claims. Because we have
concluded that the trial court did not err by rendering judgment for Prevett on the jury’s answers
to Questions 1, 2, 4, and 5 of the jury charge, we decide Aztec’s and glendonTodd’s fourth issue
against them.
3. Joint enterprise
In their sixth issue, Aztec and glendonTodd challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of
the evidence to support the jury’s answer to Question 6 and the trial court’s related rulings
regarding whether Aztec and glendonTodd were engaged in a joint enterprise. Joint enterprise
liability makes each party to the enterprise the agent of the other and responsible for the negligent
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acts of the other. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Able, 35 S.W.3d 608, 613 (Tex. 2000). The elements of
a joint enterprise are (1) an agreement, express or implied, among the members of the group; (2) a
common purpose to be carried out by the group; (3) a community of pecuniary interest in that
purpose among the members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise,
which gives an equal right of control. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt.
c). As we explained in David L. Smith & Associates, L.L.P. v. Stealth Detection, Inc., 327 S.W.3d
873, 878 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, no pet.), “[t]he theory of joint enterprise imputes liability to
one who, although he did no wrong, is so closely connected to the wrongdoer that it justifies the
imposition of vicarious liability.”
Aztec and glendonTodd argue that joint enterprise liability is applicable only in tort, and
Prevett neither pleaded nor obtained jury findings on any tort theory of recovery. Prevett responds
that although joint enterprise “originat[ed]” in tort law, “there is nothing inherent to the required
elements of joint enterprise that preclude its application to other fields of law,” and there is at least
one Texas appellate court that has applied joint enterprise liability in a breach of contract case, in
Seureau v. ExxonMobil Corp., 274 S.W.3d 206, 222 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no
pet.). In Seureau, however, the court noted, “For the purposes of this appeal, we will assume,
without deciding, that the theory of joint enterprise extends beyond negligence claims to include
the Seureaus’ fraud and contract allegations.” Id. at 218 n.9. Further, the court held that the
evidence failed to demonstrate a joint enterprise by the defendants in any event, because there was
“no agreement, common purpose, community of pecuniary interest, or equal right to control” with
respect to the alleged enterprise. Id. at 221–23.
Similarly here, even if we were to apply the theory of joint enterprise to Prevett’s claims,
we conclude the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s findings on the
theory’s elements. Prevett relies on the following evidence:
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 There was an agreement between Aztec and glendonTodd because Aztec was a
“portfolio company of glendonTodd”;
 “[B]oth glendonTodd and Aztec shared the common purpose of making money”;
 There is a community of pecuniary interest because “glendonTodd’s primary business
is ensuring the soundness of its operating companies such as Aztec,” glendonTodd
“only makes money when its portfolio companies like Aztec are sold,” and “it is part
of glendonTodd’s job to ensure that Aztec was a sound company”; and
 Aztec “was subject to a large degree of control from glendonTodd” but still had “some
voice and right to be heard” in its own “operational aspects,” establishing an equal right
of control.
We first note that, as explained in Seureau, “the joint-enterprise elements must exist with
respect to the same purpose and enterprise.” Seureau, 274 S.W.3d at 222; see also St. Joseph Hosp.
v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 529 (Tex. 2002) (if evidence shows several possible purposes and
concomitant projects or enterprises to accomplish them, charge must require jury to find joint
enterprise elements “exist with respect to the same concomitant purpose and enterprise”). The
enterprise described in Question 6 of the jury charge was “[w]ith regard to services provided by
Nick Prevett, and the failure to pay for those services.” There is no evidence that glendonTodd had
any role in whether or not Prevett provided services to Aztec after February 21, 2015, or was paid
for those services. The only evidence is that Boone, the chief executive officer of Aztec, controlled
Aztec’s hiring and firing of personnel. See Omega Contracting, Inc. v. Torres, 191 S.W.3d 828,
851 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (“The critical inquiry in analyzing the equal right of
control element is whether the defendant charged with joint enterprise liability had the right to
control the tortfeasor at the time of the tortious conduct.” [internal quotations omitted]).
More broadly, Mary Louise Hatcher, the Chief Financial Officer of glendonTodd, testified
that glendonTodd has no ownership interest in Aztec, and would benefit financially only if Aztec
was eventually sold after having “done well.” Hatcher explained:
Q. So how does GlendonTodd—in managing portfolio companies, how does
GlendonTodd Capital make its money?
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A. By making investments, sponsoring investments in operating companies.
And, ultimately, when those companies are sold and if they have done well,
then GlendonTodd may make some money.
Q. Does GlendonTodd make—if the company—If the underlying portfolio
companies make money, have a return ongoing but they are not sold, does
GlendonTodd profit from that?
A. No, it does not.
There was some evidence that Aztec and glendonTodd shared common officers. Hatcher
testified that for one year beginning in August 2013, she served as Aztec’s “Interim Chief Financial
Officer.” She did so under a written contract that was admitted into evidence at trial. The contract
expressly provided that Hatcher “shall have no authority to commit or obligate Aztec in any
manner and shall not hold herself out to third parties as being capable of doing so.”
There was also evidence that Todd Furniss, the Chief Executive Officer and founder of
glendonTodd, served as President of Aztec at one time. Furniss testified that he is not “involved at
all with the operations of Aztec Systems, Inc.,” but he knew Prevett and invited him to lunch with
the chief executive officer of Aztec’s parent company “[t]o talk about how to stimulate sales for
Aztec in the United States.” Furniss conceded that Aztec, its parent company, and the partnership
that owned its parent were “[a]ll . . . pulling towards one goal,” specifically, the “financial
performance of Aztec” “[t]o the mutual benefit of all.”
But there was no evidence “how, or whether, the monetary benefits of the enterprise were
shared” between glendonTodd and Aztec, or that the two corporations had “an equal right to a
voice in the direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control,” factors we relied on
in Stealth Detection in concluding there was insufficient evidence of a joint enterprise. See Stealth
Detection, 327 S.W.3d at 878–79; see also St. Joseph Hosp., 94 S.W.3d at 531 (no community of
pecuniary interest where no evidence that defendants agreed to share money received from
operating alleged joint enterprise); Burchinal v. PJ Trailers-Seminole Mgmt. Co., LLC, 372
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S.W.3d 200, 216 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (“Evidence of shared officers, directors,
employees, business addresses, and assets are insufficient to demonstrate joint enterprise where
the other requirements are left unmet.”).
GlendonTodd’s possible profit from the eventual sale of Aztec is insufficient to establish a
community of pecuniary interest. “Indirect, potential financial interests do not satisfy the test.”
Omega Contracting, Inc., 191 S.W.3d at 850 (no community of pecuniary interest when revenue
was divided based on each party’s work); see also Chesser v. LifeCare Mgmt. Servs., L.L.C., 356
S.W.3d 613, 626 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied) (“mere existence of monetary
benefits” to each member of alleged enterprise is insufficient; “there must be evidence that the
monetary benefits were shared among the members of the enterprise without special or
distinguishing characteristics”).
In Stealth Detection, the appellants contended the trial court erred by not rendering Stealth
Detection jointly and severally liable with a defaulting defendant, Stealth Industries, because the
two entities were engaged in a joint enterprise. Stealth Detection, 327 S.W.3d at 878. There was
evidence that Stealth Detection and Stealth Industries “had the same directors, officers, and
employees; the same address and telephone number; the same logo; the same goals; and that they
shared assets including ten trucks and $40,000 worth of computers.” Id. In addition, “[t]he only
bank account for the companies was in the name of Stealth Industries, which paid all the bills for
Stealth Detection.” Id. But because no evidence in the record showed “how, or whether, the
monetary benefits of the enterprise were shared between Stealth Detection and Stealth Industries,”
or that the two corporations had “‘an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise, which
gives an equal right of control,’” appellants failed to prove joint enterprise liability between the
two corporations. Id. at 878–79 (quoting Shoemaker v. Whistler’s Estate, 513 S.W.2d 10, 16–17
(Tex. 1974)).
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As in Stealth Detection, there is no evidence that Aztec and glendonTodd had a community
of pecuniary interest in a common purpose, and no evidence glendonTodd and Aztec had an equal
right to a voice in the direction of the alleged enterprise. See id. Even if we were to conclude that
joint enterprise theory applied to Prevett’s contract claim, the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the jury’s answer to Question 6. We decide appellants’ sixth issue in
glendonTodd’s favor.
CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court’s judgment as to glendonTodd and render judgment that Prevett
take nothing from glendonTodd. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Leslie Osborne/
LESLIE OSBORNE
JUSTICE
180183F.P05
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
AZTEC SYSTEMS, INC. AND On Appeal from the 44th Judicial District
GLENDONTODD CAPITAL, LLC, Court, Dallas County, Texas
Appellants Trial Court Cause No. DC-15-13630.
Opinion delivered by Justice Osborne;
No. 05-18-00183-CV V. Justices Myers and Nowell, participating.
NICK PREVETT, Appellee
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. We REVERSE that portion of the trial court’s
judgment awarding appellee Nick Prevett actual damages, prejudgment interest, and costs from
appellant glendonTodd Capital, LLC. We RENDER judgment that appellee Nick Prevett take
nothing from appellant glendonTodd Capital, LLC. In all other respects, the trial court’s judgment
is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee Nick Prevett recover recover his costs of this appeal and the
full amount of the trial court’s judgment from appellant Aztec Systems, Inc.
Judgment entered this 29th day of March, 2019.
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