DocketNumber： 08-05-00038-CR
Filed Date： 9/21/2006
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/9/2015
COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
JESUS GARBALENA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
§ § § § § |
No. 08-05-00038-CR Appeal from the 204th District Court of Dallas County, Texas (TC# F-9777111-TQ) |
O P I N I O N
Appellant pleaded guilty to the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child under the age of fourteen. The court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed Appellant on community supervision for a period of ten years and assessed a fine of $500. After a hearing upon the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt, the court adjudicated guilt and assessed punishment at twenty-seven years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. We affirm.
I. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE
On September 22, 2004, the State filed an amended motion to proceed to adjudication. In the motion, the State alleged that Appellant had violated twelve conditions of probation. Most pertinent to this cause on appeal is the allegation that Appellant violated condition (a) of his probation which provided that Appellant, “Commit no offense against the laws of this, any other State or the United States; do not possess a firearm during the term of probation.” The motion to adjudicate alleged, in pertinent part, that Appellant, “On or about the 15th day of June, 2003 in the city of Riverside and state of California, Jesus G. Garbalena did then and there unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally engage in sexual contact with [complainant] . . . a child then younger than 17 years . . . by contact between the hand of the defendant and the sexual organ of complainant, with the intent to arouse and gratify the sexual desire of the defendant.” Appellant pleaded true to eleven of the violation allegations and untrue to the violation of condition (a). At the hearing on the motion to proceed to adjudication, the twelve-year-old complainant testified that when she was ten, she and her mother and two other siblings moved to Kansas City to live with Appellant. She related that Appellant engaged in sexual contact with her on two different occasions by rubbing her vagina with his hand and on one occasion by rubbing her bottom with his penis.
Appellant had pleaded not true to the sexual contact offenses because the State’s motion to proceed to adjudication alleged the acts occurred in California when in fact they occurred in Kansas City. Due to this discrepancy, the court gave Appellant the opportunity to withdraw his pleas of true to the other allegations, but he declined to do so.
After the State rested, Appellant testified in his own behalf. He denied that the allegations of sexual contact were true. He stated that he never touched the complainant in an inappropriate manner. He also testified in an attempt to ameliorate his violation of the other terms of probation that he violated. He stated that he stopped reporting to his probation officer because he had money problems. He moved from Dallas County to Missouri in order to take a better paying job. He asserted that his wife caused problems because she insisted that they live together and she and the children moved to Kansas City unannounced on her own initiative. Appellant stated that he told his wife that they could not live together, but she did not believe it was true. He asserted that his inability to comply with the conditions of his probation was the result of pressure imposed by his wife. Appellant also stated that while he was reporting to his probation officer, he had always been truthful and it was he who told the probation officer that he drank a beer in violation of his probation.
During cross-examination, he admitted that he did not register as a sex offender in Missouri because he knew he was in violation of his probation. He also conceded that one of the children living with him in Missouri was the complainant in the underlying charge. Appellant admitted to having dinner with his wife and children while on probation in Dallas. He asserted that he had acted in an honest manner and had reported his contact with his children during sex offender treatment classes without having been asked any questions about those matters.
After both sides rested, the following exchange occurred:
COURT:What does probation mean to you?
APPELLANT:It means a responsibility and try to look for the help that you need and basically to look things in a positive way.
COURT:You received probation. Is probation another chance?
APPELLANT:Yes. I can say it’s my last one.
COURT:No. I’m talking about the probation you got when you pled guilty. Do you consider that your last chance?
APPELLANT:At that time I thought of things differently. What I wanted to was just get out of here.
COURT:Did you have responsibilities under the terms of your conditions of probation?
APPELLANT:Yes.
COURT:Were you man enough to meet those responsibilities?
APPELLANT:Yes, I was. But I didn’t see everything in detail as I did later and as I do now.
During closing argument, Appellant’s counsel asked the court to either continue Appellant on probation or assess a reasonable sentence. The court then sentenced Appellant to twenty-seven years’ imprisonment.
II. DISCUSSION
In Appellant’s sole issue, he contends that the court erred in failing to provide a separate punishment hearing after granting the State’s motion to proceed to adjudication. Initially, we address the State’s contention that Appellant has waived this issue on appeal.
The trial court must provide the defendant an opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of his punishment during a proceeding adjudicating guilt. See Hardeman v. State, 1 S.W.3d 689, 690-91 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); Issa v. State, 826 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). To preserve error on this issue, a defendant must timely object, bringing the lack of an opportunity to present mitigating evidence to the attention of the trial court. Hardeman, 1 S.W.3d at 690. If the defendant has an opportunity to object at the adjudication hearing, he must do so to preserve error. Id. If the defendant lacked an opportunity to object at the adjudication hearing, he may preserve error by raising the lack of an opportunity to present mitigating evidence in a motion for new trial. Id.; Lopez v. State, 96 S.W.3d 406, 414 (Tex.App.--Austin 2002, pet. ref’d).
Regardless of whether Appellant had an opportunity to object at trial, no motion for new trial was filed. We note that Appellant cites Smith v. State, 990 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999), reversed, 17 S.W.3d 660 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) ostensibly in support of his contention that he was denied a punishment hearing at the hearing on the motion to adjudicate. However, the primary holding in the appeals court case was that the accused in that case did not receive effective assistance of counsel during the filing period for a motion for new trial. Smith, 990 S.W.2d at 895. This holding was reversed by the Court of Criminal Appeals holding that the record was inadequate to rebut the presumption of adequate representation. Smith, 17 S.W.2d at 663. To the extent, if he is, that Appellant is making such a claim in the instant case, we note the same infirmity that resulted in the reversal of the Smith case. Allegations of ineffectiveness of counsel must be firmly founded by the record. Hawkins v. State, 660 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983); Mercado v. State, 615 S.W.2d 225, 228 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981). Appellant has brought no record before us to indicate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
However, even if error were preserved, Appellant had the opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of punishment before sentence was pronounced. An accused does not have an absolute right to a separate punishment hearing. Hardeman, 1 S.W.3d at 690. One must simply be given an opportunity to present evidence in mitigation of punishment if such an opportunity was not afforded before the adjudication of guilt. Id. at 690-91. In this case, Appellant was given an opportunity to explain and mitigate his actions and to request a “last” chance from the court. He was able to explain to the court that he saw things differently at the time of the hearing than he did when he was placed on probation. Accordingly, the court did not err in failing to hold a separate punishment hearing. Issue No. One is overruled.
Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue on review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
DAVID WELLINGTON CHEW, Justice
September 21, 2006
Before Barajas, C.J., McClure, and Chew, JJ.
Barajas, C.J., not participating
(Do Not Publish)