DocketNumber： 09-03-00108-CR
Filed Date： 2/11/2004
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/9/2015
Lisa Ann Morrow appeals her conviction for driving while intoxicated. After the jury found her guilty as charged in the information, the court assessed punishment at 180 days of confinement in the Montgomery County Jail and a $1,000 fine. The trial court suspended imposition of the term of confinement and placed Morrow on community supervision for 18 months. The sole point of error raised on appeal challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Citing Denton v. State, 911 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), Morrow contends that the evidence does not support an inference that she operated the vehicle because no eyewitness testified to observing her drive the automobile, and no evidence demonstrates that she took some other action to affect its functioning. Citing Coleman v. State, 704 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd), she then argues that evidence placing her in the driver's seat after an accident did not prove that she operated the vehicle before the accident because the State failed to establish temporal proximity. The appellant presents her point of error as the trial court's denial of her motion for directed verdict made at the close of the State's case-in-chief. It is well settled that a challenge to the trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict is actually a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. Cook v. State, 858 S.W.2d 467, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). To determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the offense existed beyond a reasonable doubt, we must consider all the evidence presented at trial, both from the State and the defense, in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id.; McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 613-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Morrow claims the State failed to prove that she was operating the vehicle, but does not challenge any of the other elements of the offense of driving while intoxicated. Thus, the narrow question presented in this appeal is whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Morrow operated the vehicle. When the arresting officer encountered Morrow, her automobile was disabled on the I-45 feeder road as the result of an accident. No other vehicles were involved. It appeared that the vehicle struck the concrete highway retaining wall. The motor was running and losing coolant. The appellant moved the vehicle forward when the officer directed her to move the vehicle completely off of the road. When the officer asked Morrow what happened, she told him that "she guessed she had run off the roadway." A videotape of the encounter was presented to the jury. On the tape, the jury heard Morrow state several times that she "just went off the road." She then admitted to consuming two beers at a bar, to being on the highway feeder road, and to driving. Furthermore, the appellant testified at trial. On cross-examination, Morrow admitted that she was driving. From this evidence, the jury could rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was operating a motor vehicle.
We overrule the sole point of error and affirm the judgment.
AFFIRMED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on February 2, 2004
Opinion Delivered February 11, 2004
Do Not Publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Burgess and Gaultney, JJ.
1. Tex. R. App. P. 47.7.