Interest of A.T., A.T., X.T., M.T., and F.T.

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-15-00121-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF A.T., A.T., X.T., M.T., and F.T., Children
From the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2013-PA-02073
Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Delivered and Filed: August 5, 2015
AFFIRMED
Rebekah T. appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her five
children, A.T., A.T., X.T., M.T., and F.T., asserting the evidence is insufficient to support the trial
court’s findings that she voluntarily executed an unrevoked or irrevocable affidavit of
relinquishment of parental rights and that termination is in the children’s best interest. We affirm
the trial court’s order.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 28, 2013, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed its
original petition requesting the immediate removal of the children from their parent’s care. On
September 10, 2013, the Department and the parents reached an agreement for the children to
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remain in the Department’s care with the parents having supervised visitation. Both parents were
provided service plans on October 7, 2013.
At a hearing on June 12, 2014, Rebekah T. was represented by her third attorney, who had
filed a motion to withdraw. After the caseworker testified about Rebekah T.’s lack of progress
and the Department’s decision to proceed with terminating her rights, the trial court asked the
attorney about her motion. The attorney stated she intended to withdraw at the conclusion of the
hearing; however, Rebekah T. had “indicated to me that she’s willing to relinquish right now.”
The trial court then granted a request for a recess “to allow that relinquishment to be done.”
Rebekah T. signed an affidavit of voluntary relinquishment the same day.
On June 23, 2014, a trial was held on the merits only as to Rebekah T., who was not present.
The caseworker again testified regarding Rebekah T.’s failure to complete her service plan, and
the trial court took judicial notice of the court’s file, including the affidavit of relinquishment. At
the conclusion of the trial, the trial court signed an interlocutory order terminating Rebekah T.’s
rights.
On July 7, 2014, Rebekah T. filed a pro se “Motion to Rescind Signature for Voluntary
Termination of Parental Rights.” The Motion states, “I was pressured into making a decision
without PROPER THOUGHT, I did not REALIZE what I was signing and this is due to a learing
[sic] disability see attached exhibit A.” The exhibit is a letter dated August 21, 2009, to Rebekah
T. from Charles E. Gutierrez, Ph.D. The letter states that its purpose is to provide Rebekah T. with
a summary of Dr. Gutierrez’s assessment and recommendations. The letter further states:
I have found that you meet criteria for Major Depressive Disorder, Recurrent,
Moderate: Anxiety Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified. Sexual Abuse of a Child
(Victim).
I recommend that you continue your treatment with Dr. Sanchez for your continued
care. Finally, your condition does not render you incapable of taking care of your
children and I recommend that you have your children back in your home with you.
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On July 23, 2014, Rebekah T. filed a pro se motion for new trial. This motion states: (1)
she signed the affidavit of relinquishment under duress and extreme confusion; (2) she was
pressured into making a decision without proper thought; and (3) her attorney did not explain the
relinquishment to her.
On August 12, 2014, Rebekah T.’s attorney filed another motion to withdraw, stating she
was unable to effectively communicate with Rebekah T. On August 19, 2014, the attorney also
filed a motion for the trial court to appoint Rebekah T. a Guardian ad Litem to help her understand
the termination process and the affidavit of relinquishment she signed. The motion also requests
the trial court to appoint Rebekah T. a special assistant who can assist her in understanding the
court proceedings because she has disabilities that affect her ability to understand them.
On September 23, 2014, a hearing was held on the attorney’s motion to withdraw, and
Rebekah T. was present at the hearing. The attorney explained Rebekah T. was asking her “to do
post-judgment things.” In response to the trial court’s questions, Rebekah T. acknowledged she
was asking her attorney to file documents after she signed the affidavit. Because Rebekah T. was
seeking to have the order terminating her parental rights set aside or appealed, the trial court
granted the motion to withdraw, but appointed appellate counsel to represent Rebekah T.
Rebekah T. filed a motion for severance, seeking to make the order terminating her parental
rights final for purposes of appeal. At a hearing held on January 20, 2015, the trial court reset the
matter as to the father’s rights to allow further mediation. With regard to the motion for severance,
the trial court noted that the interlocutory order was entered at Rebekah T.’s insistence that the
trial court “go forward on the affidavit of relinquishment.” Because trial as to father was set for
one month from the date of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion for severance.
On February 5, 2015, the parties appeared before the trial court and announced an
agreement was reached with the father during mediation. Rebekah T.’s attorney objected because
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he and his client were not present for the mediation. The trial court again noted Rebekah T. insisted
the affidavit of relinquishment be entered, and as a result, Rebekah T.’s presence at the mediation
was not necessary.
On February 12, 2015, the trial court held a final hearing and entered a final order
terminating the father’s rights as to M.T. and F.T. but appointing the father possessory conservator
as to A.T., A.T., and X.T. The Department was appointed managing conservator of all of the
children. Rebekah T. timely filed this appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 161.001 of the Family Code, the
Department has the burden to prove: (1) one of the predicate grounds in subsection 161.001(1);
and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(1),
(2) (West 2014); In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003). The applicable burden of proof is
the clear and convincing standard. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206(a) (West 2014); In re J.F.C.,
96 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Tex. 2002). “‘Clear and convincing evidence’ means the measure or degree
of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth
of the allegations sought to be established.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (West 2014).
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination of parental
rights, the court must “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to
determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its
finding was true.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. “[A] reviewing court must assume that the
factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so.” Id.
“A corollary to this requirement is that a court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable
factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id.
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In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination of parental
rights, a court “must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have
found to be clear and convincing.” Id. “If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that
a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a
factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is
factually insufficient.” Id.
AFFIDAVIT OF RELINQUISHMENT
In her first issue, Rebekah T. contends the evidence is insufficient to show that she
voluntarily executed the affidavit of relinquishment. In support of this contention, Rebekah T.
relies on the statements she made in her motion to rescind and motion for new trial. She argues
she felt pressured to execute the affidavit due to duress, a learning disability, and extreme
confusion, and her trial counsel did not adequately explain the affidavit. As previously noted, the
only evidence attached to these motions was a 2009 letter summarizing a doctor’s assessment of
Rebekah T. and stating she suffered from depressive and anxiety disorders.
The children’s ad litems initially assert in their brief Rebekah T. waived this issue by not
presenting it to the trial court. The Department, however, has the burden to prove the elements
necessary to support termination of the parent-child relationship. In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101,
113 (Tex. 2014). When the Department seeks termination based on an affidavit of relinquishment,
the Department has the burden to prove the affidavit was voluntarily executed. Id. at 113, 115.
“An involuntarily executed affidavit is a complete defense to a termination based on section
161.001(1)(K).” Id. at 113.
In this case, the record establishes Rebekah T. independently expressed the desire to
execute the affidavit. After executing the affidavit during a recess at a hearing, the record shows
Rebekah T. insisted on proceeding with the relinquishment. Although Rebekah T.’s motions state
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she felt pressured, “[a] direct or collateral attack on an order terminating parental rights based on
an unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights . . . is limited to issues relating to fraud,
duress, or coercion in the execution of the affidavit.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.211(c) (West
2014); In re D.E.H., 301 S.W.3d 825, 828-29 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied). In this
case, the record contains no evidence of any duress or coercion. See In re D.E.H., 301 S.W.3d at
828-29 (stating “[c]oercion occurs if someone is compelled to perform an act by force or threat”
and ‘[d]uress occurs when, due to some kind of threat, a person is incapable of exercising her free
agency and unable to withhold consent”). Mere pressure based on Rebekah T.’s own feelings is
not sufficient. See In re Bruno, 974 S.W.2d 401, 405-06 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.).
Moreover, although Rebekah T. stressed she had a learning disability, the record contains no
evidence to support this contention. The 2009 letter attached to her motion does not make any
reference to a learning disability. Finally, the trial court also observed Rebekah T. in the courtroom
and her insistence that the relinquishment be entered. Because the record contains no evidence of
any fraud, coercion or duress, and the record establishes Rebekah T. executed the affidavit at her
own insistence, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s implied finding that Rebekah
T. voluntarily executed the affidavit.
BEST INTEREST
In her second issue, Rebekah T. contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient
to support a finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The
ad litems for the children assert Rebekah T.’s affidavit alone is sufficient to support the best interest
finding, and legal authority exists to support this assertion. See Brown v. McLennan Cty.
Children’s Protective Servs., 627 S.W.2d 390, 394 (Tex. 1982) (stating “it was the intent of the
Legislature to make such an affidavit of relinquishment sufficient evidence on which the trial court
can make a finding that termination is in the best interest of the children”); Lumbis v. Tex. Dep’t
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of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 65 S.W.3d 844, 850 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied)
(“An irrevocable affidavit relinquishing a parent’s rights and a petition for termination can support
a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child and a judgment of termination.”); Ivy
v. Edna Gladney Home, 783 S.W.2d 829, 833 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1990, no writ) (holding
“an affidavit of waiver of interest in child, in and of itself, is sufficient to find termination is in the
best interest of the child”). This court, however, has held an affidavit of relinquishment “is not
ipso facto evidence that termination is in the children’s best interest.” In re A.H., 414 S.W.3d 802,
806 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.).
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the best interest finding, we apply
the factors set out in Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). Those factors include:
(1) the desires of the child; (2) the present and future emotional and physical needs of the child;
(3) the present and future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of
the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote
the best interest of the child; (6) the plans held by the individuals seeking custody for the child;
(7) the stability of the home of the parent and the individuals seeking custody; (8) the acts or
omissions of the parent which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a
proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id.
In her brief, Rebekah T. asserts the record contains no evidence as to several of the
foregoing factors. The Texas Supreme Court has, however, stated “[t]he absence of evidence about
some of [the factors] would not preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction
or belief that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002).
In this case, the oldest daughter, A.T. expressed a desire for her mother’s rights not to be
terminated. The next two oldest children, A.T. and X.T., expressed a desire to be reunified with
their father. M.T. and F.T. were too young to express their desires.
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With regard to the emotional and physical needs of the children and the emotional and
physical danger to the children now and in the future, the trial court, as the factfinder, could
permissibly infer that Rebekah T.’s future conduct could be measured by her recent past conduct.
In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). In this case, Rebekah
T. had an extensive history of involvement with the Department based on allegations of abuse and
neglect and had been referred to Family Based Support Services on repeated occasions. When the
children were removed from the home, the conditions of the home were reported to be unsafe. The
children were sleeping in an unventilated attic, and the home contained animal feces and rodent
droppings. When the children were initially removed, A.T. and X.T. were struggling
academically, and M.T. and F.T. were developmentally delayed. While in placement, the children
progressed well, were no longer struggling academically or developmentally, and were being
provided with the support and stability they needed.
With regard to parenting abilities and Rebekah T.’s acts and omissions, the record
establishes Rebekah T. failed to complete her services. At one hearing, the case worker reported
Rebekah T. refused to communicate with the Department and was not supportive of the
Department’s efforts. The CASA volunteer also reported Rebekah T. required the Department to
only communicate with her through her attorney. Despite concerns with Rebekah’s mental health,
she refused to provide the Department with information regarding her psychiatric treatment. The
CASA volunteer reported Rebekah T. was sending harassing and degrading emails to CASA and
Department staff, and she engaged in erratic, vulgar, and alarming behaviors. The trial court’s
notes also refer to Rebekah T.’s Facebook threats and slander, and the trial court made reference
at one hearing to being familiar with the case “because it has a long famous Facebook history.” In
her last report before Rebekah T. relinquished her parental rights, the CASA volunteer reported
Rebekah T. continued to engage in erratic, vulgar, and alarming behaviors, had not completed
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services, did not have stable housing, was not employed, and her therapist had discharged her
unsuccessfully. The case worker also testified Rebekah T. was inappropriate with the
Department’s employees and her behavior was upsetting to the children. Finally, although not
conclusive on the issue of best interest, Rebekah T.’s willingness to sign the affidavit of
relinquishment and her insistence that the trial court enter the order based on her affidavit is
relevant to the best interest inquiry. In re A.H., 414 S.W.3d at 806.
With regard to the plans for the children and their stability, the oldest daughter A.T.
expressed her desire to remain in her current placement until she aged out of the system. The next
two oldest children, A.T. and X.T., expressed a desire to be reunified with their father. Finally,
M.T. and F.T. were placed in the same foster home with plans for adoption. As previously noted,
the reports contained in the record establish that the children progressed academically and
developmentally while in their current placements, and their therapists supported the Department’s
plans for the children.
Having reviewed the record, we hold the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that termination of Rebekah T.’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
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