Roland Jackson v. Donald Jefferson

Opinion issued September 27, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-15-00344-CV
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ROLAND JACKSON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee
V.
DONALD JEFFERSON, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 1
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1058307
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Donald Jefferson sued Roland and Kimbanesha (“Kim”) Jackson to evict
them from his rental property and for delinquent rent. The justice court entered a
judgment of possession in Jefferson’s favor and assessed $10,000 in delinquent
rent against Kim only. Roland appealed to the county court at law, and after a de
novo trial, the county court entered a judgment of possession in Jefferson’s favor,
with no delinquent rent award. Roland appealed to this court, but we dismiss his
appeal for failure to pay the filing fee. Jefferson also appealed, contending that the
county court erred in failing to award a money judgment against Kim and Roland
for delinquent rent in the amount of $19,200. We affirm.
Background
In December 2012, Kim leased residential property in Spring, Texas from
Jefferson. Kim executed a two-year lease effective December 8, 2012 through
December 8, 2014, which obligated her to pay $1,600 monthly rent.
On December 18, 2014, Jefferson sued in justice court to evict Kim and her
ex-husband Roland from the property. Jefferson’s petition alleged that monthly
rent had not been paid on the property since November 2013. The justice court
entered a judgment of eviction in Jefferson’s favor and also awarded Jefferson
delinquent rent in the amount of $10,000 from Kim only. Roland, acting pro se,
appealed to the county court at law.
On March 30, 2015, the county court conducted a trial de novo. Jefferson
testified that, at the time of trial, he had received $16,000 in monthly rent payments
from Kim for December 2012 through September 2013, and zero dollars from
Roland in the months since Kim’s last payment. According to Jefferson, Kim
terminated the lease and Roland assumed the terms and conditions of the lease
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when Kim moved out and Roland moved in. Jefferson, however, also
unequivocally testified that Roland never signed a lease. By Jefferson’s
calculations, he was owed $19,200 in delinquent rent from the Jacksons—
representing 12 months’ occupancy at $1,600 per month.
Roland, on the other hand, testified that he had not assumed Kim’s lease and
instead, that he had made an oral agreement with Jefferson to fix up the property in
lieu of paying rent. Roland testified that Kim had been “overwhelmed” by
problems with the property, which included rodents in the attic, foundation cracks
and plumbing leaks, a poorly maintained pool, and an unkempt yard. Roland
maintained that all of these problems existed at the start of Kim’s lease and that
Jefferson had agreed but failed to address them before Kim moved in. Roland
testified that he and Kim agreed that she would move out of the home and that he
would move in with their children so that the children would not have to move and
change schools.
According to Roland, when he and Kim decided she would move out, he and
Jefferson discussed the many problems at the property and agreed that Roland
would repair the property to make it livable in lieu of paying monthly rent. Roland
testified that, pursuant to this verbal agreement, he immediately starting repairing
the property, with some help from Jefferson. And though there were subsequent
conversations between Roland and Jefferson about when Roland would start
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paying rent and in what amount, Roland testified that Jefferson never presented
him with a lease. Roland speculated that Jefferson agreed to let Roland work on
repairing the house so that he could sell the property.
On cross-examination, Jefferson acknowledged that he received a letter
threatening fines because the house’s front yard was unkempt. After receiving the
letter, Jefferson worked with Roland’s cousin, Martin Harris, to improve the front
yard. Jefferson maintained that alleged problems with the pool and pool filter were
just issues of “normal upkeep.” Jefferson agreed that Roland had told him via text
that there was a crack in the house’s foundation which ran from the pool area to the
living room and wash room, that plumbing issues caused the wash room to flood,
and that there were rodents in the attic. Notwithstanding Roland’s reporting of
such issues, Jefferson testified that the house was “one-hundred percent” move-in
ready when Kim entered into the written lease. Contrary to Roland’s claims of
having made property improvements, Jefferson testified that he visited the house
while Roland lived there and found it “incredibly filthy.”
On April 2, 2015, the county court entered a judgment that Jefferson “does
have and recover possession of the premises from Defendant Kim Jackson et al.”
The county court’s judgment did not award Jefferson any money damages.
Roland filed a notice of appeal. Jefferson filed a motion to reform the
judgment to include a money judgment against both Roland and Kim in the amount
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of $19,200 for delinquent rent. After Jefferson’s motion was overruled by
operation of law, he also filed a notice of appeal.
Involuntary Dismissal of Roland’s Appeal
On October 15, 2015, this Court notified Roland that his appeal was subject
to involuntary dismissal owing to a failure to pay the required appellate fees or
establish indigence for purposes of appellate costs and notifying Roland that his
appeal would be dismissed unless he responded within 10 days. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 5 (requiring payment of fees in civil cases unless indigent and allowing
enforcement of rule); 42.3(c) (allowing involuntary dismissal). The Court’s notice
was returned with the following marked on the envelope: “RETURN TO
SENDER[,] NOT DELIVERABLE AS ADDRESSED[,] UNABLE TO
FORWARD.”
To date, Roland has neither paid the required fees nor attempted to establish
indigence for purposes of appellate costs, nor has he provided the Clerk of this
Court with any other address. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.1(b) (“A party not represented
by counsel must sign any document . . . and give the party’s mailing address,
telephone number, fax number, if any, and email address.”). Accordingly, we
dismiss Roland’s appeal for failing to either pay the required fees or establish
indigence for purposes of appellate costs. See TEX. R. APP. P. 5; 42.3(c).
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County Court’s Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, in his first issue, Jefferson suggests the county court
may have lacked jurisdiction to render a judgment of eviction against both Kim
and Roland, since only Roland filed a notice of appeal from the justice court to the
county court. Although typically a notice of appeal filed by one party does not
serve to perfect an appeal for another, “it is well-settled that perfection of an appeal
to county court from a justice court for trial de novo vacates and annuls the
judgment of the justice court.” Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d 66, 69–70 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied). “Once a county court acquires
jurisdiction by perfection of an appeal from justice court, the rules of procedure
permit only that the county court try the case de novo or dismiss it if it is not
prosecuted.” Id. at 70 (citing Hall v. McKee, 179 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1944, no writ)). “A trial de novo is a new trial in which the entire case
is presented as if there had been no previous trial.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.10(c).
Thus, Roland’s appeal to the county court at law vacated and annulled the
justice court judgment in Jefferson’s favor. See Villalon, 176 S.W.3d at 69–70. In
the de novo trial in county court, Jefferson was to present his entire case as if there
had been no previous trial on his petition to evict Kim and Roland. See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 510.10. Jefferson’s petition named Kim and Roland as defendants, and the
record contains returns of service reflecting that each of Kim and Roland was
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served with process. See Villalon, 176 S.W.3d at 69–70 (jurisdiction of county
court in de novo appeal is co-extensive with justice court’s jurisdiction over
defendants obtained by virtue of service of citation in justice court). Accordingly,
the county court at law acquired jurisdiction over and properly rendered judgment
binding Kim and Roland. See id.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second issue, Jefferson argues that the trial court erred in failing to
award him delinquent rent in the amount of $19,200 because, according to
Jefferson, he conclusively established his entitlement to such an award with respect
to each of Kim and Roland.
A. Standard of Review
When a plaintiff challenges the judgment entered against him following a
bench trial and argues that he established his cause of action as a matter of law, we
will apply the same standard of review applicable to the denial of a plaintiff’s
motion for directed verdict. Olanipekun v. Omokaro, No. 01-13-00888-CV, 2014
WL 5410058, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 23, 2014, no pet.) (mem.
op.). We review a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for directed verdict under
the legal sufficiency standard of review. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802,
823 (Tex. 2005); see KMG Kanal-Muller-Gruppe Deutschland GmbH & Co. KG v.
Davis, 175 S.W.3d 379, 393 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
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When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on which he had
the burden of proof, he must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence establishes,
as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of his proposed disposition. Dow
Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001); see Rosenblatt v. Freedom
Life Ins., 240 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the challenged finding
and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. City of Keller, 168
S.W.3d at 822. If the evidence falls within the zone of reasonable disagreement,
we may not invade the role of the fact-finder, who alone determines the credibility
of the witnesses, the weight to give their testimony, and whether to accept or reject
all or any part of that testimony. Id.; see Dyer v. Cotton, 333 S.W.3d 703, 709
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (in bench trial, as fact-finder, trial
court may believe one witness and disbelieve another and resolve inconsistencies
in any testimony); see also Esse v. Empire Energy III, Ltd., 333 S.W.3d 166, 177
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (“trial court acts as fact-finder
in a bench trial and is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses”).
B. Applicable Law
A lease is a type of contract. The essential elements to sustain a breach of
contract claim are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) performance or tendered
performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and
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(4) damages to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. Dupree v. Boniuk Interests,
Ltd., 472 S.W.3d 355, 364 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing
Pagosa Oil & Gas, LLC v. Marrs & Smith P’ship, 323 S.W.3d 203, 213 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied)).
Rule 510 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure addresses eviction
proceedings and provides that upon a judgment in favor of a plaintiff, “the judge
must render judgment for plaintiff for possession of the premises, costs, delinquent
rent as of the date of entry of judgment, if any, and attorney fees if recoverable by
law.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.8(b).
C. Analysis
Jefferson argues that Rule 510 states that upon judgment in favor of an
eviction plaintiff, the judge “must render judgment for . . . delinquent rent.” TEX.
R. CIV. P. 510.8(b). According to Jefferson, he conclusively proved a breach of the
lease and damages in the amount of $19,200 and, accordingly, the trial court erred
in failing to enter a judgment awarding delinquent rent in that amount against
Roland and Kim.
The evidence at trial showed that the written lease was signed only by
Jefferson and Kim, but that no written lease agreement exists between Jefferson
and Roland. Jefferson testified that Kim terminated her lease and Roland assumed
the terms of the lease when Kim moved out and Roland moved in. But the county
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court heard conflicting evidence concerning the terms of Jefferson and Roland’s
oral agreement. According to Jefferson, Roland assumed the terms of Kim’s lease
agreement, including the terms regarding monthly rent. However, Roland testified
that he never agreed to pay any amount of rent and, instead, Jefferson agreed to let
Roland stay at the property rent-free while Roland invested his own resources in
improving the property. Roland testified that he and Jefferson orally agreed that
Roland would not pay rent until Roland had finished making improvements to the
property, at which point they would execute a new lease. Roland testified that
Jefferson decided to sell the property after Roland improved it, and the parties
never executed any lease or came to any alternative agreement about paying
monthly rent.
Thus, the county court heard conflicting evidence regarding the terms on
which Jefferson agreed that Kim and Roland could occupy the property. See Esse,
333 S.W.3d at 177 (appellate court defers to trial court’s resolution of conflicts in
evidence); Dyer, 333 S.W.3d at 709 (same). It was undisputed that Kim paid the
rent according to the terms of the lease until September 2013. And Jefferson
testified that Kim terminated her lease and Roland moved in to the property on the
basis of his oral agreement with Jefferson. But the trial court was not required to
accept Jefferson’s testimony that the terms of that oral agreement were identical to
the terms of the written lease. The trial court reasonably could have credited
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Roland’s testimony that Jefferson agreed that Roland could occupy the property
rent free so long as he made repairs as agreed. Because the evidence falls within
the zone of reasonable disagreement, Jefferson has not established his entitlement
to delinquent rent as a matter of law. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822.
Accordingly, we hold that the county court at law did not err in failing to award
delinquent rent in its judgment or in denying Jefferson’s motion to reform the
judgment. See id.
We overrule Jefferson’s second and third issues.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Rebeca Huddle
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Huddle.
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