DocketNumber： 10-03-00112-CV
Filed Date： 10/27/2004
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/10/2015
IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-03-00112-CV
In the Matter of D.J.
From the 52nd District Court
Coryell County, Texas
Trial Court # JV-01-1498
MEMORANDUM Opinion
D.J. appeals the trial court’s order adjudicating him delinquent by committing the offense of aggravated robbery and the court’s disposition order placing him in the Texas Youth Commission for a determinate sentence not to exceed 15 years. We affirm.
D.J.’s appointed counsel on appeal filed an Anders brief. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. 1998) (Anders procedure applies to juvenile proceedings). Counsel furnished a copy of the brief to D.J. and his guardian ad litem, and counsel’s motion to withdraw includes his letter to D.J. informing him of his right to review the record and to file a brief. See Anders at 744; D.A.S., at 299; Ayala v. State, 633 S.W.2d 526, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Sowels v. State, 45 S.W.3d 690, 694 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.); but see id. at 692 (court of appeals does not have authority to grant motion to withdraw by counsel appointed by trial court). Neither D.J. nor his guardian ad litem filed a brief or other response. The State did not file a response. See Sowels at 694.
Counsel’s brief states that counsel reviewed the record for issues of arguable merit. Counsel concludes, “no arguable points of error can be found.”
We have conducted an independent review of the record to discover whether there are arguable grounds for appeal. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. We determine that there are none.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
TOM GRAY
Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed October 27, 2004
[CV06]
ass=MsoNormal style='text-align:justify;text-indent:.5in;line-height:200%'>Del Lago security logged a fight-in-progress dispatch at 1:24 a.m. Sanchez said that he arrived on the scene within fifteen to twenty seconds of the dispatch, but the fighting was over when he got there and most of those involved had fled. Sanchez had been patrolling the hallway behind the conference center when he got a radio call from the dispatcher. Chancellor and Moriarty, who were at the cottages on routine patrol—they had not been dispatched to the cottage area—arrived within two to three minutes of the dispatch. No one wanted to report what had happened or to give their names, but Smith did tell Sanchez, whom he knew personally, there had been a fight. Smith and his friends left the conference center and went to their respective rooms.[3]
On the night in question, Chancellor and Moriarty were on duty as security in their law enforcement uniforms, and Sanchez was on duty as the loss-prevention and security officer. Chancellor had determined that, based on Del Lago’s activity that weekend, only two security officers were needed. Unlike the night before, no security officer was stationed in the bar,[4] but they all said they routinely patrolled it. Del Lago had no policy requiring a security officer be stationed in the bar, no matter how large the crowd, nor was there a policy that a security officer be present at the bar’s closing time. Moriarty usually walked through the bar four or five times a night during his shift, but he could not remember how many times or at what times he went through the bar that night. Chancellor said he routinely makes five to eight rounds through the bar when he is on duty, but he could not recall how many times he went through that night. Sanchez walked through several times, but he too could not remember at what times. Chancellor and Moriarty neither saw nor were made aware of any verbal or physical confrontations in the bar, and the bar staff had not called security to report any problems. Moriarty said there is a “crow’s nest”—a loft above the bar—that the officers used to observe the bar without patrons knowing they are being watched.
Smith, Lopez, and Morgan said they saw no uniformed officers or Del Lago security personnel in the bar that night at all. Forsythe said he saw no security during the hour or so of confrontations before the fight. Sweet saw security coming through the bar periodically that night, but not during the hour and a half of verbal confrontations; she admitted that security could have come through in that time frame and she maybe did not see them because she was busy working. She said that if security had come through the bar during the verbal confrontations, they should have been able to notice the problem.
Issues
Asserting nine issues, Del Lago contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for directed verdict, motion for JNOV, and motion for new trial. Issues one, two, and three assert that Del Lago owed no duty to Smith. In issue four, Del Lago claims that the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the finding that Del Lago breached the alleged duty.
Issues five and six allege that there is no evidence of proximate cause. The seventh issue asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s negligence finding and the jury’s 51%/49% apportionment of responsibility. Issue eight alleges charge error. Del Lago’s ninth issue asserts globally that, as to the previous eight issues, the trial court erred in denying Del Lago’s motions for directed verdict, for JNOV, and for new trial.
Duty
To prevail on a negligence cause of action, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach. Western Investments, Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005) (citing Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995)). Premises liability is a special form of negligence where the duty owed to the plaintiff depends upon the status of the plaintiff at the time the incident occurred. Urena, 162 S.W.3d at 547. In the case of an invitee, the premises liability inquiry focuses on whether the defendant proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries by failing to use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm created by a premises condition that it knew about or should have known about. Id. (citing Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 753 (Tex. 1998)). A person generally has no legal duty to protect another from the criminal act of a third person. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 756. But one who controls the security and safety of the premises has a duty to use ordinary care to protect an invitee from a third person’s criminal act if he knows or has reason to know of an unreasonable and foreseeable risk of harm to the invitee. Id. This duty developed out of the premise that the party with the “power of control or expulsion” is in the best position to protect against the harm. Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1993).
Del Lago’s first three issues assert that it owed Smith no duty. Whether a duty exists is a question of law. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 756.
Foreseeability requires only that the general danger be foreseeable, not the exact sequence of events that produced the harm. Id. When the general danger is the risk of injury from criminal activity, the evidence must reveal specific previous crimes on or near the premises to establish foreseeability. Id. A duty exists only when the risk of criminal conduct is so great that it is both unreasonable and foreseeable. Id. Whether the risk was foreseeable must not be determined in hindsight, but in light of what the premises owner knew or should have known before the criminal act occurred. Id. at 757. Factors to be considered in determining foreseeability of the occurrence of certain criminal conduct are: (1) whether any criminal conduct previously occurred on or near the property; (2) how recently the criminal conduct occurred; (3) how often criminal conduct occurred; (4) how similar the conduct was to the conduct on the property; and (5) what publicity was given to the occurrences to indicate that the premises owner knew or should have known about them. Id.
For a premises owner to foresee criminal conduct on property, there must be evidence that other crimes have occurred on the property or in its immediate vicinity. Id. Foreseeability also depends on how recently and how often criminal conduct has occurred in the past. Id. at 757-58. The occurrence of a significant number of crimes within a short time period strengthens the claim that the particular crime at issue was foreseeable. Id. at 758. On the other hand, the complete absence of previous crimes, or the occurrence of a few crimes over an extended time period, negates foreseeability. Id.
The previous crimes must be sufficiently similar to the crime in question as to place the premises owner on notice of the specific danger, but they need not be identical. Id. The publicity surrounding the previous crimes helps determine whether a premises owner knew or should have known of a foreseeable danger. Id. Actual knowledge or notice of past incidents strengthens the claim that future crime was foreseeable. Id. But unreported criminal activity on the premises is no evidence of foreseeability. Id. at 758-59.
The Timberwalk factors—proximity, recency, frequency, similarity, and publicity—must be considered together in determining whether criminal conduct was foreseeable. Id. at 759. General foreseeability principles also apply to limit the scope of a premises owner’s duty in a particular case. Mellon Mortg. Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 655, 659 (Tex. 1999) (applying proximate cause’s foreseeability standard to duty analysis); accord Garcia v. Fifth Club, Inc., 2005 WL 240425, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 3, 2005, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Stated broadly, we determine both the foreseeability of the general danger and the foreseeability that the injured party—or one similarly situated—would be harmed by that danger. Mellon, 5 S.W.3d at 655.
We now review the evidence presented in light of the Timberwalk factors to determine whether Del Lago owed Smith a legal duty to protect him from third-party criminal acts on its property.
The Evidence
Smith, through his security expert Gerald Brandt, tendered evidence of the following fourteen documented alleged assaultive crimes at Del Lago for the three and one-half years before the fight in question:
Brandt testified that these incidents made the bar fight in which Smith was injured foreseeable. We agree, yet Smith points to more evidence on the duty issue. In addition to the above reported and documented criminal activity, Smith elicited evidence of numerous occasions of undocumented criminal activity that Del Lago had actual notice of.[5] Despite Del Lago’s requirement that all incidents be reported in an incident report, Officer Chancellor admitted it was obvious that reports are not prepared for all incidents at Del Lago. While at one point he said he was not aware of unreported violent crime at Del Lago, Chancellor agreed that there had been numerous altercations at Del Lago before Smith’s injury; he said he had gone to the bar more than twenty-five times and to the cottages and the tower approximately twenty-five times for verbal and physical confrontations (arguments and fights) between guests in his six years at Del Lago. Chancellor had never witnessed a fight in the bar, but he agreed that his presence in uniform with a badge and a gun tended to deter people from fighting. Sanchez acknowledged that Del Lago had had other fights and problems and that he had been called to the bar (or to “events” at Del Lago)[6] when arguments had broken out, approximately every two to three months; once or twice he had to separate people. Officer Moriarty admitted that they had had to “separate people” before during fights.
Finally, Smith points to the “heated” verbal confrontations and shoving and pushing that preceded the fight for an hour and a half as prior ongoing activity that should factor in the duty analysis because those preceding events also made this specific fight foreseeable to Del Lago. Del Lago counters that Smith was required to establish a separate and independent history of criminal activity on the premises and that the ongoing activity that evening cannot be factored in the foreseeability analysis. Del Lago cites one case that directly supports its position, but we find it to be both distinguishable and not controlling.[7] Timberwalk itself does not exclude the sequence of events that precede a crime from the foreseeability analysis; rather, whether the risk is foreseeable is determined “in light of what the premises owner knew or should have known before the criminal act occurred.” Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 757.
The gist of Smith’s case is that Del Lago owed him a duty because of prior reported criminal and undocumented assaultive activity (physical and verbal confrontations) at Del Lago and because, on the occasion in question, its employees were aware (two waitresses) or should have been aware (the bartender and security officers) of the ongoing and escalating one-and-a-half hour confrontation, which posed an unreasonable risk of harm. Smith asserts that Del Lago should have taken steps to warn him or to make the condition reasonably safe, such as by the bar staff calling security before the fight broke out or otherwise intervening, or by a security presence through stationing an officer in the bar or by directed patrol through the bar. To exclude this ongoing one-and-a-half hour activity from our foreseeability analysis would deny the reality of the facts of this case and distort the foreseeability analysis.[8] When determining whether a duty lies, we must consider all “the facts surrounding the occurrence in question.” Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995).
Officer Chancellor opined that it is a good idea to get intoxicated, verbally abusive people out of a bar “because it can escalate into a fight”; he had seen it happen. Chancellor agreed that an hour and a half of threatening verbal confrontations between intoxicated men was not harmless because when they are arguing, punches can be thrown. Brandt noted that Del Lago’s expert testified in his deposition that he would want security called to protect his wife if she were in a bar with verbal confrontations ongoing for an hour and a half. A reasonable person who knew or should have known of the one-and-a-half hours of ongoing “heated” verbal altercations and shoving matches between intoxicated bar patrons would reasonably foresee the potential for assaultive conduct to occur and take action to make the condition of the premises reasonably safe.
Many of the previous incidents at Del Lago involved alcohol; Chancellor agreed. He referred to Del Lago as “Houston’s playground” and said it was “typical” to see guests bringing in truckloads of alcohol through the front gate. He said that guests brought alcohol to their rooms and cottages in “enormous quantities,” and Sweet said that there were intoxicated patrons in the bar every night that she worked. Del Lago’s expert agreed that alcohol increases the chance of some people being more aggressive, and he conceded that alcohol probably affected behavior that night. While Smith’s expert opined that common factors among the reported incidents were intoxication and violent crime, a rule that the sale of alcohol alone can establish foreseeability of violent crime would not comport with Timberwalk; the mere selling of alcohol does not make criminal violence against a customer foreseeable to a premises owner. See Boggs v. Bottomless Pit Cooking Team, 25 S.W.3d 818, 822-23 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.); Donnell v. Spring Sports, Inc., 920 S.W.2d 378, 384 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied). But the combination of alcohol and intoxication with the previous reported alleged crimes and undocumented incidents at the bar are part of the Timberwalk analysis regarding similarity.
Analysis
The proximity factor in Timberwalk is not in real dispute: For a risk to be foreseeable, there must be evidence that other crimes have occurred on the premises or in its immediate vicinity or closely nearby. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 757. Implicit is that the prior criminal activity need not have occurred at the exact location of the plaintiff’s injury—in this case, the bar. All fourteen of the reported alleged crimes occurred at Del Lago, as did the numerous undocumented assaultive altercations and incidents. Of the fourteen reported alleged crimes, five occurred in or just outside the bar. Chancellor had gone to the bar more than twenty-five times for physical and verbal confrontations. Sanchez said the bar had had previous fights and that he had been called there approximately every two to three months to handle arguments. And, the one-and-a-half hours of verbal confrontations and shoving matches that preceded the fight in which Smith was injured occurred in the exact location of Smith’s assault.
Regarding recency and frequency, the fourteen reported violent crimes occurred within three years and seven months of Smith’s injury; eleven had occurred within two years.[9] Chancellor had more than twenty-five calls to the bar and approximately twenty-five calls to the tower and cottages for physical and verbal confrontations in his six years at Del Lago; that averages to about eight incidents a year and totals around thirty for the three-and-a-half years before Smith’s injury. Sanchez estimated getting called to the bar every two or three months (four to six times a year, about sixteen times for the three-and-a-half years before Smith’s injury). These fourteen prior incidents of alleged violent crimes, along with the several dozen or so undocumented incidents of assaultive conduct (physical and verbal confrontations that warranted calls to security), satisfy the recency and frequency factors. See, e.g., Dickinson Arms-REO, L.P. v. Campbell, 4 S.W.3d 333, 346-47 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (11 assaults in three-and-a-half years established recency and frequency); Urena v. Western Investments, Inc., 122 S.W.3d 249, 255 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003 (8 violent crimes over three-year period before sexual assault established recency and frequency), rev’d on other grounds, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005) (reversing because no evidence of cause-in-fact). And plainly, the one-and-a-half hours of verbal altercations and pushing that preceded the fight augments recency in this case.
The prior crimes need not be identical; they only must be sufficiently similar. In this assault case, there were fourteen prior alleged assaultive crimes, eight of which involved the bar or intoxication. Between Chancellor and Sanchez, in the three-and-one-half years before the incident in question, they responded to approximately forty-five similar undocumented altercations (physical and verbal confrontations warranting calls to security). This evidence satisfies the Timberwalk similarity factor.
Publicity—notice to Del Lago of the previous alleged crimes and similar assaultive conduct—is not in dispute. All of the previously documented and reported but undocumented activity occurred at Del Lago and was known by Del Lago.
Weighing the evidence using all the Timberwalk factors, it was foreseeable as a matter of law that an assault might occur in Del Lago’s bar. See Mellon, 5 S.W.3d at 656-57. And on the occasion in question, it was foreseeable that Smith or a similarly situated person would be the victim of a criminal act and be harmed. See id. We hold that Del Lago owed a duty to Smith because of the prior reported criminal activity, the prior undocumented and similar criminal and security incidents occurring primarily in the bar but also throughout the resort, and the ongoing and escalating one-and-a-half hours of altercations in the bar leading up to the big fight.[10] We overrule Del Lago’s first three issues.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Del Lago’s fourth issue claims that the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the finding that it breached the alleged duty. The seventh issue asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury’s negligence finding and 51%/49% apportionment of responsibility.
In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807, 822 (Tex. 2005). There is legally insufficient evidence or “no evidence” of a vital fact when (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence supporting the finding, as a whole, “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Id. (quoting Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995)). If the evidence is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, its legal effect is that it is no evidence. Haynes & Boone v. Bowser Bouldin, Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 179, 183 (Tex. 1995).
When the party without the burden of proof at trial complains of the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support an adverse jury finding, we must consider and weigh all of the evidence, not just the evidence that supports the verdict. Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex. 1998); Checker Bag Co. v. Washington, 27 S.W.3d 625, 633 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. denied). We will set aside the finding only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the finding is clearly wrong and unjust. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d at 407. Reversal can occur because the finding was based on weak or insufficient evidence or because the proponent's proof, although adequate if taken alone, is overwhelmed by the opponent's contrary proof. Checker Bag, 27 S.W.3d at 633.
On these issues, Del Lago points to the following evidence:
According to Merlyn Moore , Del Lago’s security expert, the lack of criminal history at Del Lago rendered security measures at Del Lago adequate. Moore opined that Del Lago’s security met the standard of care. Moore did agree with Smith’s expert, Gerald Brandt, that directed patrol (patrol directed at areas with a history of particular problems) is preferred over routine patrol, which he called a “waste of resources,” but he disagreed with Brandt on whether the officers were on directed patrol that night and also with Brandt’s opinion that Del Lago should have had a fixed-post patrol (where an officer would stay in the bar for a certain period of time).
Brandt, Smith’s security expert, testified that ordinary care required a security officer present in the bar. He opined that Del Lago’s security program was inadequate by failing to properly train staff, by failing to deploy officers through directed patrol, and by failing to provide posting directions to officers, thereby placing an officer in the bar on the night in question. Del Lago’s officers were on routine patrol throughout the resort on the night in question; they both knew that the bar was crowded that night and that at the time in question, it was the only place on the resort open and serving alcohol to the public. Also, the bar staff should have notified security earlier when the verbal altercations began so that security could have defused the situation. Del Lago also should have required a security presence during the bar’s closing, which is when the fight occurred. Brandt also said that Del Lago should have warned its patrons, including Smith, that it was not supplying security for his protection.
Smith also points to the following evidence as support for the jury’s finding of a breach of duty and negligence of Del Lago:
Viewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, it is some evidence that reasonable jurors could credit that supports the finding, and there is contrary evidence—such as Duncan’s contradictory version of what happened in the bar that night and the contradictory opinion testimony of Del Lago’s expert and security officers—that reasonable jurors could disregard. The evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding of a breach of duty and negligence by Del Lago. And considering all of the evidence, the jury’s finding is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the finding is clearly wrong and unjust. It is the jury’s role to resolve conflicts in the evidence, weigh the evidence, and judge the credibility of the witnesses; we cannot substitute our opinion for the jury’s. See Dickinson Arms, 4 S.W.3d at 349-50. The jury’s apportionment of responsibility in this case reflects a fair and just weighing of conflicting evidence and the parties’ positions. The evidence in this case is factually sufficient to support the jury’s finding of a breach of duty and negligence, including whether Del Lago knew or reasonably should have known of the danger.[11] See id.; Lincoln Prop. Co. v. DeShazo, 4 S.W.3d 55, 60-62 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied); see also Eastep v. Jack-in-the-Box, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 116, 118-20 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Because there is legally and factually sufficient evidence that Del Lago breached its duty and was negligent, the trial court did not err in denying Del Lago’s motions for directed verdict, for JNOV, and for a new trial on these grounds. We overrule issues four and seven.
Causation
Issues five and six allege that there is no evidence of proximate cause. Proximate cause has two elements: cause in fact and foreseeability. Urena, 162 S.W.2d at 552 (citing Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex. 1992)). “These elements cannot be established by mere conjecture, guess, or speculation.” Id. (quoting Doe, 907 S.W.2d at 477). The test for cause in fact is whether the act or omission was a substantial factor in causing the injury without which the harm would not have occurred. Id. (citing Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. 2003)). If the defendant’s negligence merely furnished a condition that made the injuries possible, there can be no cause in fact. Id. Foreseeability means that the actor, as a person of ordinary intelligence, should have anticipated the dangers that his or her negligent act created for others. Travis, 830 S.W.2d at 98.
An expert’s bare or conclusory opinion on causation is insufficient to establish causation. Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 911-12 (Tex. 2004); Price v. Ford, 104 S.W.3d 331, 333 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied). Evidence of probative value is necessary. Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 119 (Tex. 1996). Some evidence of causation exists when the plaintiff introduces evidence from which reasonable minds may conclude that it is more likely than not that the event was caused by the defendant. See Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d at 911; Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 459-60 (Tex. 1992).
On cause in fact, Del Lago argues that it is speculation that the fight and Smith’s injuries would have been prevented by either (1) the presence of security in the bar or (2) intervention by the bar staff (such as calling security to the scene or ejection of one or more of those involved) when the verbal altercations first began. Because Del Lago asserts there is no evidence of causation, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807, 822.
Brandt, Smith’s expert, testified that Del Lago caused Smith’s injuries in the following ways, among others: (1) by the bar staff’s failing to notify security of the ongoing altercations so they could intervene; (2) by failing to provide security in the bar; and (3) by failing to eject the patrons involved in the conflict. Brandt said that these were all substantial factors resulting in Smith’s injuries, and if security had been present during the hour and a half, or even a few minutes before the fight, it and Smith’s injuries could have been prevented. Other witnesses’ testimony supports Brandt’s opinions. Sweet said that if a security officer had been present during the verbal confrontations and at closing, the situation would not have progressed into the fight. Bartender Duncan said that if Sweet saw or heard verbal confrontations that night and did not report it, she not only violated Del Lago policy but also put “people in a situation that could have been avoided,” and the fight “would not have occurred.” Duncan said that uniformed police officers can deter just about any problem they want. And Officer Chancellor testified that uniformed officers and a security presence prevent fights, and he would have removed intoxicated patrons who were engaging in threatening behavior or pushing each other. He said that if he had known what had been going on in the bar, he would have done all he could to resolve it. All of this evidence is not speculation; it is some evidence of probative value that the lack of security and lack of intervention was a substantial factor.
Del Lago argues that the assault was sudden and spontaneous and that a security presence would not have deterred the fight in which Smith was assaulted; it principally relies on two cases that so hold, but they are fact specific and too factually distinguishable. See Jojo’s Restaurants, Inc. v. McFadden, 117 S.W.3d 279, 281-83 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (sudden shooting in restaurant parking lot during traffic altercation that provoked assailant); Donnell, 920 S.W.2d at 382-85 (sudden fight during softball game where plaintiff provoked assailant). Whether security would have prevented a crime is necessarily determined on a case-by-case basis. In this case, there was substantial testimony about the heated hour-and-a-half confrontation that preceded the fight between the two groups in which Smith was injured; this plainly distinguishes the cases relied on by Del Lago. The absence of security and lack of intervention during that time period was a cause in fact of Smith’s injuries. There is legally sufficient evidence of proximate cause. See, e.g., Havner, 825 S.W.2d at 461; DeShazo, 4 S.W.3d at 62; Dickinson Arms, 4 S.W.3d at 349-50; Eastep, 546 S.W.2d at 120. Having made this determination, we need not address Del Lago’s subsidiary arguments on causation.
The trial court did not err in denying Del Lago’s motions for directed verdict, for JNOV, and for a new trial as to proximate cause. We overrule issues five and six.
Charge Error
In its eighth issue, Del Lago asserts that the trial court erroneously refused Del Lago’s tendered instruction/definition on foreseeability, which reads:
“FORSEEABILITY” when used with regard to the conduct of Del Lago requires that the general danger, not the exact sequence of events that produced the harm, be foreseeable. In order to have a general danger, the evidence must reveal specific previous crimes on or near the premises in order to establish forseeability. The five factors you must consider in order to establish forseeability are: 1) proximity, 2) recency, 3) frequency, 4) similarity, 5) publicity. More specifically, you should consider whether any criminal conduct occurred at or near the property, how recently it occurred, how often it occurred, how similar the conduct was to the conduct in this case, and what publicity was given to the occurrences.
We review a trial court’s decision to submit or refuse a particular question or instruction under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Texas Dep’t of Human Serv’s. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990); Byrd v. Estate of Nelms, 154 S.W.3d 149, 160 (Tex. App.—Waco 2004, pet. denied). The trial court has broad discretion in submitting jury questions and instructions. Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1995).
The trial court submitted a standard premises liability question:
Did the negligence, if any, of those named below proximately cause the occurrence in question?
With respect to the condition of the premises, Del Lago was negligent if-
a. the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm, and
b. Del Lago knew or reasonably should have known of the danger, and
c. Del Lago failed to exercise ordinary care to protect Bradley Smith from the danger, by both failing to adequately warn Bradley Smith of the condition and failing to make that condition reasonably safe.
“Ordinary Care,” when used with respect to the conduct of Del Lago as an owner or occupier of a premises, means that degree of care that would be used by an owner or occupier of ordinary prudence under the same or similar circumstances.
Answer “Yes” or “No” for the following:
A. DEL LAGO _______________
B. BRADLEY SMITH _______________[12]
Del Lago asserts that its proposed instruction closely tracks the supreme court’s Timberwalk test for foreseeability. See Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 756-57. But that test is for the court’s threshold legal determination whether the premises owner owed the plaintiff a duty. See id. at 756-59. Del Lago then argues, without citing any authority on point, that this question erroneously asked, in part, whether Del Lago knew or reasonably should have known of the “danger” without defining the “danger” and without explaining the foreseeability component of “reasonably should have known.”
Well-settled jury charge definitions and pattern jury charges should not “be embellished with addendum.” Lemos v. Montez, 680 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. 1984); see Ramirez v. H.E. Butt Grocery Co., 909 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995, writ denied). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Del Lago’s requested jury instruction on foreseeability. We overrule issue eight.
Conclusion
Because the trial court did not err in denying Del Lago’s motions for directed verdict, for JNOV, and for a new trial on issues one through eight, we overrule issue nine. Having overruled all of Del Lago’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
BILL VANCE
Justice
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Vance, and
Justice Reyna
(Chief Justice Gray dissenting)
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed October 11, 2006
[CV06]
[1] We refer to Appellants Del Lago Partners, Inc. and Del Lago Partners, L.P. d/b/a Del Lago Golf Resort & Conference Center, and BMC-The Benchmark Management Co. collectively as Del Lago.
[2] Smith’s opening brief referred to Sweet’s testimony about the “heated” conflict with citations to the reporter’s record (Vol. 4, pp. 10-11). In its reply brief, Del Lago asserted that Smith “repeatedly misstates Sweet’s testimony—she never said the exchanges between the men were ‘heated.’” In his reply brief, Smith quoted Sweet’s testimony to note that Del Lago was the party misstating Sweet’s testimony:
Q How long did those confrontations go on?
A An hour and a half, probably.
. . .
Q Okay. Was it heated?
A Yes, sir. Well - - yes. It was heated. It was - - but it was words.
Q Okay. Heated words?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did it go on over a period of an hour and a half?
A Off and on. I was working all night long, so, I mean, I was in and out through the bar. I mean, seeing different people. But when I would walk by people who where in heated - - you know, throwing words back and forth to each other - - it - - it went on throughout the night.
[3] Around 4:00 a.m., Smith called Del Lago security and reported a head injury; he was bleeding down his throat and when he blew his nose, his forehead expanded like a balloon. Sanchez and the manager on duty went to Smith’s cottage. They offered to call an ambulance, but they testified Smith refused. Smith said he signed a medical refusal form because Sanchez told him he would be all right. After going to work on Monday, June 11, Smith saw a doctor and ultimately had two surgeries to repair face and head injuries. His injuries included: a depressed frontal sinus fracture requiring surgical repair; a cerebral spinal leak requiring repair; atrophy of the temporalis muscle requiring surgical repair and residual disfigurement; a severe deceleration injury to the frontal lobe and subsequent brain atrophy, resulting in permanent brain damage; and psychological disorders from the traumatic brain injury.
[4] Chancellor explained that a security guard may have been paid by a private party to be in the bar on Friday night, or a Del Lago officer stationed himself in the bar, rather than patrolling in a golf cart during heavy rain.
[5] Del Lago asserts that these prior occasions of “undocumented” similar criminal activity should not be taken into consideration under the Timberwalk publicity factor. We agree with Del Lago that “unreported criminal activity on the premises is no evidence of foreseeability.” Gibbs v. Shuttleking, Inc., 162 S.W.3d 603, 611 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. ref’d) (citing Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 758-59). But we disagree with Del Lago’s categorization of this prior criminal activity as “unreported” just because it is undocumented in Del Lago’s records. The rationale behind the Timberwalk publicity factor of prior criminal activity is its role in helping to determine whether a premises owner knew or should have known of a foreseeable danger. Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 758. “Previous similar incidents cannot make future crime foreseeable if nobody knows or should have known that those incidents occurred.” Id. at 759. In this case, there is no doubt that Del Lago had actual notice of these prior similar incidents; evidence of their existence came from Del Lago’s security personnel, who obviously knew of them but did not document them. These prior similar incidents are properly included in our Timberwalk foreseeability analysis: “Actual notice of past incidents strengthens the claim that future crime was foreseeable.” Id. at 758.
[6] Sanchez’s testimony is not clear on whether he was called to the bar to assist when people were arguing or to “events” elsewhere at Del Lago. Because the questions preceding the use of the term “event” were about the bar, the first question using the term “event” referred to the bar, and the key event in this case concerned the bar, it can reasonably be inferred that Smith’s attorney and Sanchez were referring to events in the bar:
Q By - - by the way, there has been - - have you been in the bar when they have closed The Grandstand bar?
A Yes, sir.
Q Have you participated in helping them close?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why would you do that?
A Someone from the bar would call our dispatcher and say they were getting ready to close, and there were some people that were - - or some guests that were just not ready to leave; they wanted to finish their drinks.
Q And what would you do?
A Just go in and ask them if they wouldn’t mind putting their drinks away; it was time for them to close the bar.
Q Do you ever remember an event where the bartenders were asking other patrons to help them get people to leave?
A No, sir.
Q That would be inappropriate, wouldn’t it? Would it not?
A To me, it would be.
Q Have you ever had an event where people got into an argument where you were called in to help out?
A Yes, sir.
Q How often does that happen?
A Maybe once every two, three months.
[Emphasis added].
[7] In De Julian v. Hammock, 2003 WL 22004947 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 26, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.), an apartment complex resident was shot in the eye with a BB gun by the complex owner’s nephew, but there was no evidence the owner had knowledge of any recent assaultive conduct by the nephew. After the appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the owner, the resident urged in his motion for rehearing that the owner should have heard his nephew’s hour-and-a-half BB gun shooting spree throughout the complex and that the owner should have taken action to prevent harm. The court rejected the assertion that this episode alone created a duty: “We do not believe the same series of events that led to [the resident’s] injury can be used to provide notice to [the owner] of ‘previous’ crimes and thereby raise an issue of foreseeability of this injury.” Id. at *4 (op. on reh’g). As Smith notes, there was no evidence the owner knew—or had notice—that his nephew was roaming the complex shooting at people; there was only the injured resident’s allegation that the owner should have heard the events and taken action. See id. That aspect, and the owner’s lack of knowledge of recent assaultive conduct by the nephew, render De Julian factually inapposite to the issue before us.
Other cases cited by Del Lago on this are likewise factually distinguishable: Dailey v. Albertson’s, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.) (where store employee assaulted customer with box cutter, store could not foresee employee’s violence based only on “verbal abuse”—one loud comment directed at customer and a later brief exchange of words, with no other evidence of criminal activity); Gonzales v. Mobil Oil Corp., 2001 WL 722564, at *4-5 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28, 2001, no pet.) (finding no duty to warn gas station customer who was shot based on shooter’s “suspicious and unusual” conduct, which alone do not create a reasonable belief that a person has a likely propensity to commit violent criminal acts); Yarbrough v. Erway, 705 S.W.2d 198, 200-04 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (where bar patrons bumped each other twice and then went outside, where one stabbed the other, there was no evidence of probative value that put bar employees on notice that a dangerous or threatening situation existed between the two patrons).
[8] Pre-Timberwalk case law supports our inclusion of the ongoing activity and is not inconsistent with Timberwalk. See, e.g., Polk v. Rhinstone Wrangler & K.C.O., Inc., 774 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1989, no writ) (in finding duty, in addition to club’s prior history of fights, court considered that, on the night of the assault in question, a fight had broken out an hour before and security was not called, and the same persons fighting injured the plaintiff); Ronk v. Parking Concepts of Tex., Inc., 711 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ) (“The proprietor of the public business establishment has the duty to exercise reasonable care to protect his patrons from intentional injuries caused by third persons if he has reason to know that such acts are likely to occur, either generally or at some particular time.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Walkoviak v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 580 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.)); Eastep v. Jack-in-the-Box, Inc., 546 S.W.2d 116, 119-20 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“The portion of the rule requiring notice to the possessor that acts of violence are likely to be done does not require a long and continued course of conduct to find that the proprietor had knowledge of the violent disposition of the other patron—all that is necessary is that there be a sequence of conduct sufficiently long to enable the proprietor to act for the patron's safety.”) (emphasis added).
[9] Del Lago’s expert found most of these crimes dissimilar to the assault on Smith because they were of an inter-personal or domestic nature, rather than stranger-initiated. This position was not followed—correctly, we believe—in Dickinson Arms. See Dickinson Arms-REO, L.P. v. Campbell, 4 S.W.3d 333, 347-49 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
[10] If we were to exclude the ongoing activity from our foreseeability analysis, we would still conclude that Del Lago owed Smith a duty based on the prior documented crimes and the undocumented similar incidents.
[11] In finding that the evidence satisfied the Timberwalk factors to establish foreseeability and a duty, we necessarily found the evidence legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Del Lago knew or reasonably should have known of the danger. For the reasons explained in our duty discussion, that evidence is also factually sufficient to support that finding.
[12] The question properly tracks the pattern jury charge question for an invitee in a premises liability case. See Comm. on Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges, PJC 66.4 (2003).
Dickinson Arms-Reo, L.P. v. Campbell , 1999 Tex. App. LEXIS 7199 ( 1999 )
Yarborough v. Erway , 1985 Tex. App. LEXIS 12453 ( 1985 )
Polk v. Rhinestone Wrangler , 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 1847 ( 1989 )
Boggs v. Bottomless Pit Cooking Team , 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 4964 ( 2000 )
Lemos v. Montez , 28 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 94 ( 1984 )
Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell , 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 248 ( 1993 )
Travis v. City of Mesquite , 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 756 ( 1992 )
In Re DAS , 973 S.W.2d 296 ( 1998 )
Eastep v. Jack-In-The-Box, Inc. , 1977 Tex. App. LEXIS 2566 ( 1977 )
Lincoln Property Co. v. DeShazo , 4 S.W.3d 55 ( 1999 )
JoJos Restaurants, Inc. v. McFadden , 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 6804 ( 2003 )
Checker Bag Co. v. Washington , 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 6052 ( 2000 )
Ronk v. Parking Concepts of Texas, Inc. , 1986 Tex. App. LEXIS 7637 ( 1986 )
Price v. Ford , 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 3684 ( 2003 )
Urena v. Western Investments, Inc. , 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 7152 ( 2003 )
Stafford v. State , 1991 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 170 ( 1991 )
Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews , 898 S.W.2d 786 ( 1995 )
Walkoviak v. Hilton Hotels Corp. , 1979 Tex. App. LEXIS 3431 ( 1979 )
Texas Department of Human Services v. E.B. , 34 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 31 ( 1990 )
Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner , 46 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 689 ( 2003 )