Benton, Ernest Glenn

PD-0161-15 PD-0161-15
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 2/10/2015 1:30:49 PM
Accepted 2/11/2015 4:13:36 PM
NO. _______________ ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK
IN THE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
___________________________________________________
ERNEST GLENN BENTON, PETITIONER
VS.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
___________________________________________________
PETITION IN CAUSE NO. 2879 FROM THE 100TH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF COLLINGSWORTH COUNTY, TEXAS
AND
THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
TEXAS OF AMARILLO, TEXAS, NO. 07-13-00150-CR
___________________________________________________
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
___________________________________________________
Respectfully submitted,
BIRD, BIRD & RABE
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
February 11, 2015
P.O. BOX 1257
CHILDRESS, TEXAS 79201
BY: /s/ Dale A. Rabe, Jr._________
DALE A. RABE, JR.,
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
TELEPHONE NO.: 940-937-2543
FACSIMILE NO.: 940-937-3431
E-MAIL: birdbirdrabe@gmail.com
STATE BAR NO.: 24027638
IDENTITY OF THE JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL
1. The trial court presiding judge was the
Honorable Richard Dambold, Visiting Judge, who may
be served with process at P.O. Box 887, Clarendon,
Texas 79226, Facsimile No. 806-874-5146.
2. The Petitioner, Ernest Glenn Benton, is
currently incarcerated in the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice – Institutional Division, and may
be served with process herein at the address of his
court appointed appellate counsel and he is
represented herein by the undersigned counsel whose
address is shown on the front cover of this brief.
The Petitioner, Ernest Glenn Benton, was
represented at trial by Todd Alvey who may be served
with process at his address P.O. Box 1815, Pampa,
Texas 79066, Facsimile No. 806-331-7786.
3. The Appellee, the State of Texas, is
represented on appeal by Luke Inman, 100th Judicial
District Attorney, 800 West Avenue, Box 1,
Wellington, Texas 79095, Facsimile No. 866-233-2738.
2
The Appellee, the State of Texas, was
represented at trial by the same counsel as on
appeal.
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identity of the Judge, Parties, and Counsel 2
Table of Contents 4
Index of Authorities 5
Statement Regarding Oral Argument 6
Statement of the Case 7
Statement of Procedural History of the Case 7
Ground for Review: 7
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH APPELLANT DID THEN AND THERE
ENGAGE IN SEXUAL CONTACT WITH PSEUDONYM
DCSO04172012 BY TOUCHING THE GENITALS
OF PSEUDONYM DCSO04172012, A CHILD
YOUNGER THAN 17 YEARS OF AGE.
Reason for Review 8
Prayer for Relief 10
Appendix 11
Certificate of Compliance 12
Certification of Service 12
4
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASE LAW
Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878 8
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011)
5
NO. _______________
IN THE
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
___________________________________________________
ERNEST GLENN BENTON, PETITIONER
VS.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
___________________________________________________
PETITION IN CAUSE NO. 2878 FROM THE 100TH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF COLLINGSWORTH COUNTY, TEXAS
AND
THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF
TEXAS OF AMARILLO, TEXAS, NO. 07-13-00149-CR
___________________________________________________
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS OF TEXAS:
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The ground for review herein involves case
specific facts which are best argued before the
Court. Oral argument may prove helpful to the
Court.
6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Petitioner, Ernest Glenn Benton, was
convicted by a jury of the offense of indecency with
a child by contact after a plea of not guilty; the
punishment was assessed by the jury at life
imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice-Institutional Division. This conviction was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
District on December 9, 2014.
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The court of appeals rendered its decision
affirming Petitioner’s conviction on December 9,
2014. Petitioner filed his Motion for Rehearing on
December 29, 2014. Petitioner’s Motion for
Rehearing was overruled on January 12, 2015. This
Petition for Discretionary Review was then filed
within thirty (30) days; to wit, on February 10,
2015.
GROUND FOR REVIEW
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
APPELLANT DID THEN AND THERE ENGAGE IN SEXUAL
7
CONTACT WITH PSEUDONYM DCSO04172012 BY TOUCHING THE
GENITALS OF PSEUDONYM DCSO04172012, A CHILD YOUNGER
THAN 17 YEARS OF AGE.
REASON FOR REVIEW
It is respectfully submitted that the court of
appeals erred in holding that the evidence at trial
was sufficient to convict Petitioner of the offense
of indecency with a child by contact.
In determining whether the evidence is
sufficient to support a conviction, a reviewing
court must consider all the evidence in a light
most favorable to the verdict and determine, based
on that evidence and the reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, whether a fact finder could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878,
894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
In the case at bar, Petitioner was charged by
indictment that on or about April 14, 2012,
Appellant did then and there engage in sexual
contact with Pseudonym DCSO04172012 by touching the
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genitals of Pseudonym DCSO04172012, a child younger
than 17 years of age. 1 CR 2.
The statements of Pseudonym DCSO04172012 are so
inconsistent and contradictory that they are too
unreliable to sustain the conviction of Appellant.
Pseudonym DCSO04172012’s recollection of the events
on April 14, 2012, changed with each person she
spoke with and from day to day at trial. On day one
of trial, Pseudonym DCSO04172012 testified that
Appellant touched her genitals with his mouth. 4 RR
180. On day two of trial, Pseudonym DCSO04172012
testified that Appellant touched her genitals with
his tongue. 5 RR 63. Pseudonym DCSO04172012
testified that Appellant only rubbed baby oil on her
legs. 4 RR 182. Pseudonym DCSO04172012 told Becky
O’Neal that Appellant put baby oil down her back. 4
RR 229.
Due to the age of Pseudonym DCSO04172012, her
testimony is too subject to outside influence to
overlook the inconsistencies in her testimony. With
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no physical evidence or corroborating testimony,
Pseudonym DCSO04172012’s testimony alone should not
be enough to sustain the guilty verdict found by the
jury in this case.
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner respectfully
requests this Honorable Court grant his Petition for
Discretionary Review.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Petitioner
respectfully prays this Court grant this petition,
and upon reviewing the judgment entered below,
reverse this cause and remand it for new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
BIRD, BIRD & RABE
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
P.O. BOX 1257
CHILDRESS, TEXAS 79201
BY: /s/ Dale A. Rabe, Jr._________
DALE A. RABE, JR.,
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
TELEPHONE NO.: 940-937-2543
FACSIMILE NO.: 940-937-3431
E-MAIL: birdbirdrabe@gmail.com
STATE BAR NO.: 24027638
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APPENDIX
1. Letter from Court of Appeals December 9, 2014
2. Judgment, Trial Court’s Rulings Affirmed
3. Memorandum Opinion
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that the above and foregoing
Petition for Discretionary Review is 1,167 words in
its completion, signed on this the 10th day of
February, 2015, in accordance with the rules
governing same.
/s/ Dale A. Rabe, Jr._____
DALE A. RABE, JR.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Petition for Discretionary Review
was delivered as indicated below on this the 10th
day of February, 2015, to the following:
Mr. Luke Inman VIA E-SERVICE
District Attorney
800 West Avenue, Box 1
Wellington, Texas 79095
Mr. Ernest Benton VIA CMRRR
TDCJ # 01846243 70140510000127094627
2664 FM 2054
Tennessee Colony, TX 75886
/s/ Dale A. Rabe, Jr.____
DALE A. RABE, JR.
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FILE COPY
BRIAN QUINN
Chief Justice
Court of Appeals VIVIAN LONG
Clerk
JAMES T. CAMPBELL
Justice
Seventh District of Texas MAILING ADDRESS:
MACKEY K. HANCOCK
Justice
Potter County Courts Building P. O. Box 9540
79105-9540
501 S. Fillmore, Suite 2-A
PATRICK A. PIRTLE
Justice Amarillo, Texas 79101-2449 (806) 342-2650
www.txcourts.gov/7thcoa.aspx
December 9, 2014
Dale A. Rabe Luke McLean Inman
BIRD, BIRD & RABE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
P.O. Box 1257 800 West Ave., Box 1
Childress, TX 79201-1257 Wellington, TX 79095
* DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL * * DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL *
RE: Case Numbers: 07-13-00149-CR, 07-13-00150-CR
Trial Court Case Numbers: 2878, 2879
Style: Ernest Glenn Benton v. The State of Texas
Dear Counsel:
The Court this day issued an opinion and judgment in the captioned causes.
TEX. R. APP. P. 48.
In addition, pursuant to Texas Government Code, Sec. 51.204(b)(2), exhibits on
file with this Court, if any, will be destroyed three years after final disposition of the case
or at an earlier date if ordered by the Court.
Very truly yours,
Vivian Long
VIVIAN LONG, CLERK
xc: Honorable Richard Dambold (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)
Honorable Stuart Messer (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)
Jackie Johnson (DELIVERED VIA E-MAIL)
FILE COPY
No. 07-13-00150-CR
Ernest Glenn Benton § From the 100th District Court of
Appellant Collingsworth County
§
v. December 9, 2014
§
The State of Texas Opinion by Justice Pirtle
Appellee §
J U D G M E N T
Pursuant to the opinion of the Court dated December 9, 2014, it is ordered,
adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the trial court be affirmed.
Inasmuch as this is an appeal in forma pauperis, no costs beyond those that
have been paid are adjudged.
It is further ordered that this decision be certified below for observance.
oOo
In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
________________________
No. 07-13-00149-CR
No. 07-13-00150-CR
________________________
ERNEST GLENN BENTON, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 100th District Court
Collingsworth County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. 2878, 2879; Honorable Richard Dambold, Presiding by Assignment
December 9, 2014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
Appellant, Ernest Glenn Benton, was tried by a jury and found guilty of
aggravated sexual assault of a child1 (Trial Court Cause No. 2878, Appellate Cause No.
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i) (West Supp. 2014). The indictment alleged
Appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the penetration of the sexual organ of the victim, a child who
was then and there younger than fourteen years of age, by his mouth. An offense under this section is a
felony of the first degree.
07-13-00149-CR) and indecency with a child2 (Trial Court Cause No. 2879, Appellate
Cause No. 07-13-00150-CR), with the punishment range in both offenses being
enhanced by two prior felony convictions.3 The jury found both enhancements to be
true and assessed his sentence in each case at confinement for life. The trial court
ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. By three issues in the aggravated
sexual assault case (07-13-00149-CR), Appellant asserts (1) the trial court erred by
denying his motion for a directed verdict and (2) the evidence was legally and (3)
factually insufficient to establish he caused penetration of the victim’s sexual organ by
his mouth. By two issues in the indecency with a child case (07-13-00150-CR),
Appellant asserts (1) the evidence is legally and (2) factually insufficient to establish he
engaged in sexual contact by touching the victim’s sexual organ. We affirm the trial
court’s judgments.
BACKGROUND
The evidence at trial showed that, on April 14, 2012, the victim was eleven years
old and had been sexually abused by her father since she was nine. Late that night, her
father left his girlfriend’s house and drove the victim to Appellant’s house. On the way,
he displayed a television screen depicting a naked man and woman touching each
other. After arriving at Appellant’s house, she played a card game with her father and
2
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(a)(1) (West 2011). Count three of an amended indictment
alleged Appellant engaged in sexual contact with the victim, a child under seventeen years of age, by
touching the victim’s genitals. An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree. Id. at (d).
The State dismissed Counts I and II.
3
The State filed its Notice of Intent to Seek Enhanced Punishment based upon Appellant’s two
felony convictions for attempt to commit sexual assault in January 1996 and aggravated assault with a
deadly weapon in November 2001. As enhanced, both offenses were punishable by imprisonment for
life, or for any term of not more than 99 years or less than 25 years. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
12.42(d) (West Supp. 2014).
2
Appellant, while watching television. In Appellant’s bedroom, a television depicted a
naked man and woman touching each other. Later, the victim became tired and wanted
to go to bed. Her father gave her some “Kool-Aid” to drink. She took a sip and poured
the drink out because it tasted funny. She noticed the liquid came from a bottle labeled
blueberry vodka.
She went into the bedroom with the television, turned it off and went to bed.
Approximately, thirty minutes later, she awoke to the sound of the television. It had
been turned back on and was showing naked male and female bodies touching each
other. The victim’s pants had been removed. Her father was in front of her touching his
private parts while Appellant touched her private parts with his mouth and used his
tongue. She had baby oil on her back and bottom and Appellant put baby oil on her
legs. A black light in the bedroom was turned on. The victim got up, put her pants back
on and went into the living room. Appellant told her she looked more beautiful when
she was not wearing her clothes. The victim subsequently reported these events to a
school counselor.
Becky O’Neal, a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE), testified the victim
described Appellant putting baby oil down her back and touching her genitalia with his
mouth. She also testified that the mouth can be used, along with the tongue to
penetrate the female sexual organ and that anything that passes the fat outer lips, the
labia majora, touching the inner lips, the labia minora, however slight, is considered to
be penetration. She noted in her exam that the victim’s sexual organ did not show
trauma but testified that such a finding was not inconsistent with the abuse described by
the child.
3
The victim’s counselor at her elementary school testified that the victim
approached her and described the abuse her father had inflicted upon her. She also
told the counselor that she and her father went to Appellant’s house, she was given
blackberry vodka and was in a room with a black light when Appellant rubbed lotion on
her. She also said Appellant had touched her with his hand. She was embarrassed,
nervous and crying. The counselor called child protective services and the victim’s
mother.
Deputy Allen K. Riley served the arrest warrant on Appellant. While searching
Appellant’s house, he found playing cards similar to those described by the victim, a
black light and a near empty bottle of baby oil. One wall in the house was covered with
semi-nude photographs of females in various poses.
After the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Appellant guilty of the
offenses in both indictments and assessed Appellant’s punishment at confinement for
life. The trial court subsequently issued its judgment in conformance with the jury’s
verdict and this appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion for directed verdict
on the issue of penetration. In that regard, we treat a point of error or issue complaining
about a trial court’s failure to grant a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the
legal sufficiency of the evidence. Williams v. State, 937 S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996).
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Appellant further contends the evidence is both legally and factually insufficient to
support the conviction in each case. In that regard, we note the only standard that a
reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support
each element of a criminal offense the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt is the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 33 S. Ct. 2781, 61
L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979). See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Accordingly, Appellant’s issues essentially present a single issue, i.e., whether the
evidence is sufficient to support the verdict in each case. Id. at 895.
Appellant asserts there was insufficient evidence to establish that he penetrated
the victim’s female sex organ with his mouth or tongue or that he engaged in sexual
contact by touching her genitals. Specifically, he contends the testimony of the victim
was “so inconsistent and contradictory that they are unreliable to sustain the conviction
of Appellant.” The State asserts there was sufficient evidence to create a jury issue on
each question and this Court should defer to the jury’s verdict. We agree with the State.
See Steadman v. State, 280 S.W.3d 242, 243-45, 250 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
STANDARD OF REVIEW—SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, a
reviewing court must consider all the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict
and determine, based on that evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
whether a fact finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19 and Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 895). In conducting our
5
review, we do not sit as a thirteenth juror and may not substitute our judgment for that of
the fact finder by re-evaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence. Isassi v.
State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Rather, we defer to the fact finder
to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh the evidence, and draw reasonable
inferences from basic to ultimate facts. Id. We measure the sufficiency of the evidence
by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik
v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT
A person commits the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child if he
intentionally or knowingly, by any means, causes the penetration of the sexual organ of
a child under seventeen years of age. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(a)(1)(b)(i)
(West Supp. 2014). The State may prove penetration by circumstantial evidence, and
the victim need not specifically testify that there was penetration. Villalon v. State, 791
S.W.2d 130, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). See Murphy v. State, 4 S.W.3d 926, 929
(Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. denied). Further, evidence of the slightest penetration is
sufficient to uphold a conviction, so long as it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt.
Luna v. State, 515 S.W.2d 271, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
INDECENCY W ITH A CHILD
A person commits the offense of indecency with a child if, with a child younger
than seventeen years of age he engages in sexual contact. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 21.11(a)(1) (West 2011). For purposes of this section, “sexual contact” includes any
6
touching of a child’s genitalia with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any
person. Id. at (c)(1).
ANALYSIS
In Vernon v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that “pushing aside
and reaching beneath a natural fold of skin into an area of the body not usually exposed
to view, even in nakedness, is a significant intrusion beyond mere external contact” and
amounts to “penetration” sufficient to sustain a conviction for aggravated sexual assault.
Vernon v. State, 841 S.W.2d 407, 409-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The court held that
the evidence of the defendant’s “touching” of the complainant was sufficient to show
“penetration” of the complainant’s female sexual organ where the evidence showed that
the contact was “more intrusive than contact with her outer vaginal lips.” Id. at 409-10
(“it is not ungrammatical to describe Appellant’s touching of complainant in this case as
a penetration, so long as contact with the injured part of her anatomy could reasonably
be regarded by ordinary English speakers as more intrusive than contact with her outer
vaginal lips”).
Here, the victim testified she was undressed when Appellant “touched” her
genitalia with his mouth and used his tongue on her private parts. The SANE nurse
examiner testified the mouth can be used along with the tongue to penetrate the female
sex organ. She further testified that the absence of trauma to the victim’s genitalia was
not inconsistent with the abuse described by the child. In addition, the jury could
circumstantially infer from Appellant’s use of pornography, vodka, a black light and baby
oil that he intended to and did engage in more than simply touching the outside of her
7
genitalia. Based upon this evidence, a reasonable juror could find that Appellant’s
mouth contacted with the victim’s labia minora and, per the definition in Vernon, was a
“penetration” of her sexual organ, i.e., Appellant’s mouth and/or tongue reached beyond
the outer layer of skin comprising the external genitalia or labia majora. See Villa v.
State, 417 S.W.3d 455, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (a reasonable juror could find
appellant’s testimony that he put cream on the red area outside the child’s vagina
and/or touched the genitals of the child as an admission of penetration).
In light of this testimony and evidence, we find a reasonable fact finder could
have concluded that Appellant’s mouth and/or tongue penetrated the victim’s sexual
organ and that such touching was done with the intent to arouse or gratify his sexual
desires. Accordingly, we find the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s verdict in each
case and overrule Appellant’s respective issues. See Villa, 417 S.W.3d at 462;
Steadman, 280 S.W.3d at 243-45, 250.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgments are affirmed.
Patrick A. Pirtle
Justice
Do not publish.
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