David Michael Dollins v. State

ACCEPTED
06-14-00133-CR
SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS
1/5/2015 5:10:29 PM
DEBBIE AUTREY
CLERK
CAUSE NUMBER 06-14-00133-CR
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN
6th COURT OF APPEALS
SIXTH APPELLATE JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS
AT TEXARKANA, TEXAS 1/8/2015 3:20:00 PM
DEBBIE AUTREY
Clerk
APPEAL FROM THE 8TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY,
TEXAS
Trial Cause No. F-8840
DAVID MICHAEL DOLLINS
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
Martin Braddy
Attorney at Law
SBN 00796240
121 Oak Ave., Suite A
Sulphur Springs, Texas 75482
(903) 885-2040
(500) 885-2704 fax
1
IDENTITY OF PARTIES
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38(a), the following is a list
of all parties to the trial court‟s judgment and the names and addresses of all trial
and appellate counsel:
APPELLANT:
Steven DeWayne Pruitt
Appellate Counsel
Martin Braddy
121 Oak Avenue, Suite A
Sulphur Springs, TX 75482
(903) 885-2040
(903) 500-2704 fax
Trial Counsel
Wade Forsman
Post Office Box 918
Sulphur Springs, TX 75482
APPELLEE:
The State of Texas
Honorable Will Ramsay
District Attorney
8th Judicial District
110 Main Street
Sulphur Springs, TX 75482
(903) 885-0641
(903) 885-0640 fax
TRIAL COURT:
8th Judicial District Court
Hopkins County, Texas
Judge Eddie Northcutt
118 Church St.
Sulphur Springs, TX 75482
Phone: (903) 438-4022
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents 3
Index of Authorities 4-5
Statement of the Case 6
Issues Presented 6
Statement of Facts 6
Summary of Argument 10
Argument 10
I. Trial Court Improperly limited Appellant‟s cross- 10
examination of deputy ricks in violation of the
Confrontation Clause
A. Preservation of Error 11
B. Standard of Review 11
C. Confrontation Clause Violation 12
D. Harmful Error Analysis 16
Conclusion and Prayer 21
Certificate of Service 21
3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Alexander v. State, 949 S.W.2d 772, 774–75 (Tex.App.-Dallas 13
1997, pet. ref'd)
Davis v. State, 203 S.W.3d 845, 850-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 17
2006)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 14
1435, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986)
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641 14
(Tex.Crim.App.2006)
Hayden v. State, 296 S.W.3d 549, 554 (Tex.Crim.App.2009) 15, 16
Johnson v. State, 433 S.W.3d 546, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) 12
Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) 14, 16
Mart. v. State, 173 S.W.3d 467 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) 11
McDaniel v. State, 3 S.W.3d 176, 180 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 14
1999, pet. ref'd)
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.Crim.App. 11
1991)
Pope v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 124 (Tex. App. 2004) aff'd, 13,14
207 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
4
Rankin v. State, 41 S.W.3d 335, 345 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth, 13
2001 pet. ref'd)
Sauceda v. State, 129 S.W.3d 116, 120 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) 11
United States v. Landerman, 109 F.3d 1053, 1061–62 (5th 12
Cir.1997)
Virts v. State, 739 S.W.2d 25, 28–29 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) 13
Walker v. State, 300 S.W.3d 836, 844 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 13, 14, 16
2009)
5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was indicted in Cause Number F-8840 for Escape and in Cause
Number F-8839 for Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon. After jury
selection, but prior to evidence being presented, the State dismissed the
Aggravated Assault charge. Appellant pled “not guilty” to Escape and proceeded
to trial before a jury and elected to have the jury set the punishment upon a finding
of guilt. The jury found Appellant guilty of Escape as indicted. The jury set the
punishment at two years and six months in the Institutional Division of the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice without a recommendation for probation. The trial
court sentenced Appellant in accordance with the jury‟s verdict. The trial court
certified Appellant‟s right to appeal and Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal.
ISSUES PRESENTED
Did the trial court improperly limit Appellant‟s cross-examination of Deputy
Ricks in Violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 15, 2013, Deputy Patricia Ricks, then employed by the Franklin
County Sheriff‟s Department, responded to a 911 call from Appellant‟s residence
regarding a disturbance. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 30-32). When Deputy Ricks arrived at
the Franklin County residence she knocked on the residence‟s door and was met by
6
Jerry and Linda Dollens, Appellant‟s grandparents. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 32-33). The
deputy was told that Appellant was in his bedroom with his girlfriend, Robin
Clark. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 33-34). Deputy Ricks testified that, upon entering the
bedroom, she was informed by Ms. Clark that Appellant had held a knife to her
throat and threatened to kill her earlier that evening. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 36). The
deputy testified that Linda Dollens told her the same thing. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 36).
The deputy asked Appellant to step outside to talk to her and Appellant told the
deputy that she needed to leave and attempted to push her out of the door. (R.R.
Vol. 4 pg. 37). As the deputy grabbed and pushed Appellant out of the door, he
ran away from her to a silver truck. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 37). The deputy testified that
“I went out after him. And before I got down the steps, I told him that he was
under arrest for assault on his girlfriend. And he turned around and came back and
come back up the steps, turned around in front of me, placed his hands behind his
back, and told me that -- go ahead and arrest me.” (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 37-38). The
deputy placed her personal pink colored handcuffs on Appellant and testified that
she placed him in the back seat of her patrol truck. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 38, 82-83).
Deputy Ricks testified that when the back-up officer, Leo Herrera, arrived she
moved Appellant from the patrol truck to Officer Herrera‟s patrol car. (R.R. Vol. 4
pg. 39). Officer Leo Herrera testified that when he arrived Deputy Ricks and
Appellant were standing outside of her patrol truck with Jerry Dollens. (R.R. Vol.
7
4 pg. 57). Deputy Ricks testified that during the move from her truck to Officer
Herrera‟s car she again told Appellant that he was under arrest. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg.
40). She testified that Appellant told her that he was not going to jail and
questioned her regarding the identity of the 911 caller and why he was going to
jail. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 40-41). Appellant was talked into Officer Herrera‟s patrol
car by Deputy Ricks. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 58). Officer Herrera testified that he
doesn‟t remember exactly what was said but that Deputy Ricks possibly said that
Appellant was under arrest and was going to jail. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 63). While
Deputy Ricks and Officer Herrera was away from the patrol car they heard a noise
and returned to find that Appellant was no longer inside and a window was rolled
down, although there is no indication which window was down. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg.
44, 59).
The record does not indicate whether Appellant was placed into the front seat or
back seat of Officer Herrera‟s patrol car. However, Officer Herrera testified that
Jerry Dollens spoke to Appellant through the front of the patrol vehicle. (R.R. Vol.
4 pg. 59). Officer Herrera does not indicate whether a window was rolled down to
facilitate the conversation or was rolled up following the conversation between
Appellant and Jerry Dollens. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 59). Deputy Ricks concluded that
Appellant rolled the window down himself prior to exiting the patrol car by the
window. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 45). However, the record does not reflect whether
8
Deputy Ricks was aware of the conversation between Appellant and Jerry Dollens
in the patrol car.
Later that evening, Appellant called Deputy Rick‟s cell phone and spoke to her
three times. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 47-48). The second call Appellant asked the deputy
“what charges he was being charged with.” (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 48). Deputy Ricks
informed Appellant that he was being with assault with a deadly weapon, but that
he would need to contact the sheriff “on the escape charge.” (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 48).
Deputy Ricks testified that she did not take a formal statement from Robin
Clark nor did she seize as evidence a knife she believed was used during the
incident, although she claimed to have observed it. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 49-52). The
deputy claimed that “they” would not allow her to take the knife. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg.
52). Jerry Dollens testified that no conversation of any kind took place about a
knife and that at no time did Linda Dollens or he refuse to give a knife to law
enforcement. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 87). During the punishment phase of the trial,
Robin Clark testified that Appellant never took a knife out or put a knife to her
throat. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 142). Linda Dollens‟ testimony contradicted this
assertion. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 125). Ms. Clark also testified that Appellant has never
harmed her or said he was going to harm her. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 142).
9
On October 15, 2013, Deputy Ricks obtained an arrest warrant for Appellant
charging the offense of Aggravated Assault stemming from the events of the
incident at issue in this case. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 71-74, Defense Ex. 1).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court limited Appellant‟s cross-examination of Deputy Ricks in
violation of the Confrontation Clause. Appellant attempted to cross-examine
Deputy Ricks regarding whether she obtained or asked for a written statement from
Robin Clark, the alleged victim of the Aggravated Assault. The State made a
relevancy objection to the line of questioning and the trial court sustained it
announcing that “we‟re not going to try the Aggravated Assault case.” Ms. Clark‟s
statement went to the heart of Deputy Ricks‟ claim for having probable cause to
arrest Appellant for felony Aggravated Assault, an element of the offense.
Therefore, the trial court had no discretion to limit Appellant cross-examination
under the Sixth Amendment guarantee to the right of confrontation. This
constitutional error was harmful and the verdict should be overturned.
ARGUMENT
I. TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY LIMITED APPELLANT’S CROSS-
EXAMINATION OF DEPUTY RICKS IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
10
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow Appellant to fully
cross-examine Deputy Ricks regarding her decision to not obtain a formal
statement from Robin Clark.
A. Preservation of Error
Appellant began a line of cross-examination questions of Deputy Ricks
regarding whether she obtained a statement from Ms. Clark. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 49-
50). The State made an objection “to this line of questioning as to relevance.”
(R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 50). The trial court stated “[w]e‟re not going to try the aggravated
assault case. I‟ll sustain the objection.” (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 37-38).
B. Standard of Review
Generally speaking, the standard of review for a trial court's ruling under the
Rules of Evidence is abuse of discretion. Martin v. State, 173 S.W.3d 467
(Tex.Crim.App. 2005) citing Sauceda v. State, 129 S.W.3d 116, 120
(Tex.Crim.App.2004). Appellate courts will uphold a trial court's ruling on the
admissibility of evidence “as long as the trial court's ruling was at least within the
zone of reasonable disagreement....” Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391
(Tex.Crim.App. 1991).
However, when the ruling limits a defendant‟s cross-examination of a witness
the Confrontation Clause is implicated. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has
recently held “in this context … until it can be „determine[d] that the cross
11
examination satisfied the Sixth Amendment, the [trial] court's discretion‟ simply
„does not come into play.” Johnson v. State, 433 S.W.3d 546, 551 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014), citing United States v. Landerman, 109 F.3d 1053, 1061–62 (5th
Cir.1997). Consequently, when reviewing a trial court‟s ruling that limits a
defendant‟s right to fully cross-examine a witness, an appellate court should first
determine whether the Sixth Amendment was satisfied. If it has been, then
determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in making an evidentiary
ruling.
C. Confrontation Clause Violation
The trial court‟s limitation of Appellant‟s cross-examination of Deputy
Ricks violated the Confrontation Clause under the Sixth Amendment.
The Court of Criminal Appeal recently discussed the application of the
Confrontation Clause to a defendant‟s right to cross-examine witnesses in Johnson
v. State. The Court explained,
“[t]he Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides, in relevant part, that „[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.‟ While, as its name would suggest, this
„Confrontation Clause‟ generally protects the defendant's right
to physically “confront” his accusers face-to-face, this is hardly
12
the only right protected by the Confrontation Clause. Rather,
„[t]he main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure
for the opponent the opportunity of cross-examination[,]‟
because that is „the principal means by which the believability
of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.”
Johnson v. State, 433 S.W.3d 546, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
“Hence, the right to cross-examine a testifying state witness extends to any
matter that could reflect on the witness's credibility. This includes impeaching the
witness with relevant evidence that might reflect bias, interest, prejudice,
inconsistent statements, traits of character affecting credibility, or evidence that
might go to any impairment or disability affecting the witness's credibility.” Pope
v. State, 161 S.W.3d 114, 124 (Tex. App. 2004) aff'd, 207 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006), citing Virts v. State, 739 S.W.2d 25, 28–29 (Tex.Crim.App.1987),
Rankin v. State, 41 S.W.3d 335, 345 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth, 2001 pet. ref'd),
Alexander v. State, 949 S.W.2d 772, 774–75 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd).
Thus, the trial court should give the defendant great latitude to reveal any relevant
facts that reflect on the credibility of the witness. Walker v. State, 300 S.W.3d
836, 844 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009) citing Pope, 161 S.W.3d at 124. For
purposes of witness credibility, “the test of relevancy is not whether the answer
sought will expound any of the main issues, but whether it will aid the court or jury
13
in appraising the credibility of the witness and assessing the probative value of the
direct testimony.” Walker, 300 S.W.3d at 844, citing McDaniel v. State, 3 S.W.3d
176, 180 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd).
However, there are several areas where cross-examination may be
inappropriate, and in those cases, the trial judge has the discretion to limit cross-
examination. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435,
89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986). A trial judge may limit cross-examination based on
concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the safety of the
witness, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Pope, 161
S.W.3d at 124.
“Each Confrontation Clause issue must be weighed on a case-by-case basis,
carefully taking into account the defendant's right to cross-examine and the risk
factors associated with admission of the evidence. In weighing whether evidence
must be admitted under the Confrontation Clause, the trial court should balance the
probative value of the evidence sought to be introduced against the risk its
admission may entail. The trial court maintains broad discretion to impose
reasonable limits on cross-examination to avoid harassment, prejudice, confusion
of the issues, endangering the witness, and the injection of cumulative or collateral
evidence.” Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
14
Confusion of the issues “refers to a tendency to confuse or distract the jury
from the main issue of the case.” Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641
(Tex.Crim.App.2006). Unless the inquiry on cross-examination is addressing an
issue that relates to the charged offense or the credibility of the witness, “allowing
a party to delve into the issue beyond the limits of cross-examination wastes time
and confuses the issue.” Hayden v. State, 296 S.W.3d 549, 554
(Tex.Crim.App.2009).
Here, the defense strategy was to develop a reasonable doubt regarding two
elements of the offense required by the indictment and Court‟s Charge. First, that
the arresting officer, Deputy Ricks, did not have probable cause to arrest
Appellant. Second, that the probable cause to arrest was sufficient only for
misdemeanor Assault, not felony Aggravated Assault, by eliminating the probable
cause that a knife was used or exhibited during the Assault.
The State‟s evidence of probable cause was limited to the testimony of
Deputy Ricks regarding what she was told by Robin Clark and Linda Dollens.
Therefore, the credibility of Deputy Ricks regarding what she was told by Robin
Clark was critical to a determination of whether probable cause to arrest Appellant
for the felony Aggravated Assault existed beyond a reasonable doubt.
Whether or not Deputy Ricks took a statement from Robin Clark that
evening, or at all, is important in determining whether the deputy was really told
15
what she claimed by Ms. Clark. The jury could have formed a reasonable doubt as
to the credibility of the deputy regarding the statement that developed the probable
cause based on the lack of a written or recorded statement from Ms. Clark
reiterating the deputy‟s claim. What Robin Clark really told Deputy Ricks that
evening was essential to two elements of the offense. Therefore, the line of
question addressed two main issues in the offense at hand and the credibility of the
only witness offered by the State as to those issues.
Consequently, the limitation of the cross-examination of Deputy Ricks
regarding the statement of Robin Clark did not “avoid harassment, prejudice,
confusion of the issues, endangering the witness, [or] the injection of cumulative or
collateral evidence.” Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 222 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
The limitation was not necessary to prevent “confuse or distract [of] the jury from
the main issue of the case.” Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641
(Tex.Crim.App.2006). Instead, it would have aided the “jury in appraising the
credibility of the witness and assessing the probative value of the direct
testimony.” Walker, 300 S.W.3d at 844.
Therefore, the trial court committed Constitutional Error by unreasonably
limiting Appellant‟s cross-examination of Deputy Ricks in violation of the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.
D. Harm Analysis
16
“[W]hen a trial court unconstitutionally restricts cross-examination, the
reviewing court first assumes that “the damaging potential of the cross-
examination” had occurred. The reviewing court then asks: Would the admission
of that impeachment evidence, in the context of the trial as a whole, likely have
made any significant impact upon the minds of an average jury? To decide that
question, the Court set out a number of non-exclusive factors, including:
(1) The importance of the witness's testimony in the
prosecution's case;
(2) Whether the testimony was cumulative;
(3) The presence or absence of evidence corroborating or
contradicting the witness's testimony on material points;
(4) The extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted; and
(5) The overall strength of the prosecution's case.
Most of these factors apply regardless of whether the constitutional error was in the
admission or exclusion of evidence. But the initial “assumption” that the
damaging potential of the cross-examination had been realized applies only when
the trial court restricts cross-examination or excludes evidence. In those instances,
the reviewing court must determine whether it is convinced, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the fact-finding process was reliable even if the improperly restricted or
17
excluded evidence is factored into the analysis.” Davis v. State, 203 S.W.3d 845,
850-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
Therefore, assuming that Appellant had been successful in challenging the
credibility of Deputy Ricks regarding the statement of Robin Clark that established
probable cause to arrest Appellant for the felony Aggravated Assault, the question
is whether the Court finds that, beyond a reasonable doubt, that would not have
had an impact on the outcome.
1. The importance of the witness's testimony in the prosecution's case
Here, Deputy Ricks‟ testimony was essential in establishing the elements of
the offense. The State called only two witness, Deputy Ricks and Officer Herrera.
Deputy Ricks‟ testimony established all of the elements of the offense. Officer
Herrera merely provided support for the deputy‟s assertion that Appellant was
placed inside his patrol car and later left the patrol car without permission of law
enforcement. If the jury did not believe Deputy Ricks beyond a reasonable, then
they could not have convicted Appellant.
2. Whether the testimony was cumulative
Deputy Ricks‟ testimony regarding what she claims she was told by Robin
Clark was not cumulative. The State did not call Ms. Clark or any other witness
regarding the conversation between Deputy Ricks and Ms. Clark. Although Ms.
Clark was available to testify and did testify at punishment, the State chose to call
18
only Deputy Ricks regarding the deputy‟s claim of probable cause. If the State had
called Ms. Clark, one would assume that she would have testified, as she did at
punishment, that Appellant did not assault her with a knife or otherwise. It would
be a safe assumption that she would have denied having told Deputy Ricks that
Appellant did so that evening.
3. The presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting
the witness's testimony on material points
Other evidence was developed during trial that contradicted Deputy Ricks‟
testimony regarding material issues. Most significantly, Deputy Ricks testified
that, although she observed the knife used by Appellant during the assault, she did
not seize it as evidence because “they” did not allow her. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 52).
Jerry Dollens contradicted this assertion testifying that no conversation of any kind
took place about a knife and that at no time did Linda Dollens or he refuse to give
a knife to law enforcement. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 87). Furthermore, it is nonsensical to
believe that law enforcement cannot seize evidence used in a crime found in
“plain-view” because a defendant‟s family doesn‟t want them to seize it.
4. The extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted
Appellant was allowed to cross-examine Deputy Ricks regarding matters
other than the taking of Robin Clark‟s statement. However, that line of
questioning was cut off by the trial court and not allowed to be fully developed.
19
When asked if she had obtained a statement from Ms. Clark, the deputy
initially replied that she did not recall. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 49). After being referred
to her report, Deputy Ricks then changed her testimony stating that “I believe she
told me that she would come in the next day to write a statement.” (R.R. Vol. 4 pg.
50). As Appellant‟s trial counsel began to press Deputy Ricks regarding whether
she asked for or obtained a written statement, the State objected and the trial court
shut down the line of questioning. (R.R. Vol. 4 pg. 50).
It is likely that Appellant‟s trial counsel interpreted the trial court‟s ruling as
applying, not only to the taking of Ms. Clark‟s statement, but also to the taking of a
statement of Linda Dollens. That would explain the lack of attempted cross-
examination regarding whether a written statement was obtained from Ms.
Dollens.
5. The overall strength of the prosecution's case
The State‟s case, as presented, was weak and depended solely on the
credibility of Deputy Ricks. She was the sole witness called by the State to prove
the elements of the offense. Further, her testimony was contradicted by Jerry
Dollens. There was no audio, video, or forensic evidence admitted, although
Officer Herrera testified that his patrol car was equipped with a video camera. The
State chose to not call anyone present during the statement‟s that established
20
probable cause, although all were present to trial to testify. Also, no incriminating
statements of Appellant were admitted at trial.
Considering these factor and assuming that the cross-examination would
have been effective in challenging Deputy Ricks‟ credibility regarding Ms. Clark‟s
statement to her that evening, this Court should find that the limitation on cross-
examination had some impact on the outcome of Appellant‟s trial. Therefore, the
error was harmful and the verdict should be overturned.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
It is for the reasons contained herein that Appellant would respectfully pray
that this Court of Appeals for the Sixth District reverse the judgment of conviction
of the Appellant and remand the case to the 8th Judicial District for retrial.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Martin Braddy
Martin Braddy
Attorney for Appellant
SBN 00796240
121 Oak Ave., Suite A
Sulphur Springs, Texas 75482
(903) 885-2040
(903) 500-2704 fax
21
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
instrument was forwarded to 8TH Judicial District Attorney, Will Ramsay, on this
the 5th day of January, 2015.
/s/ Martin Braddy
Martin E. Braddy
WORD COUNT CERTIFICATION
This document complies with the typeface requirements of Tex. R. App. P.
9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-
point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the
word-count limitations of Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i), if applicable, because it contains
3,311 words, excluding any parts exempted by Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ Martin Braddy
Martin E. Braddy
22