DocketNumber： 11-01-00370-CR
Filed Date： 2/20/2003
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/10/2015
11th Court of Appeals
Eastland, Texas
Opinion
Arthur Lee Jackson
Appellant
Vs. Nos. 11-01-00369-CR & 11-01-00370-CR -- Appeals from Dallas County
State of Texas
Appellee
In each cause, the jury convicted Arthur Lee Jackson of aggravated kidnapping,[1] found that he did not voluntarily release the victims in a safe place, and assessed his punishment at confinement for 20 years. We affirm.
In each appeal, appellant presents two issues for review. In his issues, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence in support of his convictions. In Cause No. 11-01-00369-CR, appellant was convicted of the aggravated kidnapping of B.C. by abducting B.C. with the intent to inflict bodily injury or sexually abuse B.C. In Cause No. 11-01-00370-CR, appellant was convicted of the aggravated kidnapping of E.G. either by abducting E.G. with the intent to inflict bodily injury or sexually abuse E.G. or by abducting E.G. and using or exhibiting a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. The jury was instructed that it could find appellant guilty as a party to the offense or as the principal actor.
In order to determine if the evidence is legally sufficient, we must review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664 (Tex.Cr.App.2000). In order to determine if the evidence is factually sufficient, we must review all of the evidence in a neutral light and determine whether the evidence supporting guilt is so weak as to render the conviction clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or whether the evidence supporting guilt, although adequate when taken alone, is so greatly outweighed by the overwhelming weight of contrary evidence as to render the conviction clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. Vasquez v. State, 67 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Tex.Cr.App.2002); Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283 (Tex.Cr.App.2001); Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Cr.App.2000); Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.Cr.App.1997); Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Cr.App.1996).
The record shows that appellant and four other men drove to Dallas, Texas, from Shreveport, Louisiana, in search of marihuana. Appellant drove the pickup. After arriving in Dallas, appellant stopped in order to ask the victims if they knew where to buy some marihuana. The victims, 14-year-old males B.C. and E.G., were at a bus stop waiting for the bus to take them home. After initially answering negatively, E.G. told the men to try the projects in north Dallas. At that point, the passenger from the front seat of the pickup, Derrick Johnson, got out of the pickup, exhibited a firearm, and forced the victims to get into the pickup. When the victims were unable to direct the occupants of the pickup to a location to buy marihuana, appellant and Johnson became angry. During the incident, appellant hit E.G. with his fist, and Johnson hit E.G. two times in the face with the gun. Appellant hit B.C. in the head with his fist, and Johnson pointed the gun at B.C. B.C. testified that, at some point during the incident, appellant had the gun. Other testimony showed that the gun belonged to appellant.
Appellant also threatened to take the victims back to Shreveport and kill them there. Instead, however, appellant and Johnson forced the victims to take all of their clothes off (except for E.G.=s muscle shirt). The assailants threw some of the clothes out the window. At the instigation of appellant and Johnson, B.C. was forced to perform oral sex on one of the backseat passengers; E.G. was forced to perform oral sex on Johnson and appellant. Then, appellant suddenly stopped the pickup on the shoulder of Central Expressway in Plano and told the victims to get out. Appellant would not allow E.G. to put his boxers back on. The victims, who were naked and cold, walked to a nearby trailer park where an old woman gave them some clothes. B.C. called 911 from the pay phone at the trailer park.
Shortly thereafter, police officers stopped the pickup, which was still being driven by appellant. Inside the pickup, officers found a Glock 27, .40 caliber handgun under the driver=s seat; a jacket and jersey belonging to E.G.; and shot records belonging to B.C. An officer also located other items of the victims= clothing, including a pair of jeans and boxers, along the freeway.
We hold that the evidence is both legally and factually sufficient to show that appellant, acting as either a principal or a party to the offense, is guilty of the aggravated kidnapping of both B.C. and E.G. Because an abduction is a Acontinuous, ongoing event,@ appellant=s intent to injure or sexually abuse the victims need not have been present at the time of the initial abduction from the bus stop. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex.Cr.App.2000); Weaver v. State, 657 S.W.2d 148, 150 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). The record reflects that the victims were abducted and were restrained from leaving during the course of events that included physical abuse and sexual assault. Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to show that, during the course of the abduction, appellant intended to injure or sexually abuse the victims. See Curry v. State, supra; Weaver v. State, supra. The evidence is also sufficient to show that appellant and Johnson exhibited a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. Appellant=s issues are overruled.
The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.
PER CURIAM
February 20, 2003
Do not publish. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Arnot, C.J., and
Wright, J., and McCall, J.
[1]TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. ' 20.04 (Vernon Supp. 2003) defines the offense and provides that it is a first degree felony.