DocketNumber： 11-03-00262-CV
Filed Date： 8/31/2004
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 4/17/2021
11th Court of Appeals
Eastland, Texas
Memorandum Opinion
Michael V. Garza
Appellant
Vs. No. 11-03-00262-CV B Appeal from Harris County
Monica Lynne Garza
Appellee
Michael V. Garza appeals from the decree of divorce dissolving his marriage to Monica Lynne Garza following a trial before an associate judge of the 309th District Court of Harris County. He asserts in four points that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court=s valuation of the parties= homestead, of his personal savings account, and of his personal retirement account and that the trial court erred by failing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm.
Trial was held before an associate judge who evaluated the parties= community property and made a division thereof. The associate judge=s report included values assigned by the judge to the property. Michael did not appeal the associate judge=s determinations to the district judge for trial de novo. The district judge adopted and confirmed the associate judge=s report and subsequently signed the final divorce decree. Despite appropriate requests, the trial court failed to file findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Michael insists in points one, two, and three that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court=s valuation of three assets. Michael asserts that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court=s valuation of the parties= residence at $120,000.00 because the evidence only showed a value within a range of $125,000.00 to $142,000.00; that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court=s valuation of his personal savings account at $82,340.00, as opposed to the amount of $32,327.32; and that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the trial court=s valuation of his personal retirement account in the amount of $35,000.00. We also construe his argument to suggest that the misvaluation of these three assets constituted an abuse of discretion by the trial court in the division of the marital estate.
In order to complain on appeal of the division of the marital estate, an appellant must be able to demonstrate from the evidence in the record that the division is so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Wallace v. Wallace, 623 S.W.2d 723, 725-26 (Tex.Civ.App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ dism=d). We conclude from that principle that these three points should properly be considered as one point B that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the community estate because there is factually insufficient evidence in support of the court=s valuation of three of the assets included in the division. While Michael raises the question as to whether the trial court might have abused its discretion, he makes no argument and presents no authority to the effect that the division made, assuming the misvaluation which he urges, constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial court in the division of the marital estate. In lieu of such argument, Michael continually refers to the trial court=s failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law, an issue which we will address in our discussion of point four.
Of the three items to which Michael refers, the residence was awarded to Monica, while Michael received his personal retirement account. Michael=s personal savings account was divided, with Michael receiving $43,853.00 and Monica receiving no less than $38,487.00.
An assertion that the evidence is Ainsufficient@ to support a fact finding means that the evidence supporting the finding is so weak or the evidence to the contrary is so overwhelming that the answer should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965). We are required to consider all of the evidence in making this determination. Maritime Overseas Corporation v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex.1998).
The trial was held in February 2003. Monica testified, through her inventory and appraisement, that the market value of the parties= residence was $120,000.00, that the value of Michael=s retirement plan as of March 31, 2002, was $35,000.00, and that the balance of his personal savings plan as of December 31, 2001, was $82,340.00, but that he had removed funds from the account since the date of their separation. She identified three exhibits, Plaintiff=s Exhibit Nos. 13, 14, and 15, as exhibits produced by Michael in discovery. These documents show that the balance of Michael=s personal retirement plan was $33,775.00 on December 31, 2001; $35,001.05 on March 31, 2002; $29,797.91 on July 25, 2002; $30,854.47 on September 3, 2002; and $32,327.32 on January 17, 2003. They show that the balance of Michael=s personal savings plan was $82,340.00 on December 31, 2001; $61,461.07 on July 25, 2002; $35,743.53 on September 3, 2002; and $35,743.53 on January 17, 2003.
Monica indicated that these documents reflect Michael=s withdrawal of $30,000.00 from their Apension plan@ without telling her. She stated that Michael had indicated in court that he had used $25,000.00 to pay off credit card debt and $5,000.00 for his attorney=s fees. Monica also introduced into evidence credit card statements produced by Michael in discovery showing that he had made approximately $26,852.03 in credit card payments between July and December 2002. Monica testified that these payments were made after Michael moved out and that what he was paying off was not community debt. Monica stated that Michael had told her just before separation that they had $40,000.00 in credit card debt, but that she would have understood only $15,000.00 to be legitimately charged on the accounts. She said that she had firsthand knowledge that Michael had spent $30,000.00 on a female other than herself. She said she could tell by looking at the credit card statements. No inventory and appraisement filed on behalf of Michael appears of record, and he presented no testimony as to the values of his personal savings plan or his personal retirement plan.
Monica estimated the value of the home at both $120,000.00 and $125,000.00, while acknowledging that she had obtained an estimate in the amount of $132,000.00. She requested that the court consider the cost of selling the home in arriving at its valuation. Michael presented evidence that the Harris County Appraisal District appraised the home at $142,000.00. We find that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court=s valuation of the home.
Evidence as to the values of Michael=s personal retirement plan was undisputed. The last statement before the divorce showed a valuation of just over $35,000.00, while a statement shortly after the divorce was filed and subsequent statements showed lesser amounts. We find that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court=s valuation of the personal retirement account.
Michael testified that, prior to his being served with divorce papers, he borrowed the amount of $30,700 from his personal savings plan in order to reduce the interest rate that he owed on credit card debt. He denied using any of the money on any woman other than Monica.
Monica testified that she and Michael separated on July 13, 2002. Michael borrowed the money from his personal savings plan on or about July 26, 2002. The last statement in evidence of the value of the account prior to the parties= separation showed the value of the plan at $82,340.00. We hold that the evidence is factually sufficient to support the trial court=s valuation of Michael=s savings plan. As previously noted, even if the evidence was factually insufficient to support the trial court=s valuation of any of these properties, Michael has presented no argument or authority in support of his assertion that the trial court abused its discretion in the division of the marital estate as a result of any misvaluation of the property. We overrule points one, two, and three.
Michael asserts in point four that the trial court erred by failing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. Michael timely requested findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with TEX.R.CIV.P. 296 and timely filed a notice of past-due findings of fact and conclusions of law. He made no specific request for findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the marital assets and their values in accordance with TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. ' 6.711 (Vernon Supp. 2004). The trial court erred by filing no findings of fact and conclusions of law in response to Michael=s request. The failure of the trial court to file sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law is presumed to be harmful unless the contrary appears on the face of the record. Tenery v. Tenery, 932 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tex.1996); Panchal v. Panchal, 132 S.W.3d 465 (Tex.App. B Eastland 2003, per curiam order). In this case, the only issue in contention is whether the trial court=s division of the community property was just and right. As evidenced by points one, two, and three, Michael has had no difficulty in determining from that order the monetary value that the judge assigned to the marital assets in making the division. In order to complain on appeal of that division, Michael must be able to demonstrate from the evidence in the record that the division is so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion. Wallace v. Wallace, supra at 725-26. Even if, as Michael maintains, the associate judge=s order signed by the district judge does not constitute findings of fact and conclusions of law for appellate purposes, the record reflects all facts and findings necessary in order for Michael to pursue a contention that the division of the property was so unjust and unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion. We therefore find that the face of the record reflects that Michael was not harmed by the trial court=s failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Michael maintains that he was harmed because, in the absence of findings, he could not clearly state the basis of the trial court=s valuation of the assets. He contends that, without findings regarding how the trial court arrived at the amount of assets available for division, the court=s valuation cannot be properly challenged on appeal. He seeks remand so that he may obtain findings of fact underlying the associate judge=s valuation. He contends that, in the absence of findings, he would have to resort to conjecture as to every conceivable factor that could have supported the valuations or the unequal division of the property and as to every conceivable combination of testimony and evidence that would refute each possible factor.
Generally, a trial court must file findings of fact only with respect to ultimate or controlling issues. Hill v. Hill, 971 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex.App. - Amarillo 1998, no pet=n). However, in a suit for dissolution of marriage in which the court has rendered a judgment dividing the estate of the parties, on a request by a party, the court shall state in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the value or amount of the community estate=s assets, liabilities, claims, and offsets on which disputed evidence has been presented. Section 6.711. Michael did not specifically make such a request. Even if his general request was sufficient, there is nothing that compels the trial court, in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, to set forth either the factors supporting its valuation findings or the factors supporting its division of the property. Consequently, Michael was not harmed due to the trial court=s failure to file findings of fact concerning such matters.
Michael relies upon the case of Roberts v. Roberts, 999 S.W.2d 424 (Tex.App. - El Paso 1999, no pet=n). That case was also a divorce case in which the trial judge failed to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at 439. The court held that the appellant was harmed where the trial court failed to assign values to the various community estates. Id. at 441. In the case at bar, the values of the property divided, while not contained in findings of fact and conclusions of law, are sufficiently set forth in the associate judge=s report so as to enable Michael to present three points complaining of the sufficiency of the evidence as to those findings. He makes no reference to the value of any property by the associate judge that he was not able to ascertain.
We also note that the case at bar is distinguishable from the order of this court in Panchal v. Panchal, supra. In that case, the trial court failed to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the characterization and value of each party=s assets, liabilities, claims, and offsets. Id. at 466. We found that the value of items divided by the trial court would affect the presentation of the appellant=s challenge to the division of the community estate. Id. We noted that, with respect to the value of the parties= stock portfolio, the appellant=s testimony gave a wide range of value and the record did not indicate the value the trial court attributed to it. Id. In the case at bar, the record reflects that the values assigned by the associate judge were set forth in the judge=s report in a way so as to enable Michael to present points of error complaining of the insufficiency of the evidence to support the findings. Consequently, Michael has not been harmed by the trial court=s failure to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. We overrule point four.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
PER CURIAM
August 31, 2004
Not designated for publication. See TEX.R.APP.P. 47.2(a).
Panel consists of: Arnot, C.J., and
McCall, J., and Hill, S.J.[1]
[1]John G. Hill, Former Chief Justice, Court of Appeals, 2nd District of Texas at Fort Worth sitting by assignment.