Fernandez, Michael Joseph v. Ruben Jaime Rivera

Opinion issued August 30, 2002

In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas  

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NO. 01-01-00834-CV

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MICHAEL JOSEPH FERNANDEZ, Appellant

V.

RUBEN JAIME RIVERA, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 157th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 98-56332

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O P I N I O N  

In this accelerated appeal, appellant, Michael Joseph Fernandez, brings an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment. Fernandez presents two issues on appeal, claiming the trial court erred in not granting summary judgment in his favor, based on governmental and qualified immunity, on all claims asserted by appellee, Ruben Jaime Rivera.

We reverse and render in part and affirm in part.

Facts and Procedural Background

In his second amended petition, Rivera sued Fernandez, a Houston Police Officer, ⁽¹⁾ in both his official and individual capacity, for negligence, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from an incident that occurred at Rivera's residence.

On the night of March 22, 1997, Officer Fernandez, on a low-priority dispatch call, went to Rivera's house to deliver a message to Margarita Gonzales, who was living there with Rivera. Vernon Gonzales, Margarita's husband, had reported he was unable to reach her by telephone and requested the dispatch to inform Margarita that their daughter was ill. Officer Fernandez arrived at Rivera's house and, when Rivera answered the front door, Fernandez asked to speak with Margarita Gonzales.

According to Officer Fernandez, when Rivera opened the door, Fernandez felt his safety was in jeopardy because Rivera appeared evasive and did not fully open the door. Rivera also refused to call Margarita to the door. Officer Fernandez alleged that, after Rivera refused to comply with his request to fully open the door, Fernandez pushed the door open, and Rivera then pushed Fernandez and hit him with his forearm and hand. Officer Fernandez then attempted to arrest Rivera, and the two men struggled through several rooms of the residence before additional officers arrived to assist in subduing Rivera.

The version of events presented by Rivera differed significantly from that presented by Officer Fernandez. Rivera denied ever striking Fernandez. According to Rivera, he fully opened the front door when asked to do so and immediately called Margarita Gonzales to the door. Rivera alleged that Gonzales told Officer Fernandez she had already spoken to her daughter and was aware that she was ill. However, Officer Fernandez ignored Gonzales, "violently" pushed the door back, grabbed Rivera, pushed and hit him with his hands and his flashlight or baton, and told Rivera he was "going to teach him a lesson." Rivera further alleged that all the other Houston Police officers, who arrived to assist Officer Fernandez, kicked him while he was on the ground.

Officer Fernandez answered the lawsuit and asserted governmental and qualified immunity from suit and liability. He subsequently filed his motion for summary judgment, seeking judgment as a matter of law on all claims raised by Rivera both on the grounds of immunity and on the merits of Rivera's claims. After a hearing, the trial court denied Fernandez's motion for summary judgment in its entirety.

We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2002), which permits an individual who is an officer of a political subdivision of the state to appeal the denial of a summary judgment based on an assertion of immunity. See City of Houston v. Kilburn, 849 S.W.2d 810, 812 (Tex. 1993).

Standard of Review

A party moving for summary judgment has the burden of proving there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985); Farah v. Mafrige & Kormanik, 927 S.W.2d 663, 670 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). When deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d. at 548-49. Every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor. Id. When a defendant moves for summary judgment, it must either: (1) disprove at least one element of the plaintiff's cause of action, or (2) plead and conclusively establish each essential element of its affirmative defense, thereby rebutting the plaintiff's cause of action. Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995); Farah, 927 S.W.2d at 670. We apply this standard in reviewing whether Fernandez established all of the elements of his affirmative defenses to Rivera's claims.

Official Capacity

In his second issue, Fernandez argues he, in his official capacity, is immune from suit and liability based on the affirmative defense of governmental immunity. ⁽²⁾    

Under the common-law doctrine of governmental immunity, a unit of government may not be sued without consent. Scott v. Prairie View A & M Univ., 7 S.W.3d 717, 719 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). A suit against a government employee in his official capacity is, in all respects, a suit against the governmental unit; thus, an employee sued in his official capacity is shielded by governmental immunity. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Hohman, 6 S.W.3d 767, 777 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). The City of Houston is a governmental unit generally immune from tort liability, except where the legislature has specifically waived that immunity. City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288, 291 (Tex. 1995); Reyes v. City of Houston, 4 S.W.3d 459, 461 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).

Intentional Tort Claims

The Texas Tort Claims Act provides a limited waiver of immunity for governmental units, including municipalities performing governmental functions such as providing police protection. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 101.021, .0215 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2002) ("the Act"). This waiver does not extend to suits for intentional torts. Id. § 101.057 (Vernon 1997).

Rivera's claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress are intentional tort claims. Hohman, 6 S.W.3d at 777 (intentional infliction of emotional distress); City of Hempstead v. Kmiec, 902 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (false arrest and malicious prosecution). Because there is no waiver of governmental immunity under the Act for intentional torts, Fernandez, in his official capacity, is immune from suit and liability for such claims. See Hohman, 6 S.W.3d at 777.

In the absence of a waiver of governmental immunity, a court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit against a governmental unit. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999). When a trial court learns that it lacks jurisdiction to hear a cause, the court must dismiss the cause and refrain from rendering a judgment on the merits. Li v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 984 S.W.2d 647, 654 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, writ denied).

We conclude the trial court erred in not dismissing, for want of subject matter jurisdiction, Rivera's intentional tort claims brought against Fernandez in his official capacity, and we sustain this portion of Fernandez's second issue.

Statutory Bar

Fernandez argues that, should we decide to reverse and render judgment of dismissal on Rivera's intentional tort claims alleged against Fernandez in his official capacity, section 101.106 of the Act bars Rivera from pursuing the intentional tort claims alleged against Fernandez in his individual capacity as well as the negligence claim brought against Fernandez in both his official and individual capacities.

Section 101.106 provides that "[a] judgment in an action or a settlement of a claim under this chapter bars any action involving the same subject matter by the claimant against the employee of the governmental unit whose act or omission gave rise to the claim." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.106 (Vernon 1997). Texas courts have held that this statutory bar may be triggered by a judgment against or in favor of a governmental entity. See Dallas County MHMR v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 343-44 (Tex. 1998). However, section 101.106 contemplates the existence of a final judgment against or in favor of a governmental unit. See Gibson v. Spinks, 895 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tex. 1995). Here, there has been no judgment against or in favor of a governmental unit because the City of Houston was not named as a party.

Accordingly, we conclude Rivera's remaining intentional tort and negligence claims are not barred by section 101.106.

Negligence Claim

The Act further provides that "[a] governmental unit . . . is liable for personal injury and death so caused by a condition or use of tangible personal or real property if the governmental unit would, were it a real person, be liable to the claimant according to Texas law." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1997). ⁽³⁾ Fernandez's liability, if any, in his official capacity, for Rivera's negligence claim, is derivative of the qualified immunity, ⁽⁴⁾   if any, which protects him in his individual capacity. See K.D.F. v. Rex, 878 S.W.2d 589-596-97 (Tex. 1994). If, in his individual capacity, Fernandez's qualified immunity protects him from Rivera's negligence claim, he is similarly protected from such claim in his official capacity.

We must, therefore, examine the extent to which Fernandez's qualified immunity protects him, in his individual capacity, both from Rivera's negligence and intentional tort claims.  

Individual Capacity

In his first issue, Fernandez argues the trial court erred in not granting summary judgment in his favor on Rivera's negligence and intentional tort claims alleged against Fernandez in his individual capacity.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense to claims brought against a government employee, in his individual capacity, that applies when the employee exercises discretion, in good faith, while acting within the scope of his official authority. Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 465 (Tex. 1997); Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Perez, 905 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. App--Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ). The purpose of the qualified immunity doctrine is to protect public officers from civil liability for conduct that would otherwise be actionable. City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex.1994).  

The parties do not dispute that, at all relevant times pertaining to the incident on March 22, 1997, Fernandez was performing the discretionary functions of a police officer while in the course and scope of his employment. The only dispute is whether Fernandez was acting in good faith in the performance of those duties.

Concerning good faith, Chambers held that an officer acts in good faith in a pursuit case if "a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar circumstances, could have believed that the need to immediately apprehend the suspect outweighed a clear risk of harm to the public in continuing the pursuit." Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656. The court derived this test from federal immunity law and stated as follows:

[W]e look to whether a reasonable official could have believed his or her conduct to be lawful in light of clearly established law and the information possessed by the official at the time the conduct occurred. Thus, qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law."

Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656 (quoting Swint v. City of Wadley, 5 F.3d 1435, 1441-42 (11th Cir.1993)). The "could have believed" aspect of the good-faith test means that in order to achieve summary judgment, an officer must prove that a reasonably prudent officer might have believed that his actions were justified. It does not mean that an officer has to prove that it would have been unreasonable not to act as he did; nor must the officer prove that all reasonably prudent officers would have acted as he did. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656-57. To controvert the officer's summary judgment proof on good faith, a plaintiff must do more than show that a reasonably prudent officer could have decided to act otherwise; the plaintiff must show that "no reasonable person in the defendant's position could have thought the facts were such that they justified defendant's acts." Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 657 (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986)).

In qualified immunity cases, good faith is measured against a standard of objective legal reasonableness, "without regard to the officer's subjective state of mind." Wadewitz, 951 S.W.2d at 466 (citing Chambers, 883 S.W.2d at 656). We apply the good faith test both to Rivera's negligence claims alleged against Fernandez in his official capacity and to his negligence and intentional tort claims alleged against Fernandez in his individual capacity. See Kmiec, 902 S.W.2d at 121 (holding police chief acted in good faith involving claims of false arrest, malicious prosecution, and defamation); Victory v. Bills, 897 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1995, no writ) (holding material fact issue existed sufficient to defeat summary judgment for sheriff's deputy on claims of assault and battery).

In the present case, Fernandez offered, as summary judgment evidence, his affidavit and that of his former supervisor, Houston Police Captain R. D. Ellen. Neither affidavit, nor any of Fernandez's other summary judgment evidence, addressed the facts as Rivera alleges they occurred. Rivera's deposition testimony was supported and corroborated by the deposition testimony of Margarita Gonzales. Neither we nor the trial court can resolve the factual differences presented by the evidence in Fernandez's favor. Taking Rivera's proof as true, as the trial court was required to do, Rivera's summary judgment evidence raised a material fact issue regarding whether any reasonable police officer would have acted as Rivera alleged Fernandez to have acted here. See City of Houston v. Davis, 57 S.W.3d 4, 7-8 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Roberts v. Foose, 7 S.W.3d 311, 315 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).

Therefore, in light of the contradictory proof on material facts presented by the summary judgment record, and Fernandez's failure to address the facts in the light most favorable to Rivera, we hold that Fernandez failed to produce sufficient proof to meet his burden to conclusively establish good faith and the trial court did not err in denying this portion of the motion for summary judgment.

We overrule Fernandez's first issue, and we overrule the portion of Fernandez's second issue concerning the negligence claim alleged against him in his official capacity.  

Merits of Rivera's Claims

Fernandez also argues that, notwithstanding our resolution of the issue of his immunity, he was entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Rivera's claims because, as a matter of law, Fernandez demonstrated Rivera cannot prevail on his causes of action and Rivera failed to present adequate summary judgment evidence to support all the elements of his causes of action. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c), (i). However, our interlocutory review of the denial of Fernandez's motion for summary judgment is limited to determining whether he is immune from the claims presented by Rivera. See Gallia v. Schreiber, 907 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ). Accordingly, we do not consider whether Fernandez has shown, as a matter of law, whether Rivera can prevail on the merits of his claims.

Conclusion

We reverse and render judgment of dismissal solely on Rivera's intentional tort claims brought against Fernandez in his official capacity. We affirm the remainder of the trial court's interlocutory order.

   Terry Jennings

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Mirabal, Hedges, and Jennings.

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.

1.

The City of Houston, Fernandez's employer, was not separately named as a defendant.

2.

Governmental immunity is also referred to as sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Brand v. Savage, 920 S.W.2d 672, 674 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ).

3.

Rivera argues the tangible personal property used here was Fernandez's baton and/or his flashlight (used as a baton, not merely for illumination).

4.

Qualified immunity is also referred to as official immunity. Brand, 920 S.W.2d at 674.