DocketNumber： 01-02-00322-CR
Filed Date： 7/18/2002
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/2/2015
Opinion issued July 18, 2002
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
____________
NOS. 01-02-00322-CR
01-02-00323-CR
____________
CALVIN MAURICE BRADLEY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 9th District Court
Waller County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 10647 and 10648
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant was charged with tampering with physical evidence and with possession with intent to deliver cocaine, weighing four grams or more but less than 200 grams. After denial of his motion to suppress, on December 7, 2001, appellant entered into a plea bargain agreement with the State in which the State's punishment recommendation would be that appellant: (1) be sentenced to 20 years confinement in each case to run concurrently, (2) check in at the jail at 5:00 p.m. on January 2, 2002, and (3) pay court costs of $241.25 in each case.
As part of that agreement, appellant waived in writing his right to file a motion for new trial and to appeal. The documents in question read, in pertinent part:
Defendant agrees to plead guilty to the above specified offense(s), true to enhancement and special issues, if any, in the indictment or information, judicially confess, and waive any right to a motion for new trial and appeal.
. . .
Having been informed of whatever right to pursue a motion for new trial and appeal may exist, and having agreed to waive those rights, and after having consulted with my attorney, I hereby voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive those rights.
Those portions of the documents were signed by appellant and his counsel under oath. The trial judge signed a statement that read:
The Court consents to and approves the foregoing waivers and consents to the stipulation and introduction of evidence. After having agreed to assess punishment consistent with the plea agreement, the Court hereby finds that the Defendant understands the consequences of waiving the right to a motion for new trial and appeal. The Defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived such right. Said waiver is accepted by the Court.
Appellant pleaded guilty in each case, and the trial court followed the terms of the plea bargain agreement in assessing punishment.
Despite having waived the right to appeal, appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal in each case. His appellate counsel then filed amended notices of appeal that stated the appeals were from the denial of the motion to suppress. Because appellant waived under oath any right to appeal as part of his plea bargain agreement, and because the trial judge followed that agreement, we hold appellant's waiver of his right to appeal was valid and enforceable. See Lacy v. State, 56 S.W.3d 287, 288 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Buck v. State, 45 S.W.3d 275, 278 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); see also Blanco v. State, 18 S.W.3d 218, 219-20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Bushnell v. State, 975 S.W.2d 641, 642-44 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd); Littleton v. State, 33 S.W.3d 41, 44 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2000, pet. ref'd).
Accordingly, we order the appeals dismissed.
All pending motions are denied as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Chief Justice Schneider, and Justices Nuchia and Radack.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.