DocketNumber： 01-02-00460-CV
Filed Date： 5/15/2003
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/2/2015
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
____________
NO. 01-02-00460-CV
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ALFONSO V. QUINTERO D/B/A QUINTERO BONDING COMPANY, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 400th District Court
Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 01-CV-119993
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Alfonso V. Quintero d/b/a Quintero Bonding Company (Quintero) appeals from a final judgment forfeiting a bail bond after entry of a judgment nisi. In three issues, Quintero contends that (1) there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to establish that the principal defendant signed the bond, (2) the bond was defective because it contained an improper admonishment regarding appointment of counsel, and (3) the trial court denied Quintero due process of law when it granted final judgment before allowing one year to elapse from the date the principal defendant failed to appear. We affirm.
Background
After he was charged with the felony offense of possession of a controlled substance, Guillermo Hurtado Giles entered into a bail bond with Quintero in the amount of $120,000. Giles failed to appear at his trial on July 9, 2001, and the trial court entered a judgment nisi on July 27, 2001, to which Quintero, as the named surety, filed an answer. Thereafter, the trial court held a hearing and rendered a final judgment forfeiting the bond.
Issue 1: Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first issue, Quintero contends that there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to establish that Giles signed the bond. Before a bail bond becomes valid, the principal defendant must sign the bond by name or mark. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.08(4) (Vernon Supp. 2003). In a bond forfeiture proceeding, the State has the burden of proof. See Deckard v. State, 615 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Deckard v. State, 605 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). The bond, along with the judgment nisi declaring its forfeiture, are the two essential elements of the State’s cause of action. See id. Once the State provides the bond and judgment nisi, forfeiture becomes final unless good cause is shown why the defendant did not appear. Deckard, 608 S.W.2d 675, 676 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).
In the instant case, the trial court took judicial notice of the bond and judgment nisi. The bond itself bears the signature of Giles. Quintero has offered no evidence to indicate that the signature was a forgery or that Giles did not sign the bond. Thus, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to show that Giles signed the bond.
We overrule issue one.
Issue 2: Improper Admonishment
In his second issue, Quintero contends that the bond was defective because it contained an improper admonishment regarding appointment of counsel. However, an admonishment regarding appointment of counsel is not a statutorily mandated requisite of a bail bond. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 17.08(4). Accordingly, the issue of whether the admonishment was proper is irrelevant when considering the bond’s validity. Even assuming, arguendo, that the admonishment was improper, we hold that the bond was not defective.
We overrule issue two.
Issue 3: Due Process
In his third issue, Quintero contends that the trial court denied him due process of law when the court granted final judgment before allowing one year to elapse from the date Giles failed to appear. According to Quintero, it was the informal policy of Fort Bend County to not seek a final judgment on a bond forfeiture until one year elapsed from the date the principal defendant failed to appear. Quintero argues that he relied on this policy when he signed the bond and that the trial court’s failure to adhere to the policy denied him due process.
Contrary to Quintero’s contentions, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Fort Bend County implemented the informal policy described by him. And even if it had, Quintero cites us to no authority to support his position that such an informal policy granted him a due process right in the policy’s enforcement. Quintero admitted at trial that Fort Bend County “wasn’t mandated to do that [wait one year] and the statute doesn’t require it.” Accordingly, we hold that Quintero has not shown that his due process rights were somehow violated when the trial court entered final judgment prior to one year elapsing from the date Giles failed to appear.
We overrule issue three.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Laura Carter Higley
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Alcala and Higley.