DocketNumber： 01-03-00317-CV
Filed Date： 12/23/2004
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/2/2015
Opinion issued December 23, 2004
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-03-00317-CV
ALICE JOSEPH, Appellant
V.
MIRROR FINISHES & COLLISION OF HOUSTON, INC., AND NUVELL FINANCIAL SERVICES CORPORATION, Appellees
On Appeal from the 333rd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1999-57266
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Alice Joseph sued (1) Gary Golden d/b/a West Houston Title Service (“West Houston Title”); (2) Mirror Finishes & Collision of Houston, Inc., (“Mirror Finishes-Houston”); (3) Mirror Finishes & Collision of Texas, L.L.C., (“Mirror Finishes-Texas”); (4) Unistar Financial Services Corporation, (“Unistar”); (5) Great Southern General Agency, (“Great Southern”); (6) Daniel L. DesChamps; (7) Mark A. Sparks; and (8) Nuvell Financial Services Corporation (“Nuvell”) to recover damages associated with the repossession and subsequent sale of her car. Appellee Nuvell then filed (1) a counterclaim against Joseph for the remaining balance due on her note; (2) a cross action against West Houston Title and Mirror Finishes-Houston d/b/a and a/k/a Mirror Finishes-Texas; and (3) a third-party action against Joseph’s husband, Wilbert J. Joseph, Jr. Joseph appeals two trial court orders granting summary judgments to Nuvell and to appellee Mirror Finishes-Houston. During the pendency of the appeal, our court twice requested that Joseph supplement our record, and once abated the case to allow the parties to clarify the finality of the trial court’s orders. Despite the efforts of the parties in response to our inquiries, the record before us demonstrates that this case lacks finality. We therefore dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Background
Joseph filed her lawsuit against numerous defendants to recover damages associated with the repossession and subsequent sale of her car. Nuvell then filed a counterclaim, a cross action, and a third-party action. Mirror Finishes-Houston filed a motion for partial summary judgment and a motion for final summary judgment. The trial court granted both of Mirror Finishes-Houston’s summary judgment motions. Nuvell also filed a motion for summary judgment against Joseph, which the trial court granted. Joseph filed her own motion for summary judgment against Mirror Finishes-Texas and West Houston Title. The trial court granted Joseph’s summary judgment against Mirror Finishes-Texas and West Houston Title. Joseph appeals the two trial court orders’s granting summary judgment to Nuvell and Mirror Finishes-Houston.
In an order issued in June 2003, we abated this appeal and remanded the case to the trial court. We directed Joseph to obtain a date for a trial court hearing to resolve claims involving herself and Mirror Finishes-Houston, and we directed the trial court to file a supplemental record containing a final judgment disposing of all parties and claims. In an order issued in October 2003, we lifted the abatement, reinstated Joseph’s appeal, and ordered the trial court to file a clerk’s record.
In this appeal, Joseph claims that the trial court erred in granting Mirror Finishes-Houston’s and Nuvell’s motions for summary judgment because: (1) the mechanic’s lien that resulted in the repossession and sale of her car is invalid, and thus disputed issues of material fact exist regarding her claims; (2) Nuvell failed to determine whether the Mirror Finishes-Houston possessed a valid lien, thus breaching its contract with Joseph; and (3) a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Joseph’s libel claims against Nuvell.Finality of the Motions for Summary Judgment
The summary judgments from which Joseph appeals are neither final nor appealable because they do not dispose of all parties and claims before the trial court, neither by express recitation purporting to do so, nor as a factual matter apparent from the face of the record. The general rule, with a few mostly statutory exceptions not implicated here, is that an appeal may be taken only from a final judgment; that is, a judgment disposing of all pending parties and claims. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Absent a conventional trial on the merits, a judgment is final for purposes of appeal only if it disposes of all pending parties and claims in the record. Id. The intent to finally dispose of the case must be unequivocally expressed in the words of the judgment or be apparent from the record. Id. at 200.
Here, the summary judgments neither dispose of every pending claim and party, nor do they purport to be a final judgment as to “all claims and parties.” The record in this case supports the interlocutory nature of the two summary judgment orders at issue in this appeal. There is no “final” judgment in this case, nor do either of the orders of the trial court granting summary judgment to Mirror Finishes-Houston and to Nuvell on Joseph’s claims purport to dispose of all parties and all claims. The record contains no dismissal order, non-suit, or other instrument—i.e., a pleading amendment, a dismissal for want of prosecution, or a final judgment that disposes of Joseph’s claims against the remaining six defendants. The record also lacks any final orders disposing of Nuvell’s counterclaim, cross action, or third- party action. Moreover, the two orders Joseph complains of on appeal have not been severed by the main action.
The record does reflect that the trial court issued an order granting Joseph’s motion for summary judgment against two other defendants, Mirror Finishes-Texas and West Houston Title. However, these summary judgment orders do not reduce Joseph’s award to a money judgment, or any other specific form of relief, nor do they purport to show that Joseph has a final judgment against either of these defendants for any of the causes of action enumerated in her petition. Thus, the summary judgment orders in favor of Joseph on her affirmative claims are also interlocutory in nature. This case lacks finality and thus we lack jurisdiction to hear any direct appeal. See id.
Conclusion
Based on the language of the summary judgment orders and the record presented, we hold that the summary judgments at issue in this appeal are neither final nor appealable. We therefore dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Jane Bland
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Taft, Jennings and Bland.