DocketNumber： 01-03-00380-CR
Filed Date： 7/8/2004
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/2/2015
Opinion issued July 8, 2004
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NOS. 01-03-00380-CR 01-03-00381-CR
____________
NOVELL QUINTIN WOODS JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 337th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 909704 and 928529
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In two separate cases, which were tried together, the trial court found appellant, Novell Quintin Woods Jr., guilty of the first degree felony offense of burglary and the second degree felony offense of aggravated assault. The trial court then made an affirmative finding that appellant had used a deadly weapon during the commission of the aggravated assault, assessed appellant’s punishment at confinement for 18 years in each case, and sentenced appellant accordingly, with the sentences to run concurrently.
In four points of error, appellant contends that the evidence was factually insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated assault, the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction for burglary, and the trial court erred in denying his motions for a new trial, which were filed in each case, without first holding hearings on the motions.
We affirm.
Factual Background
Julia Dominguez testified that she had met appellant in 2000 and, although he was married to another woman, they had begun a romantic relationship. Appellant eventually moved into her apartment and lived with Dominguez until early April 2002, when she “thr[e]w him out” following an argument.
On April 12, 2002, while Dominguez was spending the evening at her apartment with her boyfriend, Charles Mulkey, her 10-year-old daughter, Amanda, and Amanda’s 10-year-old friend, Courtney McRae, appellant knocked on the front door of Dominguez’s apartment. When Dominguez looked through the “peephole” in the door and saw appellant, she became alarmed and upset because she had not invited appellant to come to her apartment that evening and she did not want appellant to know that Mulkey was at her apartment because Mulkey hated appellant. While appellant stood outside the apartment, Dominguez called him on his cellular telephone “to ask him to just go away so there would not be a confrontation between him and [Mulkey].”
Dominguez explained that, after Mulkey learned that appellant was outside the apartment, Mulkey retrieved, from Dominguez’s bedroom, a .25 caliber handgun that Dominguez had borrowed from a friend. Mulkey then told Dominguez, “I’m going to get that MF [sic]. He’s got to go down.” Dominguez and Mulkey then struggled over the gun, and Amanda yelled either “Stop!” or “No, Jackie, no!” During the struggle, Dominguez noticed that the gun had “jammed,” but she did not know if it had jammed during the struggle or sometime earlier.
Appellant then broke down the door of Dominguez’s apartment, came into her bedroom, “leaned across” the bed, and began fighting with Mulkey, who was on the opposite side of the bed from the bedroom door. Although it was undisputed that, during his intrusion into the apartment, appellant had stabbed Mulkey twice, had also stabbed Dominguez in the stomach, arm, and shoulder, and had cut off part of Dominguez’s ear, Dominguez testified that she did not see whether appellant had a knife and did not recall being involved in the struggle. Dominguez explained that, after she had seen appellant fighting with Mulkey, her next memory was of being in the hospital and that she did not remember receiving any of the injuries that she had sustained.
When the State asked Dominguez whether she had given appellant “permission to kick [her] door in,” Dominguez stated that she was confused by the question, refused to answer, and then invoked her Fifth Amendment right not to testify. In response to a question by appellant’s counsel concerning whether appellant had entered the apartment with her consent, Dominguez responded, “I would say it would be with it, because I believe he was trying to help us.”
Dominguez further testified that, although she had known Mulkey for most of her life, she had become “reacquainted” with him in June 2001, when they had begun a romantic relationship. During their relationship, Mulkey had choked and hit Dominguez and had threatened to kill her and to hurt appellant. Dominguez believed that appellant was aware of Mulkey’s prior violence and threats because, prior to the incident in question, appellant had gone with Dominguez when she had obtained a protective order against Mulkey while he was in jail in San Antonio. Although the protective order was in effect on the night of the stabbings, Dominguez admitted that she had invited Mulkey to visit and to stay with her and, a day or two earlier, had purchased and sent him a bus ticket so that he could travel to Houston to see her.
McRae testified that she had gone to Dominguez’s apartment that day to spend the night with Amanda and that she and Amanda were in Dominguez’s bedroom when appellant broke down the apartment door. When McRae saw appellant come into the bedroom and stab Mulkey with a knife, she, out of fear, ran into the hallway of the apartment and yelled for Amanda to come with her. McRae then saw Dominguez run backwards out of the bedroom, with appellant following her. When Dominguez reached the apartment’s patio door, McRae saw appellant stab her several times and heard Amanda yell at him to stop. After McRae telephoned for emergency assistance, appellant left, and McRae saw that Dominguez’s ear was “hanging off.” McRae further testified that, some time after the incident, either Amanda or Dominguez had told McRae that Mulkey had threatened to kill appellant.
Mulkey testified that, beginning in August 2000, he had lived with Dominguez at her apartment for approximately one and one-half months. Mulkey moved out after he and Dominguez “began having some complications” because of appellant’s telephone calls to Dominguez’s apartment. Mulkey, who had been “on a monitor situation,” then returned to San Antonio, turned himself in, and spent six months in jail. Dominguez had visited Mulkey every Friday while he was in jail in San Antonio. Although Mulkey admitted that, before his release, he had been served with a protective order requiring him to stay away from Dominguez, he denied that he had beaten or had threatened to kill Dominguez. After his release, Mulkey came to Houston to stay with Dominguez because she had told him that she needed to see him.
When Mulkey heard a knock on the apartment door on the evening in question, he heard Dominguez “gasp.” Mulkey determined that appellant was at the door and went to look for Dominguez’s gun in the bedroom. Mulkey explained that he had intended to open the door and to tell appellant to leave, but when he retrieved the gun, Dominguez and Amanda argued with him and told him that they did not want him to get into any trouble. Mulkey then put the gun in his pocket and sat on the bed, and Dominguez left the bedroom. A few minutes later, Mulkey heard a “big boom,” stood up, and saw that appellant had kicked down the apartment door and was holding a knife in his hand. Appellant then came into the bedroom and attacked Mulkey before Mulkey could pull the gun out of his pocket. Mulkey testified that he was stabbed in the chest and neck and was bleeding profusely. Appellant then left the bedroom, and Mulkey heard him screaming, “I thought you loved me.” Mulkey did not see appellant stab Dominguez or Amanda.
Appellant then returned to the bedroom and told Mulkey, “When I come back, I’m going to kill you.” As appellant turned and left the apartment, Mulkey tried to shoot him with Dominguez’s gun, but the gun jammed. Mulkey then ran out of the bedroom and saw Dominguez, Amanda, and McRae on the sidewalk outside the apartment. Dominguez was lying on the ground, and Mulkey saw that she had been stabbed three or four times and that part of her ear had been cut off.
Appellant testified that he had gone to Dominguez’s apartment that evening to talk and to try to “get back together” with her and that he did not know that Mulkey was there. Appellant knocked on the door of the apartment, and, when no one answered, he began to walk away. As appellant was leaving, Dominguez called him on his cellular telephone. Dominguez sounded “nervous” on the telephone, and, after appellant heard Amanda in the background yell, “No, Jackie, no,” appellant kicked down the apartment door. Appellant explained that, at the time that he kicked down the door, he was aware that Mulkey had previously threatened Dominguez and that Dominguez had obtained a protective order against Mulkey. Although Dominguez had not invited him into the apartment, appellant kicked down the door because he believed that Mulkey was inside the apartment and was hurting Dominguez or Amanda.
Inside the apartment, appellant saw Mulkey and Dominguez fighting in the bedroom. After Mulkey had pointed a gun at him, appellant pulled a knife out of his pocket and attacked Mulkey. During his struggle with Mulkey, appellant heard Dominguez tell him, “Novell, stop. Novell, please.” When asked whether he had intentionally stabbed Dominguez, appellant testified, “Not to my recollection. I mean, I was swinging, and I don’t know.” Appellant stated that he did not remember stabbing Dominguez, hearing Amanda or McRae screaming, or leaving later to buy beer. Appellant further testified that, not long after the stabbings, Dominguez and her daughter had visited him in jail and that, while he was in jail awaiting trial, he and Dominguez had discussed the idea of getting married.
Houston Police Officer D. Cohen testified that, on April 12, 2002, while on patrol, he was dispatched to investigate the disturbance at Dominguez’s apartment. Upon his arrival, Cohen spoke to a security guard and, based on the guard’s description of appellant, Cohen located appellant at a nearby convenience store. Cohen arrested appellant as appellant was leaving the store with a beer in his hand. Cohen found a bloody knife in appellant’s back pocket and saw that appellant had blood on his clothing.
When Officer Cohen returned to the apartment to speak with Dominguez, Amanda, and Mulkey, he saw “blood everywhere.” Amanda, who had a cut on her hand and appeared to be upset, told Cohen what had happened at the apartment, and he described her statement as follows:
She had stated that [appellant] had come to the house. He was knocking on the door. Her mom kept telling him to leave, she didn’t want to talk to him, and after a few minutes all of a sudden they hear the door come crashing open, crash open.
She stated that [appellant] went in the room, started assaulting Mr. Mulkey with a knife. The mother tried to stop the assault. He then stabbed Julia. At that point she stated she tried to stop him from assaulting her mother and he had pushed her out of the way, and I believe at that point that’s when her hand had gotten cut. Then he had stopped assaulting the mom and again came back and stabbed Mr. Mulkey in the neck. At that point I believe she stated that her mother had ran [sic] outside, with [appellant] following her. He had punched her, knocked her to the ground, and at that point started stabbing her outside the apartment.
The State introduced into evidence Dominguez’s and Amanda’s medical records from Ben Taub Hospital, where they had received medical treatment that evening. Those records indicate that Amanda gave the following description of that evening’s events to the hospital’s emergency room personnel:
[Amanda] describes [appellant]–41 yrs–maternal ex-boyfriend came to home; was angry b/c mom was in communication [with] another ex-boyfriend “Jackie.” [Appellant] apparently knocked door down & began stabbing “Jackie” and [Amanda]’s mom. [Amanda] notes she tried to help mom & was stabbed in [left] hand & hit in [right] mandibular area.
Sufficiency of the Evidence—Aggravated Assault
In his first point of error, appellant argues that the evidence was factually insufficient to support his conviction for the aggravated assault of Mulkey “because the State failed to disprove that [appellant] assaulted [Mulkey] in self-defense.” A person commits the offense of aggravated assault if the person intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another by using a deadly weapon. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.02(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004). Appellant concedes that he intentionally stabbed Mulkey, but he contends that his conduct was immediately necessary to protect himself or Dominguez from Mulkey.
Self-defense and defense of third person are classified as “defenses” to prosecution. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 2.03, 9.02, 9.31, 9.33 (Vernon 2003). Once a defendant produces some evidence that supports a defense, the State then bears the burden of persuasion to disprove the defense. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). “The burden of persuasion is not one that requires the production of evidence, rather it requires only that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. A guilty verdict constitutes an implicit finding by the fact finder against the defensive theory of self-defense. Id. When a defendant challenges the factual sufficiency of the rejection of a defense, the reviewing court reviews all of the evidence in a neutral light and asks whether the State’s evidence taken alone is too weak to support the finding and whether the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 595. As the Court of Criminal Appeals has recently stated:
There is only one question to be answered in a factual-sufficiency review: Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
Zuniga v. State, No. 539-02, slip op. at 8, 2004 WL 840786 at *7, (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 21, 2004) (footnote omitted).
In a factual sufficiency review, we may not substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The fact finder is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the witnesses’ testimony, and the fact finder may believe all, some, or none of any witness’s testimony. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Jaggers v. State, 125 S.W.3d 661, 672 (Tex App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
The Penal Code provides that “a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree he reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force.” Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 9.31(a). A person may justifiably use deadly force against another (1) if he would be justified in using force against the other under section 9.31, (2) if a reasonable person in the actor’s situation would not have retreated, and (3) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes that the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force or to prevent the other’s imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated robbery. Id. § 9.32(a).
A person may also justifiably use deadly force against another to protect a third person if, under the circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the actor would be justified under sections 9.31 or 9.32 in using force or deadly force to protect himself against the unlawful force or unlawful deadly force that he reasonably believes to be threatening the third person whom he seeks to protect and if the actor reasonably believes that his intervention is immediately necessary to protect the third person. Id. § 9.33. A “reasonable belief” is defined as one that would be held by “an ordinary and prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor.” Id. § 1.07(42) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
Appellant argues that he was justified in defending himself and Dominguez from Mulkey because he reasonably believed that Mulkey had threatened them with a gun. He notes that Dominguez and McRae confirmed that Mulkey had been a previous threat to Dominguez and that Dominguez “corroborated the fact” that Mulkey pointed a gun at appellant prior to the stabbing. Appellant asserts that retreat was not a reasonable alternative because, by the time that he saw the gun, he was already inside the apartment and was “fearful for Ms. Dominguez’s safety.” Moreover, he notes that Mulkey’s testimony was not credible because of his “numerous prior felony convictions,” his attempt to hide the gun from police officers, contradictions between his testimony and that of other witnesses, and his motive to lie—implicating himself in committing another felony offense.
Appellant testified that, based on his knowledge of Dominguez’s violent prior relationship with Mulkey and on Amanda’s scream that he heard on his telephone, appellant kicked down the apartment door because he believed that Mulkey was inside the apartment and was hurting either Dominguez or Amanda. Appellant explained that, once inside the apartment, he saw Mulkey and Dominguez fighting, he stabbed Mulkey only after Mulkey had pointed a gun at him, and he did not remember stabbing Dominguez.
Dominguez testified that, as she was talking to appellant on the telephone to ask him to leave, Mulkey found out that appellant was outside, got Dominguez’s gun from her bedroom, and threatened to kill appellant. Dominguez further testified that, when she and Mulkey struggled for the gun, Amanda yelled “Stop!” or “No, Jackie, no!” Despite the fact that she was stabbed several times, Dominguez testified that she could not remember whether she had seen appellant holding a knife.
In contrast, Mulkey testified that he had been sitting in Dominguez’s bedroom with the gun in his pocket when appellant kicked down the door of the apartment and attacked him with a knife. Mulkey heard appellant yell at Dominguez, “I thought you loved me.” Mulkey further testified that he had not pointed the gun at appellant until after appellant had stabbed Mulkey and Dominguez and as appellant was leaving the apartment. Moreover, Officer Cohen testified that Amanda had told him that, after her mother had asked appellant to leave, appellant kicked the door down and then started stabbing Mulkey. When her mother tried to stop appellant, Amanda saw him stab her mother. Amanda also told Cohen that appellant had later followed her mother outside the apartment and had punched her, knocked her down, and stabbed her again. McRae also testified that she saw appellant chase Dominguez across the apartment and stab her several times.
With regard to appellant’s contention that he stabbed Mulkey in self-defense, appellant and Mulkey presented differing versions of events in their testimony concerning whether Mulkey had pointed the gun at appellant before appellant stabbed him. Although Dominguez testified that Mulkey had threatened to shoot appellant with the gun, Dominguez did not testify that Mulkey had ever pointed the gun at appellant inside the apartment. McRae testified that she had not seen Mulkey point a gun at appellant before appellant stabbed him, but also testified that either Dominguez or Amanda had later told her that Mulkey had threatened to shoot appellant with the gun. Moreover, appellant’s argument that he stabbed Mulkey while acting in the defense of Dominguez and Amanda was undercut by the testimony and photographic evidence presented at trial that appellant stabbed Dominguez, both in another room and outside the apartment, several times after he had stabbed Mulkey.
The trial court, as the fact finder, was entitled to resolve these conflicts in the evidence against appellant. Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 647. Faced with different versions of the events that took place inside the apartment that evening, the trial court simply chose not to believe appellant’s testimony that he had acted in defense, either of himself, Dominguez, or Amanda, when he stabbed Mulkey. In regard to Mulkey’s credibility, we note that the trial court, as fact finder, was free to believe all, some, or none of any witness’s testimony. See Sharp, 707 S.W.2d at 614. In regard to appellant’s challenge to the factual sufficiency of the trial court’s rejection of his claims of self-defense and of defense of third persons, viewing all of the evidence in a neutral light, we hold that the evidence of guilt, taken alone, was not too weak to support appellant’s conviction for the aggravated assault of Mulkey and that the proof of guilt was not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was factually sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for the aggravated assault of Mulkey.
We overrule appellant’s first point of error.
Sufficiency of the Evidence—Burglary
In his second and third points of error, appellant contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient (1) to prove that he entered Dominguez’s apartment without her effective consent and (2) to refute his defense that he entered the apartment out of necessity to protect Dominguez.
In reviewing the evidence on legal sufficiency grounds, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
Necessity, like self-defense and defense of a third person, is a “defense” to prosecution. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 2.03, 9.02, 9.22 (Vernon 2003). As noted above, the State bears the burden of persuasion to disprove such a defense, which “requires only that the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594. In regard to appellant’s challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the rejection of his defense of necessity, we review all of the evidence in a neutral light, and we ask whether the State’s evidence, taken alone, is too weak to support the finding and whether the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See id.
A person commits the offense of burglary if, without the effective consent of the owner, the person (1) enters a habitation with the intent to commit an assault or (2) enters a habitation and commits an assault. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 30.02 (Vernon 2003). A property owner’s lack of consent to the entry may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. See Schenk v. State, 652 S.W.2d 509, 510 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, pet. ref’d). In regard to necessity, conduct that is otherwise criminal is justified if (1) the actor reasonably believes that the conduct is immediately necessary to avoid imminent harm; (2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh, according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the conduct; and (3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the conduct does not otherwise plainly appear. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 9.22.
In support of his legal sufficiency challenge, appellant asserts that Dominguez stated that he did not need consent to enter her apartment when he believed that she was in danger. However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding of guilt, we note that appellant admitted that Dominguez had not invited him into the apartment before he kicked down the door and forced his way inside. Dominguez testified that, one or two weeks earlier, she had thrown appellant out of her apartment, and she admitted that, when appellant knocked on her door that night, she did not invite him into her apartment because she wanted to avoid a confrontation between him and Mulkey. Moreover, there is ample evidence in the record that after he entered the apartment, appellant, did not “protect” Dominguez. Rather, he inflicted serious stab wounds to both Mulkey and Dominguez. In fact, McRae testified that she saw appellant chase Dominguez across the apartment and stab her several times. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that appellant entered Dominguez’s apartment without her effective consent and the trial court’s rejection of appellant’s defense that he entered the apartment out of necessity to protect Dominguez.
Appellant argues that the evidence was factually insufficient to support his burglary conviction because Dominguez testified that she consented to his entry of her apartment “under the circumstances” and because there “was more evidence” to support his necessity defense “than there was to defeat it.” He asserts that the evidence established that Mulkey was a “potential threat” to Dominguez and that Mulkey “grabbed” the gun prior to appellant’s entrance into the apartment. In support of his factual sufficiency challenge, appellant relies on (1) Dominguez’s refusal to answer the State’s question as to whether she had given permission to appellant to kick down the door of her apartment and (2) Dominguez’s testimony that she felt that appellant had entered the apartment because he was “trying to help” her and Amanda.
However, the trial court, as the fact finder, was entitled to weigh the credibility of Dominguez’s testimony in light of her reluctance to answer the State’s questions, inability to remember details of the events, and apparent reconciliation with appellant prior to trial. See Sharp, 707 S.W.2d at 614; Jaggers, 125 S.W.3d at 672. Moreover, the trial court also heard evidence that appellant had gone to Dominguez’s apartment to try to “get back together” with her, after having been recently forced to move out, and that he was surprised to find Mulkey staying with her. Mulkey testified that, after appellant forced his way into the apartment, appellant had yelled at Dominguez, “I thought you loved me” as he chased and then stabbed her several times. The record thus supports a finding that appellant entered the apartment out of jealousy, without Dominguez’s consent, to assault Mulkey and Dominguez, rather than to “protect” Dominguez. In regard to appellant’s challenge to the factual sufficiency of the trial court’s finding that appellant had entered Dominguez’s apartment without her effective consent and the trial court’s rejection of appellant’s necessity defense, viewing all of the evidence in a neutral light, we hold that the evidence of guilt, taken alone, was not too weak to support appellant’s burglary conviction and that the proof of guilt was not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 595. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was factually sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for burglary.
We overrule appellant’s second and third points of error.
Motions for New Trial
In his fourth point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying, without a hearing, the motions for new trial that he filed in each case. In his motions for new trial, appellant argued that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial request to withdraw his waiver of his right to trial by jury in each case.
A defendant is entitled to a hearing on a motion for new trial if the motion and any accompanying affidavits raise matters, not determinable from the record, upon which the defendant could be entitled to relief. Wallace v. State, 106 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). To be sufficient to entitle the defendant to a hearing, the motion for new trial and any accompanying affidavits must indicate that reasonable grounds exist for holding that such relief could be granted. Martinez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 19, 21-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The purpose of the hearing is to give the defendant an opportunity to develop fully the matters raised in his motion. Id. at 21. If the trial court denies a hearing on the motion for new trial and the defendant appeals from that denial, the appellate court must review the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion. Wallace, 106 S.W.3d at 108.
Here, prior to trial, and in accordance with the State’s agreement not to seek punishment of confinement for more than 20 years in each case in the event of a conviction, appellant’s court-appointed counsel filed a waiver of appellant’s right to a jury trial in each case. The following day, and while appellant was still represented by counsel, appellant filed pro se motions to withdraw his waiver of his right to a jury trial in each case. As noted above, the cases were subsequently tried to the bench together. Following his conviction, appellant filed motions for new trial in each case, arguing that, prior to trial, the trial court should have granted his withdrawal of his waiver of the right to a jury trial. Appellant argues that the trial court was required to hold a hearing on his motion for new trial “to establish whether there was a finding that the withdrawal [of appellant’s waiver of a jury trial] would have resulted in an unreasonable delay, or impedance of justice, or prejudice to the State, or inconvenience to witnesses.”
The record indicates that appellant’s pro se motions to withdraw his waiver of the right to a jury trial were never presented to the trial court for a ruling, either before or at any time during trial. Nevertheless, the trial court was not required to consider appellant’s pro se pretrial motions because, at the time that they were filed, appellant was already represented by court-appointed trial counsel. There is no right to hybrid representation. Rudd v. State, 616 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); McKinny v. State, 76 S.W.3d 463, 478 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Thus, appellant’s motions for new trial did not show the existence of reasonable grounds for holding that the requested relief could be granted. See Martinez, 74 S.W.3d at 21-22. Moreover, the record indicates that appellant’s waivers of his right to a jury trial were made in accordance with an agreement that he had made with the State concerning its request for punishment in the event of a conviction—an agreement that the State kept and that the trial court followed in assessing appellant’s punishment at confinement for 18 years in each case.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motions for new trial. See Wallace, 106 S.W.3d at 108.
We overrule appellant’s fourth point of error.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Terry Jennings
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Jennings, and Keyes.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).