Shirley Hill Chumley v. Donald Charles Barhorst

Opinion issued April 14, 2005  

In The  

Court of Appeals

For The  

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-03-01342-CV

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SHIRLEY HILL CHUMLEY, Appellant

V.

DONALD CHARLES BARHORST, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 127th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2002-31508

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  MEMORANDUM OPINIONThis is an appeal from a take-nothing judgment rendered in favor of appellee, Donald Charles Barhorst. Appellant, Shirley Hill Chumley, filed a negligence action for the injuries she sustained as a result of an automobile collision. On appeal, the issues are (1) whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s findings on liability, damages, and malice (issues one, two, four through seven, and nine); and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in overruling appellant’s motion for new trial (issues three, eight, and ten). We reverse and remand.   

BACKGROUND

            On January 19, 2002, Chumley drove along Cypresswood Drive on a clear, dry afternoon. She stopped at a red traffic light at the corner of the Interstate 45 service road. After the light turned green, Chumley began to drive through the intersection. Barhorst’s vehicle, which was traveling north on the service road, drove through the red light at this intersection and collided into the side of Chumley’s vehicle. Chumley was severely injured and knocked unconscious.

          Chumley sued Barhorst under a negligence theory of liability. The case was tried before a jury, which found that (1) Barhorst’s negligence, if any, did not proximately cause the occurrence in question; (2) Chumley was awarded zero damages for physical pain and mental anguish in the future, lost earning capacity in the future, physical impairment in the future, and disfigurement in the past and future; (3) Chumley’s harm did not result from malice; and (4) no exemplary damages should be assessed against Barhorst. The trial court entered a take-nothing judgment in favor of Barhorst on October 10, 2003. Chumley moved for a new trial, but the trial court denied her motion.

DISCUSSION

          In issue two, Chumley contends the evidence is factually insufficient to support the jury’s failure to find that Barhorst was a proximate cause of the occurrence in question.   

          To prevail on a negligence claim, Chumley was required to prove all three of the following: (1) Barhorst owed a legal duty; (2) he breached that duty; and (3) the breach proximately caused her injuries. Van Horn v. Chambers, 970 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tex. 1998); Prime Prods., Inc. v. S.S.I. Plastics, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 631, 635 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied). Proximate cause requires that the negligent act or omission was (1) a cause-in-fact of the injury, i.e., a substantial factor in bringing about the injury and without which it would not have occurred, and (2) foreseeable, i.e., a person of ordinary intelligence should have anticipated the danger created by the negligent act or omission. Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477-78 (Tex. 1995).   

Sufficiency of Evidence  

          Because Chumley challenges the sufficiency of the evidence related to several of the jury’s liability and damages findings, we begin by setting out the applicable standard of review for such a challenge. Chumley attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse jury finding on which she has the burden of proof. In reviewing a claim that the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, we consider and weigh all of the evidence, and may set aside the verdict only if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. Vickery v. Vickery, 999 S.W.2d 342, 376 (Tex. 1999); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986).

            A court of appeals may reverse and remand a case for new trial if it concludes that the jury’s “failure to find” is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex. 1998). A court of appeals must detail the evidence relevant to the issue in consideration, clearly state why the jury’s finding is factually insufficient or so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, and state in what regard the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence in support of the verdict. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001); Ames v. Ames, 776 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Tex. 1989). An appellate court cannot substitute its opinion for that of the trier of fact and determine that it would reach a different conclusion. Glockzin v. Rhea, 760 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied).

          We begin by reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence. For evidence supporting the jury’s failure to find Barhorst’s negligence, if any, a proximate cause of Chumley’s injuries, Barhorst relies on his own testimony and that of his wife, Mrs. Barhorst. Barhorst had driven approximately one million miles in his life and had never been involved in a traffic accident before January 19, 2002. The day of the accident, Barhorst felt awake, alert, and in complete control of his mental and physical faculties. Barhorst testified that he did not have any problems controlling his vehicle and did not feel any impairments until he admittedly “blacked out” going down the exit ramp just before the accident. Mrs. Barhorst testified that she had never before observed her husband lose consciousness like he did on this occasion, except for a grand-mal seizure Barhorst had in the middle of the night “back in the seventies,” at least twenty years prior to the incident in question. Barhorst testified that, since the grand-mal seizure, he had been taking medication. The medication he was taking at the time of the accident, Tegatral XR, never made him feel like he was limited in what he could do. Moreover, he testified he did not feel he was putting anyone at risk by driving on the day of the accident. However, this testimony, which supports the jury’s finding that Barhorst was not a proximate cause of Chumley’s injuries, is weak. Therefore, we must examine the entire record to determine if the evidence against the fact finder’s determination is so great as to make this determination manifestly unjust. Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Maxus Exploration Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 276 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1988, writ denied).

          To support her position that, contrary to the jury’s finding, Barhorst was a proximate cause of Chumley’s injuries, Chumley points to the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Barhorst, Officer L. Anders, and eyewitness Elizabeth Galindo. The jury may believe one witness and disbelieve another, and it may resolve inconsistencies in any testimony. Eberle v. Adams, 73 S.W.3d 322, 327 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).   

          Prior to the accident, Elizabeth Galindo was driving in the left lane traveling eastbound on Cypresswood, next to Chumley’s vehicle. Galindo estimated that Barhorst’s vehicle was traveling at a rate of speed of approximately 40 to 45 miles per hour. Galindo testified that Chumley entered the intersection when Chumley’s light was green. Galindo witnessed Barhorst’s vehicle approaching Chumley’s vehicle and saw it collide with Chumley’s vehicle after Chumley went through the intersection.   

          Officer Anders, a police officer assigned to the accident investigation division of the Harris County Sheriff’s Department, investigated the accident involving Chumley and Barhorst. Anders testified that, based on the information he gathered at the scene of the accident, Barhorst was responsible for the accident. Based on his investigation, Anders testified that Barhorst’s vehicle drove through a red traffic light, which caused him to collide with Chumley’s vehicle. Anders did not find any skid marks on Barhorst’s vehicle, and concluded from this fact that Barhorst did not brake before the collision.

          Mrs. Barhorst, a passenger in her husband’s vehicle, also testified at trial regarding the accident. She testified that she assumed her husband’s traffic light at the intersection was red because the vehicles in front of her husband’s vehicle were all stopped. She also stated that she did not deny that her husband “ran the red light and crashed into Shirley Chumley’s car.” Mrs. Barhorst saw her husband’s hands and legs become rigid prior to the accident.  

          Barhorst discussed blacking out and losing consciousness. Barhorst testified that, besides the grand-mal seizure in the mid 1970s, he had never lost consciousness before the accident in question, but that he had experienced periodic feelings of light-headedness where he felt like he was falling asleep. Barhorst explained, “[W]hen I was at home, I periodically--and this is every two or three, four, five months, don’t know because it was not repetitive, I would have this light-headedness or gray area.” During these episodes, which would last four or five seconds, his hands would become “a little slow in reacting [sic] what you want to do.” He would experience dizziness, which would sometimes occur after driving; blurry vision during which things would slide out of focus; loss of control over his hands; and difficulty moving his arms. Dr. Randolph Evans, a neurologist that Barhorst saw after the accident, recorded Barhorst’s description of these episodes by stating Barhorst “believes he has a seizure about once every couple of months.”

          At trial, Barhorst did not deny that he ran the red light at the intersection at which the accident occurred, but he claimed he does not remember doing so because he lost consciousness. Contrary to his deposition testimony that indicated he told someone two days after the accident that his foot was on the accelerator, Barhorst testified, “If I was in a blacked-out condition at the time, I may have had my foot on the accelerator as stated here.” During his direct examination, Barhorst testified to the following regarding the foreseeability of the accident:

[Counsel]:   Okay. So given the history of seizures, light-headedness, it was foreseeable that you could have one of these episodes at any time, including on January 19, 2002. Correct?

[Barhorst]:   As I review it, yes. Went back over it, yes.

[Counsel]:   In fact, you said as you look back over it, Mr. Barhorst, it actually occurred to you before that you could have one of these seizures, light-headedness episodes while you were driving. True?

[Barhorst]:   Looking back over it, thinking back over it, yes.

[Counsel]:   I’m sorry. I didn’t make my question clear. Even before January 19 of 2002, it had occurred to you that this could happen to you, didn’t it? Right?

[Barhorst]:   Yes.

[Counsel]:   And if you were driving, unlike working in the yard or doing something else, you would not have the opportunity to stop or sit down and let it pass. Right?

[Barhorst]:   Thinking back over it, yes, you are right.

[Counsel]:   And it would certainly not be a safe thing for you to drive while you were going through one of these episodes. True?

[Barhorst]:   Probably not.

. . .

[Counsel]:   Knowing that you drove anyway and caused this terrible car wreck on January 19, 2002?

[Barhorst]:   I was driving on January 19, 2002, yes.

[Counsel]:   Now, you were taking medication to stop or help you with the seizures, were you not?

[Barhorst]:   Yes.

[Counsel]:   And, in fact, it was medication called Tegatral?

[Barhorst]:   Tegatral XR.

[Counsel]:   That is a -- specifically, that is a seizure medication. Correct?

[Barhorst]:   Yes.

[Counsel]:   And it also has, I believe you experienced side effects of drowsiness, double vision, dizziness when you take teg trawl [sic]?

[Barhorst]:   If you take too much Tegatral, you get the double vision.

[Counsel]:   That is the medicine that you were taking that day. Correct?

[Barhorst]:   Yes.

On cross-examination, Barhorst admitted that, prior to the accident, he had thought about the possibility of having an episode of light-headedness while he was driving. Barhorst also went on to testify that the accident was his fault.

[Counsel]:   Now, obviously you know now it wasn’t safe to enter the intersection of Cypresswood and I-45 service road when you did that, right?

[Barhorst]:   Yes.

[Counsel]:   And you also know beyond any doubt that this crash was your fault. True?

[Barhorst]:   Yes.

[Counsel]:   And no one else’s fault but yours?

[Barhorst]:   No one else’s fault.

In response to the question of whether he knew that he should not have been driving on the day of the accident given his medical history, Barhorst answered, “Looking back, yes, I should not have been driving.” Barhorst acknowledged that, given his condition, he should not have been driving:

[Counsel]:   So you should have known on January 19 that you should not have been driving. True?

[Barhorst]:   Yes.

[Counsel]:   Because if you got a medical condition where you get blurry vision, lose control, have slow responses, you could hit or run over somebody. True?

[Barhorst]:   True.

[Counsel]:   And here that somebody was Shirley Chumley?

[Barhorst]:   On that date, yes.

          A jury’s failure to find a fact need not be supported by any evidence, but the jury may not refuse to find a fact in the face of overwhelming evidence of the existence of the fact. Schmeltekopf v. Johnson Well Serv. of Luling, 810 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, no writ). Here, however, the jury’s finding is contrary to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence, including testimony by the defendant, the defendant’s wife, the plaintiff, and an eyewitness that he ran a red stop light at which other cars had stopped. See Bay, Inc. v. Ramos, 139 S.W.3d 322, 329-30 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. filed); but see Eisen v. Bartlett, 822 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (although it agreed defendant was negligent, court held jury’s finding was not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence because the only evidence that defendant struck plaintiff’s car was plaintiff’s own testimony, which the jury could disbelieve). Such conduct is a departure from the standard of care of a reasonably prudent driver. We conclude that the jury’s failure to find Barhorst’s negligence a proximate cause of Chumley’s injuries is against the great weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Moore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 792 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ) (noting that there was no evidence of any other cause of the accident, court held the jury’s finding of no negligence was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence). Therefore, we sustain Chumley’s second issue. Due to our disposition of issue two, we do not reach Chumley’s remaining issues.  

CONCLUSION

          We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for further proceedings.   

                                                             Sherry Radack

                                                             Chief Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Higley and Bland.