DocketNumber： 01-06-00619-CR
Filed Date： 5/3/2007
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/3/2015
Opinion issued May 3, 2007
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-06-00619-CR
ALEJANDRO MARTINEZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 184th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 989812
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant, Alejandro Martinez, of capital murder. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (Vernon Supp. 2006). The State did not seek the death penalty, and the trial court sentenced appellant to life in prison. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.31(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006). In three points of error, appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his videotaped statement; (2) the evidence was factually insufficient to support his conviction; and (3) the trial court erred by denying his requested jury instruction on the voluntariness of his videotaped statement.
We affirm.
At 3 a.m. on May 17, 2004, Darreon King stumbled to the home of the Taylor family and knocked on the door. King was bleeding and said that he had been shot. The family called 9-1-1 and soon the police arrived. King later died at the hospital of multiple gunshot wounds.
King's best friend, Tony Washington, was later found in his car in an apartment complex parking lot. Washington had also died of gunshot wounds. Ballistics evidence later determined that the same firearm had been used to kill both King and Washington.
From Washington's cellular telephone records, the police developed appellant as a suspect. The police learned that appellant was staying with his mother in Roma, Texas. Houston police homicide investigators, B. McDaniel and R. Moreno, traveled to Roma to interview appellant. The officers went to the home of appellant's mother. Apellant agreed to accompany the officers to the Roma police station for an interview. During the interview, appellant admitted to shooting King and Washington. Appellant then provided a videotaped statement in which he gave the following description of the events surrounding the shootings:
Appellant was indicted for capital murder. He filed a pre-trial motion to suppress his videotaped statement, contending that the statement had been involuntarily made. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
The case was tried to a jury. At trial, the defense argued that appellant shot King and Washington because appellant believed that Owens would kill him if he did not shoot the two men. In this regard, the jury received an instruction on the affirmative defense of duress, which it implicitly rejected when it found appellant guilty of capital murder. As statutorily required, the trial court sentenced appellant to life in prison.
In his first point of error, appellant contends that the trial court "erred in denying the appellant's motion to suppress his statement as such statement was involuntarily given and in violation of the Texas Constitution."
A. The Motion to Suppress Hearing
At the motion to suppress hearing, the State and the defense offered differing versions of the events surrounding appellant's videotaped statement. Appellant testified to the following description of the events:
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the State presented the testimony of Officers McDaniel and Moreno. The officers' account of the events surrounding the videotaped statement differed from appellant's account in a number of pertinent respects. Either one or both of the officers testified to the following:
The State also introduced the videotaped statement into evidence. The videotaped statement reflects that the officers informed appellant of his statutory rights and that appellant chose to waive these rights by giving the statement. The videotaped statement also shows that appellant responded affirmatively when asked if he had agreed to accompany the officers to the police station.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress and made the following oral findings of fact and conclusions of law:
[T]he defendant was not under arrest at the time the confession was made, and he was not placed under arrest at the time the confession was made, and he was not placed under arrest at the home in Roma. I specifically find that no firearms were drawn. I find that the Miranda warnings were given by Sergeant [B.] McDaniel. I find that the defendant understood those warnings, and that he freely and voluntarily waived his rights. I specifically find that he did not say he wanted to go home while he was being questioned. And I find that there were no promises or threats made. Specifically, I find that the confession was made under voluntary conditions, and that the statement was freely and knowingly given.
B. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to an abuse of discretion standard. See Villarreal v. State, 935 S.W.2d 134, 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole fact-finder and may choose to believe or disbelieve any or all of the witnesses' testimony. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts when supported by the record, particularly if the findings turn on witness credibility and demeanor. Id. at 856. We give the same deference to determinations of mixed questions of law and fact if their resolution depends upon witness credibility and demeanor. Id. In contrast, we review issues that present purely legal questions pursuant to a de novo standard. Id. We must view the record and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the ruling on the suppression motion, and sustain the ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Villarreal, 935 S.W.2d at 138.
C. Voluntariness of Appellant's Statement
Appellant contends that the record does not support the trial court's ruling that his statement was voluntarily made. To be admissible, a confession must be voluntarily given and free from coercion or improper influences. See Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In determining the question of voluntariness, a court should consider the totality of circumstances under which the statement was obtained. Creager v. State, 952 S.W.2d 852, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The ultimate question is whether the appellant's will was overborne. Id. at 856. A statement is involuntary "only if there was official, coercive conduct of such a nature that any statement obtained thereby was unlikely to have been the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker." Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199, 211 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Appellant presents three arguments to support his contention that the statement was not voluntarily made. Appellant first acknowledges that the State presented evidence supporting the trial court's finding that no officer drew a weapon, but contends that "it is beyond belief that officers investigating a violent double homicide such as this would not have their arms at the ready when going to appellant's house." For this reason, appellant contends that his testimony regarding the officers' use of weapons "should be credited."
We disagree. As the fact finder, the trial court was free to believe the officers' testimony regarding the use of weapons and disbelieve that of appellant. See Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 854. Without more, we must defer to the trial court's credibility determination.
Appellant next contends that his statement was involuntary because he was "subjected to an intensive and extensive interrogation." He relies on the fact that the officers "talked to him for well over two hours before they finally reduced his statements to tape." Although the length of an interrogation may be a consideration in determining the voluntariness of a statement, we agree with the State that two to three hours of questioning does not render a statement involuntary. This is particularly true in cases, such as this, in which evidence was presented showing that appellant had been twice given his rights, told repeatedly that he could leave, and yet voluntarily chose to continue the interview. Other courts have held that questioning of much longer durations did not render a confession involuntary under analogous circumstances. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417, 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (holding that eight hours of questioning without food did not render confession involuntary in light of appellant's willingness to continue, being Mirandized, and understanding his rights); Bell v. State, 169 S.W.3d 384, 391-92 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref'd) (holding that eight hours of questioning while in handcuffs and leg shackles did not render confession involuntary when appellant never indicated he did not want to answer any more questions or that he wanted to speak to attorney, and never requested food, water, or bathroom breaks).
Lastly, appellant contends that his statement was given involuntarily because "the officers kept pressing [him] that his statement was inconsistent with the physical evidence." On cross-examination, Officer Moreno testified that appellant admitted at various times throughout the interview that he was lying. The following exchange then occurred between the defense and Officer Moreno:
Q. Officer McDaniel had a set of facts in his mind as to how the [murders] had happened?"
A. That's possible, yes, sir.
Q. All right. And if [appellant] said something that didn't match his facts, he would call it a lie or pressure him a little bit, just tell us what really happened, is that they way it happened?
A. I wouldn't say it was pressuring. It was just not matching with the physical evidence McDaniel had.
Q. And you would have kept [appellant] there until the evidence started to match up to his physical evidence?
A. To what we knew based on physical evidence that we had.
Although Officer McDaniel apparently confronted appellant by pointing out that appellant's statements did not match the evidence in the case, nothing in the record suggests the officer's tactics improperly compelled appellant to continue the interview. See State v. Terrazas, 4 S.W.3d 720, 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (telling suspect "what had to be" in statement not type of practice held to be inherently coercive); see also Stevenson v. State, 780 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1989, no pet.) ("A confession is not rendered inadmissible because it is made after an accused has been told by an officer taking the confession that it would be best to tell the truth . . . ."). Rather, the officers' testimony and the videotaped statement itself reflect that appellant's statement was voluntarily made, without coercion, and occurred after appellant had been fully informed of his rights. As fact finder, the trial court was entitled to believe this evidence and conclude that appellant had waived his rights and made the statement voluntarily.
We hold that appellant has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to suppress the videotaped statement.
We overrule appellant's first point of error.
In his third point of error, appellant contends that "the trial court erred in denying the appellant's requested instruction on the voluntariness of the appellant's statement pursuant to article 38.22, section 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." Appellant specifically contends that the following trial evidence presented by the State sufficiently raised the issue of voluntariness of the confession: (1) appellant was "removed from his mother's house and taken to the Roma Police Department"; (2) officers from two agencies were involved; (3) the officers were all armed; (4) appellant was questioned for over two hours before he provided the videotaped statement; and (5) "there is no indication that he was allowed to tell his family where he was being held." (1)
Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22, section 6 provides that the trial court must, in the absence of the jury, make an independent finding regarding whether the statement was made voluntarily. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 6 (Vernon 2005). If the trial court finds that the statement was made voluntarily, evidence pertaining to its voluntariness may be submitted to the jury, and the court must instruct the jury that it may not consider the confession unless it believes, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the confession was voluntarily made. Id.; Miniel v. State, 831 S.W.2d 310, 316 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Section 7 of article 38.22 further requires that, when the voluntariness issue is raised by the evidence, the trial court shall instruct the jury on the law pertaining to the statement. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 7 (Vernon 2005); Miniel, 831 S.W.2d at 316.
Before this requirement is triggered, some evidence must be presented to the jury that raises the voluntariness issue. Butler v. State, 872 S.W.2d 227, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). "Only when some evidence is presented that a confession is not voluntary is the matter put in issue." Miniel, 831 S.W.2d at 317 (emphasis added). Thus, we must determine whether the evidence cited by appellant raised the issue of voluntariness.
Appellant argues that evidence showing he was "removed" from his mother's house raised the voluntariness issue. Despite appellant's characterization, no evidence was presented at trial that appellant was "removed" by the officers. That is, no evidence was presented at trial indicating that the officers did or said anything to make appellant believe that he had no choice but to accompany them. Rather, the evidence presented at trial showed that appellant was not under arrest at the time and that he willing accompanied the officers to the Roma police station. Evidence showing only that appellant responded affirmatively to the officers' request to accompany them does not raise the issue of voluntariness. See Miniel, 831 S.W.2d at 317 ("Evidence presented by the State in anticipation of an attack upon the voluntariness of a confession does not put voluntariness in issue.").
Appellant submits that voluntariness was raised because officers from two agencies were involved and because the officers were armed. While the evidence showed that the officers were armed, no evidence was presented indicating that any officer removed a weapon from its holster or engaged in any show of force. The fact that officers from two agencies were involved is not inherently suggestive of coercion, and appellant does not explain how voluntariness was raised by such fact.
Appellant also contends that the length of his questioning--"well over two hours"--raised the issue of voluntariness. During this time period, the record reflects that appellant was informed of his rights and told that he was free to terminate the questioning and leave. Appellant chose to waive these rights and speak to the police for over two hours, and then chose to give a videotaped statement. The record also shows that, on the way to the police station, the officers offered to stop to get appellant something to eat and that, during the interview, appellant was allowed to take a bathroom break.
Lastly, appellant claims that he was entitled to a voluntariness instruction because there is no evidence that he was "allowed to tell his family where he was being held." We agree with the State that the lack of such evidence in the record does not necessarily raise the issue of voluntariness, particularly when the totality of evidence in the record indicates that appellant affirmatively waived his rights and gave the statement voluntarily. Absent some positive evidence that appellant's statements were coerced, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not give the requested instruction. See Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
We overrule appellant's third point of error.
In his second point of error, appellant contends that the evidence is factually insufficient for the jury to have rejected his affirmative defense of duress.
Duress is an affirmative defense to prosecution when a defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he "engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was compelled to do so by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or another." Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 8.05(a) (Vernon 2003); see also Edwards v. State, 106 S.W.3d 833, 843 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2003, pet. ref'd). There are two components of immediacy in an imminent threat: (1) the person making the threat must intend and be prepared to carry out the threat immediately and (2) carrying out the threat must be predicated upon the threatened person's failure to commit the charged offense immediately. Anguish v. State, 991 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd).
This affirmative defense is not available to a defendant if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subject to compulsion. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 8.05(d) (Vernon 2003). Compulsion exists only if the force or threat of force would render a person of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting the pressure. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 8.05(c); Edwards, 106 S.W.3d at 843.
When a defendant asserts an affirmative defense, the reviewing court considers all the evidence and determines whether the judgment rendered is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Edwards, 106 S.W.3d at 843; see also Meraz v. State, 785 S .W.2d 146, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). In making this determination, we must accord due deference to the fact finder's determinations, particularly those determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence. Edwards, 106 S.W.3d at 843.
Appellant asserts that he established the affirmative defense of duress through his videotaped statement in which he claimed that he killed King and Washington because Owens threatened to kill him if he did not kill the two men. Appellant contends that he believed that Owens would kill him if he did not do as Owens directed because appellant knew that Owens was heavily involved in the drug trade and had exhibited violent tendencies in the past, particularly with regard to protecting his illegal drug business. Appellant stated that he had heard Owens say in the past that he would kill anyone who "messed" with him. Appellant claimed that he feared that Owens would blame him for the botched drug deal. Appellant also saw that Owens had firearms in his possession on the night of the murders, including an assault rifle. Appellant further cites to his claim that Owens was nearby in his own vehicle when the murders took place.
Appellant also relies on post-murder events to further show that Owens was someone with a violent nature, whom appellant legitimately feared. Appellant told the police that Owens directed appellant to shoot Washington a second time, even though Washington was already dead. Appellant further claimed that, after the murders, Owens had threatened to kill him and his own cousin if either talked about the murders. Appellant also told the police that he went to Roma because he feared Owens. Lastly, appellant cites evidence that, when Owens was eventually arrested, the police found a large quantity of illegal drugs, cash, and an assault rifle, as described by appellant, in Owens's vehicle.
The jury's verdict of guilt in this case was an implicit rejection of appellant's testimony that he acted under duress. We disagree with appellant that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the jury's rejection of his affirmative defense of duress. As the exclusive judges of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given their testimony, a jury may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness's testimony. See McKinny v. State, 76 S.W.3d 463, 468-69 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.); see also Edwards, 106 S.W.3d at 843. Here, the jury was entitled to believe appellant's statement to the extent that he admitted killing King and Washington but disbelieve appellant's self-serving claim that he committed the murders because Owens threatened to kill him if he did not.
Even if it believed all of appellant's statements, the jury could have determined that any threat Owens made was not an imminent threat. Owens was not in the car with appellant and the two murder victims; rather, Owens was in his own vehicle at the time of the killings. Appellant, who was himself armed, was alone in the car with King and Washington when he committed the murders.
Finally, appellant admitted that he knew that Owens was a violent person. Nevertheless, appellant contacted Owens regarding the purchase of marijuana and chose to facilitate an illegal drug transaction involving Owens. In doing so, the jury could have concluded appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable he would be subject to compulsion. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 8.05(d).
After viewing all of the evidence, we conclude the jury's rejection of appellant's affirmative defense of duress is not so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust. Thus, we hold that the evidence was not factually insufficient, as claimed by appellant.
We overrule appellant's second point of error.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Laura Carter Higley
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Keyes, and Higley.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
1. Appellant did not testify at trial.