DocketNumber： 01-06-00672-CR
Filed Date： 2/5/2009
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/3/2015
Opinion issued February 5, 2009
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
NO. 01-06-00672-CR
PATRICK RENOID SMITH, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 230th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 1057399
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Patrick Renoid Smith pleaded guilty to the charge of aggravated robbery. After ordering a presentence investigation and holding a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Smith to fifteen years’ confinement. In a single issue, Smith contends the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his motion for new trial. We affirm.
Background
According to Smith’s plea, he attempted to deprive the complainant of her personal property with the use of a deadly weapon, a gun, in February 2006. Following his apprehension, Smith entered a guilty plea and opted to have the trial court determine his punishment. The trial court sentenced Smith after a presentence investigation and hearing.
In his motion for new trial, Smith claimed that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call numerous witnesses who were available to testify about his character and his suitability for a reduction of sentence or provide letters of recommendation for a reduction of sentence. Smith’s motion included fourteen affidavits of possible witnesses who averred that they were not called to testify for Smith and that, had they been called, they would have asked that his sentenced be lowered. The trial court reviewed the motion and the affidavits and denied Smith’s request for hearing and motion for new trial.
Discussion
We review a trial court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing and motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gonzalez, 855 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Bruno v. State, 916 S.W.2d 4, 6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d). Accordingly, we will reverse the trial court’s ruling only when its decision is so clearly wrong “as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree.” Gonzalez, 855 S.W.2d at 695.
“The purpose of the hearing is to fully develop the issues raised in the motion.” Jordan v. State, 883 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). If a defendant raises issues that are not readily determinable from the existing record, the trial court strays outside the zone of reasonable disagreement if it fails to hold a hearing on those issues. Reyes v. State, 849 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). On the other hand, if the motion presents issues that are readily determinable from the record, the decision either to hold or deny a hearing is within the trial court’s discretion. Id.
Smith claims the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a hearing on his motion for new trial, contending that he was entitled to a hearing because it would allow him to develop facts not shown by the record, namely, that his counsel did not properly investigate or present evidence that would have supported mitigation of his punishment. We disagree. In Wallace v. State, 106 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the notion that a defendant need only assert reasonable grounds for relief that are not determinable from the record in order to be entitled to a hearing, and held that, based on evidence previously adduced, the trial court could have reasonably concluded “(a) that the strength of the prosecution’s case was such that the new evidence suggested by the affidavits, even if true, was not compelling enough to probably bring about a different result in a new trial and, therefore (b) that appellant’s motion and accompanying affidavits did not show that he could be entitled to relief.” Id. at 108. Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have denied Wallace’s request for a hearing on his motion for new trial. Id.
As the fact finder who assessed Smith’s punishment, the trial judge could reasonably determine whether the testimony of the proposed witnesses, as described in their affidavits and taken as true, would have compelled it to impose a lesser sentence. See id.; see also Macri v. State, 12 S.W.3d 505, 510 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. ref’d) (holding that, “[a]s the trier of fact for punishment, the trial court could determine from the affidavits whether he would have imposed a lesser sentence had he heard testimony from the people who wrote the letters.”).[1] Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Smith’s request for hearing and motion for new trial.
Conclusion
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Smith’s request for hearing on his motion for new trial. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jane Bland
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Taft, Bland, and Sharp.
Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
[1] We find the cases relied on by Smith to be distinguishable. In both Lair v. State, 265 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.), and Milburn v. State, 15 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d), the juries, not the trial courts, assessed the defendants’ punishments. Lair, 265 S.W.3d at 595–96; Milburn, 15 S.W.3d at 271. In Torres v. State, 4 S.W.3d 295 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.), the defendant claimed that counsel’s ineffectiveness rendered his plea involuntary, an issue that required further factual development. Id. at 296–97.