Ruben Ramos v. State

NUMBER 13-98-364-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

___________________________________________________________________

RUBEN RAMOS

, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

, Appellee.

___________________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 92nd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.

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O P I N I O N

Before Justices Dorsey, Chavez, and Rodriguez Opinion by Justice Dorsey

The trial court found appellant, Ruben Ramos, guilty of the offense of hindering a secured creditor and sentenced him to ten years of community supervision, imposed a $100 fine, and ordered him to pay $16,500 in restitution. By three points of error, Ramos claims the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the penalty imposed was greater than that provided for by law. We find the evidence legally insufficient, and reverse and render judgment of acquittal.

In 1989, Ramos purchased a piece of property on Oklahoma Street in Weslaco that included a building and fixtures. The building had been used as a gun shop. In 1990, Ramos signed a deed of trust, which gave the National Bank of Weslaco a lien against the property, and any improvements, thereby making the Bank a secured creditor. The total loan amount was $34,500, and the house was valued at $46,000.

Ramos failed to repay the loan as agreed, and the bank foreclosed and took possession of the property. Upon entry of the property, it appeared that the house had been vandalized. All light fixtures, sinks, cabinets, doors, and paneling had been removed. An appraisal showed that in this condition, the house was worth $26,000. The State offered no evidence showing the date or approximate date the property was damaged.

Ramos was charged with hindering the secured creditor of the property. The indictment alleged that he "intentionally and knowingly destroyed, harmed and reduced the value of said property by removing light fixtures, floor covering, walls, cabinets, doors, windows, ceiling and bathroom fixtures. . . ."

Ramos testified that he began remodeling the house immediately after purchasing it. He said that the house was in the state in which the Bank found it because it was in the middle of the extensive remodeling project. He claimed that he simply ran out of money, and stopped paying the note and ceased the remodeling project. He denied personally removing anything from the house.

Next, Ramos challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Here, Ramos argues that the State failed to meet its burden to prove that he committed the crime with the requisite intent. The statute makes it clear that "intent to hinder enforcement of [an] interest or lien" is required for a violation. Tex. Pen. Code. Ann. § 32.33(b) (Vernon 1994); see also Lantz v. State, 601 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (noting that intent is required); Anzaldua v. State, 696 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (listing "intent to hinder enforcement of interest or lien" as an element of the crime). Intent is the "conscious objective or desire to engage in conduct or cause the result." Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 6.03(a) (Vernon 1991); Lantz, 601 S.W.2d at 376.

When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Texas courts have applied Jackson in such a way that the only evidence a reviewing court considers is the evidence that supports the verdict. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 166 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). This standard of review also applies to bench trials. Grant v. State, 989 S.W.2d 428, 432 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Gonzalez v. State, 954 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1997, no pet.). We hold that the State produced legally insufficient evidence that Ramos possessed the required element of intent to hinder enforcement of the Bank's security interest.

The State presented the testimony of Mr. David Gamez, a patrol sergeant with the Weslaco Police Department, who investigated the case. Gamez testified that upon showing Ramos pictures of the house showing what appeared to be vandalism, he asked Ramos if he knew what had happened to the property. He testified that Ramos responded that he had "removed the property because it was still owed, the property that he had put in there." Gamez testified that they found some stainless steel sinks, some lumber, some toilet seats, porcelain sinks, doors and lights at Ramos' parent's house, and that Ramos told Gamez he took the fixtures from the Oklahoma Street house to his parents' house.

However, Gamez's testimony was vague regarding what Ramos actually said to him. The following colloquy took place during cross-examination of Officer Gamez:

1. . . . Now, tell me again what Mr. Ramos told you when you talked to him regarding the property that was taken from the house.

1. That he had bought it from the Bank and that he had problems with the Bank because there was to -- he wanted to make it one -- one property and they didn't allow it. They wanted him to do two properties, so he started having problems with the Bank and he removed the property because it was still owed.

1. What was still owed, the house or the property?

A. The property.

Q. The items that were taken?

A. Yes, sir.

We hold that this amounts to no evidence that Ramos possessed the intent required to make his conduct a violation of the statute. Section 32.33(b) makes it clear that a person must act "with intent to hinder enforcement of the security interest or lien" in order to violate the statute. The only evidence that the State offers is Officer Gamez's testimony that Ramos told him he removed the property "because he still owed." We do not believe that any rational juror could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ramos possessed the intent to hinder the Bank's interest in the property. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the verdict of guilt.

Penal code § 32.33(c) describes the situation where intent may be presumed, but there is no evidence raising that presumption present in this case. Under that section, intent is presumed if, when any part of the debt is due, the defendant fails to pay the part then due and, if the secured party makes demand, to deliver possession of the secured property to the secured party. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 32.33(c) (Vernon 1994).

If a reviewing court determines that the evidence is legally insufficient, it must render a judgment of acquittal. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Accordingly, because we find that the evidence was legally insufficient on the required element of intent, we reverse the conviction and render judgment of acquittal.

______________________________

J. BONNER DORSEY,

Justice

Do not publish

.

Tex. R. App. P. 47.3(b).

Opinion delivered and filed

this 17th day of August, 2000.