Celtic Properties, L.C. v. Cleveland Regional Medical Center, L.P.

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-13-00464-CV
____________________
CELTIC PROPERTIES, L.C.
V.
CLEVELAND REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, L.P.
________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 75th District Court
Liberty County, Texas
Trial Cause No. CV70930
________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Celtic Properties, L.C. (Celtic or appellant), the plaintiff in the
proceeding below, appeals from an Order Granting Final Summary Judgment to
Appellee, Cleveland Regional Medical Center, L.P. (CRMC or appellee), the
defendant in the proceeding below. 1 This case relates to a dispute between the
1
Community Health Systems, Inc. and CHS/Community Health Systems,
Inc. were also named as defendants in the original proceedings below but are not
1
parties about a commercial lease of an office building located in Cleveland, Texas.
We affirm.
UNDERLYING FACTS
This is the second time the underlying suit has been on appeal to this court.
The current appeal concerns the trial court’s Final Summary Judgment, which was
rendered after a remand following this court’s opinion in Cleveland Regional
Medical Center, L.P. v. Celtic Properties, L.C., 323 S.W.3d 322 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2010, pet. denied) (hereinafter referred to as the “first appeal”).
In the first appeal 2, we affirmed in part, reversed and rendered in part, and
reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the trial court. More specifically,
we stated:
We reverse the portions of the judgment finding defendants liable for
tortious interference with an existing contract and intentional invasion
of property rights and render judgment that plaintiff take nothing on
those causes of action. We reverse the portion of the judgment finding
defendants liable for negligence and awarding damages for negligence
and remand to the trial court for a new trial. We affirm the judgment
in all other respects.
____________________
named as defendants in the Plaintiff’s Sixth Amended Petition, the live pleading at
the time the trial court granted the Final Summary Judgment.
2
The factual background of the dispute between the parties as it relates to the
jury trial and the prior appeal is explained in detail in our previous opinion.
Cleveland Regional Medical Center, L.P. v. Celtic Properties, L.C., 323 S.W.3d at
328-32.
2
323 S.W.3d at 354. The majority affirmed the judgment for breach of contract and
for damages in the amount of $318,222.77 and attorney’s fees in the amount of
$193,000.
After the case was remanded to the trial court, Celtic filed its Fifth Amended
Petition, wherein it reasserted a negligence claim and a breach of contract claim.
As stated in the Fifth Amended Petition, Celtic described its breach of contract
claim as follows:
[I]n failing to maintain and protect the Property from damage, and in
causing further damage to the Property, CRMC breached the parties’
contract. The Letter Agreement is an enforceable agreement, and it
expressly refers to and incorporates the Master Lease (the June 15,
1994 Lease and July 1996 first amendment thereto).
On September 24, 2012, CRMC filed a traditional and no evidence motion
for summary judgment on all of Celtic’s remaining theories as asserted in Celtic’s
Fifth Amended Petition. While CRMC’s motion for summary judgment was
pending, on November 8, 2012, Celtic filed its Sixth Amended Petition, wherein
Celtic asserted a negligence claim, a breach of contract claim with further
allegations that the breach of contract claim relates only to damages that occurred
between the time of the first trial and the final judgment, and a waste claim. On
November 8, 2012, Celtic also filed a response to the motion for summary
judgment that was styled as “Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for
3
Traditional Summary Judgment.” In that response, Celtic references the affidavit
of John Murphy (the Murphy Affidavit) as being attached thereto, but the response
in the record does not have a copy of the affidavit. Nevertheless, the record
indicates that CRMC filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Response on November 14, 2012,
wherein CRMC included several objections to the Murphy Affidavit. On
November 15, 2012, the trial court sustained most of CRMC’s objections to the
Murphy Affidavit. On February 8, 2013, the trial court granted CRMC a partial
summary judgment on Celtic’s negligence claim, but denied a summary judgment
on the waste and breach of contract claims as asserted in the Sixth Amended
Petition.
On April 9, 2013, CRMC filed another traditional and no evidence motion
for summary judgment that it styled as its “Motion for Final Summary Judgment,”
asking the trial court to grant summary judgment on the two remaining claims—
the breach of contract and negligent waste claims. On June 11, 2013, Celtic filed
Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment. The
Murphy Affidavit was attached as an exhibit to Celtic’s Response to Defendant’s
Motion for Final Summary Judgment. CRMC filed a Reply to Plaintiff’s Response,
and therein CRMC stated “Celtic has once again offered the affidavit of Dr. John
Murphy in response to [CRMC]’s motion for summary judgment. This is the exact
4
affidavit that Celtic previously filed in response to the [CRMC]’s prior September
2012 motion.” CRMC renewed its previous objections to the Murphy Affidavit and
urged additional grounds for the trial court to disregard the affidavit. The trial court
granted a final summary judgment for CRMC finding that CRMC’s “Motion for
Traditional and No Evidence Summary Judgment . . . is meritorious,” and granting
the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. On August 12, 2013, the trial
court also entered an Order on Defendant’s Re-Assertion of Prior Objections to the
Affidavit of Dr. John Murphy, wherein the trial court sustained two additional
objections and overruled a third objection to the Murphy Affidavit. Celtic filed a
motion for new trial, and CRMC filed a response to the motion for new trial. The
motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
329b(c). Celtic timely filed a notice of appeal.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
In three stated issues, Celtic contends the trial court erred in granting CRMC
a final summary judgment on Celtic’s negligence, breach of contract, and waste
claims. First, Celtic argues that the trial court erred in granting CRMC’s no
evidence motions for summary judgment because Celtic contends it produced
“sufficient evidence of each element” of its claims. In support of its first issue,
Celtic argues that the Murphy Affidavit was more than a scintilla of evidence that:
5
CRMC was “negligent in performing its remediation of the leased premises[,]”
CRMC “breached its contract by failing to complete remediation of the leased
premises[,]” and CRMC “committed waste by failing to remediate and/or repair
the lease premises prior to abandoning it.” Celtic contends that it established with
the Murphy Affidavit that “[p]rior to the start of the original trial in 2007, CRMC
had begun a remediation of the mold damage in the building. And during the
original trial CRMC’s attorneys represented to the trial court and Celtic that
CRMC fully intended to complete that remediation.” In Celtic’s second issue,
Celtic contends that the trial court erred in granting CRMC’s no evidence motions
for summary judgment because the motions were “general motions that did not list
the specific elements of each claim on which [CRMC] believed Celtic could
produce no evidence.” And in Celtic’s third issue, Celtic argues that the trial court
erred by granting CRMC’s “Traditional Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s
negligence, contract[,] and waste causes of action because Defendant had a
contractual duty to not damage the property and/or repair any damage to the
property beyond normal wear and tear.” As part of its third issue, Celtic contends
that CRMC, “as a lessee under a lease contract, had a common law duty to not
damage the lease premises beyond normal wear and tear, and CRMC breached that
duty by beginning but not completing the remediation project, thereby committing
6
negligence.” Celtic also argues that CRMC had “a contractual duty to repair
damages to the lease premises . . . and [CRMC] breached that duty when it failed
to do so and abandoned the premises on November 30, 2007,” CRMC “was guilty
of committing waste,” Celtic “could re-plead these issues after remand,” Celtic’s
claims “are not barred by the statute of limitations,” and that Celtic’s claims “are
not barred by estoppel, the law of the case doctrine, res judicata or this Court’s
remand order.”
CRMC argues that the trial court correctly entered a final summary
judgment on all three of Celtic’s claims and that Celtic waived its complaints on
appeal by failing to bring forth a sufficient record to show error requiring reversal.
Further, CRMC contends that the summary judgment was proper because CRMC
failed to meet its burden of proof on one or more elements of its claims and that, as
a matter of law, Celtic has no claim for negligence, waste, or breach of contract.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s ruling on a traditional summary judgment motion
de novo. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex.
2003). We “consider whether reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in
their conclusions in light of all of the evidence presented.” Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam). We
7
“consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging
every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant and resolving any doubts
against the motion.” Id. at 756. “A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a
pretrial directed verdict, and we apply the same legal sufficiency standard in
reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment as we apply in reviewing a directed
verdict.” King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750-51 (Tex. 2003).
Rule 166a(i) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a]fter
adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting summary judgment
evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence
of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party
would have the burden of proof at trial.” See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Fort Worth
Osteopathic Hosp., Inc. v. Reese, 148 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. 2004). To defeat a no-
evidence motion, the nonmovant must present some evidence raising a genuine
issue of material fact as to the elements challenged by the moving party’s no-
evidence motion. Id.; BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Zaffirini, 419 S.W.3d 485, 507 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). In responding to a no-evidence motion for
summary judgment, the nonmovant must produce more than a scintilla of evidence
on the challenged elements to avoid summary judgment. Ford Motor Co. v.
Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004); Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences,
8
Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003). More than a scintilla of evidence exists
when the evidence allows reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their
conclusions. Id. Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence does
“‘no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion as to a fact.’” King Ranch, 118
S.W.3d at 751 (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex.
1983)). When, as here, the trial court does not specify the grounds upon which it
ruled, the summary judgment may be affirmed on any of the meritorious grounds
set forth in the movant’s motion for summary judgment. Dow Chem. Co. v.
Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001).
SCOPE OF REMAND
Because we previously affirmed in part, reversed and rendered in part, and
reversed and remanded in part in the prior appeal, before we review the summary
judgment we must determine the scope of the remand from the prior appeal.
Generally, “[w]hen a case has been remanded, the cause is pending and amended
pleadings may be filed in pending cases pursuant to [rule] 63.” U.S. Fid. and Guar.
Co. v. Beuhler, 597 S.W.2d 523, 524-25 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1980, no
writ); see also Sepulveda v. Krishnan, 839 S.W.2d 132, 137 n.2 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1992), aff’d, 916 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1995). However, when an
appellate court remands a case and limits a subsequent trial to a particular issue,
9
the trial court is restricted to a determination of that particular issue. See Hudson v.
Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1986). In interpreting the mandate of the
appellate court, we look not only to the mandate itself but also to the opinion of the
court. Id.
This court’s mandate from the first appeal contains the following language:
This cause was heard on the record of the Court below, and the same
being considered; it is the opinion of this Court that there was error in
the judgment. It is therefore ordered that we reverse the portions of
the judgment finding defendants liable for tortuous [sic] interference
with an existing contract and intentional invasion of property rights
and render judgment that plaintiff take nothing on those causes of
action. We reverse the portion of the judgment finding defendants
liable for negligence and awarding damages for negligence and
remand to the trial court for a new trial. We affirm the judgment in all
other respects. The trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED IN PART;
REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART; REVERSED AND
REMANDED IN PART.
The following excerpts from this Court’s opinion in the prior appeal relate
specifically to the negligence claim and the Court’s instruction to the trial court on
remand:
In issue six, appellants complain that the trial court erred by
submitting a defective question and instruction on Celtic’s negligence
claim.
...
[CRMC] pleaded the affirmative defense of contributory
negligence. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 94. [CRMC] also pleaded that Celtic’s
claims were “barred, in whole or in part, by the doctrine of
proportionate responsibility and contribution.”
10
...
[W]e find more than a scintilla of evidence to support the
submission of Celtic’s contributory negligence to the jury. [footnote 7
omitted]
...
We reverse the portion of the judgment finding defendants liable for
negligence and awarding damages for negligence and remand to the
trial court for a new trial.
323 S.W.3d at 343-54.
After examining the mandate and opinion, we conclude that we remanded
the case to the trial court solely on the negligence issue, and that the parties were
not free to retry claims that were previously decided. The remand was further
clarified in footnote 7 of our opinion as follows:
7
While Celtic submitted this as a general negligence issue we
recognize that a tenant’s breach of the duty to exercise reasonable care
to protect the leased premises from injury other than normal wear and
tear is in essence a breach of the duty to prevent negligent waste. See
King’s Court Racquetball v. Dawkins, 62 S.W.3d 229, 233 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.); Sullivan v. Booker, 877 S.W.2d 370,
372 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). In fact,
Celtic cited Dawkins in its brief in support of its motion to enter
judgment, for its contention that the defendants’ negligence was
properly submitted to the jury. We note that appellants argued in their
motion for new trial that allowing plaintiff to recover under both
contract and tort theories of liability was improper. However,
appellants do not properly raise or pursue this issue on appeal.
Although the propriety of allowing recovery under both contract and
tort theories of liability is questionable, we refrain from addressing the
merits of that issue in this opinion.
11
Id. at 355 n.7.
ABSENCE OF A RESPONSE TO THE NO-EVIDENCE PORTION OF THE
ORIGINAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In CRMC’s original motion for summary judgment filed on September 24,
2012, CRMC asserted both no-evidence and traditional grounds for a summary
judgment as to all claims asserted in Celtic’s Fifth Amended Petition. According to
CRMC, Celtic filed two separate responses to the original motion for summary
judgment, “[o]ne address[ing] [CRMC]’s no evidence grounds, while the other
addressed the traditional grounds.” However, the only response to the original
motion for summary judgment in the record is styled as “Plaintiff’s Response to
Defendant’s Motion for Traditional Summary Judgment.” 3 CRMC argues that
Celtic has failed to “ensure that an adequate record was filed” in the Court of
Appeals because Celtic’s response to the original no-evidence motion for summary
judgment is not included in the appellate record.
3
The Plaintiff’s Response to the Defendant’s No Evidence Motion for
Summary Judgment is not in the record. However, the parties are in agreement that
Celtic filed a response to the No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment, and
further that Celtic attached the same Murphy Affidavit to the response that it
attached to the response to the Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment. CRMC
filed objections to the affidavit. The order ruling on those objections is part of the
record on appeal.
12
The trial court granted a partial summary judgment on CRMC’s “Traditional
Motion for Summary Judgment” as to Celtic’s negligence claim, and then the trial
court initially denied CRMC’s original motion for summary judgment on Celtic’s
waste and breach of contract claims. According to the record, CRMC’s subsequent
motion for final summary judgment re-asserted no-evidence and traditional
summary judgment grounds, and it is the motion for final summary judgment that
is the basis for the trial court’s final judgment. Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s
Motion for Final Summary Judgment is in the record. Additionally, according to
the record, Celtic used the same Murphy Affidavit as support for Celtic’s Response
to the original Motion for Traditional Summary Judgment and in the Response to
Defendant’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment. Therefore, the absence from the
appellate record of Celtic’s Response to the no-evidence portion of CRMC’s
original motion for summary judgment is not significant to our review.
OBJECTIONS TO MURPHY AFFIDAVIT
CRMC objected to the Murphy Affidavit when it was first referenced by
Celtic in Celtic’s Response to the original Motion for Summary Judgment, and
then again when the same affidavit was filed by Celtic in response to the Motion
for Final Summary Judgment. The trial court entered two orders in which the court
13
sustained many of CRMC’s objections to substantial portions of the Murphy
Affidavit, but the court did not completely strike the affidavit.
On appeal, Celtic states that “[t]he trial court erred in ruling that Dr.
Murphy’s affidavit was inadmissible as summary judgment proof.” Celtic does not
cite to the specific ruling or order of the court about which it complains, nor does
Celtic explain or identify the specific objection, the basis on which the objections
were sustained, or why the trial court erred in its rulings. When a party fails to
object to a trial court’s ruling sustaining objections to its summary judgment
evidence, it waives the right to challenge that ruling on appeal even if it may
otherwise have meritorious arguments. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1); Berryman’s
S. Fork, Inc. v. J. Baxter Brinkman Int’l Corp., 418 S.W.3d 172, 190-91 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied); Cantu v. Horany, 195 S.W.3d 867, 871-72 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). Celtic has also failed to provide any legal analysis as
to why the trial court erred in sustaining the particular objections to the Murphy
Affidavit, and we conclude that Celtic’s argument is inadequately briefed. See Tex.
R. App. P. 38.1(i); Goodenberger v. Ellis, 343 S.W.3d 536, 539-40 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2011, pet. denied); Moreno v. Quintana, 324 S.W.3d 124, 128 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2010, pet. denied). We overrule Celtic’s challenge to the trial court’s
rulings that sustained the objections to the Murphy Affidavit.
14
SPECIFICITY OF CRMC’S NO-EVIDENCE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION
In Celtic’s second issue, Celtic maintains that the trial court erred in granting
CRMC’s no-evidence summary judgment motions because the motions “were
general motions that did not list the specific elements of each claim on which it
believed Celtic could produce no evidence.” According to Celtic, because both of
the motions as to the no-evidence grounds were general demurrers, they should
have been denied. We disagree.
The rules of civil procedure state that general demurrers shall not be used.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 90. To preserve error for appellate review, a complaint must be
made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion that specifically
states the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial
court, and the trial court must rule or refuse to rule on the request, objection, or
motion. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Celtic did not preserve error on this issue. See
State Farm Lloyds v. Page, 315 S.W.3d 525, 531 (Tex. 2010). Even if Celtic had
preserved error, we conclude that the motions are not fatally defective. In CRMC’s
motions for summary judgment, CRMC set out the elements of each of the causes
of action that were the subject of the motions and specifically stated which
elements of each cause of action were lacking. Accordingly, the no-evidence
motions for summary judgment gave Celtic fair notice of the bases for the motions
15
and were not fatally defective. See Bever Props., L.L.C. v. Jerry Huffman Custom
Builder, L.L.C., 355 S.W.3d 878, 888 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.); see also
Timpte Indus., Inc. v. Gish, 286 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. 2009). Issue two is
overruled.
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM
Celtic argues on appeal that the Murphy Affidavit presented more than a
scintilla of evidence that CRMC was negligent in performing its remediation of the
lease premises, and that the affidavit sets forth the “course of dealing between the
parties, statements made by CRMC’s attorneys at the first trial promising to
complete the remediation work on the lease premises, the fact that CRMC
abandoned the lease premises during the middle of the remediation work and left it
in complete disarray,” as well as the “types of damage CRMC’s conduct caused[.]”
Celtic does not cite to the specific portion of the Murphy Affidavit or other
evidence in the record to support its arguments. Celtic further argues that “Dr.
Murphy’s affidavit raised sufficient evidence of the contractual relationship
between the parties and CRMC’s duty to make the repairs pursuant to that
relationship, the fact that CRMC failed to fulfill that responsibility, and the
damages Celtic suffered as a result.”
16
After applying the rulings of the trial court which sustained the objections to
the Murphy Affidavit as outlined in the two orders in the record, the only
remaining portion of the Murphy Affidavit which could have been considered by
the trial court would be as follows:
BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, personally appeared John
Murphy, who being duly sworn, deposed as follows:
“My name is John Murphy. I am a Manager for Celtic
Properties, L.C. I am at least 18 years of age and of sound mind. I
have personal knowledge of the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Response
to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. I hereby swear that
the following statements in support of Plaintiff’s Response to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment are true and correct to
the best of my ability.
‘On or about July 15, 1994 Celtic Properties, L C. entered into
a lease agreement with Cleveland Regional Medical Center, L.P. In
July 1996, there was an amendment to the July 15, 1994 lease and
that became what would be referred to as the Master Lease. I
occupied 301-B of the Property the subject of this suit until 1999 when
I became the Medical Director of Cleveland Regional Medical Center,
L.P[.]’'s rural health center in Livingston, Texas.
Ultimately, after the trial concluded, Cleveland Regional
Medical Center, L.P. vacated the property, which to my knowledge
was done without notice to Celtic Properties, L.C. or to myself.
Furthermore, in 2007, prior to the time of trial, without notice to or
the consent of Celtic Properties, L.C., Cleveland Regional Medical
Center, L.P. initiated what it later purported was a remediation repair
project of the Property, which severely damaged the entire property,
both suite 301-A and suite 302-B. Specifically, Cleveland Regional
Medical Center, L.P. removed, without replacement or repair,
sheetrock, carpet, ceiling tiles[,] electrical Wiring, AC ducts,
insulation, and finishes that were never previously damaged, and
17
Cleveland Regional Medical Center. L.P. left open holes to the
exterior of the property, Celtic Properties, L. C. was unable to lease
the property for an extended period of time and forced to undertake
substantial repairs to the property that Cleveland Regional Medical
Center, L.P. nor was Celtic Properties, L. C. aware that Cleveland
Regional Medical Center, L.P. had not made and would refuse to
make the repairs and necessary remedial activities as required and as
promised during the trial.
‘As a result of the following and the time in which the causes of
action actually accrued, the timing of the trial, and the fact that no
discovery has taken place in this matter since the Final Judgment was
signed on or about March 11,. 2008. Therefore, Celtic Properties.
L.C. has not had an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery before
the pending summary judgment hearing. Thus, Celtic Properties, L. C.
requests additional time to conduct the necessary discovery, therefore
rending [sic] the filing of a Motion for Summary judgment by
Cleveland Regional Medical Center. L.P., procedurally premature.
‘The facts contained in Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment are true and correct to the best of my
ability.
‘Further affiant sayeth not.”
A negligence cause of action requires (1) a legal duty, (2) breach of that
duty, and (3) damages proximately resulting from that breach. Van Horn v.
Chambers, 970 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Tex. 1998). The partial summary judgment
granted by the trial court relating to the negligence claim was expressly granted on
the basis of defendant’s original motion for summary judgment as a “traditional
summary judgment.” Celtic argues in its first and second appellate issues that the
trial court erred in granting a “no-evidence summary judgment” on the negligence
18
claim. Because the record establishes that the trial court granted CRMC’s a
traditional summary judgment as to the negligence claim, we overrule Celtic’s first
and second issues regarding the negligence claim, and we need not address Celtic’s
argument that the Murphy Affidavit established more than a scintilla of evidence to
support the negligence claim because the trial court granted a traditional summary
judgment on the negligence claim.
With respect to Celtic’s third appellate issue, we must determine whether or
not the trial court erred in granting CRMC a traditional motion for summary
judgment on the negligence claim. In our prior opinion we noted that although
Celtic submitted an issue to the jury under a general negligence issue,
we recognize that a tenant’s breach of the duty to exercise reasonable
care to protect the leased premises from injury other than normal wear
and tear is in essence a breach of the duty to prevent negligent waste.
See King’s Court Racquetball v. Dawkins, 62 S.W.3d 229, 233 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.); Sullivan v. Booker, 877 S.W.2d 370,
372 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
323 S.W.3d at 345 n.7. We further stated, “[a]lthough the propriety of allowing
recovery under both contract and tort theories of liability is questionable, we
refrain from addressing the merits of that issue in this opinion.” Id.
In CRMC’s original motion for summary judgment, CRMC argued that
Celtic was not entitled to a recovery for a negligence claim because their damages
were not independent from the economic losses under the alleged breach of
19
contract, and the action sounds in contract and not in tort law. Additionally, CRMC
argued in its original motion for summary judgment that, as a matter of law, it
owed no duty of care to Celtic. In its response to CRMC’s traditional motion for
summary judgment, Celtic stated: “Non-Movant claims a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to Movant’s claims of negligence, waste and breach of contract. As
proof thereof, Non-Movant submits an affidavit, attached hereto as Exhibit ‘A’, as
summary judgment evidence, filed with this response and incorporated by such
reference for all purposes as if recited verbatim herein.” However, Celtic did not
elaborate on or explain what genuine issues exist on the negligence claim or how
the Murphy Affidavit raises a genuine issue of material fact in relation thereto.
Furthermore, Celtic completely failed to respond to CRMC’s legal argument that
the negligence claim is barred as a matter of law because the claim sounds in
contract and not tort. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
granting CRMC a traditional summary judgment on the negligence claim and we
overrule all of Celtic’s issues relating thereto.
NO EVIDENCE AS TO BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM REGARDING FAILURE TO
COMPLETE THE REMEDIATION OF THE PREMISES
Celtic contends that the Murphy Affidavit also raised more than a scintilla of
evidence in support of each of the necessary elements of its breach of contract
claim. According to Celtic, “[t]he trial court had before it evidence of the contract
20
between Celtic and CRMC, a previous jury finding that the contract existed and
was enforceable that was affirmed on appeal, evidence that Celtic was a principal
party to the contract as landlord, evidence that CRMC had or undertook an
obligation to perform the remediation work; CRMC’s failure to do so, and that
Celtic suffered substantial damages by that failure.” In Celtic’s Sixth Amended
Petition, the live pleading at the time CRMC filed its Motion for Final Summary
Judgment, Celtic alleged
Count 2: Breach of Contract
22. Without waiving the foregoing and in the alternative, Celtic would
show that, in failing to maintain and protect the Property from
damage, and in causing further damage to the Property, CRMC
breached the parties’ contract. Said breach of contract accrued after
the trial on the merits was concluded, wherein the holdover tenant,
CRMC, abandoned the premises after the conclusion of trial.
Therefore, said breach of contract would not have accrued until after
the trial was concluded and is therefore a viable cause of action. The
Letter Agreement is an enforceable agreement, and it expressly refers
to and incorporates the Master Lease (the June 15, 1994 Lease and
July 1996 first amendment thereto). The Letter Agreement is attached
hereto and its terms are incorporated herein by reference.
Celtic further alleged in its Sixth Amended Petition that the breach of contract
claim relates only to damages that occurred between the time of the first trial and
the final judgment.
In order to prove a breach of contract, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a valid
contract, (2) performance or tendered performance by the plaintiff, (3) breach of
21
the contract by the defendant, and (4) damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result
of that breach. Grynberg v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., L.P., 296 S.W.3d 132, 136
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). As stated in Celtic’s Sixth
Amended Petition, Celtic claims CRMC breached the Letter Agreement “in failing
to maintain and protect the Property from damage, and in causing further damage
to the Property,” and further that CRMC’s attorney made an oral representation
during trial that the remediation and repairs would be completed by CRMC, but
CRMC then failed to complete the repairs after the jury trial. Celtic contends that
the Murphy Affidavit established the existence of a contract and that CRMC failed
to make repairs and remediate the damages it caused. But in the Murphy Affidavit,
Murphy recites both events that occurred “prior to the time of trial” and then
complains that CRMC “had not made and would refuse to make the repairs and
necessary remedial activities as required and as promised during the trial.” Celtic
relies upon the jury’s finding in the prior trial, and the verbal representation, if any,
of CRMC’s attorney during the jury trial for the basis of its breach of contract
claim. Celtic’s pleadings demonstrate that its post and pre-trial breach of contract
claims all relate to damages resulting from a leaky water heater in 2005, mold
remediation work it admits was completed by October 15, 2007, and related
restoration and maintenance work allegedly not performed.
22
According to Celtic’s Sixth Amended Petition, Celtic’s breach of contract
relates to the failure of CRMC to “maintain and protect the Property from damage,
and in causing further damage to the Property, CRMC breached the parties’
contract. Said breach of contract accrued after trial on the merits was concluded,
wherein holdover tenant, CRMC, abandoned the premises after the conclusion of
trial.” Celtic further claims that these claims “relate back to its original petition,
because these claims arise out of the same occurrence or transaction.”
With respect to CRMC’s Motion for Final Summary Judgment on the breach
of contract claim, in Celtic’s response to the motion, Celtic relies principally on the
Murphy Affidavit. However, after reviewing the Murphy Affidavit (as reformed by
the rulings of the trial court in sustaining the CRMC objections), we conclude that
nothing within the Murphy Affidavit or other documents attached to Celtic’s
Response to the Motion for Final Summary Judgment provides evidence of a new
breach of the Lease Agreement. According to Exhibits O and P attached to the
Motion for Final Summary Judgment, CRMC gave notice of its intent to vacate the
premises, and the landlord-tenant relationship formally ended no later than
November 30, 2007 4, approximately one month following the jury’s verdict on
4
Exhibits O and P attached to the Motion for Summary Judgment indicate
that CRMC provided its keys to the building to Celtic on November 8, 2007, about
two weeks after the jury’s verdict.
23
October 23, 2007. The final judgment in the underlying suit was not signed until
March 11, 2008. The language in that judgment states that its “disposes of all
claims and all parties.” The jury’s verdict and judgment as affirmed by this court in
the earlier appeal cannot be used as evidence to support a new breach of contract
claim arising out of the same transaction and occurrences. The Murphy Affidavit
does not provide evidence of a contract enforceable against CRMC as a purported
“holdover tenant,” or of a contractual agreement regarding the alleged promise
made at trial, or of how CRMC breached a contract after trial. Additionally, as we
previously stated, the scope of remand to the trial court was limited to the
negligence claim, if any. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court properly
granted CRMC a no-evidence summary judgment as to Celtic’s breach of contract
claim, and we overrule Celtic’s first issue and sub-issues relating thereto. Because
we have sustained the no-evidence summary judgment on the breach of contract
claim, we need not address the propriety of a traditional summary judgment on the
breach of contract claim.
NO EVIDENCE OF COMMISSION OF WASTE BY FAILING TO REMEDIATE
As noted above, in footnote 7 of our prior opinion we refrained from
addressing whether allowing Celtic to recover under both contract and tort theories
of liability was improper, and this Court recognized that a tenant’s breach of the
24
duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the leased premises from injury other
than normal wear and tear is in essence a breach of the duty to prevent negligent
waste. Even if the scope of the remand included a claim for waste, however, Celtic
also failed to present evidence to the trial court that established a permanent injury
to the reversionary interest in the property and a reduction to the overall value of
the property.
Waste is an injury to the reversionary interest in land caused by the
wrongful act of a tenant or other party rightfully in possession….
Waste includes injury resulting from failure to exercise reasonable
care in preserving the property. [citations omitted]
RC Bowen Estate v. Continental Trailways, 256 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Tex. 1953).
To establish a claim of waste, a party must show: (1) permanent injury to the
reversionary interest in land (2) caused by the unjustified or wrongful act of a
tenant or other party rightfully in possession (3) that results in reduction in value of
the property. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 571-72 (Tex.
1981). Whether couched in terms of contract or tort, there must be evidence of a
wrongful act or unreasonable conduct by the tenant. Sullivan v. Booker, 877
S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). The measure
of damages for a waste claim is the decrease in market value caused by the injury.
See Hall v. Hubco, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 22, 35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2006, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g); cf. Porras v. Craig, 675 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex.
25
1984) (When injury to land is permanent, damages are measured by loss in market
value.).
Other than the Murphy Affidavit, Celtic offered no evidence in support of its
claims. And we find nothing in the record before us that established any decreased
value of the building or permanent injury. Murphy’s conclusory statement that the
property was “damaged” is insufficient to satisfy Celtic’s burden. See Plotkin v.
Joekel, 304 S.W.3d 455, 487 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (a
conclusory assertion does not raise a genuine issue of a material fact in a summary
judgment). The trial court properly granted the no-evidence summary judgment as
to Celtic’s waste claims. We overrule all of Celtic’s issues relating thereto.
Having overruled all of Celtic’s issues on appeal, the trial court’s judgment
is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
_________________________
LEANNE JOHNSON
Justice
Submitted on October 15, 2014
Opinion Delivered July 31, 2015
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
26