State v. Ismael Serda

ACCEPTED
13-15-00187-CR
THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
6/23/2015 4:01:20 PM
CECILE FOY GSANGER
CLERK
CAUSE NO. 13-15-00178-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN
13th COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG,
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS 6/23/2015 4:01:20 PM
CECILE FOY GSANGER
Clerk
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellant
V.
ISMAEL SERDA,
Appellee
APPEAL FROM THE 28th DISTRICT COURT
NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS, IN TRIAL CAUSE NO. 13-CR-1027-A
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE ISMAEL SERDA
BY: TRAVIS BERRY
State Bar No. 24059194
travisberrylaw@gmail.com
P.O. Box 6333
Corpus Christi, Texas 78466
Telephone: (361) 673-5611
Facsimile: (361) 442-2562
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Reply point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The trial court properly granted Appellee’s motion to suppress
I. Statement of Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II. Standard of Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
III. The State’s “cooperating officers” argument under Hoag v. State and
Fonseca v. State is misguided as the officers failed to complete their
cooperation and testify at the hearing on the motion to suppress where
their hearsay statements were properly excluded. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
IV. No evidence was presented by the State to establish that Officer Castro
had a reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
V. Appellee never consented to this encounter with a person unknown to
him . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
PRAYER FOR RELIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
i.
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Allen v. State, 13-13-00188-CR, 2014 WL 4402135, at *2-4
(Tex.App. - Corpus Christi, Sept 4, 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Bland v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 14-12-01057-CV, 2013 WL 3868447,
at *4 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist] July 23, 2013, pet. denied) . . . . . . 11
Busby v. State, 253 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Dewalt v. State, 307 S.W.3d 437 (Tex. App. - Austin 2010, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . 10
Fonseca v. State, 881 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1994, no pet.) 6-11
Hoag v. State, 728 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11
Hubbard v. State, 133 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 2004, pet. ref’d) . . . 10
Jackson v. State, 424 S.W.3d 140 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d) . . . . . 17
Linney v. State, 401 S.W.3d 764(Tex. App.- 14th Dist. 2013, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . 17
Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Praska v. State, 557 S.W.2d 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-12
Spakes v. State, 913 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587 (Tex. Crim. App.2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 6
State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) . . . . . . . . . 5
ii.
State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
United States. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15-17
Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-15, 18
Whitehead v. State, 130 S.W.3d 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
RULES AND STATUTES
Fourth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13-17
Texas Penal Code §9.22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10
Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
iii.
CAUSE NO. 13-15-00178-CR
STATE OF TEXAS * IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
*
VS. * THIRTEENTH DISTRICT
*
ISMAEL CERDA * STATE OF TEXAS
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State failed to bring any witnesses to the traffic violations alleged to
have been committed by Appellee. The State attempted to bring statements from a
DPS officer and a police dispatch officer via hearsay rather than presenting those
witnesses in court. The trial court properly sustained defense objections to such
hearsay.
The only witness to testify about the traffic stop, Officer Castro, never
witnessed any traffic violations herself and stated she only made the traffic stop at
the order of the dispatch officer.
Without any evidence that a traffic violation occurred, the trial court held
that no reasonable suspicion existed to stop Appellee’s vehicle. The trial court
properly granted Appellee’s motion to suppress all evidence seized in this traffic
stop. The State’s issues on appeal should be overruled.
1
ARGUMENT
REPLY POINT:
The trial court properly granted Appellee’s motion to suppress
The State complains on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to
consider evidence and witnesses it did not produce or present at the hearing.
I. Statement of Facts
The Appellee was being followed from Portland, Texas, into Corpus Christi,
Texas, by an unknown, unmarked pick-up truck. (RR2 - 39; Supp. CR17 - Finding
No. 2) Appellee testified that the unmarked pick-up truck was not a police vehicle,
that he felt he was being “chased” by an unknown person, and that the pick-up
kept increasing its speed during this pursuit to the point of exceeding the speed
limit. (RR2 39-41, 45) Appellee testified that he was scared and frightened as he
felt that this unknown person chasing him wanted to harm him. (RR2 - 42, 46)
After hearing evidence, the trial court found that this speeding occurred because:
“Defendant did not know that he was being followed by any police officers
or agents or any authorities; he thought he was being chased by an unknown
person.”1 (Supp. CR17 - Finding No. 3)
The State never presented its witness to this alleged incident, nor did it
1
Officer Castro testified that Appellee thought he was being pursued by this pick-up
truck (RR2 - 18, 26)
2
present any police reports from that witness. The trial court found as such. (Supp.
CR17 - Finding No. 5) The State twice desired findings on excluded evidence.
(Supp. CR 10, 19; RR2 - 7 lines 2-8, lines 14-16; RR2 - 9,10, RR2 - 50)
In its Order denying the State’s request for additional findings of fact, the
trial court held that:
“The State denied the Court the opportunity to hear the full examination of
this material witness to this stop. There was no reason given by the State of
his unavailability nor did the State express the need for his testimony at the
time of the hearing as the record shows.” (Supp. CR25)
Due to the State’s failure to bring its material witness, the trial court was
only presented evidence from the State’s sole witness - Officer Castro. Officer
Castro admittedly made a traffic stop of Appellee’s vehicle without observing any
traffic violations and corroborated that there was no law enforcement indicia on
the vehicle pursuing Appellee:
Defense: At any time while you were on the freeway or before the stop,
did you see the Defendant driving recklessly?
Castro: No.
Defense: Did you see him speeding?
Castro: No.
Defense: Did you see him almost have a collision?
Castro: No.
3
Defense: Did Eric Walters have any kind of emergency – police
emergency lights on this car?
Castro: No, sir.
Defense: He didn’t have any flashing lights inside of his grill?
Castro: I don’t recall.
Defense: So basically you can’t say that you stopped the defendant for a
traffic violation because you didn’t, is that correct?
Castro: Correct. (RR2 - 15, 16)
Officer Castro stopped Appellee’s vehicle only upon information from
dispatch2, not on any personal observations in corroboration of alleged traffic
violations. (RR2 - 16, 17; RR2 - 26, 27; Supp. CR. 18 - Finding No. 9) Officer
Castro agreed with the defense that there was “no basis for stopping him” and
when Appellee was asked to exit the vehicle and placed under arrest, no sobriety
tests had been performed. (RR2 - 26, lines 10-19) The trial court was also shown
Officer Castro’s dashboard camera video of the stop wherein no traffic violations
were observed. (RR2 - 47, lines 21-25)
Upon the evidence presented, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion to
suppress and made the conclusions that: 1.) No evidence was presented of Agent
2
“I mean, based upon what dispatch was telling me, I just detained him.”
4
Walters’ observations; 2.) The officer who made the traffic stop observed no basis
the stop; and 3.) The traffic stop served no community care-taking function.
(Supp. CR. 18)
II. Standard of Review
When reviewing the ruling on a suppression motion, regardless of whether
the judge granted or denied the motion, appellate courts view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the ruling. State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011)3The prevailing party is afforded the strongest legitimate view of
the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from it. Id.
In a motion to suppress hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and
judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony,
such that he may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony,
even if that testimony is not controverted. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2000) We will uphold the trial judge’s ruling if it is reasonably
grounded in the record and correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.
Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447-448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); State v.
Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App.2006).
If the trial judge makes express findings of fact, we view the evidence in the
3
Citing State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
5
light most favorable to his ruling and determine whether the evidence supports
these factual findings. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
III. The State’s “cooperating officers” argument under Hoag v. State and
Fonseca v. State is misguided as the officers failed to complete their
cooperation and testify at the hearing on the motion to suppress where their
hearsay statements were properly excluded.
“An appellate court’s review of the record is generally limited to the
evidence that was before the trial court at the time of the trial court’s ruling.”4
“This ensures that the record on appeal accurately reflects all of the evidence that
was seen by, used by, or considered by the trial judge at the time [s]he made a
ruling.”5
At the hearing on Appellee’s motion, the State failed to present any witness
to alleged traffic violations committed by Appellee. The State attempted to
introduce observations and statements from witnesses in absentia. At each
attempt by the State to enter evidence via hearsay, the trial court denied its
admittance. (RR2 - 7, lines 2-8 & lines 14-16; RR2 - 9,10; RR2 - 50)
Although Appellee admitted to speeding at this hearing, the traffic stop
occurred before the hearing. Appellee’s admission of speeding (later discussed
4
Whitehead v. State, 130 S.W.3d 866, 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
5
Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
6
under the Law of Necessity infra.) at the hearing does not create a reasonable
suspicion retroactively. Officer Castro testified that, before making the stop, she
had no direct knowledge that a traffic violation had occurred as she had not
witnessed any traffic violations. In addition to the DPS Agent the State failed to
produce, the State also failed to present the police dispatch officer who allegedly
made the call to Officer Castro to make a traffic stop.
Hoag & Fonseca
Upon reading of both Hoag v. State6 and Fonseca v. State7, the State’s
argument that the trial court should have allowed statements from the DPS officer
and the dispatch officer into evidence because they were “cooperating officers”
during the arrest is misguided. It is true that before and up to Appellee’s arrest all
law enforcement involved were cooperating. This is the first part to this
“cooperation.” The second part of this “cooperation” is the live testimony of the
“cooprerating officers” in Court.
In both Hoag and Fonseca, the State had multiple officers involved in the
arrest who all cooperated in the arrest. In addition to their cooperation at arrest
was their cooperation at the defendant’s hearing on its motion to suppress.
6
728 S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
7
881 S.W.2d 144, 150 (Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1994, no pet.)
7
In both Hoag and Fonseca, the cooperating officer’s evidence was admitted
because they were present in court at the hearing on the defendant’s motion to
suppress and made live testimony about what they observed during the arrest. This
did not occur in the instant case and the fact that these officers may have
“cooperated” in Appellee’s arrest does not exempt their appearance at the
suppression hearing.
Without the testimony of these “cooperating officers” or any police reports
from these “cooperating officers”, the trial court was not presented with any
evidence besides Officer Castro’s testimony; testimony that clearly stated that the
officer did not have any reasonable suspicions of her own to make a traffic stop of
Appellee’s vehicle because she observed no traffic violations.
The State’s first argument that the trial court should have considered the
collective knowledge of the cooperating officers to determine that reasonable
suspicion existed fails as it is based only in the trial court allowing inadmissable
hearsay evidence.
IV. No evidence was presented by the State to establish that Officer Castro
had a reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop.
The trial court found that the Appellee was speeding for an acceptable
reason, because the “Defendant did not know that he was being followed by any
8
police officers or agents or any authorities; he thought he was being chased by an
unknown person. Defendant accelerated and decelerated his vehicle at different
speeds in an attempt to get away from the unknown vehicle.” (Supp. CR 17 -
Finding No’s 3 & 4) This finding did not exculpate the Appellee from such action,
rather the trial court found it justified under the facts of this harrowing unmarked
police pursuit.
Under the law of necessity8, Conduct is justified if:
(1) the actor reasonably believes the conduct is immediately necessary to
avoid imminent harm;
(2) the desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly outweigh,
according to ordinary standards of reasonableness, the harm sought to be
prevented by the law proscribing the conduct; and
(3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed for the conduct
does not otherwise plainly appear.
The necessity defense applies to the violation of speeding.9 The trial court
did not cite the Penal Code in its findings but it is the law under which the court’s
finding is grounded. (Supp. CR17 - Finding No. 4) Tex. Pen Code §9.22(1) and
8
Texas Penal Code §9.22
9
See Spakes v. State, 913 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) “The plain language
codifying the necessity defense evidences a legislative intent that the defense apply to all offenses
unless the legislature has specifically excluded it from them”
9
Dewalt v. State,10 “requires the defendant to first bring forward evidence of a
specific imminent harm.” Also, Hubbard v. State11 holds that “a defendant must
admit the conduct charged (speeding) and then offer evidence justifying the
conduct. “
The defense brought forward such evidence of specific imminent harm from
this unknown pursuer (RR2 39-43, 45 & most specifically at RR2 - 42), the
Appellee admitted to such speeding (CR1 - 30 ¶2, RR2 - 45, 46), the Appellee
testified during the State’s cross that he was speeding, “To get away from the
vehicle that was chasing me” (RR2 - 46, lines 1-3) and the trial court’s findings
were grounded in the record.
Nonetheless, the State quotes Praska v. State12 to argue that any defense
Appellee might have to any traffic infractions would not negate an officers
reasonable suspicion to make a detention. As was the case in Hoag and Fonseca,
the officer in Praska that had a reasonable suspicion also testified at the hearing
on a defense motion to suppress. This live testimony about what these officers
personally observed is why their information was taken into evidence by their
10
307 S.W.3d 437, 454 (Tex. App. - Austin 2010, pet. ref’d)
11
133 S.W.3d 797, 801-802 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 2004, pet. ref’d)
12
557 S.W.2d 83, 85-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)
10
respective trial courts. Had those same officer’s failed to appear to testify in Hoag,
Fonseca, and Praska, Appellee argues their observations offered as hearsay would
not have been allowed. (This is assuming counsel makes the hearsay objection as
did defense counsel in the instant case).
The observations and statements of the State’s “cooperating officers” were
properly excluded. Officer Castro’s observations at the inception of her arrival
behind Appellee’s vehicle saw no traffic violations. Throughout her tracking of
Appellee’s vehicle, she observed no traffic violations. There was nothing the State
had in its possession or had secured through a witness to show the trial court that
Officer Castro had a reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop.
The “paranoid speeding drunk” defense
On this point, the State has offered a quote from Derichsweiler v. State13.
Although similar in certain respects, Derichsweiler is not guiding caselaw in this
appeal as everything the officer in Derichsweiler observed to create a reasonable
suspicion to make a stop was also testified to by that officer in court. The same
again goes for the State’s other cited case law in Bland v. Texas Dep’t of Pub.
Safety14 and Praska at 85-86.
13
348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)
14
No. 14-12-01057-CV, 2013 WL 3868447, at *4 (Tex. App. - Houston [14th Dist] July
23, 2013, pet. denied)
11
Without any evidence to offer the trial court that Appellee was a “paranoid
speeding drunk” BEFORE Officer Castro arrived and observed zero traffic
violations, i.e. live testimony from the DPS Agent, there exists no evidence of
such for the trial court to consider. It is the State’s burden to prove its assertions
which in this case was to produce its witness to the alleged traffic violations.
V. Appellee never consented to this encounter with a person unknown to him
Appellee was believably in fear for his own safety when pursued at
increasing and decreasing rates of speed by a foreign pick-up truck driven by an
unknown individual. The trial court made a finding to support Appellee’s
contention. (Supp CR17 - Finding No’s 3 & 4) Appellee would argue that human
beings with any sense of self-preservation do not subject themselves to that which
creates fear and apprehension. This is why Appellee refused to pull over earlier in
this pursuit, that the vehicle following him was not law enforcement:
Defense: Okay. So why didn’t you pull over?
Appellee: It wasn’t a -- it was a pickup. I felt like it was some guy
chasing me. (RR2 - 41)
Later in his testimony, Appellee stated that he feared that this person was
out to harm him, that he “was scared.” (RR2 - 42, lines 9-11) This fear and
apprehension fueled Appellee’s reason for pulling over, that this person was still
12
“on my tail” and Appellee needed to determine whether his safety was in jeopardy.
(RR2 - 43, lines 4-9)
The State has attached the holding of Wade v. State15 into its brief to argue
that this was a “police - citizen interaction” that was a “consensual encounter”
between this DPS Agent and Appellee which “does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment”. The record clearly shows that the interaction between the DPS
Agent and Appellee was initiated by the DPS Agent and continued for a
considerable distance during which Appellee was in fear and concern for his own
safety. The Appellee did not consent to this and the Fourth Amendment applies in
this situation.
The State is misguided in its attempt to bridge a nexus between the facts of
the instant case and the holding in Wade. The consensual encounter in Wade dealt
with a defendant sitting stationary in his work van near the public boat ramp of
Lake Waco in China Spring, Texas. A Texas game warden docked his boat to
investigate this work van parked by the boat ramp as it trailered a work trailer, not
a boat trailer and no fishing equipment or implements were present.
Defendant Wade on his own volition, rolled his window down to engage the
officer in conversation. The officer was just assuring that the “occupant was okay”
15
422 S.W.3d 661, 667-668 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)
13
wherein the officer then became suspicious of Wade’s behavior. The officer
testified that Wade presented “unordinary nervousness”, that his story of why he
was parked there changed, and Wade gave “strange responses” to his questions.
This suspicion led to a search of Wade’s van which discovered drugs.
The “police - citizen interaction” seen in Wade is nothing like the facts of
this case. A Texas Game Warden walking in uniform from a conspicuously
marked game warden boat is a clear sign of law enforcement authority. Wade
voluntarily rolled his window down to engage this known law enforcement officer.
Appellee was not a part of such a clearly marked and calm scenario as was
described in Wade.
Most interesting to note about Wade is the fact that in this “consensual
encounter”, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled in the defendant’s favor. It
overruled the trial court’s denial of Wade’s motion to suppress and reversed the
Court of Appeals decision affirming the trial court’s denial.16 Though Appellee’s
interaction with the DPS Agent was clearly not consensual, even if it was, Wade
further reinforces Appellee’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to be “secure in
16
“Neither nervousness nor a refusal to cooperate with an officer during a consensual
encounter are sufficient by themselves to constitute reasonable suspicion. Nor were they
sufficient in combination with appellant's statements about his reasons for coming to the boat
launch to provide the basis for the detention and frisk. Appellant's statement about the pipe in his
truck was derived from the warden's illegal detention and was “fruit of the poisonous tree,” and
therefore that statement could not provide probable cause for searching appellant's truck.” Id. 676
14
his person”.
The State has also quoted an unpublished case that discussed Wade - Allen
v. State17. This case is not pertinent to determine whether or not Appellee’s
encounter with the DPS Agent was consensual as the interaction between police
and the defendant in Allen was not consensual. The officer in the Allen case
followed the defendant’s vehicle without the driver’s consent until he viewed a
traffic violation and made a valid traffic stop. As has been seen in all of the cases
cited by the State, the officers in both Wade and Allen who observed the activity
that led to reasonable suspicion also testified live in court.
Lastly, the State in its quote of Wade, it has referenced the “Mendenhall
test”18 for determining whether a seizure has occurred under the Fourth
Amendment. The question in Mendenhall was whether, in light of the surrounding
circumstances, “a reasonable person would believe he was free to leave.”
The facts of Mendenhall are not similar to the instant case in any respect
and the test is not applicable to support the State’s argument. Sylvia Mendenhall
was seen walking through the Detroit Airport and federal DEA Agents working at
the Airport found her movements to be highly suspicious. The agents approached
17
13-13-00188-CR, 2014 WL 4402135, at *2-4 (Tex.App. - Corpus Christi, Sept 4, 2014)
18
United States. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)
15
Ms. Mendenhall, identified themselves as federal Drug Enforcement Agency
agents, asked her a series of questions about her travels, and asked her if she
would accompany them to their office at the Detroit Airport. Ms. Mendenhall
voluntarily joined the agents and went to the office.
At the DEA office, the agents asked to inspect Ms. Mendenhall’s handbag
and told her that she could decline to allow such search. Ms. Mendenhall did not
assert any objection to the search and allowed it. That search revealed nothing
however the next search of her person, by a female officer after gaining the same
un-objected to consent, revealed drugs. Since Ms. Mendenhall was free to leave
during this questioning and voluntarily stayed, there was no search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Potter Stewart’s opinion concluded:
“Respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when she went
with the agents from the concourse to the DEA office. Whether her consent
to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress
or coercion is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances.
Under this test, the evidence -- including evidence that respondent was not
told that she had to go to the office, but was simply asked if she would
accompany the officers, and that there were neither threats nor any show of
force -- was plainly adequate to support the District Court’s finding that
respondent voluntarily consented to accompany the officers.” Id. at
The Mendenhall case about voluntariness and consent under the Fourth
Amendment does not apply here. First, Appellee was never appraised of the law
16
enforcement status of his pursuer. Second, the interaction between this DPS agent
and Appellee was never consensual. Third, Appellee was never given an
opportunity to decline further search and pursuit as the pursuit began while in
vehicle transit. Lastly under Mendenhall, the totality of the circumstances clearly
show that Appellee pulled over under duress. For these reasons, the Mendenhall
test provides no assistance to Fourth Amendment analysis.
Due to the lack of consent to the interaction between the DPS Agent and
Appellee, the State’s third issue should be overruled.
Failure to Adequately Brief the Issue
Further, the Appellant’s brief “must contain a clear and concise argument
for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the
record.” Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). When the appellant’s brief contains no argument
or citation to any authority that might support an argument, the point of error is
inadequately briefed and presents nothing for review. Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d
878, 896 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see also Jackson v. State, 424 S.W.3d 140, 155
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d); Linney v. State, 401 S.W.3d 764, 783
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d).
The reviewing court has no obligation to construct and compose a party’s
issues, facts, and arguments with appropriate citations to authorities and to the
17
record. Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 896; Busby v. State, 253 S.W.3d 661, 673 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008).
The State has cited no cases at all to flesh out the nature of its’ argument
that the “police-citizen interaction” between the DPS Agent and Appellee was a
consensual encounter. The State has made blanket references to small portions of
Wade, Allen, and Mendenhall which do not apply to this case. The State has failed
to properly brief its third issue and does not make a complete argument to show
any error in the trial court’s ruling.
For this additional reason, the State’s third issue should be overruled.
CONCLUSION
Faced with this evidence, the trial court could only reach the legal
conclusion that the defense’s motion to suppress should be granted. The trial
court’s grant of Appellee’s motion was grounded in the record and was correct
under applicable theories of law.19
PRAYER
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellee respectfully requests that the
judgement of the trial court be affirmed.
19
Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447-448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
18
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Travis Berry
Travis Berry
Texas Bar No. 24059194
P.O. Box 6333
Corpus Christi, Texas 78466
T: (361) 673-5611; F: (361) 442-2562
travisberrylaw@gmail.com
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
19
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on this 23rd day of June 2015, a true and correct
copy of the Appellant’s Brief has been sent via e-mail to A. Cliff Gordon, the
attorney for the State at the Nueces County District Attorney’s Office, 901
Leopard - Rm. 206, Corpus Christi, Texas 78401.
/s/ Travis Berry
Travis Berry
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Rule 9.4(i)(3) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
undersigned certifies this brief complies with the type-volume limitations
announced in Rule 9.4(i)(2)(B) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
1. The undersigned certifies that the Appellee’s Brief contains no more than
3,968 words in proportionately spaced typeface, an amount of words within
the limits set forth in Rule 9.4(i)(2)(B)
2. The brief has been prepared in proportionately spaced typeface using
WordPerfect 12 in 14 pt. Times New Roman. Footnotes have been used and
are all accounted for in the above word count.
3. The undersigned acknowledges a material misrepresentation in completing
this certificate, or circumvention of the type-volume limits states in Rule
9.4(i)(2)(B) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, may result in the
Court striking the brief.
/s/ Travis Berry
Travis Berry
20