Tinaka C. Bell v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division

NUMBER 13-01-148-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

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TINAKA C. BELL, Appellant,

v.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION ET AL., Appellees.

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On appeal from the 156th District Court of Bee County, Texas.

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O P I N I O N

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Yañez and Castillo

Opinion by Justice Yañez

Tinaka Charles Bell appeals from the trial court's judgment affirming the administrative action taken against him by the appellee, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID). We affirm.

By six points of error, appellant argues: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the TDCJ-ID administrative ruling and the trial court's subsequent affirmance of that ruling; (2) the TDCJ-ID deprived appellant of his right to due process by not allowing him to attend the disciplinary hearing and by denying his witnesses the opportunity to testify at the hearing; and (3) records falsified by the TDCJ-ID were wrongly admitted against appellant at his disciplinary hearing.

Background

At approximately 4:00 p.m., December 20, 1999, an inmate riot broke out in the administrative segregation area of the McConnell Unit of the TDCJ-ID in Beeville. In a hearing on January 11, 2000, appellant was found to have participated in the riot. He was fined $534.97 for damaging state property during the riot, and a charge in that amount was assessed against his inmate trust account. After he exhausted his administrative remedies through the TDCJ-ID grievance system, appellant filed suit in the District Court of Bee County against TDCJ-ID. Following a pre-trial hearing and review of the administrative record, the trial court signed a final judgment on December 22, 2000, affirming appellant's disciplinary conviction and fine. This appeal ensued.

Applicable Law

A TDCJ-ID inmate is liable for his intentional damage to state property. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §500.02(a) (Vernon 1998). If more than one inmate is involved in the property damage, each inmate is jointly and severally liable for the damage. Id. The state's claims for property damages shall be adjudicated through an administrative procedure. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §500.02(b) (Vernon 1998). Damages may only be assessed after a hearing and may not exceed the value of the property damaged. Id. An inmate's trust account may be seized to satisfy the inmate's liability for property damage. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §500.002(c) (Vernon 1998).

After exhausting all administrative remedies, an inmate may petition a district court for judicial review of the adjudication of liability for property damage. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §500.002(e) (Vernon 1998). Upon judicial review, the district court shall follow the rules governing judicial review of contested cases provided in chapter 2001 of the Texas Government Code. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §500.002(d) (Vernon 1998); Tex. Gov't Code Ann.§ 2001.171 (Vernon 2000).

Standard of Review

When reviewing a case under the premise of a substantial evidence question, a court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the state agency on the weight of the evidence on questions committed to agency discretion but:

(1) may affirm the agency decision in whole or in part; and

(2) shall reverse and remand the case for further proceeding if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(A) in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision;

(B) in excess of the agency's statutory authority;

(C) made through unlawful procedure;

(D) affected by other error of law;

(E) not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the reliable and probative exercise of discretion;

(F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §2001.174 (Vernon 2000). Section 500.002 does not specify the scope of judicial review. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §500.002(a) (Vernon 1998). Therefore, the "substantial evidence" standard specified in section 2001.174 applies in this case. Tex. Gov't Code Ann.§ 2001.174 (Vernon 2000).

Substantial evidence review is a limited standard of review, requiring "only more than a mere scintilla" to support an agency's determination. Montgomery Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559, 566 (Tex. 2000); R.R. Comm'n v. Torch Operating Co., 912 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Tex. 1995). The determination of whether an agency's determination meets that standard is one of law. Fireman's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. 1984); Bd. of Firemen's Relief & Ret. Fund Trs. v. Marks, 150 Tex. 433, 242 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. 1951). A court applying the substantial evidence standard of review may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency on the weight of the evidence. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 2001.174 (Vernon 2000); Tex. Health Facilities Comm'n v. Charter Medical-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Tex. 1984). The issue for the reviewing court is not whether the agency's decision was correct, but only whether the record demonstrates some reasonable basis for the agency's action. City of El Paso v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 883 S.W.2d 179, 185 (Tex. 1994). In fact, an administrative decision may be sustained even if the evidence preponderates against it. Torch Operating, 912 S.W.2d at 793.

Application

A. Is the Evidence Sufficient to Uphold the Administrative Ruling?

By his first point of error, appellant argues that the TDCJ-ID disciplinary action assessing a property damage charge against his inmate trust account was made without substantial supporting evidence.

We must determine whether the record demonstrates some reasonable basis for the TDCJ-ID decision. See City of El Paso, 883 S.W.2d at 185. There exists in the record documentation that the charging officer saw appellant actively participating in the riot and destroying state property and the officer testified accordingly at the hearing. The officer in question stated that he was on the roof and saw appellant striking a broom handle against a window. The officer also stated that he recognized appellant because he had brought appellant to segregation earlier. We hold this evidence to be "more than a scintilla,"Davis, 34 S.W.3d at 566, and find that there is substantial evidence supporting the disciplinary action. Appellant's first point of error is overruled.

B. Was Appellant Deprived of His Right to Due Process?

By his second, third, and sixth points of error, appellant contends he was denied his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. First, he argues that he was wrongly excluded from the January 11, 2000, disciplinary hearing. Second, he alleges that he was not allowed to introduce witnesses on his own behalf. We construe these points of error as issues of procedural due process.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against deprivation of life, liberty, or property by the state "without due process of law." Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 (1981). The opportunity to be heard is the fundamental requirement of due process; it is an opportunity which must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id. at 540; Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). The Due Process Clause promotes fairness by requiring the government to follow appropriate procedures when its agents decide to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).

We examine procedural due process issues in two steps: first, we ask whether an existing liberty or property interest has been interfered with; and secondly, we determine whether the procedures attendant upon that interference were constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky Dep't of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462 (1989). A prison inmate has a property interest in his inmate trust account. Brewer v. Collins, 857 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ). At a minimum, state law requires procedures that ensure that an inmate's property right is not arbitrarily abrogated. Brewer, 857 S.W.2d at 823 (citing Ex parte Henderson, 645 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)(revocation of good-time credit)). Appellant has clearly satisfied the first requirement.

Next, we must determine whether the TDCJ-ID's disciplinary procedures were constitutionally sound. Generally, to satisfy the requirements of due process, a prison disciplinary action must meet the following minimum procedural requirements: (1) the inmate must be given advance written notice of the charges against him; (2) any evidence against an inmate must be disclosed to him; (3) there must be a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action; (4) the inmate should be afforded the opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence in his own defense as long as doing so will not jeopardize institutional safety or correctional goals; and (5) the inmate should be given the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 559 (1974); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). Appellant claims that he was deprived of the third, fourth, and fifth requirements.

The United States Supreme Court has held, in the context of a review of a disciplinary action in which an inmate was placed in administrative segregation, that:

in determining what is "due process" in the prison context, we are reminded that one cannot automatically apply procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society . . . to the very different situation presented by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison. Prison administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security. These considerations convince us that petitioners were obligated to engage only in an informal, nonadversary review of the information supporting respondents' administrative confinement, including whatever statement respondent wished to submit, within a reasonable time after confining him to administrative segregation.

Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1983) (citations omitted); see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. The courts should defer to prison administrators' adoption and implementation of policies needed to ensure order and security. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974). The rights of an inmate become subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the regime to which the inmate has become lawfully committed. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555. In a prison disciplinary hearing, an inmate is not afforded the full range of rights or the full extent of rights that are given to a free man. Id. There must be a mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution. Id. at 556.

The right to attend a disciplinary hearing is an essential due process protection, but it is not absolute, nor is the right guaranteed. Battle v. Barton, 970 F.2d 779, 782 (11th Cir. 1992)(per curiam); see also Moody v. Miller, 864 F.2d 1178, 1181 (5th Cir. 1989)(if a prisoner is unable to attend a disciplinary hearing, due process requires nothing more than that the hearing be held in accordance with all of the other requirements of due process that are called for under the circumstances).

The Disciplinary Report and Hearing Record states that there was a "threat posed to staff by offender's actions at (the) time of (the) hearing" and that there was a "security threat in the living area." Because of these conditions, appellant was not allowed to attend the hearing. Although appellant, himself, was not present at the hearing, an attorney was there to represent his interests, to cross-examine those witnesses adverse to the appellant's interest, and to present evidence on appellant's behalf. The record shows that TDCJ-ID believed a threat would be posed from a confrontation with appellant. We hold that appellant had no absolute due process right to attend the disciplinary hearing. We must, therefore, defer to TDCJ-ID's determination that there was a security risk to officers and inmates in attempting to escort appellant to the hearing that morning.

Appellant also claims that he was deprived of the opportunity to present witnesses in his defense. As mentioned above, the Fourteenth Amendment affords a defendant the right to present witnesses in his favor; however we have noted that these rights are limited in the case of prison inmates, where matters of safety and security must be considered by prison administrators. The witnesses that appellant sought to present at the hearing were also inmates, who corroborated his statement that he was not involved in the riot. Although these witnesses did not give live testimony at the disciplinary hearing, their statements, denying appellant's participation in the riot, were submitted by appellant's counsel for the court's consideration. Appellant's due process rights were not violated in this case.

We overrule appellant's second, third, and sixth points of error.

C. Was the record falsified?

By his fourth and fifth points of error, appellant contends that both the Disciplinary Hearing Records and the Inmate Initial Offense Report, along with the Preliminary Investigation Report and Worksheet, were falsified. Appellant offers no evidence to support these allegations. This Court has carefully reviewed the record, including the audio tape recording of the administrative hearing, and we find no indication that the records were falsified. We overrule appellant's fourth and fifth points of error.

The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

LINDA REYNA YAÑEZ

Justice

Do not publish. Tex. R. App. P. 47.3.

Opinion delivered and filed this the

31st day of August, 2001.