Javier Amaya Garza v. State

NUMBER 13-16-00476-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
JAVIER AMAYA GARZA, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 92nd District Court
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Contreras and Benavides
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides 1
1 The Honorable Rogelio Valdez, former Chief Justice of this Court, did not participate in this
decision because his term of office expired on December 31, 2018. The Honorable Dori Contreras currently
serves as the Chief Justice for the Thirteenth Court of Appeals.
A jury convicted appellant Javier Amaya Garza of murder, a first-degree felony.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.). Prior to trial,
Garza filed a motion to suppress physical evidence found both inside and around the
outside areas of Garza’s home under the authority of a warrant. The trial court granted
Garza’s motion to suppress evidence found inside Garza’s home, but it denied the motion
as to evidence found around the outside areas of his home. By four issues, which we
construe as two, Garza contends the trial court erred in: (1) partially denying his motion
to suppress; and (2) allegedly “accepting” his plea of guilty to manslaughter without
conducting a formal plea proceeding. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The State charged Garza with murder, alleging that he intentionally or knowingly
caused the death of his nephew Jorge Alberto Valero by shooting Valero with a firearm.
At trial, the evidence showed that Garza hosted a birthday party at his house for Valero.
The party involved a lot of drinking. According to a witness, at some point in the night,
Garza and Valero got into an argument about guns and money, and Garza shot Valero.
Although the evidence at trial established Garza as the shooter, Garza told responding
officers a different story on the night of the shooting. Specifically, Garza told officers that
Valero was killed by an unknown drive-by shooter who fled the scene in a vehicle while
Garza was urinating in the back part of his residence. Based on this story, officers
obtained a warrant to search Garza’s residence for evidence. Garza was not a suspect
at the time the warrant was issued.
Officers executed the search warrant at Garza’s residence and recovered several
pieces of physical evidence, some of which the State admitted at trial, including: a pistol,
a bullet, casings, a camo jacket, and blood lifts. After hearing all the evidence, a jury
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found Garza guilty of murder and sentenced him to life in prison. See id. Garza filed a
motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.
II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
By his first issue, Garza contends that the trial court erred by not granting his
motion to suppress in its entirety because there was no basis to search his residence.
Specifically, Garza argues that the facts contained in the affidavit did not supply probable
cause that evidence of a crime would be found at his residence.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
No search warrant may legally issue unless it is based on probable cause that
evidence of a crime will be found at the place to be searched. See U.S. CONST. amend.
IV; TEX. CONST. art. I § 9; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.06 (West, Westlaw through
2017 1st C.S.). Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances,
there is a “fair probability” that evidence of a crime will be found at a specified location.
Bonds v. State, 403 S.W.3d 867, 872–73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). A “sworn affidavit
setting forth substantial facts establishing probable cause” must be filed with the search-
warrant request. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(b) (West, Westlaw through 2017
1st C.S.). “To justify a search, the circumstances must indicate why evidence of an illegal
activity will be found in a particular place.” U.S. v. Bass, 785 F.3d 1043, 1049 (6th Cir.
2015) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Accordingly, the affidavit must
establish “a nexus between the place to be searched and things to be seized, such that
there is a substantial basis to believe that the things to be seized will be found in the place
searched.” Id.
A trial judge’s determination regarding whether probable cause exists to support
issuance of a search warrant is restricted solely to the affidavit’s four corners. See Walker
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v. State, 494 S.W.3d 905, 907 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (citing
Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 873). When reviewing a magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant,
“appellate courts as well as trial courts apply a highly deferential standard of review
because of the constitutional preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant
over warrantless searches.” Id. (citing State v. McLain, 337 S.W.3d 268, 271–72 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011)). As such, reviewing courts must uphold the magistrate’s probable-
cause determination if the magistrate had a “substantial basis” for concluding that a
search warrant probably would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. See id. (citing Gates,
462 U.S. at 236; Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 873). A magistrate may interpret a search-warrant
affidavit in a “non-technical, common-sense manner, drawing reasonable inferences
solely from the facts and circumstances contained within the affidavit’s four corners.” Id.
(citing Bonds, 403 S.W.3d at 873). Reviewing courts are not to invalidate a warrant by
interpreting the affidavit in a “hypertechnical, rather than a common-sense, manner.” Id.
at 908.
B. Analysis
The probable-cause affidavit for the warrant stated, in relevant part, as follows:
...
C. Sheriff’s Deputies arrived at location and were escorted to a canopy
on the west side of the residence where they discovered the body of
a deceased male.
D. Sheriff’s Deputies observed a deceased male subject had suffered
an apparent gunshot wound.
...
F. Sheriff’s Deputies met with a male witness who stated several males
were drinking at location throughout the night.
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G. The male witness further stated he had seen a vehicle drive onto the
property and heard a gunshot before seeing the same vehicle leave
location.
H. Sheriff’s Deputies checked the immediate area and located two
bullet casings in the vicinity of the deceased but were unable to
locate a weapon.
The discovery of two spent shell cartridge casings in the immediate proximity of
the deceased victim with an apparent gunshot wound provided a link between the crime
and Garza’s residence. Based on these facts, it is fairly probable, though not certain, that
firearms, ammunition or other evidence that would be related to the firing of a firearm
would be discovered at Garza’s residence. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 246 (observing that
probable cause requires only a fair probability of criminal activity, not a certain showing
of such activity). Restricting our review to the four corners of the affidavit, and applying
a highly deferential standard, we conclude that the magistrate had a substantial basis for
finding that there was probable cause to search the vicinity of Garza’s home because it
could be inferred that there were items on Garza’s property that were relevant to the
shooting. Id. Accordingly, the trial court properly partially denied Garza’s motion to
suppress. We overrule Garza’s first issue.
III. INVOLUNTARY PLEA
By his second issue, Garza contends that the trial court violated state and federal
law by allegedly accepting his plea of guilty to manslaughter without first ensuring that he
entered the plea intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily as required by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. He notes
that he was never advised either orally or in writing about the consequences of his alleged
guilty plea. Specifically, Garza identifies the following rights that the trial court should
have given him prior to his plea: (1) against self-incrimination; (2) to a trial by jury; (3) to
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confront witnesses; and (4) the elements of the offense of manslaughter. Furthermore,
Garza complains that the trial court failed to provide certain statutory admonishments set
out in article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure for accepting guilty pleas.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 26.13 (West, Westlaw through 2017 1st C.S.).
Here, the State charged Garza with one count of murder and did not charge him
with manslaughter. At the start of trial, the State read the murder indictment out loud in
front of the jury. Garza’s counsel then volunteered the following statement in answer to
the indictment: “[Garza] pleads not guilty to murder, however, he is pleading guilty to
manslaughter, the lesser included.” (Emphasis added). However, the State did not make
an offer of the lesser included offense of manslaughter at any time throughout the
proceeding.
After an in-chambers conference, the trial court advised the jury that “nothing has
changed” regarding their role and the status of the case—the case would go forward on
the charge of murder, and the jury convicted Garza of such. Because the Fourteenth
Amendment and article 26.13 of the code of criminal procedure both require the trial court
to accept a plea of guilty, and here, by contrast, Garza did not enter a plea of guilty
pursuant to any plea agreement and instead pleaded not guilty to the charge of murder,
the trial court was under no obligation to admonish Garza regarding his attempt to plead
guilty to an uncharged lesser included offense. See Davison, 405 S.W.3d. at 688 (holding
that a judge has no duty to admonish a defendant when he pleads not guilty); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. Art. 26.13. We overrule his second issue.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Having overruled Garza’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
GINA M. BENAVIDES,
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
31st day of January, 2019.
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