Kristi Collins v. State

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-18-00114-CR
Kristi COLLINS,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the 218th Judicial District Court, Wilson County, Texas
Trial Court No. 16-09-180-CRW
Honorable Russell Wilson, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: May 15, 2019
AFFIRMED
Kristi Collins appeals her conviction for aggravated assault on a public servant. Collins
argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s rejection of her defense of mistake
of fact.
BACKGROUND
Deputy Frank Ashton responded to a domestic disturbance at Collins’s residence at
7:30 a.m. on February 28, 2016. The dispute at the residence arose out of an altercation between
Collins and her fiancé’s son, Chris. Deputy Ashton approached the residence in a marked police
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vehicle, and he was wearing his Sheriff’s uniform. As he approached in his vehicle, Deputy
Ashton made eye contact with a female, presumably Collins, who was standing on the front porch.
Deputy Ashton testified he was certain the female made eye contact with him “because she turned
to her right and looked straight at [him] and then turned towards the trailer and then went back in
the trailer.” Deputy Ashton approached the residence on foot while announcing he was from the
Sheriff’s Office so that anyone inside the residence could hear. Shortly after, Collins’s fiancé,
Richard Berry, walked out of the residence and onto the front porch with a gun strapped on his
shoulder. Deputy Ashton unholstered his weapon and asked Berry to put his gun down. While
Berry was complying with Deputy Ashton’s request, Collins appeared at an open window and
yelled: “You put your weapon down. You’re trespassing.” Deputy Ashton testified Collins was
the female he saw on the front porch as he approached in his vehicle. Deputy Ashton heard Collins
say “[y]ou know what” as she disappeared from the window and reappeared with a shotgun pointed
towards him. Believing his life was in imminent danger, Deputy Ashton fired two shots, both
hitting Collins and ending the altercation. Deputy Ashton was wearing a body camera that
captured the entire incident. The footage from the camera was properly introduced into evidence
and was shown to the jury.
At trial, Collins testified the sun blinded her view when Deputy Ashton pulled his service
pistol and she was not able to see he was a peace officer. Although her testimony was somewhat
inconsistent, Collins claimed she stuck the shotgun out of the window because she thought Chris
or one of his friends had arrived and was threatening Berry with a weapon. The court instructed
the jury on the mistake-of-fact defense in the jury charge. After hearing the evidence, the jury
found Collins guilty of aggravated assault on a public servant.
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DISCUSSION
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and could have found against
the accused beyond a reasonable doubt on a defensive issue raised by the evidence. Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
“It is a defense to prosecution that the actor through mistake formed a reasonable belief
about a matter of fact if his mistaken belief negated the kind of culpability required for commission
of the offense.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.02(a). Because the mistake-of-fact defense must be
based on a reasonable belief about a matter of fact, the defense is inapplicable where the mistaken
belief is not reasonable. Gant v. State, 814 S.W.2d 444, 452 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, no writ);
see also Thompson v. State, 236 S.W.3d 787, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). When reviewing the
jury’s rejection of Collins’s mistake-of-fact defense, we must be mindful that the jury, as the trier
of fact, is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their
testimony. Aldeman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The jury is free to
believe or disbelieve all or any part of any witness’ testimony. Id.; see also Braughton v. State,
No. PD-0907-17, 2018 WL 6626621, at *14 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 19, 2018) (“[B]y its implicit
rejection of appellant’s defenses in finding him guilty, the jury necessarily signaled its disbelief in
[appellant’s] testimony as lacking in credibility, and the legal sufficiency standard does not permit
us to substitute our view of the credibility of the witness testimony for the jury’s.”).
The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Collins intentionally or
knowingly threatened Deputy Ashton with a deadly weapon and that Collins knew Deputy Ashton
was a public servant who was lawfully discharging an official duty. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 22.01, 22.02. The State also bore the burden of persuasion in disproving Collins’s mistake-of-
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fact defense. See Saxton, 804 S.W.2d 913. Here, the jury heard Deputy Ashton’s testimony that
Collins looked directly at him when he pulled up in his marked patrol vehicle. Deputy Ashton
also testified that the sun was rising to his right and was not positioned behind him, thus
contradicting Collins’s testimony that the sun blinded her view. His testimony regarding the
position of the sun was corroborated by the second deputy to arrive at the scene and by video from
the body camera that was shown to the jury. In addition, there were inconsistencies in Collins’s
testimony about who she thought was approaching the house. It was the jury’s role, as the fact-
finder, to reconcile conflicts in the evidence. See Braughton, 2018 WL 6626621, at *11. The jury
was free to believe Deputy Ashton’s testimony and disbelieve Collins. See Aldeman, 828 S.W.2d
at 421. The jury was also able to consider the video evidence and draw reasonable inferences
regarding whether Collins could have reasonably believed Deputy Ashton was not a public servant.
See Braughton, 2018 WL 6626621, at *11. When we view all the evidence before us in the light
most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the jury could have rationally found Collins committed
the aggravated assault and knew that Deputy Ashton was a public servant. In addition, a rational
jury could have found Collins’s mistaken belief—that Deputy Ashton was not a public servant—
was unreasonable and, therefore, rejected her mistake-of-fact defense. See Thompson, 236 S.W.3d
at 800. Thus, the evidence is legally sufficient to support Collins’s conviction for aggravated
assault of a public servant.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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