Ron Seale, Individually and as the Representative of the Estate of Clara Lavinia Seale v. Horace Truett Seale and Wife, Nan Seale

ACCEPTED
12-15-00004-CV
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS
5/1/2015 4:15:55 PM
CATHY LUSK
CLERK
Case No. 12-15-00004-CV
IN THE FILED IN
12th COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS 5/1/2015 4:15:55 PM
CATHY S. LUSK
Clerk
TYLER, TEXAS
__________________________________________________________________
RON SEALE, Individually and as the Representative of the Estate of CLARA
LAVINIA SEALE
Appellant,
V.
HORACE TRUETT SEALE and wife, NAN SEALE
Appellees.
__________________________________________________________________
APPEALED FROM CAUSE NO. CV04637
In the County Court at Law of Van Zandt County, Texas
______________________________________________________________________________
APPELLANT’S APPELLATE BRIEF
_____________________________________________________________________________
Respectfully submitted,
Richard L. Ray
State Bar No.16606300
Ray & Thatcher, Attorneys at Law, P.C.
300 South Trade Days Boulevard
Canton, Texas 75103
(903) 567-2051
Fax (903) 567-6998
Email: rlray@rayandthatcher.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The following list of parties and counsel is provided so the members of the
court may determine whether they are disqualified to serve or should recuse
themselves from participating in the decision of the case:
1. Appellant:
Ron Seale
17296 FM 17
Canton, Texas 75103
2. Counsel for Appellant:
Richard L. Ray
Victoria Ray Thatcher
Ray & Thatcher, Attorneys at Law, P.C.
300 S. Trade Days Blvd.
Canton, Texas 75103
903-567-2051
903-567-6998 – fax
rlray@rayandthatcher.com
3. Appellees:
Horace Truett Seale and wife, Nan Seale
c/o Martin Walker, P.C.
The Arcadia Theater
121 N. Spring Avenue
Tyler, Texas 75702
4. Counsel for Appellees:
John (Jack) F. Walker, II
Martin Walker, P.C.
The Arcadia Theater
121 N. Spring Avenue
Tyler, Texas 75702
903-526-1600
903-595-0796 – fax
jwalker@martinwalkerlaw.com
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CASES PAGE
Identity of Parties and Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Index of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, iv
Statement of the Nature of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
Issues Presented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Procedural History and Background Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3
Summary of the Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14
A. Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Statement Regarding Oral Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
Prayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Certificate of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Certificate of Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18-END
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES PAGE
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Section 37.001………………………….…….4
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Section 37.004………………………..……..12
Tx. Gov’t. Code § 25.0003 ……………………………………………….4, 7, 9, 14
Tx. Gov’t Code § 25.2362………………………………………………… 6, 9, 14
Tx. Gov’t Code § 26.043……………………………………………… 6, 9, 12, 14
CASES PAGE
Bennett v. Ross, 278 S.W. 314 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1925)………………….11
Carter v. Gray, 125 Tex. 219, 81 S.W.2d 647 (Comm’n App. 1935)………….....11
City of Dallas v. Albert (Sup. 2011) 354 S.W.3d 368…………………………….13
City of Dallas v. Brown (App. 5 Dist. 2012) 373 S.W.3d 204, rehearing
overruled, review denied………………………………………………...…13
Galley v. Hedrick, 127 S.W.2d 978 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1939)…………….11
J.M. Huber Petroleum Co. v. Yake, 121 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Civ. App.
Amarillo 1938)…………………………………………………………..…11
In re Marriage of Skarda, 345 S.W. 3rd 665 (Tex. App. Amarillo, 2011)……11, 12
Kegans v. White, 131 S.W.2d 990 (Tex. Civ. App. Eastland 1939),
writ refused……………………………………………………………..….11
Penney v. Woody, 147 S.W. 872 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1912……………...…11
Texas Dept. of Transp. v. Sefzik (Sup. 2011) 355 S.W.3d 618……………………13
iii
Wilder v. Cox, 104 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1937), writ dismissed…..11
OTHER SOURCES PAGE
Volume 16, Texas Jurisprudence 3rd Section 94 …………………………………10
Vernon’s Ann. Texas Const. Art. 5 §§ 1, 21.009(2), 25.003(a), (c)(1),
25.1541(a)(3), 25.15242, 26.043…………………………………………..13
iv
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an “Order” (1CR74) which was in substance an Order
of Dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ cause of action, dated December 16, 2014. The
Defendants previously filed a Motion to Dismiss dated on October 10, 2014, for
lack of jurisdiction (1CR28).
The Appellant subsequently filed a timely Notice of Appeal on January 12,
2015 (1CR76).
ISSUES PRESENTED
The trial court erred in dismissing the Appellants’ cause of action against
Appellees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
a. Procedural History
The case at issue commenced with its filing on February 2, 2012, when the
Appellants, Ron Seale, Individually and as the representative of the Estate of Clara
Lavinia Seale, hereinafter referred to as “Ron Seale”, filed suit against the
Appellees, Horace Truett Seale, a brother, and his wife Nan Seale, hereinafter
referred to as “Truett Seale”, for declaratory judgment relief relative to a deed
which is attached to the Appellants’ Petition (1CR6, 11).
1
On or about February 24, 2012, “Truett Seale” filed his answer which he
amended on August 21, 2014, in which he did not allege a “lack of jurisdiction” on
the part of the County Court at Law (Van Zandt County).
As indicated above, on October 10, 2014, “Truett Seale” filed a Motion to
Dismiss based essentially upon the “inability” of the County Court at Law to
determine a “title issue to real property”.
This came as no surprise to “Ron Seale” since the Court, at a Summary
Judgment setting on September 26, 2014, suggested its lack of jurisdiction when it
stated:
“THE COURT: One concern I have, Mr. Ray, is I would need to
review the County Courts at Law enabling statute, but I’m not sure that I
have authority to rule on real property matters and disputes. Have you
checked the enabling statute lately? I know I can handle stuff that is a whole
line of cases with respect to landlord tenant type appeals from the JP courts
and you kind of get into some situations there where it’s close when you’re
dealing with issues of possession.
I’m handling that, but I believe there’s some prohibition against
handling land, real property type interest in Van Zandt County. I think that
may be reserved to the district court. I don’t know if you can get around that
2
through a Dec action. That would be something that would need to be
briefed.” (1RR10(12/26/14))
Once again, in his Answer and Amended Answer, “Truett Seale” pled no
lack of jurisdiction.
On December 16, 2014, an Order, untitled, dismissed “Ron Seale’s” cause of
action, after argument before the Court heard on November 20, 2014. A copy of
the argument is provided in the Reporter’s Record. (1RR4(11/20/14))
b. Factual Background
On August 9, 1999, Angus Seale signed a warranty deed to “Truett Seale” and
wife Nan Seale to some 157.3 acres. (1CR11)
The deed contained no description and, essentially, disinherited some four (4)
other siblings.
More critical, Lavinia Seale, Angus Seale’s wife, did not sign the deed or
convey her community interest to “Truett Seale” by any known instrument.
As a result, on February 2, 2012, “Ron Seale” as representative of the Lavinia
Seale estate, his mother, filed suit seeking declaratory relief to determine the validity
of the deed to “Truett Seale” and also the proportionate ownership purchased.
No issue of title or recovery was raised in his petition. (1CR6)
3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The order of the lower court should be reversed because the Van Zandt
County Court at Law does have jurisdiction to construe instruments under the
Declaratory Judgment Act (Civil Practice and Remedies Code 37.001 et seq).
ARGUMENT
A. Jurisdiction.
The only issue is the jurisdiction of the Van Zandt County Court at Law; and
the issue is, “Does the Court have jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment action
which seeks an interpretation of a deed?”
There are three (3) statutes that are relevant and key to this determination.
Section 25.0003 of the Government Code states as follows:
(a) A statutory county court has jurisdiction over all causes and
proceedings, civil and criminal, original and appellate, prescribed by law for
county courts.
(b) A statutory county court does not have jurisdiction over causes
and proceedings concerning roads, bridges, and public highways and the
general administration of county business that is within the jurisdiction of
the commissioners court of each county.
4
(c) In addition to other jurisdiction provided by law, a statutory
county court exercising civil jurisdiction concurrent with the constitutional
jurisdiction of the county court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district
court in:
(1) Civil cases in which the matter in controversy exceeds $500 but
does not exceed $200,000, excluding interest, statutory or punitive
damages and penalties, and attorney’s fees and costs, as alleged on
the face of the petition; and
(2) Appels of final rulings and decisions of the division of workers’
compensation of the Texas Department of Insurance regarding
workers’ compensation claims, regardless of the amount in
controversy.
(d) Except as provided by Subsection (e), a statutory county court
has, concurrent with the county court, the probate jurisdiction provided by
general law for county courts.
(e) In a county that has a statutory probate court, a statutory
probate court is the only county court created by statute with probate
jurisdiction.
5
(f) A statutory county court does not have the jurisdiction of a
statutory probate court granted statutory probate courts by the Texas Probate
Code.
Section 26.043 of the Government Code specifically states civil matters in
which the County Court is without jurisdiction, as follows:
A county court does not have jurisdiction in:
(1) A suit to recover damages for slander or defamation of character;
(2) A suit for the enforcement of a lien on land;
(3) A suit in behalf of the state for escheat;
(4) A suit for divorce;
(5) A suit for the forfeiture of a corporate charter;
(6) A suit for the trial of the right to property valued at $500 or more
and levied on under a writ of execution, sequestration, or
attachment;
(7) An eminent domain case; or
(8) A suit for the recovery of land.
The specific statute of the Government Code which creates the Van Zandt
County Court at Law is Government Code 25.2362, which states:
6
(a) In addition to the jurisdiction provided by Section 25.0003 and
other law, and except as limited by Subsection (b), a county court at law in
Van Zandt County has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in:
(1) Felony cases to:
(A)Conduct arraignments;
(B) Conduct pretrial hearings;
(C) Accept guilty pleas; and
(D)Conduct jury trials on assignment of a district judge
presiding in Van Zandt County and acceptance of the
assignment by the judge of the county court at law;
(2) Class A and Class B misdemeanor cases;
(3) Family law matters;
(4) Juvenile matters;
(5) Probate matters;
(6) Guardianship matters; and
(7) Appeals from the justice and municipal courts.
(b) A county court at law’s civil jurisdiction concurrent with the
district court in civil cases is limited to cases in which the matter in
controversy does not exceed $200,000. A county court at law does not have
7
general supervisory control or appellate review of the commissioners court
or jurisdiction of:
(1) Suits on behalf of this state to recover penalties or escheated
property;
(2) Felony cases involving capital murder;
(3) Misdemeanors involving official misconduct; or
(4) Contested elections.
(c) Repealed by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 3 (H.B.79), §
4.50(a)(92).
(d) The judge of a county court at law shall be paid a total annual
salary set by the commissioners court at an amount that is not less $1,000
less than the total annual salary received by a district judge in the county. A
district judge’s or statutory county court judge’s total annual salary does not
include contributions and supplements paid by a county.
(e) Repealed by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 3 (H.B. 79) §
4.50(a)(92).
(f) The district clerk serves as clerk of a county court at law in
family court matters and proceedings, and the county clerk shall serve as
clerk of a county court at law in all other matters. Each clerk shall establish
a separate docket for a county court at law.
8
(g) The official court reporter of a county court at law is entitled to
receive a salary set by the judge of the county court at law with the approval
of the commissioners court.
(h) Repealed by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 3 (H.B. 79), §
4.50(a)(92).
(i) If a jury trial is requested in a case that is in a county court at
law’s jurisdiction, the jury shall be composed of six members unless the
constitution requires a 12-member jury.
Added by Acts 2009, 81st Leg., ch. 1103, § 15(a), eff. Jan. 1, 2011.
Amended by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., ch. 773 (H.B. 1897) § 1, eff. Sept. 1,
2011; Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 3 (H.B. 79), § 4.50(a)(92), eff. Jan.
1, 2012.
The use of the wording that the County Court’s jurisdiction “is the
jurisdiction provided by Section 25.0003 and other law” is somewhat in artful
because it makes no reference to Section 26.043 which states in Section (8) that a
county court (constitutional) “does not have jurisdiction in a suit for recovery of
land”. Instead, the statute clearly states that the “county curt at law’s civil
jurisdiction” is “concurrent with the district court in civil cases” which clearly
implies that the county court at law’s jurisdiction has been enhanced by its unique
statute, 25.2362.
9
Apparently the Court determined that “Ron Seale’s” petition was a suit to
recover land, although the order of dismissal states no specific reason for the
dismissal, other than “lack of jurisdiction”.
“Ron Seale” makes no claim for recovery of land or determination of a title
issue, in his petition (1CR6). Further, his prayer states:
“PRAYER FOR RELIEF
THEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this court:
1. Render a judgment declaring Defendants to have no right at law or in
equity to the above described real property, or;
2. In the alternative, if this court should find that Defendants have an
interest in the property, declaring the specific nature and value of any
such interest of the Defendants;
3. That the Defendants be held to account to the estate for rents and
profits received from the property; and
4. For any other relief to which the Plaintiff is entitled.”
Perhaps the court construed the limitations of the jurisdictional statutes too
literally and too narrowly.
Volume 16 of Texas Jurisprudence 3rd Section 94, Courts, states with respect
to suits for recovery of land and county court at law jurisdiction as follows:
10
Although county courts do not have jurisdiction of suits for the
recovery of land or the enforcement of liens on land, (§ 92) such a court may
exercise jurisdiction, in a proper case, when title is only incidentally
involved. Kegans v. White, 131 S.W.2d 990 (Tex. Civ. App. Eastland 1939),
writ refused; Galley v. Hedrick, 127 S.W.2d 978 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo
1939); J.M. Huber Petroleum Co. v. Yake, 121 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. Civ. App.
Amarillo 1938); Wilder v. Cox, 104 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin
1937), writ dismissed. Thus, it may have jurisdiction of an action for breach
of warranty of title, Penney v. Woody, 147 S.W. 872 (Tex. Civ. App.
Amarillo 1912), and an action on a note given for the purchase price of land,
when the plaintiff does not assert any lien and is not attempting to enforce it
on the land. Carter v. Gray, 125 Tex. 219, 81 S.W.2d 647 (Comm’n App.
1935); Bennett v. Ross, 278 S.W. 314 (Tex. Civ. App. Amarillo 1925).
In In re Marriage of Skarda, 345 S.W. 3rd 665 (Tex. App. Amarillo, 2011)
the Court states that:
“County Court at law of Lubbock County had jurisdiction to
characterize property as joint property of husband and wife in divorce
proceeding, despite argument that husband asserted property was his
separate real property and court lacked jurisdiction in suit for recovery of
land; divesting of jurisdiction in suits for recovery of land only referred to
11
constitutional county courts, not statutory county courts, legislature had
given court concurrent jurisdiction with district courts in family law cases
and proceedings, and resolution of disputed characterization of property
held by parties was matter incident to divorce (emphasis added).” Vernon’s
Ann. Texas Const. Art. 5, § 1; V.T.C.A., Government Code §§ 21.009(2),
25.003(a), (c)(1) 25.1541(a)(3), 25.1542, 26.043. In re Marriage of Skarda,
345 S.W.3d 665 (Tex. App. Amarillo 2011).
In the instant case “Ron Seale’s cause of action seeks purely a declaratory
judgment ruling to interpret a deed. There is no challenge to title.
Section 37.004 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, relative to
declaratory relief, states:
(a) A person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other
writings constituting a contract or whose rights, status, or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise
may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under
the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a
declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.
(b) A contract may be construed either before or after there has
been a breach.
12
(c) Notwithstanding Section 22.001, Property Code, a person
described by Subsection (a) may obtain a determination under this chapter
when the sole issue concerning title to real property is the determination of
the proper boundary line between adjoining properties. Acts 1985, 69 th Leg.,
ch. 959, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985. Amended by Acts 2007, 80th Leg., ch. 305, §
1, eff. June 15, 2007.
A declaratory judgment action does not “enlarge a trial court’s jurisdiction,
and a litigant’s request for declaratory relief does not confer jurisdiction on a court
or change a suit’s underlying nature.” City of Dallas v. Brown (App. 5 Dist. 2012)
373 S.W.3d 204, rehearing overruled, review denied; Texas Dept. of Transp. v.
Sefzik (Sup. 2011) 355 S.W.3d 618; City of Dallas v. Albert (Sup. 2011) 354
S.W.3d 368.
“Ron Seale” clearly falls within the ambit of declaratory relief. He is a
person “interested under a deed”, as an heir and as representative of the Lavinia
Seale (spouse of Angus Seale) Estate.
However, such a request for interpretation is not for “recovery of land”.
Jurisdiction of Declaratory Relief is not limited. “Ron Seale” was entitled to
have the Van Zandt County Court at Law interpret and determine the validity of
the deed and accordingly its proportionate interest owners.
13
It is clear that the County Court at Law cannot determine title, but it is not
limited in construing and interpreting instruments, wills and deeds.
CONCLUSION
Appellees are entitled to declaratory relief as a matter of law on their cause
of action because the Van Zandt County Court at Law does have jurisdiction
“concurrent with the District Court” where the interpretation of a deed by an
interested party is sought.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
(38.1(e) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure)
This case has little or no dispute concerning the facts. It hinges entirely
upon an interpretation of a statute (Government Code 25.0003, 25.2362, 26.043)
and its impact.
The Appellant is not requesting oral argument.
PRAYER
Appellant prays that the trial court’s order of dismissal be reversed, that the
cause be remanded, and that the costs of court, both trial and appellate, be assessed
against Appellees.
14
Respectfully submitted,
RAY & THATCHER, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, PC
/s/ Richard L. Ray
RICHARD L. RAY
State Bar No. 16606300
VICTORIA RAY THATCHER
State Bar No. 24054462
300 South Trade Days Blvd.
Canton, Texas 75103
903-567-2051
903-567-6998 (fax)
rlray@rayandthatcher.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS
15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellants’
Appellate Brief has been mailed via U.S. First Class Mail, on this the 1st day of May,
2015, to the following counsel of record:
John F. (Jack) Walker, III
Martin Walker, P.C.
The Arcadia Theater
121 N. Spring Avenue
Tyler, Texas 75702.
/s/ Richard L. Ray
RICHARD L. RAY
16
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Relying on the word count function in the word processing software
used to produce this document, I certify that the number of words in this
Appellees’ Appellate Brief (including any caption, identity of parties and
counsel, statement regarding oral argument, table of contents, index of
authorities, statement of the case, statement of issues presented, statement
of jurisdiction, statement of procedural history, signature, proof of service,
certification, certificate of compliance, and appendix) is 3,980 .
/s/ Richard L. Ray_________
RICHARD L. RAY
17
APPENDIX
DESCRIPTION EXHIBIT NUMBER
1. Order (of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction)
(12/16/14)………………………..………………………….…”A”
2. Tx. Gov’t. Code § 25.0003……………….……………..……..”B”
3. Tx. Gov’t Code § 25.2362…………….……………………….”C”
4. Tx. Gov’t Code § 26.043………………………………………”D”
18
EXHIBIT "A"
( CAUSE NO. CV04637 FIJ Fn FOR RECORn
20140£CI6 PMJ: 21
RON SEALE, Individually and as the § .COUNTY COURT AT LAW
Representative ofthe Estate of CHARUJTTf fll rDSt
CLARA LAVINIA SEALE
§
§
co:.;,
COUNTY Gt[P,K, \'All z.iJiar
Plaintiff § BY--~----- 0£P
§
vs. § OF
§
HORACE TRUETT SEALE and wife, §
NAN SEALE, §
Defendants § VANZANDT COUNTY, TEXAS
ORD:ER
On November 20, 2014, the Comt heard the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Jurisdiction. All patties were represented by counsel.
Having considered the motion, Plaintiff's response, the arguments of counsel, and the
applicable law, the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's claims. It ls
therefore ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jul'isdiction is hereby
GRANTED.
SIGNED AND ENTERED on this the
/~'/4day of December, 2014.
/20Mlll~nt~.t/
HONORAaLERANDALL.McDONALD
JUDGE PRESIDING
(
EXHIBIT "B"
TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE
TITLE 2, JUUDICIAL BRANCH
SUBTITLE A. COURTS
Section. 25.0003. JURISDICTION
(a) A statutory county court has jurisdiction over all causes
and proceedings, civil and criminal, original and appellate, prescribed
by law for county courts.
(b) A statutory county court does not have jurisdiction over
causes and proceedings concerning roads, bridges, and public
highways and the general administration of county business that is
within the jurisdiction of the commissioners court of each county.
(c) In addition to other jurisdiction provided by law, a
statutory county court exercising civil jurisdiction concurrent with the
constitutional jurisdiction of the county court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the district court in:
(!)Civil cases in which the matter in controversy exceeds $500
but does not exceed $200,000, excluding interest, statutory
or punitive damages and penalties, and attorney's fees and
costs, as alleged on the face of the petition; and
(2)Appels of final rulings and decisions of the division of
workers' compensation of the Texas Department of
Insurance regarding workers' compensation claims,
regardless of the amount in controversy.
(d) Except as provided by Subsection (e), a statutory county
court has, concurrent with the county court, the probate jurisdiction
provided by general law for county courts.
(e) In a county that has a statutory probate court, a statutory
probate court is the only county court created by statute with probate
jurisdiction.
(f) A statutory county court does not have the jurisdiction of
a statutory probate court granted statutory probate courts by the Texas
Probate Code.
Section 26.043 of the Government Code specifically states civil
matters in which the County Court is without jurisdiction, as follows:
A county court does not have jurisdiction in:
(l)A suit to recover damages for slander or defamation of
character;
(2)A suit for the enforcement of a lien on land;
(3) A suit in behalf of the state for escheat;
(4)A suit for divorce;
(5) A suit for the forfeiture of a corporate charter;
(6)A suit for the trial of the right to property valued at $500 or
more and levied on under a writ of execution, sequestration,
or attachment;
(7) An eminent domain case; or
(8)A suit for the recovery ofland.
2
EXHIBIT "C"
TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE
TITLE 2, JUUDICIAL BRANCH
SUBTITLE A. COURTS
Section. 25.2362. VANZANDT COUNTY COURT AT LAW PROVISIONS
(a) In addition to the jurisdiction provided by Section
25.0003 and other law, and except as limited by Subsection (b), a
county court at law in VanZandt County has concurrent jurisdiction
with the district court in:
(!)Felony cases to:
(A)Conduct arraignments;
(B)Conduct pretrial hearings;
(C)Accept guilty pleas; and
(D)Conduct jury trials on assignment of a district
judge presiding in Van Zandt County and
acceptance of the assignment by the judge of the
county court at law;
(2)Class A and Class B misdemeanor cases;
(3)Family law matters;
(4) Juvenile matters;
(5)Probate matters;
(6)Guardianship matters; and
(?)Appeals from the justice and municipal courts.
(b) A county court at law's civil jurisdiction concurrent with
the district court in civil cases is limited to cases in which the matter
in controversy does not exceed $200,000. A county court at law does
not have general supervisory control or appellate review of the
commissioners court or jurisdiction of:
(l)Suits on behalf of this state to recover penalties or
escheated property;
(2)Felony cases involving capital murder;
(3)Misdemeanors involving official misconduct; or
(4) Contested elections.
(c) Repealed by Acts 2011, 82"d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 3
(H.B.79), § 4.50(a)(92).
(d) The judge of a county court at law shall be paid a total
annual salary set by the commissioners court at an amount that is not
less $1,000 less than the total annual salary received by a district
judge in the county. A district judge's or statutory county court
judge's total annual salary does not include contributions and
supplements paid by a county.
(e) Repealed by Acts 2011, 82"d Leg., 1'1 C.S., ch. 3 (H.B.
79) § 4.50(a)(92).
(f) The district clerk serves as clerk of a county court at law
in family court matters and proceedings, and the county clerk shall
serve as clerk of a county court at law in all other matters. Each clerk
shall establish a separate docket for a county court at law.
(g) The official court reporter of a county court at law is
entitled to receive a salary set by the judge of the county court at law
with the approval of the commissioners court.
(h) Repealed by Acts 2011, 82nd Leg., 1'1 C.S., ch. 3 (H.B.
79), § 4.50(a)(92).
(i) If a jury trial is requested in a case that is in a county
court at law's jurisdiction, the jury shall be composed of six members
unless the constitution requires a 12-member jury.
Added by Acts 2009, 81'1 Leg., ch. 1103, § 15(a), ef£ Jan. 1, 2011.
Amended by Acts 2011, 82"d Leg., ch. 773 (H.B. 1897) § 1, eff. Sept.
1, 2011; Acts 2011, 82"d Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 3 (H.B. 79), § 4.50(a)(92),
eff. Jan. 1, 2012.
2
EXHIBIT "D"
TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE
TITLE 2, JUUDICIAL BRANCH
CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTY COURTS
Section. 26.043. CIVIL MATTERS IN WHICH COUNTY COURT IS WITHOUT
JURISDICTION
A county court does not have jurisdiction in:
(l)A suit to recover damages for slander or defamation of
character;
(2)A suit for the enforcement of a lien on land;
(3)A suit in behalf of the state for escheat;
(4) A suit for divorce;
(5)A suit for the forfeiture of a corporate charter;
(6)A suit for the trial of the right to property valued at $500 or
more and levied on under a writ of execution, sequestration,
or attachment;
(7) An eminent domain case; or
(8) A suit for the recovery of land.