Harriman, Timothy Scott

6S3-fS
Cause No.
ORIGINAL
IN THE
CRIMINAL COURT OF APPEALS
TIMOTHY HARRIMAN,
Appellant,
„ RECEIVED SW
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
Vs. MAY 29 2015
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee.
FILED IN
On Petition for Discretionary Review COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
from the Court ofAppealsfor the
NAY 29 2015
Fifth District Court No. 5
At Dallas County, Texas Abel Acosta, Clerk
In Cause No. 05-13-01547-CR;
Trial Cause No. F94-015553-L
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
Counsel of Record:
Timothy Scott Harriman
TDCJ# 00677187
Pro Se Petitioner
2 Jester Rd, Vance Unit
Richmond, Texas 77406
Attorneyfor Appellant
LIST OF PARTIES
APPELLANT/PETITIONER
Timothy Harriman
APPELLEE
The State of Texas
DEFENSE COUNSEL AT TRIAL
Original Trial:
Amy Abboud
7161 Bishop Road, Suite 200
Piano. Texas 75024
Post-Conviction DNA Motion:
Julie Doucet
Dallas County Public Defender's Office
Frank Crowley Courts Building
133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB-2
Dallas, Texas 75207-4399
STATE'S ATTORNEYS AT TRIAL
John Vance, Linda Bayless, and Scott Bryant
Dallas County District Attorney's Office
Frank Crowley Courts Building
133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB-19
Dallas, Texas 75207-4399
APPELLANT'S ATTORNYS ON APPEAL
Post-Conviction DNA Motion:
Julie Woods
Dallas County Public Defender's Office
Frank Crowley Courts Building
133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB-2
Dallas, Texas 75207-4399
STATE'S ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL
Original Trial: Patricia PoppoffNoble
Post-Conviction DNA Motion: Shara Saget
Dallas County District Attorney's Office
Frank Crowley Courts Building
133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB-19
Dallas, Texas 75207-4399
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF PARTIES ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE... 1
HISTORY OF THE CASE 2
GROUND ONE FOR REVIEW 4
GROUND TWO FOR REVIEW 6
ARGUMENT 7
Point of Error 1, Restated 7
The intermediate courts abused their discretion in denying
Appellant's motion for post-conviction DNA testing because
Appellant met his burden of establishing that identity was or
is an issue in this case and demonstrating by a preponderance
ofthe evidence that he would not have been convicted had the
results ofthe DNA test been available at trial.
Point of Error 2, Restated 10
The intermediate courts have misconstrued Chapter 64 to
mandate a foreclosure on indigent defendants' rights when an
important question of factual Identity arises from state and
federal concerns as to actual innocence that falls within
contours ofscientific certainty.
PRAYER 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 14
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 15
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
Harriman v. State,
No. 05-94-00905-CR, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 2556 (Tex. App.- Dallas Oct. 12,
1995, no pet.) 1
Bell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 301, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) passim
Ex Parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) passim
Blacklockv. State, 235 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) 5
Esparza v. State, 282 S.W.3d 913, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) 5
Peyravi v. State,
S.W.3d (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2013, no pet.)
(NO.14-13-00118-CR; 11-7-3.) 5
Skinner v.Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289,1296, 179 L. Ed. 2d 233 (2011) 6
State v. Swearingen, 424 S.W.3d 32, 37-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) 6
Routier v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) 7
Jacksonv. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979) 10
Ex Parte Robbins, 360 S.W3d 446,457 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) 11
In Re Franklin, 337 S.W.3d 890, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) 12
Gonzales v. State, 4 S.W.3d406, 412 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999) 12
Statutes
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 64.03(a) .2
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 64.03(a)(2)(A) 2
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art. 64.03(a)(1)(B) 4
Miscellaneous
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, article 11.073 6
HOW DNA Evidence Works, http://science.howitorks.com/life/genetic/dna-
evidence.htm (last visited September 26, 2014) 12
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS:
COMES NOW; Appellant/Petitioner, Timothy Harriman, and submits
this Petition for Discretionary Review from the denial of a motion for post
conviction DNA testing in Criminal District Court No. 5 of Dallas County,
Texas, the Honorable Carter Thompson, Judge presiding.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A jury convicted Petitioner of murder and sentenced him to thirty-four
years' imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. (CR: 5-
8). Petitioner appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed his
conviction on October 12, 1995. See Harriman v. State, No. 05-94-00905-
CR, 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 2556 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 12, 1995, no pet.).
On August 15, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion for post-conviction
forensic DNA testing pursuant to Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. (CR: 17-26). On September 25, 2013, the State filed a response
to Petitioner's motion. (CR: 47-67). In its response, the State identified two
pieces of evidence that have been retained in this case: (1) head hair standard
and (2) hairs from hands. (CR: 47-67). The State argued in its response that
"Appellant's motion should be denied because identity 'was not and is not
an issue' in this case and Petitioner failed to show that he 'would have' not
been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA
testing." (CR: 51-52).
On October 12, 2013, and without a hearing, the trial court entered an
order denying Petitioner's motion for post-conviction DNA testing. (CR: 68-
69). The court found that identity was not and is not an issue in this case and
that Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that he
would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained
through DNA testing as required by Article 64.03(a)(2)(A) of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure. (CR; 68-69); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art.
64.03(a)(2)(A). Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal. (CR: 72-75).
HISTORY OF THE CASE
Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder based upon an
uncorroborated statement and/or confession, and sentenced to thirty-four
years' confinement. The trial court entered a deadly weapon finding on the
same, absent any factual findings of harm or injury required. The Fifth
District Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction On grounds of "mere
probable cause" alone. See Harriman v. State, No. 05-94-00905-CR, 1995
Tex. App. LEXIS 2556 (Tex. App.- Dallas Oct. 12,1995, no pet.).
On or about February, 2012, applicant filed an original motion for
post-conviction forensic DNA testing pursuant to Chapter 64 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure. The convicting court ignored the motion. On
August 15, 2012, Appellant filed his "second" motion for post-conviction
forensic DNA testing pursuant to Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure.1 (CR: 17-26). Again, the court ignored the request in violation of
due process.
Notwithstanding, on February 12, 013, defendant was compelled to
file his Pro Se motion pursuant to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
rule 52.1 under mandamus relief. On February 22, 2013, the intermediate
court of appeals ordered the State to respond. On March 7, 2013, the State
argued and attached (1) the trial court's order directing the state to bring
forth the DNA evidence, if any, signed on March 1, 2013, and (2) a motion
annexed for extension of time.
On May 4, 2015, the court of appeals handed down an opinion
affirming the trial court's order denying the request for DNA Testing on the
sole basis that the record shows that Petitioner admitted to conduct that is
unsupported by [any] evidence outside of the rule of Corpus Delicti.(citing
Bell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 301, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ( SeeAppx. 2).
1See Appx. 1.
GROUND ONE
The intermediate courts abused their discretion in
denying Appellant's motion for post-conviction DNA testing
because Appellant met his burden ofestablishing that identity
was or is an issue in this case and demonstrating by a
preponderance of the evidence that he would not have been
convicted had the results of the DNA test been available at
trial.
The intermediate courts abused their discretion in denying Petitioner's
motion for post-conviction DNA testing because Petitioner has met his
burden under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure by
establishing that identity was or is an issue in this case and that he would not
have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA
testing at the time of his trial. The trial court's explicit finding that identity
was not and is not an issue in this case is not supported by the trial record
which contains evidence that (1) a third person may have been responsible
for the victim's death, (2) a probability of causing death is not sufficient
absent harm and/or injury not shown outside of the defendant's statement,
and (3) newer testing techniques would show such probabilities are
unreliable and exculpatory results can be obtained. TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. Art. 64.03 (a)(1)(B).
In light of the trial testimony and that the only medical examiner
could not determine the cause and manner of the victim's death, evidence of
a third person's DNA on the victim or the fact that the alleged victim could
have died from other means, establishes by a preponderance of the evidence
that Petitioner would not have been convicted had the DNA test results been
available at trial. Admitted conduct, without more, cannot stand as sufficient
to constitute affirmative evidence of appellant's guilt as to the underlying
offense of murder. Ex Parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d 883, 893-94 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011).
The statutes language and legislative history is very clear that a
defendant can make identity an issue whether or not there is an accuser, or
whether the defendant pled guilty. See Blacklock v. State, 235 S.W.3d 231,
233 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Esparza v. State, 282 S.W.3d 913, 922 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009). It should follow that when a defendant makes an extra
judicial statement that is uncorroborated, the question of identity will always
be open for inquiry thereto. Blacklock, 235 S.W.3d at 233, (indicating that
under "some" circumstances, a witnesses statement maybe irrelevant to
constitute Identity issues).
2
The purpose of such DNA testing is to provide an avenue by which a defendant may seek to establish
innocence and exclude himself as the perpetrator of the alleged offense. Peyravi v. State, S.W.3d
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist] 2013, nopet.)(No. 14-13-00118-CR; 11-7-13).
GROUND TWO
The intermediate courts have misconstrued Chapter 64
to mandate a foreclosure on indigent defendants' rights
when an important question of factual Identity arises
from state and federal concerns as to actual innocence
thatfalls within contours ofscientific certainty.
Under Texas law, the Legislature's amendments towards Chapter 64's
advancements in reviewing such cases, as lies here, are not fully explained
when considering "other methods" for determining the existence of DNA
related biological evidence. Hence, the appellate court has decided an
important question of state and/or federal law in a way that directly conflicts
with legislative intent, applicable decisions, and should be settled by this
Honorable Criminal Court of Appeals. It remains unconstitutional to
continue to deprive an innocent person, whether indigent or not, the
opportunity to resolve prior conflicts. See Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289,
1296, 179 L. Ed. 2d 233 (2011)(noting that, as unconstitutional, Texas courts
have construed the statute under DNA testing, to completely foreclose any
prisoner who could have sought DNA testing...); e.g. State v. Swearingen,
424 S.W.3d 32, 37-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
Art. 64.03(a)(1)(B) See also S.B. 344, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
article 11.073.
ARGUMENT(S)
Point of Error 1, Restated:
The intermediate courts abused their discretion in denying
Appellant's motion for post-conviction DNA testing because
Appellant met his burden of establishing that identity was or
is an issue in this case and demonstrating by a preponderance
ofthe evidence that he would not have been convicted had the
results ofthe DNA test been available at trial.
Standard of Review
Courts review a trial court's ruling on a post-conviction motion for
DNA testing under a bifurcated standard of review. Rivera v. State, 89
S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). The appellate court will give almost
total deference to the trial court's determination of issues of historical fact
and application-of-law-to-fact issues that turn on credibility and demeanor
and will review other application-of-law-to-fact issues de novo. Routier v.
State, 273 S.W.3d 241, 246 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). When the trial court
rules on a motion for DNA testing without a hearing, courts review the
ruling de novo. Smith v. State, 165 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005);
see also Martinez v. State, No. 05-11-00329-CR, Tex. App. LEXIS 1970, *6
(Tex. App.-Dallas march 13, 2012, pet. refd) (not designated for
publication). For purposes of review, the appellate court must assume that
the results of the DNA testing to which Appellant is entitled under Chapter
64 would be favorable to Petitioner. Routier, 273 S.W.3d at 257.
The trial court and appellate court's conclusion that identity was not
and is not an issue in this case is not supported by evidence in the trial
court record.
This Court has noted that, "The presence of another person's DNA at
the crime scene will not, 'without more,' constitute affirmative evidence
of... innocence." (citing Bell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 301, 306
(Tex.Crim.App.2002). In this Court's decision, the evidence of guilt was
over-whelming of the defendant's guilt. Id. However, unlike this Court's
decision found in the above, and in Dinkins v. State, 84 S.W.3d 639, 642
Tex.Crim.App.2002), the intermediate court(s) cannot say with reasonable
certainty that the trial court found evidence of guilt that bears out
constitutional concerns towards innocence. The bone of contention in the
instant case is that a criminal agent [necessary] is wholly absent outside of
the defendant's statement. Blacklock, 235 S.W.3d at 233 (Indicating that
under "some" circumstances, a witnesses statement maybe irrelevant to
constitute Identity issues).
Detective Carollo conceded during trial, that Petitioner's statement to
police did not specifically admit that he killed the victim. (RR3: 235).
Detective Carollo testified that when he spoke with Petitioner about the
offense, Petitioner told him that Vanlandingham (the decedent) routinely
purchased cocaine from a drug dealer named Carlos who lived in the same
apartment complex. (RR3: 231). When the detective asked Petitioner if he
knew of anyone who wanted to kill the victim, Petitioner said that the victim
owed Carlos a lot of money for the cocaine and that Carlos could be
involved in the murder. (RR3: 231-32). Additionally, neighbors, including
Carlos, partied with the victim inside Petitioner's apartment on the date of
the offense. (RR4: 15-17). Trial testimony also established that the victim
had been in a relationship with Carlos's cousin Marvin. (RR3: 227; State's
Exhibit 24). On the date of the offense, Petitioner walked into his apartment
and saw the victim and Marvin in a physically intimate scenario. (RR4: 18-
19). The evidence at trial established that many other people had access to
the apartment and the victim on the day of his death. Nothing in the record,
outside of the principle of corpus delicti points or brings forth the upshot of
identity of the defendant. Moreover, this Court is to believe that the
defendant somehow has stealthily overcame the demand for cause and
result.3
3 Cause: n. 13(c) Something that produces an effect or resultIt has been said that an act in which no way contributed to the result in
question cannot be the cause of it; but this, of course, does not mean that an event
which ,xmight" have happened in the same way though the defendant's act or omission had
not occurred is not the result of it. The question is not what would have happened,
but rather what did happen, (citing) Joseph H. Beale, The Proximate Consequencer of an
Act, 33 Harv.L.Rev. 633, 638(1920).
Here, the appellate court's ruling under the term "probability," leaves
room for an appealable decision. The question of [without more] cannot be
answered absent precise scientific certainty within the realm of newer testing
techniques now available. Therefore, it would be, but for an abuse of
discretion, for the trial court and the appellate court to deprive, prohibit, or
foreclose on a defendant's entitlement to reach or engage the (more) explicit
standard of exculpatory evidence otherwise necessary under an independent
collateral inquiry into the validity of murder. Ex Parte Gutierrez, 337
S.W.3d at 893-94.
Point of Error 2, Restated:
The intermediate courts have misconstrued Chapter 64 to
mandate a foreclosure on indigent defendants' rights when an
important question offactual Identity arises from state and
federal concerns as to actual innocence that falls within
contours ofscientific certainty.
Under Texas Law, as well as federal law, the courts must consider
whether the jury could rely on facts that turn on sound and reasonable
scientific evidence in analyzing whether the credibility of a witness may be
regarded as fact. Ex Parte Brooks, 219 S.W.3d 396, 401
(Tex.Crim.App.2007); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781
10
(1979) (discussing the standards of review under reasonable credibility of
witness(s)). See also Ex Parte Robbins, 360 S.W.3d 446, 457
(Tex.Crim.App.2011) (involving due course and due process violations that
rendered his trial unfair and unconstitutional...).
The trial court failed to consider evidence in the trial record indicating
that favorable results from DNA testing of the hairs and additional
fingerprint DNA related evidence would corroborate a defense theory
and could have tipped the jury's verdict in Defendant's favor.
The appellate court's assertion that biological evidence of a third
person in Vanlandingham's hand would "only muddy the waters" is not
supported by the record. (CR: 51). The state courts cannot know if there was
DNA evidence from a third person on the victim's hand, or whether
Petitioner could be excluded as a donor because the hairs collected and/or
the fingerprint analysis submitted to SWIFS were never fully tested or
identified for DNA. Indeed, this is the purpose of post-conviction DNA
testing. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 64.01(b)(2)(A).
Under Texas law, the trial court must consider reliable facts and sound
medical evidence in lieu of statements that were (or should have been)
inadmissible at trial. Ex Parte Gutierrez, 337 S.W.3d at 893-94; Dansby v.
State, 960 S.W.2d 668(Tex.App.-Tyler 997)(Harm was shown from
improper admission of the defendant's unrecorded oral confession where the
n
statement contradicted his position at trial, the State emphasized the
improper evidence, ...). It is apparent from the record that the appellate
court would otherwise suggest that, "even if exculpatory evidence could be
identified, this fact would not prove innocence or guilt.4 Again, the court
rests its decision on the defendant's uncorroborated confession. This clearly
conflicts with prior applicable decisions of appellate courts and this Court's
precedent, i.e. Gonzales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 406, 412 (Tex.App.-Waco
1999)(A defendant's extra-judicial confession standing alone, is not
sufficient to support a conviction; there must be other evidence independent
of the confession that tends to prove the corpus delicti)(citmg Williams v.
State, 958 S.W.2d 186, 190 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
Therefore, the intermediate courts have misconstrued Chapter 64 to
essentially foreclose on a defendant's entitlement to have the testing done
when he is seeking out the validity of the instant conviction. InReFranklin,
2008, LEXIS 4545, 2008 WL 2468712 (337 S.W.3d 890, 892 Tex. Crim.
App. 2008)(reasonable grounds exist for a testing motion are present when
the facts stated in the request for counsel or otherwise knownto the convict-
4Appx. 2 at Pp 4.
5How DNA Evidence Works, http://science.howitworks.com/life/genetic/dna-evidence.htm (last
visited September 26, 2014).
12
ing court reasonably suggests a plausible argument for testing can be made.
Conversely, reasonable grounds for testing are not present if the record
before the court shows that DNA testing is impossible or that no viable
argument for testing can be made).
The fact that Petitioner suggested to choking the victim does not mean
he killed the victim, especially in light of the evidence of the victim's drug
and alcohol use, and absence of harm or injury done. Consequently, the trial
record did not establish that Petitioner was the person who caused the
victim's death. Tangible probative evidence collected from the crime scene
includes, but not limited to, fingerprints from a tray in the apartment's
bathroom. (RR3: 208-12). These fingerprints did not belong to Petitioner or
the victim. (RR3: 211-12). The Physical Evidence Detective did not collect
any evidence from [any of] the areas where the victim's deceased body had
been inside the apartment. (RR3: 208-12). Consequently, the biological
material retrieved from the victim's hand, scientific information, and
additional biological evidence collected during the autopsy would be vital in
establishing who was near the victim and/or caused his death.
If a third person's DNA were found on Vanlandingham, this
information would certainly be exculpatory. It supports Petitioner's defense
that another person could be responsible for the victim's death. Evidence
13
that a third person's biological material was on the victim at the time of his
death would most certainly establish that a third person, not Petitioner, was
near the victim at the time of his death. Vanlandingham had a criminal
record, was a drug user, and owed money to his drug dealer. (RR3: 136-37;
RR4: 15-17). If testing shows that the DNA is from a third person and not
Petitioner, this information would constitute objective corroboration of
Appellant's defensive theory that the victim could have been killed by
another person with a motive. Whether DNA of a third person was on the
victim would be significant in the jury's evaluation of the defensive theory
presented at trial.
Furthermore, because this case involves an absence of injury and/or
harm done within the essential meaning of [caus]ation, and does more than
clearly diminish the credibility of either an uncorroborated statement or
extra-judicial confession, nor will it support a hypothetical conclusion under
any Texas Rules or Law applied, the intermediate courts have erred in
concludingthat exculpatory evidence would "only muddy the waters." Bell,
90 S.W.3d at 306.
14
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSD3ERED, Petitioner prays that
this Court reverse the appellate and trial court's order denying Petitioner's
motion for post-conviction DNA testing.
Respectfully submitted
/s/ Timothy Scott Harriman
( Signature of Pro Se Petitioner )
Timothy Scott Harriman
TDCJ# 677187
2 Jester Road, Carol Vance Unit
Richmond, Texas 77406
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing petition was served on the
Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, Supreme Court Bldg., P.O.
Box 12308, Austin, Texas 78711, and the Dallas County Criminal District
Attorney's Office (Appellate Division), 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., 10th Floor,
Dallas, Texas 75207, by placing this document in the United States Postal
Service on May 23, 2015.
/s/ Timothy Scott Harriman
Timothy Scott Harriman
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that this petition for discretionary review, exclusive of
appendices, is 3,713 words in length, according to Microsoft Office, which
was used to prepare this petition and complies with the word-count limit and
typeface conventions required by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
/s/ Timothy Scott Harriman
Timothy Scott Harriman
15
APPENDIX
16
TIMOTHY SCOTT HARRIMAN, § IN THE TEXAS COURT
Applicant, §
§ OF
§
§ an1
THE STATE OF TEXAS CRIMINAL APPEALS
§
MOTION FOR FORENSIC D.N.A. TESTING: ART. 64.01
101
Applicant, Timothy Scott Harriman appearing Pro Se in the above styled and numbered
cause of action, respectfully requests this Honorable Court to consider the requested material,
specifically, D.N.A. subject matter consisting of, but not limited to, DNA FINGERPRrNTING;
DNA analysis, i.e. skin, blood, hair, fingerprinting on skin, and subsequent testing as to inquiry of
facts consistent with Penal Code §6.04 and TRE 702.
For the purposes listed herein, and pursuant to Vernon's Ann. Texas C.C.P. art.
64.03(a)(2)(A), the applicant would respectfully show, "but for " causation must be clearly
established, other than a hypothetical capability of causing death or serious bodily injury,
between the accused' conduct and the [Resulting harm, Wooten v. State, 267 S.W.3d 289(
2010) thus, herein, constituting a reasonable probability clearly exists that had this information
and forensic testing been made available to the trier-of-fact, if proven true, would be clear and
convincing so as to undermine confidence in the outcome of the defendant'strial. SeeRay v.
State. 897 S.W.2d333rrex.Crim.App. 1995): Johnston v. State. 115SS.W.3d
761.764CTex.Crim.Avv. -Austin 2003).
Because the courts require morethan mere probability or omission of factual evidence to
sustain a conviction; i.e. superficial bruising to the skinonly, this finding cannotdivorce the
"cardinal findings" as alleged in the defendant's indictment, (to wit: strangulation of the neck
with hands being a deadly weapon). Such allegations must be supported by evidence directly
related to the allegation(s) made.
This standard is brightlined in the Supreme Court's precedents spelled out in Jackson v.
Virginia, 443 U.S 307,318-319(1979) (Under this test, we permit juries to draw multiple
reasonable inferences, as long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at trial.
However, juries are not permitted to come to conclusions based on "mere speculation or factually
unsupported inferences or presumptions." To correctly apply ... this standard, it is vital that the
courts of appeals understand the difference between a reasonable inference supported by the
evidence at trial, speculation, and a presumption...).
Likewise, because the State and the Court of Appeals solely relied upon an improper
result, due to no fault ofthe defendant's, based on speculation unsupported by facts ("bruising
could have been obscured by the discoloration of the skin") when forensic testing factually relies
upon other evidence necessary to prove an ultimate fact in existence, i.e. petechial hemorrhaging
in the eyes; bruising to neck strap muscles; contusions to nose and mouth; congestion in
respiratory system; 70%blockage of coronary artery, ect...) all of which would indeed constitute
such allegations set out in the indictment.
However, because counsel never exercised or demonstrated a tactical or strategic decision
towards adversarial testing of the facts consistent with such a caseas this, when such basicand
essential elementsof the allegedcrime must be supported by facts found under TRE Rule 702.
To the contrary, this requirement is so basic to the principle of the defendant's due
process soasto preclude prejudice. With respect to effective counsel and under these precise
circumstances, iheAke v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1092(1985) Court spoke in
terms of the "basic tools of an adequatedefense" in concluding that in certain circumstances
(such asthis) a defense expert is such theelement necessarily required. Rey, at345; Ake, at83,
105 S. Ct. at 1096.
Therefore, because the defendant was prejudiced to a vital and critical defense function,
being fundamental in nature and the State has suppressed such information and vital evidence
herein requested, and the result was adverse to the defendant's due process, the Applicant now
presents facts sufficient by a preponderance of the evidence, that this evidence was either
suppressed by the State and/or his counsel never investigated the essential facts as to the scientific
evidence necessary to corroborate an alleged confession nonetheless. See State's Findings of
Fact, at 27-29, W94—01553-L(A); Affidavit, at 6, ("I do not recall consulting [any] experts
regarding the cause of death and autopsy findings.").
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arises from an unlawful interrogation in violation of Texas Code 38.22 §3,
Vernon's Ann. C.C.P.penal code §37.09, when the defendant is to agree with an unreasonable
"what if or "how do you think it could have happened" hypothesis not reasoned upon the facts
while constructing a "fraudulent misrepresentation" of evidence against the accused. See State's
Findings ofFact, at 12, W94-01553-L(A)(The Court finds [no] evidence that an audio or visual
recording was made of applicant's statement."). Nonetheless, this alleged statement was admitted
into evidence, but for an abuse of the Court's discretion, was wholly misleading to the jury and
the defendant. This statutory violation prejudiced the defendant under his due process entitlement
altogether. See Dansby v. State. 960 S.W. 2d 668(Tex.App.-Tyler 1997) (harm was shown from
the improperadmission of the defendant's unrecorded oral confession where the statement
contradicted his position at trial,the State emphasized the improper evidence, anda finding of
harmless error would [en]courage repetition).
Additionally, the State knowingly suppressedvital information and facts that would
exculpate thedefendant, specifically, body hair, (that were notsuitable butmay now be reached)
air and/orskin undernails; lungweightconsistent with drug and/oralcohol induced cardiac
arrest; toxicology of alcohol-blood related findings that are not consistent with sole
decomposition; and petechial hemorrhages specifically associated with strangulation and/or
asphyxia.
Accordingly, when the cause of death and manner of death is found to be undetermined,
and no trauma or injury is found true only three days after death has occurred, in these cases the
death certificate may be signed off as "undetermined," though the cause may be equally attributed
to "lethal cardiac arrhythmia," as this condition cannot be detected after death on postmortem.
However, where this option is taken, the manner of death [must] be declared as natural, e.g. Smith
v. State. Tex.App.- 10th Dist.2008/20008 WL 553558 unreported).
Perhaps, under similar circumstances as lies here, an accused is to agree to believing, by
giving a statement contrary to evidence already known, leaving an insufficientprobability that he
shot someone, police find deceased without injury or cause of death, yet the law may promote
prosecution of the accused nevertheless,would precisely violate his due process entitlement
altogether. See Lvnum v. Illinois. 372 U.S. 528. 83 S. Ct. 917. 9 L.Ed2d 92 (1963).
The thresholdquestion here is, was the factual cause of death reachedunder FRE 702, is
easilyanswered when the defendant was precluded, by no fault of his own,to an adversarial
testing of the facts sufficient to overcome the unconstitutional burden of proofwhen the
defendant is required to prove otherwise. InRe Winship. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). In the practice of
law applicable here, theapplicant invokes his actual innocence joined with the constitutional
violation(s) therein, meaning that he is factually innocent ofthe underlying offense of murder in
the first degree, specifically here, the facts have not changed. Under the reasonableness standard,
a person ofreason would conclude that ifa finding adverse toone's interest may promote harm,
he could seek a second or even a third opinion. However, within this case, it has not been yet
reasoned within the interests ofjustice.
WHEREFORE PREMESIS CONSIDERED, this provision of Chapter 64, is to give
applicant "full access" to the courts, and to provide a check ofthe integrity on the prior individual
decision(s) ofthe trial court and the court ofappeals. House Research Org, Bill Analysis
Tex.S.B.3 at8, 77thLeg., RS (March21, 2001); Kutznerv. State. 75.W.3d427. 433.
435(Tex. Crim.Avv.2002).
Accordingly, there exists a reasonable probability that ifthe evidence to be tested results
adversely towards a substantial showing of causation, it would indeed constitute a factual
innocence finding. Although a finding being inconclusive may render neither a finding for or
against the defendant, he may rely upon other facts to be tested and relied upon for
conclusiveness under DNA fingerprinting material to be essential element ofthe alleged offense.
Therefore, the precise evidence, being DNA in nature, to be tested is as follows:
(1) Hair sample subject matter;
(2) Blood samples, including toxicology samples within the context of alcohol-
blood concentration and symptoms being lethal levels at the time of death, as
opposed to time of examination;
(3) Toxicology as to a probability to existent drug concentration, specifically,
cocaine;
(4) Forensic inquiry underDNAfingerprinting in context to abnormalities that
affect activity of the cardiac muscles;
(5) DNA fingerprinting as to precise toxicology results indicating the specific
probability of blood-alcohol levelat time of death, as opposed to present
level of 0.17% to 0.20%;
(6) DNA fingerprinting asto evidence of facts consistent with harm or injury to
alleged victim, including finger-nail clippings signifying struggle;
(7) DNA fingerprinting showing cardinal findings ofeither asphyxia or
strangulation, within the context of, but not limited to, blockage of coronary
arteries, contusion of mouthand nose, petechial hemorrhaging of eyes;
(8) Factual conclusions of DNA fingerprinting and injury results listed; and
(9) Death certificate showing all indications andlegal basis.
Because applicant has demonstrated that, but for a reasonable probability, he would not
havebeen convicted of murderundereitheran cumulative error doctrine, and/ora structural error
all the same, ifproven true, the exculpatory results had been obtained through discovery or
further inquiry and additional testing necessary to the essential element tothe crime, the Court
should find that pursuant to Art. 64.04, the Movant "isentitled" todiscovery when considered
with the record in this case that would promote an imperative fundamental principle in comity,
and finality in the interests ofjustice required, e.g. Smith v. State, 165 S.W.3d
36HTex.Crim.App.2005).
Accordingly, Movant need not prove his actual innocence (a principle under habeas law)
in order to meet his burden to have the testing done. He need only show that the evidence
requested may be re-evaluated and/or tested with [new]er testing techniques. Vernon's
Ann.Tex.CCP. art 64.01(b)(1)(A),(B).
With premises considered, this Court has jurisdiction under Senate Bill 3, and may make
the appropriate rendering in favor of such request when applicant, Timothy Scott Harriman, is in
fact indigent and unable to compensate such expenses, with respect to his present conviction of
murder in the first degree. In Re Rosers. 53 S.W.3d 778 (Tex.App. - 2 Dist. 2001).
Respectfully submitted,
(Signatureof Applicant/Pro Se)
Timothy Scott Harriman, 677187
1391 FM 338, Beto Unit
Tennessee Colony, Texas 75880
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify hat a true and correct copy of the aforegoing motion has been served
upon the DistrictClerk: Gary Fitzsimmons, 133 N. RiverfrontBlvd., LB-12, Dallas,Texas
75297; to be processed and transmitted to all parry's of interest, by placing this document, with
affidavit annexed, in the United States mail, via prison mail system effective: August 10,2012.
cott Harriman, 677187
tfL K):39
,^'s*
AFFIDAVIT
TIMOTHY SCOTT HARRIMAN §
V. §
STATE OF TEXAS
County of Dallas
I, TIMOTHY SCOTT HARRIMAN, being of sound mind and being over the age of
eighteen, herein, make the following statementof facts that are true and correct, and are based
upon personal knowledge of the same, am competent to make the following affidavit:
On the night of September 16, 1993,1 was already under the influence of alcohol and
drugs due to the stateof depression, during the past here years, I had been experiencing what is
called black-outs, however, at the time, I didn't even know the symptomsor terminology. On this
particular night in question, I had experienced this precise symptom, which resulted in poor
decision making nonetheless.
When I woke the following morning, I discovered George (the alleged victim) lying on
the floor covered in his sheet,as he had done prior during sleep. I called his name because it was
time to go towork. However, he did not respond; although, I noticed his toes moving as ifhe
were jut ignoring me. After several attempts to get his attention, I arose toheck on him. When I
touched his shoulder, I noticed thecoldness of his skin, which coincidently, brought a rush of
shock and fear, mainly due towhat the circumstances entailed, (several people being with him
doing drugs that I was not aware of...) and my past paranoia and negativity.
Nonetheless, I failed to make the appropriate decision and call police altering what I
discovered, which brings forth unreasonable decisions forthwith. Admittedly, upon being arrested
and placed in custodial interrogation(s), Ireasonably still desired to help or aide police in their
investigations, possibly finding out what truly happened to George. However, applying hindsight,
I have discovered this as clearly not the case here.
Although, the record will indicate that I gave an affidavit in my on hand-writing, that
wasn't sufficient for a conviction, mainly because of how George was found. Thus, I was
subjected to agree to "what if or "how do you think it might have happened" hypothesis, which
has resulted in incredible and uncorroborated events that cannot be reasoned under scientific
explanation(s). Since I could not recall specific events of the night in question, police took a
vindictive turn, and reasoned that I was holding something back. Nevertheless, this statement was
taken in violation of State statute code being without the administrative protection of the very
letter of Art. 38.22.
Further, my counsel solely relied upon the prosecutions file and brief discussions with
myself, indicating only a formality, knowing the circumstances after the fact are not, and cannot
constitute murder as alleged. Consequently, only hours before trial ended in guilt phase, my
counsel asked me if I "would like for her to compel an expert to attest to the fact that if someone
strangled or asphyxiated, they would know this beyond a reasonable doubt, and to bring in court
documents establishing such," to which I agreed, yet I wondered why she had not already
prepared for this essential information in which to aide the jury in their determinations.
Nonetheless, counsel came back with absolutely nothing, nor an explanation as to why
she came back empty handed and then insisted for me to take the stand when it was contrary to
my position during trial.
To the contrary, prosecution did not aide the jury nor did my counsel. Specifically,the
probate force and essential element to the crime was withheld from the jury along with myself not
made known of the facts to which I now request. The forensic testing is imperative to all in the
interests ofjustice so required.
I, TIMOTHY SCOTT HARRIMAN, being presently incarcerated at Beto Unit, TDCJ-ID,
declare under penalty of perjury thatthe facts stated herein, aretrueandcorrect and are based
upon personal knowledge of the same.
jjj**,'^- , _
TimothjssSeott Harriman, 677187
APPENDIX
17
AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed May 4, 2015.
In The
Court of Appeals
ifftftfj district of utexas at Dallas
No. 05-13-01547-CR
TIMOTHY SCOTT HARRIMAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 5
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F94-01553-ML
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Francis, Evans, and Stoddart
Opinion by Justice Evans
Timothy Scott Harriman appeals from the trial court's denial of his post-conviction
motion for DNA testing. In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his
motion because he met his burden to show the statutory prerequisites for testing. We affirm the
trial court's order.
Factual Background
Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to thirty-four years' confinement. We
affirmed the conviction in Harriman v. State, No. 05-94-00905-CR, 1995 WL 635032 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Oct. 12, 1995, no pet.). The evidence presented at trial included a signed
voluntary statement by appellant. According to appellant's statement, on the evening of
September 16, 1993, he and his roommate, George Vanlandingham, were in their apartment
along with several neighbors. Vanlandingham purchased cocaine from a neighbor named Carlos
as well as beer for the group. Appellant stated he became angry with Vanlandingham for
spending money on beer and cocaine because he owed appellant $100 in rent. Appellant left the
apartment and, when he returned, Vanlandingham was alone. Appellant said he and
Vanlandingham began to argue about the rent money and appellant grabbed him by the throat
and squeezed until Vanlandingham "went limp and fell to the ground." Appellant stated he
thought Vanlandingham was only unconscious because he felt a pulse, so he moved
Vanlandingham to the area of the apartment where he slept and covered him with a sheet.
The following morning, appellant realized Vanlandingham was dead. Appellant did not
call the police because he was afraid they would think he intended to kill Vanlandingham.
Instead, he wrapped the body in a sheet and put him in a closet. The next day, appellant left to
stay at a friend's. Vanlandingham's body was discovered two days later by an apartment
complex maintenance worker. Appellant was indicted and convicted for causing
Vanlandingham's death by strangling him.
On August 15, 2012, appellant filed a motion for post-conviction DNA testing pursuant
to chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The State responded that it had retained
two pieces of biological evidence in the case but argued the request for testing should be denied
because the identity of the person who committed the offense was not at issue in the case and the
results could not prove appellant's innocence. The trial court denied appellant's motion without
a hearing finding that identity was not an issue and there was no showing that appellant would
not have been convicted even if DNA testing had shown the biological material did not belong to
him. Appellant now brings this appeal of the trial court's denial of his motion.
-2-
Analysis
Chapter 64 of the code of criminal procedure governs a convicted person's request for
post-conviction forensic DNA testing and contains multiple threshold requirements that must be
met before a movant is entitled to such testing. Appellant bears the burden of meeting all
statutory predicates. See Routier v. State, 273 S.W.3d 241, 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). When a
trial court rules on a motion for DNA testing without conducting a hearing, we review the court's
ruling de novo. See Smith v. State, 165 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We must
assume for purposes of our review that the results of the DNA testing would be favorable to
appellant. See Routier, 273 S.W.3d at 257.
Among the requirements for testing under Chapter 64, a movant must show that identity
was an issue in the case. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.03(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2014)
Appellant contends identity was an issue here because he testified at trial that Vanlandingham
still had a pulse after he choked him and many other people had access to the apartment and the
victim on the date of the offense. Appellant was indicted and convicted, however, on the basis
that his admitted strangling of Vanlandingham was the cause of death. Although appellant
disputed that his actions killed Vanlandingham, there was no evidence presented at trial of any
other potential cause of death. Because appellant admitted to the conduct the jury concluded
caused Vanlandingham's death, identity was not an issue in the case.
A second requirement for testing is that the movant must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that he would not have been convicted if the DNA testing had revealed exculpatory
results. Id. art. 64.03(a)(2)(A). This showing is not made if the exculpatory test results would
"merely muddy the waters." Rivera v. State, 89 S.W.3d 55, 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Appellant argues that, if a third person's DNA were found on Vanlandingham, this would
support his defensive theory that another person, such as Carlos, was responsible for the murder.
The biological evidence available for testing in this case was a "head hair" and "hairs from
hands." The evidence was undisputed that numerous people, including Carlos, were with
Vanlandingham shortly before he was killed. Accordingly, even if the hairs found on
Vanlandingham belonged to someone else, this fact would neither prove that person's guilt nor
disprove appellant's. See Bell v. State, 90 S.W.3d 301, 306 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc)
(presence of another person's DNA at crime scene will not, without more, constitute affirmative
evidence of movant's innocence). Again, appellant admitted to the conduct the jury concluded
caused Vanlandingham's death. At best, the requested DNA evidence would only "muddy the
waters." The trial court did not err in concluding that DNA testing was not required.
We overrule appellant's sole issue and affirm the trial court's order.
DAVID EVANS
Do Not Publish JUSTICE
Tex. R. App. P. 47
131547F.U05
(Eourt of Appeals
ifltftl? Wxstvxtt of utexas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
TIMOTHY SCOTT HARRIMAN, On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
Appellant No. 5, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F94-01553-ML.
No. 05-13-01547-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Evans. Justices
Francis and Stoddart participating.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the order of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 4th day of May, 2015.