70 S.W.3d 873,
1The trial court certified appellant's right toappeal the denial ofhis motion to suppress in these cases.
-2-
888 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Jurisdiction over felony cases such as appellant's lies in the district
or criminal district court where the indictment is first filed. See Tex. Code Crim. PROC. Ann.
arts. 4.05, 4.16 (West 2005). No transfer order, however, is required where one court empanels
the grand jury that returns the indictment in the case, but the indictment is filed in another court.
See Bourque v. State,
156 S.W.3d 675, 678 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. ref d). The record
here shows that the indictment in cause number F-07-24608 was presented to the 204th District
Court; the indictment in cause number Fl 1-61783 was presented to Criminal District Court No.
3; the indictment in cause number Fl 1-61784 was presented to the 363rd District Court; and the
indictments in cause numbers F13-57590 and F13-57591 were presented to Criminal District
Court No. 2. All five indictments, however, were filed in Criminal District Court No. 5 and there
is nothing in the record to indicate the cases were originally filed in a court other than the
Criminal District Court No. 5. Accordingly, no transfer order was needed to confer Criminal
District CourtNo. 5 with jurisdiction over these cases. See
id.
Moreover, Texas courts have held that even when such a transfer order is required, its
absence from the record is a procedural error rather than jurisdictional error. See Lemasurier v.
State,
91 S.W.3d 897, 899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet ref d); Mills v. State,
742 S.W.2d
831, 834-35 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no writ.). The absence of a transfer order merely
subjects the transferee court to a timely plea to the jurisdiction; it does not render actions of the
transferee court void.
Lemasurier, 91 S.W.3d at 899;
Mills, 742 S.W.2d at 835. If no timely
plea to the jurisdiction is filed in the trial court, appellant waives the right to complain about the
lack ofa transfer order on appeal. See
Mills, 742 S.W.2d at 835. Appellant acknowledges that
Mills and other cases directly contradict his position that the lack of transfer order constitutes
jurisdictional error that may be presented for the first time on appeal. The only reason appellant
presents for departing from long-standing precedent is his contention that these cases "simply
cite to their antecedents without any Constitutional or statutory authority for the proposition that
a jurisdictional defect can be cured by a procedural default." We are not persuaded by appellant's
argument. Because appellant did not file a plea to the jurisdiction in the trial court, he has
waived his complaint about the lack of a transfer order. See
Lemasurier, 91 S.W.3d at 899;
Mills, 742 S.W.2d at 835. We therefore resolve this issue against appellant.
II. Motion to Suppress
In cause numbers F13-57590 (unlawful possession of firearm by a felon) and F13-57591
(possession of more than one gram, but less than four grams of cocaine) appellant raises an issue
complaining of the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. Specifically, appellant argues
the trial court erred by finding the officers had a reasonable beliefthere might be someone inside
the apartment needing aid, thereby justifying the warrantless entry into the apartment.
In its written findings of fact, the trial court found the following. On July 3, 2013, Dallas
police officers received a dispatch regarding shots fired at apartment 518 at 520 West Page
Avenue in Dallas, Texas. The caller told dispatch a heavy-set black male with braided hair
carrying a shotgun or pump style gun had entered his apartment, unit 518. The caller also
reported hearing gunshots fired inside the apartment.
Officers went to the apartment complex and knocked on the door of unit 518. No one
answered immediately. Shortly after their arrival, officers encountered a woman approaching the
door to unit 518 who indicated she knew the occupant. She also knocked on the door and
attempted to get the occupant to answer. After a couple of minutes, a heavy-set black male with
braided hair, later identified as appellant, opened the door. He matched the caller's description
and stood in the doorway blocking the officer's view into the apartment. One of the officers
advised appellant why they were and asked to enter the apartment. When appellant attempted to
close the door, officers pushed it open and entered the apartment. One of the officers testified
-4-
that they entered the apartment to ensure no one was injured, to determine if anyone was in need
of assistance, to investigate or prevent a dangerous situation, or to protect someone who might be
in the apartment. After entering the apartment, officers observed a handgun, marijuana, and
cocaine in plain view.
The trial court found that, based on the facts known at the time, the officers reasonably
believed someone inside the residence could be in need of immediate aid and they needed to act
to preserve life or avoid serious injury. The trial court concluded the warrantless search was
justified under the both the emergency doctrine and exigent circumstances doctrine.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of
review where we afford almost total deference to the trial court's findings of historical fact while
applying a de novo review to the trial court's application of the law of search and seizure to the
facts. Valtierra v. State,
310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, so long as its express or implied findings are
supported by the record.
Id. The trial court's ruling will be upheld if it is "reasonably supported
by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case."
Id. (quoting State v.
Dixon,
206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
A warrantless search of a premises is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution unless it falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Gutierrez v. State,
221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). One of these
exceptions is the emergency doctrine. Laney v. State,
117 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003). This exception applies when the police act in their community caretaking role and is
limited to the caretaking functions ofprotecting or preserving life or avoiding serious injury.
Id.
at 860-61. A warrantless entry and search is justified under the emergency doctrine when the
officers reasonably believe a person within is in need of immediate aid.
Id. at 860. When
-5-
assessing whether a warrantless search is justified under the emergency doctrine, we apply an
objective standard based on the police officers' conduct and the facts and circumstances known
to the officers at the time of the search.
Id. at 862. If the doctrine applies, police may seize
evidence in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities.
Id.
Based on the record before us, we conclude the emergency doctrine justified the
warrantless entry into the apartment. Officers testified that they went to the apartment where
they encountered appellant in response to a 911 call stating a man with a gun entered that
apartment and that the caller heard shots fired inside that apartment. When the officers first
knocked on the door, no one responded. Appellant answered the door a couple of minutes later
and matched the description of the man with the gun provided by the 911 caller. When the
officers explained why they were there and asked to enter the apartment to make sure no one was
injured or shot inside, appellant tried to shut the door. The officers then pushed the door open
and proceeded to check the apartment to make sure no one was injured or shot inside or needed
assistance. It was during this check that the officers found the gun and drugs in plain view. One
testifying officer continued to emphasize the purpose in entering the apartment was to make sure
no one was injured or needed assistance based on the 911 report and appellant's behavior of not
answering the door when the police first knocked and then attempted to the shut the door when
he asked to enter. Based on these facts, an officer could have reasonably believed entering the
apartment was necessary to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury.
Reviewing the totality of the circumstances in the light most favorable to the support the
trial court's judgment, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the
emergency doctrine applied to these facts. Our conclusion that the emergency doctrine supports
the trial court's ruling make is unnecessary to address whether the trial court's denial of the
-6-
motion to suppress can also be upheld based on the exigent circumstances doctrine. We resolve
this issue against appellant.
We affirm the trial court's judgments.
/David Evans/
DAVID EVANS
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
I40139F.U05
-7-
Court of Appeals
JrTtftlj Btstrltt of ®,xas at Ballaa
JUDGMENT
REGINALD DONEY THOMPSON, On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
Appellant No. 5, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F07-24608-L
No. 05-14-00139-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Evans, Justices
Bridges and Lang participating.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED
Judgment entered this 15th day of December, 2014.
-8-
Court of Appeals
ifftftlj district of utexas at Ballas
JUDGMENT
REGINALD DONEY THOMPSON, On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
Appellant No. 5, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F11 -61783-L
No. 05-14-00140-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Evans, Justices
Bridges and Lang participating.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED
Judgment entered this 15th day of December, 2014.
Court of Appeals
iFfftlj District of ufexas at Ballas
JUDGMENT
REGINALD DONEY THOMPSON, On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
Appellant No. 5, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F11 -61784-L
No. 05-14-00141-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Evans, Justices
Bridges and Lang participating.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, thejudgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 15th day of December, 2014.
-10-
Court of Appeals
ifliftfj District of ®,xas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
REGINALD DONEY THOMPSON, On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
Appellant No. 5, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F13-57590-L
No. 05-14-00142-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Evans, Justices
Bridges and Lang participating.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, thejudgmentof the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 15th day of December, 2014.
Court of Appeals
ifliftl? District of ®exas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
REGINALD DONEY THOMPSON, On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
Appellant No. 5, Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F13-57591 -L
No. 05-14-00143-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Evans, Justices
Bridges and Lang participating.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED
Judgment entered this 15th day of December, 2014.
-12-