DocketNumber： 14-08-00590-CR
Filed Date： 6/18/2009
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/15/2015
Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed June 18, 2009.
In The
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
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NO. 14-08-00590-CR
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RICHARD GODDARD, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 13th District Court
Navarro County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 30702-CR
M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
A jury convicted appellant Richard Goddard of possession of a Penalty Group 1 controlled substance, namely cocaine, in an amount less than one gram. The trial court assessed punishment at twenty-two months= confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal JusticeBState Jail Division. Appellant challenges his conviction on the sole ground that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
I. Background
On May 23, 2006, Detective Paul Jock of the Corsicana Police Department was dispatched to room 147 of the Corsicana Inn to investigate a report of possible narcotic activity. After learning from the motel clerk that appellant was the registered guest, Detective Jock knocked on the motel room door. Appellant answered and consented to a search of the room. The room was a typical small motel room with one big open bedroom and a bathroom and vanity in the back.
When Detective Jock entered the room, appellant=s niece, Tina Dickson, had just taken a shower and was getting dressed. She and appellant stood outside with another police officer while Detective Jock searched the room. In the course of his search, Detective Jock found what appeared to be a broken crack pipe and two pieces of crack cocaine under the sink. The substance field-tested positive for cocaine. Appellant and Dickson were subsequently arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance. Dickson pleaded guilty, was convicted of the charge, and received probation.
At trial, Dickson testified that, on May 23, 2006, she and appellant purchased a large quantity of crack cocaine and went to room 147 of the Corsicana Inn. While she and appellant were smoking some of the cocaine, she heard someone knock on the door. When she looked through the peephole, she recognized Detective Jock as a narcotics detective. She testified that she Afreaked out@ and broke the glass which they had used to smoke the cocaine.
II. Analysis
In his sole issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, he asserts the State failed to affirmatively link him to the substance found in the motel room.
A. Standard of Review
When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we do not ask whether we believe the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318B19 (1979). Rather, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 319; Mason v. State, 905 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc). Although we consider all evidence presented at trial, we may not re‑weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the jury. King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc). In other words, the jury is the exclusive judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be given their testimony, and it is the exclusive province of the jury to reconcile conflicts in the evidence. Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc). We consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in making our determination. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
B. Possession of a Controlled Substance
To prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must show that the accused (1) exercised control, management, or care over the substance, and (2) knew the substance he possessed was contraband. Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The State does not have to prove the accused had exclusive possession of the contraband; joint possession is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Cude v. State, 716 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). However, when the controlled substance is not found in the accused=s exclusive possession, additional independent facts must affirmatively link the accused to the controlled substance. See Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406.
The Aaffirmative links@ analysis is used by courts to review evidence relating to the accused=s knowledge and control of the controlled substance. See Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); McQuarters v. State, 58 S.W.3d 250, 259 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 2001, pet. ref=d). An affirmative link generates a reasonable inference that the defendant knew of the contraband=s existence and exercised control over it. Lair v. State, 265 S.W.3d 580, 600 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet. ref=d). The evidence demonstrating such links may be direct or circumstantial. See Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 405B06. The evidence, however, must demonstrate that the accused=s connection to the controlled substance was more than just fortuitous. See id. at 406.
Some of the factors that may affirmatively link an accused to contraband include whether: (1) the defendant was present when a search was conducted; (2) the contraband was in plain view; (3) the contraband was found in proximity and accessible to the defendant; (4) the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) the defendant possessed other contraband or drug paraphernalia when arrested; (6) the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) the defendant made an attempt to flee; (8) the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) there was an odor of contraband; (10) other contraband or drug paraphernalia was present; (11) the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (13) the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt. Olivarez v. State, 171 S.W.3d 283, 291 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The number of factors present in a given case is not as important or compelling as the logical force the factors have in establishing the elements of the offense. Wootton v. State, 132 S.W.3d 80, 87 (Tex. App.CHouston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref=d). Further, the links need not be so strong as to rule out every other possibility except the defendant=s guilt. Brown, 911 S.W.2d at 748; Wootton, 132 S.W.3d at 87. Thus, affirmative links are established by the totality of the circumstances. See Wootton, 132 S.W.3d at 87.
C. Evidence of Possession
Appellant acknowledges that he was present in the room in which the contraband was found. However, he argues that his presence in the vicinity of the substance is the only affirmative link connecting him to the contraband and, as such, is legally insufficient to demonstrate that he knowingly possessed the controlled substance.
Appellant is correct that mere presence at a location where drugs are found is insufficient, by itself, to establish actual care, custody, or control of the drugs. See Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). However, presence or proximity, when combined with other evidence, either direct or circumstantial, may well be sufficient to establish that element beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. It is not the number of links that is dispositive, but rather the logical force of all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial. Id.
Here, it is undisputed that appellant was present in the motel room where crack cocaine was found. The room was small with one big open bedroom, a bathroom, and a vanity. The cocaine was found under the sink in the back of the motel room. A broken crack pipe was found next to the cocaine. Appellant was the registered occupant of the room. Thus, the factors linking appellant to the contraband are that (1) appellant was present at the time the crack cocaine was found; (2) the cocaine was readily accessible to appellant; (3) drug paraphernalia was present when he was arrested; and (4) appellant had the right to possess the premises where the contraband was found.
In addition, Dickson testified that she and appellant purchased a large quantity of crack cocaine, appellant had the cocaine in his possession in the motel room, and they smoked a portion of it in the room. She also testified that they were still smoking it when Detective Jock knocked on the door. This evidence is arguably another factor linking appellant to the contraband as it suggests that he was under the influence of narcotics when he was arrested. Dickson further testified that after seeing the detective through the peephole, she went to the bathroom and broke the crack pipe.
After reviewing the direct and circumstantial evidence above in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant was guilty of the charged offense. See Beall v. State, 237 S.W.3d 841, 850 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 2007, no pet.) (finding evidence of affirmative links between defendant and contraband found in motel room sufficient to support conviction where defendant made incriminating statement at time of arrest, drugs were found in boot next to bed where defendant slept, and arresting officer testified that defendant=s appearance at time of arrest was consistent with drug use); Watson v. State, 861 S.W.2d 410, 415B16 (Tex. App.CBeaumont 1993, pet. ref=d) (concluding evidence was sufficient to sustain conviction for possession of controlled substance where evidence showed drugs found in motel room were accessible to defendant, defendant answered door indicating his exercise of control over motel room, contraband was found in enclosed place, paraphernalia to use contraband was in view of appellant, and smoke alarm in room had been manually disconnected). Accordingly, we overrule appellant=s sole issue.[1]
III. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
/s/ Eva M. Guzman
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Guzman, and Boyce.
Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
[1] The instant case was transferred to this Court from the Tenth Court of Appeals. On March 10, 2008, the Texas Supreme Court ordered a number of amendments to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, one of which was to Rule 41.3. See Order Amending Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Mar. 10, 2008 (Tex. Misc. Docket No. 08-9017). The amended rule, effective September 1, 2008, provides, in relevant part:
In cases transferred by the Supreme Court from one court of appeals to another, the court of appeals to which the case is transferred must decide the case in accordance with the precedent of the transferor court under principles of stare decisis if the transferee court=s decision otherwise would have been inconsistent with the precedent of the transferor court. The court=s opinion may state whether the outcome would have been different had the transferee court not been required to decide the case in accordance with the transferor court=s precedent.
Tex. R. App. P. 41.3. A review of relevant case law reveals no inconsistency between the decisions of the Tenth Court and this Court. In the absence of any such conflict, we have cited to precedent of this Court where appropriate.