James Earl Scott v. State

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 6, 2008

Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed November 6, 2008.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

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NO. 14-07-00360-CR

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JAMES EARL SCOTT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 176th District Court

 Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1066583

M E M O R A N D U M   O P I N I O N

A jury convicted appellant James Earl Scott of murder and, after finding two felony enhancements Atrue,@ sentenced him to sixty-five years= confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.  In a single issue, appellant challenges his conviction on the ground that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that one of the State=s witnesses was an accomplice as a matter of law.  We affirm.

I.  Background

Appellant has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence; we therefore discuss the facts only briefly here and throughout the opinion as necessary to address appellant=s issue.

On April 23, 2006, appellant was riding in Domingo Turcio=s car when he received a phone call from his brother, John Scott.  After talking with his brother for a few moments, appellant asked Turcios to take him to appellant=s house.  Appellant later told police that John had called to inform him that he Ahad gotten into it with some Mexican males.@  Turcios complied, and when they arrived at appellant=s home, appellant asked Turcios to wait.  Appellant went inside his house and returned to Turcios=s car carrying a gun.  Appellant=s cousin, Darrell Perry, either entered the car at appellant=s house or was riding with appellant and Turcios before appellant obtained the gun.  According to Turcios, he anticipated the three of them were going to make a drug deal.  At appellant=s request, Turcios drove toward Charriton Street.  Appellant was in the front passenger seat and Perry was sitting in the back seat.

At a cross street, they started following behind  appellant=s brother, who was driving another car.  They drove onto Charriton Street, where they saw, Jonathan Pastrana, and his friend, Mauricio Palma, walking.  Pastrana threw a beer bottle at John=s vehicle, breaking the front windshield.  Moments later, appellant emerged from Turcios=s vehicle and began shooting at Pastrana and Palma.  The two attempted to run from the scene, but Pastrana suffered a fatal gunshot wound and fell to the ground.  After Pastrana fell,^[1] appellant re-entered  Turcios=s vehicle; both Turcios and John fled the scene in their own cars.  Turcios left appellant and Perry at a street corner near the house in which they lived and then took his car to a friend=s house, because, according to Turcios, he was trying to hide it from police.  He stated he also cleaned his car with bleach in an effort to remove any physical evidence from the shooting.

Through their investigation, police discovered the murder weapon, which was hidden at another individual=s house.  Apparently, John was the actual owner of the weapon.  During questioning by police, appellant admitted that he fired shots toward Palma and Pastrana, but stated that he believed they were shooting at him. 

At trial, Turcios admitted that he had been charged with misdemeanor deadly conduct for his actions on April 23.  Palma also testified and identified appellant as the shooter.  Additionally, appellant=s written statement, in which he admitted he shot at Palma and Pastrana, was admitted into evidence.  After both sides rested and closed, the trial court charged the jury.  In its charge, the trial court included instructions on accomplice witnesses, as well as self-defense.  The jury returned a verdict of Aguilty@ and assessed punishment at sixty-five years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.  The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury=s verdict, and this appeal ensued.

II.  Analysis

A.        Standard of Review

When reviewing allegations of charge error, an appellate court must first determine whether error actually exists in the charge.  Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (en banc).  If error is found, the court must determine whether the error caused sufficient harm to require reversal.  Id. The degree of harm required for reversal depends on whether the error was preserved.  Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).  If no proper objection was made, the error requires reversal only if it is so egregious and created such harm that the appellant has not had a fair and impartial trial.  Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc) (op. on reh=g).  On the other hand, when there has been a timely objection to an improper jury charge the error requires reversal unless it is harmless.  Id.

B.        Accomplice Witnesses

Before a conviction may rest upon an accomplice witness=s testimony, that testimony must be corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the accused with the crime.  See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14 (Vernon 2006); Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 498 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).  This Aaccomplice witness rule@ creates a statutorily imposed review that is not derived from federal or state constitutional principles defining the legal and factual sufficiency standards.  Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 498.  A witness=s mere presence at the scene of the crime does not make him an accomplice witness.  Id.  An accomplice is someone who participates with the defendant before, during, or after the commission of a crime and acts with the requisite culpable mental state.  Id.  To be considered an accomplice witness, the witness=s participation with the defendant must have involved some affirmative act that promotes the commission of the offense with which the defendant is charged.  Id.   A witness is not an accomplice to a crime merely because he knew of the offense and did not disclose it, or even if he concealed the offense.  Id.  Further, complicity with a defendant in the commission of another offense separate from the charged offense does not make that witness an accomplice.  Id.; see also Creel v. State, 754 S.W.2d 205, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).  Essentially, if the witness cannot be prosecuted for the same or a lesser-included offense with which the defendant is charged, that witness is not an accomplice witness as a matter of law.  Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 498.

 A trial judge must instruct the jury that a witness is an accomplice witness as a matter of law only when there is no doubt that the witness is an accomplice.  Id. Such an instruction is appropriate, for instance, when the witness is charged with the same offense as the defendant or a lesser‑included offense or when the evidence clearly shows that the witness could have been so charged.  Id.; Blake v. State, 971 S.W.2d 451, 454B55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc). Whether the witness is actually charged or prosecuted for their participation is irrelevant to the determination of accomplice statusCwhat matters is the evidence in the record.  See Blake, 971 S.W.2d at 455.  If the evidence as to a witness=s status as an accomplice is conflicting, the jury should determine the witness=s status under instructions defining an Aaccomplice.@  Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 498B99; Blake, 971 S.W.2d at 455. But there still must be some evidence of an affirmative act on the part of the witness to assist in the commission of the charged offense before such an instruction is required.  Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 499.

C.        Application

In his sole issue, appellant contends that he was egregiously harmed by the trial court=s failure to instruct the jury that Domingo Turcios was an accomplice as a matter of law.  We disagree for several reasons.

Here, the trial court, after instructing the jury on the law regarding accomplices,^[2] charged the jury with determining whether Turcios was an accomplice.  According to the trial court=s charge, the jury could not convict appellant based on Turcios=s testimony if it believed that Turcios was an accomplice unless there was other evidence, outside of his testimony, tending to connect appellant with the offense.^[3] Thus, this case is distinguishable from cases in which the trial court utterly failed to include an accomplice-witness instruction.  See, e.g., Howard v. State, 972 S.W.2d 121, 125B26 (Tex. App.CAustin 1998, no pet.) (determining that trial court erred by failing to include an instruction on accomplice-witness testimony in jury charge).  We next consider whether any doubt exists that Turcios could have been charged with murder or a lesser-included offense of murder.

An offense is a lesser included offense if:

(1) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged;

(2) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest suffices to establish its commission;

(3) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less culpable mental state suffices to establish its commission;  or

(4) it consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an otherwise included offense.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.09 (Vernon 2006).  A person commits misdemeanor deadly conduct if he recklessly engages in conduct that places another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.  See Tex. Penal code Ann. ' 22.05(a), (e) (Vernon 2003).  ARecklessness and danger are presumed if the actor knowingly pointed a firearm at or in the direction of another whether or not the actor believed the firearm to be loaded.@  Id. ' 22.05(c).

A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if:

(1) acting with the kind of culpability required for the offense, he causes or aids an innocent or nonresponsible person to engage in conduct prohibited by the definition of the offense;

(2) acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense;  or

(3) having a legal duty to prevent commission of the offense and acting with intent to promote or assist its commission, he fails to make a reasonable effort to prevent commission of the offense.

Id. ' 7.02(a).

If, in the attempt to carry out a conspiracy to commit one felony, another felony is committed by one of the conspirators, all conspirators are guilty of the felony actually committed, though having no intent to commit it, if the offense was committed in furtherance of the unlawful purpose and was one that should have been anticipated as a result of the carrying out of the conspiracy.

 Id. ' 7.02(b). 

Turcios testified, among other things, as follows:

$          Appellant did not tell Turcios anything about what his brother had said when he called appellant while he was riding in Turcios=s car.

$          Appellant entered his car with a gun in his pants and asked Turcios to give him a ride down the street.

$          Turcios did not ask appellant why or what was going on, but Turcios thought that it was probably a drug deal. 

$          As Turcios followed John=s car, he did not know anything at all about any prior conflict.

$          After Pastrana damaged the vehicle appellant=s brother was driving, appellant fired at least four shots at Pastrana and Palma, hitting Pastrana at least one time.

$          After appellant shot Pastrana, Turcios drove the car away. Turcios and appellant did not speak in the car after the shooting, and Turcios never asked appellant why he shot Pastrana, whom Turcios had never seen before.

The conflicting trial evidence shows that doubt existed as to whether Turcios was an accomplice; the evidence did not clearly show that Turcios could have been charged with the murder of Pastrana or with a lesser-included offense.^[4] See Druery, 225 S.W.3d at 498.  Therefore, the trial court did not have a duty to instruct the jury that Turcios was an accomplice witness as a matter of law.  See id.  Although Turcios admitted that he attempted to hide his car and clean out any physical evidence of the shooting after the crime, such behavior does not make him an accomplice.  See id. at 498 (concluding that a witness was  not an accomplice to a crime because he knew about the offense and did not disclose it or concealed it).  Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court properly allowed the jury to determine whether Turcios was an accomplice witness as a matter of fact. 

Finally, we note that even if the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding Turcios=s status, an accomplice witness=s testimony may only be considered when other evidence tends to connect the defendant to the crime.  See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.14. Here, the record contains other evidence that tends to connect appellant to the offense, starting with appellant=s own statement in which he admitted he shot at Pastrana and Palma.  Additionally, Palma identified appellant as the shooter.  Thus, even if the trial court should have instructed the jury that Turcios was an accomplice as a matter of law, the record does not show that appellant suffered egregious harm from the trial court=s jury charge.

In light of the foregoing, we overrule appellant=s sole issue.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

/s/        Eva M. Guzman

Justice

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed November 6, 2008.

Panel consists of Justices Frost, Seymore, and Guzman.

Do Not Publish C Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

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^[1]  The medical examiner testified that Jonathan Pastrana died from a gunshot wound to the back.  Pastrana had also been shot in the leg.

^[2]  These instructions provided as follows:

An accomplice, as the term is here used, means anyone connected with the crime charged, as a party thereto, and includes all persons who are connected with the crime by unlawful act or omission on their part transpiring either before, at the time of, or after the commission of the offense, and whether or not they were present and participated in the commission of the crime.  A person is criminally responsible as a party to an offense if the offense is committed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for which he is criminally responsible, or by both.  Mere presence alone, however, will not constitute one a party to an offense.

A person is criminally responsible for an offense committed by the conduct of another if, acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid theother person to commit the offense.  The term Aconduct@ means any act or omission and its accompanying mental state.

You are instructed that a conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless the jury first believes that the accomplice=s testimony is true and that it shows the defendant is guilty of the offense charged against him, and even then you cannot convict unless the accomplice=s testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense charged, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense, but it must tend to connect the defendant with its commission.

^[3]  This portion of the jury charge stated:

Therefore, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that an offense was committed and you further believe from the evidence that the witness, Domingo Turcios, was an accomplice, or if you have a reasonable doubt whether he was or not, as that term is defined in the foregoing instructions, then you cannot convict the defendant upon the testimony of the said Domingo Turcios unless you further believe that the testimony of Domingo Turcios is true and that it shows the defendant is guilty as charged in the indictment; and even then you cannot convict the defendant unless you further believe that there is other evidence in the case, outside of the testimony of Domingo Turcios tending to connect the defendant with the offense charged in the indictment, and then from all the evidence you must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.

^[4]  Appellant cites Ortiz v. State in support of his claim that deadly conduct is a lesser-included offense of murder.  144 S.W.3d 225, 231B32.  In Ortiz, we stated that, based on the facts of that case, deadly conduct was a lesser-included offense of murder.  Id. at 231B34.  We specifically noted, however, that although deadly conduct may be a lesser-included offense of murder, Ait is not necessarily a lesser[-]included offense in all cases.@  Id. at 234 n.7.  In Ortiz, there was evidence that appellant knowingly discharged a firearm in the direction of one or more individuals.  Id. at 233.  Unlike the appellant in Ortiz, however, nothing in our record indicates that Turcios discharged a firearm in the direction of the decedent.  Therefore, Ortiz is not on point.