Patrick E. Coleman v. State

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
No. 07-13-00253-CR
PATRICK EUGENE COLEMAN, APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
On Appeal from the 320th District Court
Potter County, Texas
Trial Court No. 66,450-D, Honorable Don R. Emerson, Presiding
May 27, 2014
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.
Appellant, Patrick Eugene Coleman, appeals the trial court’s judgment of
conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and the resulting ten-year
sentence of imprisonment.1 On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the jury’s finding that the pistol he used during the commission of the assault—
which was later discovered to most likely be an unloaded CO2-propelled air pistol—was
a deadly weapon. We will affirm.
1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2011).
Factual and Procedural History
Christy Johnson, an employee at a northwest Amarillo United supermarket,
alerted a store manager, Lisa Garza, that there was man suspected of shoplifting inside
the store. Garza spotted the man to whom Johnson referred, a man later identified as
appellant, as he was nearing a store exit. Garza directed Johnson to enlist the help of
one or more male managers. As Johnson went to do so, Garza followed closely behind
appellant as he walked out of the store exit and directed him at least twice to come back
inside the store. As Garza was preparing to reach for appellant’s left arm, he turned
toward her. Appellant warned her, “Don’t or I’ll shoot you,” and he showed her a gun
that had been concealed under his coat or waistband. Garza explained that appellant
never pointed the gun directly at her, but he displayed the gun and held it with his right
hand somewhat close to his chest such that she could see the “top part of the barrel” of
that gun as he threatened to shoot her with it.
Carol Shepherd, manager of the supermarket’s floral department, had seen the
interaction shortly before appellant began to leave the store. Noticing that Garza was
following appellant out of the store, Shepherd followed shortly behind the two of them.
She heard Garza try to coax appellant back into the store and also saw appellant turn
around and display the gun. She testified that she was approximately five feet behind
Garza at the time and, from her vantage point, was able to very clearly see the gun
appellant displayed to Garza.
Immediately after the interaction, Garza was very upset. She described herself
as “froze[n] in [her] tracks” as she watched appellant walk away toward his car. She
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acknowledged that she had a mobile phone in her hand but was too rattled or shaken to
be able to call 911. She called out to fellow coworkers to call 911, that appellant had
just pointed a gun at her. Garza and other employees tried but were unable to get a
license plate number of the car in which appellant left the scene, but they did get a good
description of the car, which they reported to responding officers: a red, two-door Dodge
Intrepid with clear plastic tape over the passenger door window.
Responding Amarillo Police Department officer, Corporal Donna Hill, broadcast a
description of appellant’s car, and APD patrol officer, Weldon Cox, located a matching
vehicle a short time later at a convenience store but with a female as its driver and sole
occupant. When Cox approached the female, she explained that her friend, Patrick,
had come to her residence and, when she asked him to take her to get refreshments,
he invited her to just use his car and drive herself there. She did. Cox and other APD
officers who had arrived to assist conducted a search of the vehicle and found what was
later identified as a CO2 pellet gun, or air pistol, in the glove compartment of the car.
A second air pistol and appellant himself would later be found when officers
arrived at the female friend’s motel room. Appellant was arrested and charged with
aggravated assault using a deadly weapon. A Potter County jury found appellant guilty,
and the same jury assessed punishment at ten years’ incarceration. The trial court
imposed sentence accordingly. Appellant timely appealed and, on appeal, contends
that the evidence was insufficient to show that the object he used or exhibited during the
commission of the assault was a deadly weapon. We will affirm.
3
Standard of Review
In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979); Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “[O]nly that evidence which is sufficient in
character, weight, and amount to justify a factfinder in concluding that every element of
the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt is adequate to support a
conviction.” Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 917 (Cochran, J., concurring). We remain mindful
that “[t]here is no higher burden of proof in any trial, criminal or civil, and there is no
higher standard of appellate review than the standard mandated by Jackson.” Id.
When reviewing all of the evidence under the Jackson standard of review, the ultimate
question is whether the jury’s finding of guilt was a rational finding. See id. at 906–07
n.26 (discussing Judge Cochran’s dissenting opinion in Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d
404, 448–50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), as outlining the proper application of a single
evidentiary standard of review). “[T]he reviewing court is required to defer to the jury’s
credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’
credibility and the weight to be given their testimony.” Id. at 899.
Applicable Law
A person commits assault if he “intentionally or knowingly threatens another with
imminent bodily injury.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(2) (West Supp. 2013). An
assault becomes aggravated if the actor commits assault and uses or exhibits a deadly
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weapon during commission of the assault. See id. § 22.02(a)(2). Again, appellant
challenges only the deadly weapon finding as it relates to his conviction for aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon. We need, then, to focus our review only on the evidence
relevant to the character of the weapon appellant used when he threatened Garza with
imminent bodily injury.
The Texas Penal Code defines a “[d]eadly weapon” as (1) “a firearm or anything
manifestly designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious
bodily injury” or (2) “anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of
causing death or serious bodily injury.” Id. § 1.07(a)(17) (West Supp. 2013). “Serious
bodily injury” is defined as “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that
causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ.” Id. § 1.07(a)(46). The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals has summarized the statutory definitions of “deadly weapon” as
meaning that “[a] weapon can be deadly by design or use.” See Tucker v. State, 274
S.W.3d 688, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Alonzo v. State, No. 07-12-00244-CR, 2014
Tex. App. LEXIS 3703, at *8 n.3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 7, 2014, pet. filed) (mem.
op., not designated for publication).
The State may prove that a BB or pellet gun is a deadly weapon through several
means, including lay or expert testimony that the weapon is capable of causing serious
bodily injury. See, e.g., Adame v. State, 69 S.W.3d 581, 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(affirming deadly-weapon finding when police testified BB gun at issue could cause
serious bodily injury if pointed and fired at someone); Campbell v. State, 577 S.W.2d
493, 495–96 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (discussing expert ballistic testimony
5
regarding BB gun’s capacity to harm); Williams v. State, 240 S.W.3d 293, 299 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g) (observing that State introduced warning
label for CO2 air gun that identified risk of serious injury or death); Corte v. State, 630
S.W.2d 690, 691–92 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, pet. ref’d) (affirming deadly-
weapon finding when police investigator testified that CO2 pellet gun used in robbery
“was capable of inflicting serious bodily injury”). In some cases, the State has failed to
prove that the BB or pellet gun is a deadly weapon. For instance, in Mosley v. State,
545 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), although the defendant had pointed a BB
gun at a woman during an assault, the court noted that the gun was not loaded, had not
been pointed directly at the woman’s face, and had not been used to bludgeon the
woman. Further, the State’s expert witness testified that a projectile fired from that BB
gun could not penetrate skin, but probably could cause loss of sight if a person were
shot in the eye. See id. Ultimately, based on the evidence before it, the Mosley court
concluded that the BB gun used in that case was not a deadly weapon in that it was not
designed, made, or adapted for the purpose of inflicting serious bodily injury and was
not calculated to produce death or serious bodily injury. See id. at 146.
Appellant relies heavily on the position taken in Mosley, pointing to the
evidentiary parallels between that case and the instant case. To more closely examine
his reliance on Mosley in support of his contention that the subject air pistol is not a
deadly weapon, we will look to the evidence in the record before us.
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Analysis
Evidence Concerning the Displayed Weapon
Garza testified that there was no doubt in her mind that the object appellant was
holding was a gun, that she was able to see the top part of the barrel as he held it in his
right hand somewhat close to his chest. She explained that he pulled out the gun from
his clothing but agreed that he did not point it directly at her and never pointed it in her
face. Shepherd, who had been following closely behind Garza and appellant, was also
able to see the incident. She explained that appellant “turned around, opened his coat
up, and had what I saw looked like a pistol.” She very clearly saw the pistol from her
vantage point.
Evidence Concerning the Air Pistol
Treating either of the discovered air pistols as the weapon appellant displayed
when he threatened Garza, we have reviewed the record for evidence concerning the
character and capacity of those weapons.2 Describing the air pistol found in the motel
room, APD Sergeant Anthony Merriman characterized the weapon as a CO2-propelled
BB gun and testified that he believed that the air pistol was “capable of putting
somebody’s eye out.”
APD Officer Jason Gipson, a patrol officer and firearms instructor with the APD,
described the air pistol found in the glove compartment of appellant’s car as one
2
We proceed under the assumption that the object used was one of the two air pistols found
during the investigation rather than another unidentified pellet gun or other handgun. Indeed, the
evidence presented gave the jury no reason to believe the gun appellant used was anything but an air
pistol. See Alonzo, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3703, at *13.
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“fashioned to look like a large caliber revolver.” He, too, agreed that an air pistol of such
design was capable of putting someone’s eye out. In an exchange with defense
counsel on the nature and capacity of the gun, Gipson explained further, elaborating on
the particular design of this gun:
Q: And unless it were pointed at your head, it – it couldn’t put your eye
out, could it?
A. Sir, I don’t know.
Q. Well, in your opinion, based on your training –
A. My opinion, if someone pointed this gun at me, I would have to shoot
back at them.
On redirect examination, Gipson clarified and elaborated:
Q. If you were looking at that weapon from a few feet away in someone
else’s hand, you said if someone was pointing it at you, you would have to
shoot them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would that weapon look like a – a real firearm –
A. Yes, sir. It’s –
Q. – from a distance of a foot or two?
A. It’s specifically fashioned to look like a real firearm. Most CO2 guns – if
you’ll allow me to show this. Most CO2 guns have a – I refer to it as a
wrench, which is kind of a little screw device which activates that CO2
cartridge and pushes it forward, and it punctures the top of the CO2
cartridge. This one has one, but it’s hidden inside the grip right here, and
it’s specifically hidden to conceal that – I refer to it as a wrench. That may
not be the proper terminology. But you can see that it doesn’t protrude out
of the grip as it does on normal CO2 guns. This is fashioned to look just
like a .357 revolver. And, in fact, somewhere on here, it says .357 on it.
So it’s as real to the real thing as can be, in my opinion, dangerously so.
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Corporal Billy Ray Haden testified about the air pistol found in the motel room, in
large part, echoing Gipson’s testimony about the design and capacity of the other air
pistol:
Q: And does that appear to be, if you were looking at that weapon from a
foot or two away, does that appear to be a real semiautomatic firearm?
A. Yes, sir, it does.
Q. But, in fact, it is not a real firearm?
A. It is not.
Q. It’s a pellet gun?
A. Yes, it’s like a .177 caliber pellet gun.
Q. And in your opinion, would that firearm be able to put your eye out if it
was – it you were hit with a pellet that comes out of that firearm?
A. Yes, sir.
Discussion
From this testimony, we see that there is sufficient evidence that an air pistol
designed like either pistol found in this investigation was capable of causing serious
bodily injury. More specifically, based on the APD’s officers’ testimony, a fact-finder
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that, if the air pistol were used to shoot a
person, the air pistol was capable of causing serious bodily injury, including the
possibility of “permanent disfigurement” or “protracted loss or impairment of the function
of any bodily member or organ.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17), (46).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold the State
presented sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the pistol appellant used
when he threatened Garza was a deadly weapon. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912; see
9
also Adame, 69 S.W.3d at 582 (holding that State had presented sufficient evidence
that a particular BB gun was capable of causing serious bodily injury).
In the face of this evidence, appellant emphasizes the point that, when each air
pistol was discovered by police, it was unloaded. In fact, the air pistol found in the glove
compartment of his car did not even have a CO2 cartridge, the absence of which would
render the weapon entirely incapable of causing serious bodily injury. Again,
appellant’s contention relies heavily on the position taken in Mosley, in which the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that an unloaded air pistol was not a deadly
weapon, in part, because defendant never pointed it at the victim’s face. See Mosely,
545 S.W.2d at 145 (noting also that State’s expert witness testified that BB gun’s
projectile could not penetrate skin). Ultimately, however, whether the air pistol was
loaded at the time of a criminal transaction is of no moment in our deadly-weapon
analysis; the crucial question before us is only whether it is “capable of causing serious
bodily injury.” See Adame, 69 S.W.3d at 582; James v. State, No. 01-10-00693-CR,
2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 3019, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 19, 2012, pet.
ref’d) (opinion designated for publication). Indeed, the presence of the word “capable”
in the provision enables the statute to cover conduct that threatens deadly force, even if
the actor has no intention of actually using deadly force. McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d
497, 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (citing Tisdale v. State, 686 S.W.2d 110, 114–15 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1984) (en banc) (op. on reh’g)). Therefore, the fact that the State did not
provide evidence at trial that the air pistol was loaded does not undermine the jury’s
deadly-weapon finding. Further, in circumstances such as these, where appellant
threatened to shoot Garza and displayed the weapon, the jury may infer that the air
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pistol was loaded. See Adame, 69 S.W.3d at 582 (citing Delgado v. State, 986 S.W.2d
306, 308 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.)).
Appellant also points to the evidence suggesting that appellant never pointed the
weapon directly at Garza’s face as evidence that the weapon could not have caused
bodily injury to Garza. Again, however, we must concentrate on the critical inquiry
before us: whether the gun had the capacity to cause serious bodily injury. When there
is no dispute regarding whether an air gun has been used or exhibited during an
offense, the question of whether that offense is enhanced to aggravated status hinges
on the capability of the air gun. See James, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 3019, at *7–8.
Appellant’s contentions, here, that the gun was displayed in such a way as to not pose a
direct threat of serious bodily injury to Garza sounds more in terms of a challenge to the
element of whether appellant used or exhibited the gun during the commission of an
assault. See id. at *7. And, “this case is not a ‘used or exhibited’ case since the
evidence clearly shows that appellant used and exhibited the BB gun during the
convenience store robbery. The issue here is whether appellant’s BB gun was ‘capable’
of causing serious bodily injury.” Adame, 69 S.W.3d at 582. The evidence that
appellant displayed the air pistol to Garza as he stood a short distance from her and
threatened to shoot her and that the air pistol was capable of causing serious bodily
injury if pointed and fired at someone is sufficient to support the jury’s deadly-weapon
finding. See id.
Despite appellant’s specific contentions regarding the insufficiency of the
evidence to support the deadly-weapon finding, we return to our conclusion: viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold the State presented sufficient
11
evidence to support the jury’s finding that the pistol appellant used when he threatened
Garza was a deadly weapon. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 912; Adame, 69 S.W.3d at
582. Accordingly, we overrule appellant’s sole point of error.
Conclusion
Having overruled appellant’s sole point of error, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment of conviction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(a).
Mackey K. Hancock
Justice
Do not publish.
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