Patrick Stevan Herrington v. State

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
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NO. 09-12-00238-CR
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PATRICK STEVAN HERRINGTON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
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On Appeal from the 1A District Court
Jasper County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 10759JD
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Patrick Stevan Herrington of aggravated sexual assault of a
child. In two issues, Herrington contends that the trial court erred in failing to issue
findings of fact and conclusions of law after the trial court denied his motion to
suppress his statement. Herrington argues that this was a violation of his due
process rights.
Section 6 of article 38.22 states, “[i]n all cases where a question is raised as
to the voluntariness of a statement of an accused, the court must make an
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independent finding in the absence of the jury as to whether the statement was
made under voluntary conditions.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 6
(West Supp. 2013). It further provides that if the court finds that the statement was
voluntary and admissible as a matter of law and fact, “the court must enter an order
stating its conclusion as to whether or not the statement was voluntarily made,
along with the specific finding of facts upon which the conclusion was based[.]”
Id.
After the parties filed their appellate briefs, the trial court issued findings of
fact and conclusions of law regarding defendant’s motion to suppress, which was
made part of the appellate record. These findings of fact and conclusions of law
state the trial court’s conclusions regarding the voluntariness of Herrington’s
statement and specify the findings of fact on which its conclusions were based.
Neither party filed an amended or supplemental brief. The mere absence of the
findings of fact and conclusions of law from the record seemingly forms the entire
basis of both of Herrington’s issues on appeal. Accordingly, we overrule
Herrington’s issues as they have been rendered moot by the trial court’s findings of
fact and conclusions of law that were entered after Herrington filed his brief. See
Beltran v. Beltran, 324 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.) (“A
case is rendered moot when: (1) it appears that a party seeks to obtain a judgment
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upon some controversy, when in reality none exists; or (2) a party seeks a
judgment upon some matter which cannot have a practical legal effect upon a then
existing controversy.”). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
AFFIRMED.
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CHARLES KREGER
Justice
Submitted on December 2, 2013
Opinion Delivered January 29, 2014
Do not publish
Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger, and Horton, JJ.
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