Eric D. Stone v. State

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 2-07-431-CR
ERIC D. STONE APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 355TH DISTRICT COURT OF HOOD COUNTY
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellant Eric D. Stone appeals from a conviction for aggravated sexual
assault of a child committed on or around November 1, 2001. Stone pleaded
guilty to two counts of aggravated sexual assault, and the jury assessed his
punishment at ninety-nine years’ confinement on each count. The trial court
imposed the punishment assessed by the jury and ordered the sentences to run
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… See T EX. R. A PP. P. 47.4.
concurrently. Stone’s appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief asserting that
there are no grounds that could be argued successfully on appeal. See Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). Because we hold that any
appeal from this case would be frivolous, we will grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
II. Anders Brief
Stone’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw
as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In his motion, counsel avers
that he has conducted a professional evaluation of the record and, after a
thorough review of the applicable law, has reached the conclusion that there
are no arguable grounds to be advanced to support an appeal of this cause and
that the appeal is frivolous. In his brief, counsel has reviewed the history of the
case, including detailing the evidence presented. Counsel’s brief and motion
meet the requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the
record demonstrating why there are no reversible grounds on appeal and
referencing any grounds that might arguably support the appeal. Id.; see Mays
v. State, 904 S.W .2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.).
Stone was given the opportunity to file a pro se brief on his own behalf, but he
chose not to do so.
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In our duties as a reviewing court, we must conduct an independent
evaluation of the record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining
that the appeal is frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991); Mays, 904 S.W.2d at 923. Only then may we grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109
S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).
Because Stone entered an open plea of guilty, our independent review for
potential error is limited to potential jurisdictional defects, the voluntariness of
his plea, error that is not independent of and supports the judgment of guilt,
and error occurring after entry of the guilty plea. See Monreal v. State, 99
S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); Young v. State, 8 S.W.3d 656,
666–67 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
III. C ONCLUSION
We have carefully reviewed the appellate record and counsel’s brief. We
agree that the appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit. We find nothing in
the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178
S.W.3d 824, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Therefore, we grant the motion to
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withdraw filed by Stone’s appellate counsel and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
SUE WALKER
JUSTICE
PANEL F: CAYCE, C.J.; WALKER and MCCOY, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
T EX. R. A PP. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: July 3, 2008
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