Reginald R.W. Coleman v. State

AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed January 17, 2014.
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-13-00434-CR
REGINALD R.W. COLEMAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F12-24792-W
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Francis, Lang-Miers, and Lewis
Opinion by Justice Lang-Miers
Reginald R.W. Coleman waived a jury and pleaded guilty to burglary of a habitation. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a) (West 2011). The trial court assessed punishment at ten
years’ imprisonment. The trial court’s judgment also includes an order that appellant pay $244
in court costs. In two issues, appellant contends there is insufficient evidence in the record to
support the trial court’s order for him to pay court costs and the trial court abused its discretion
by sentencing him to imprisonment. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
In his first issue, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s
order that he pay $244 in court costs because the clerk’s record does not contain a bill of costs.
The State responds that the evidence in the record is sufficient to support the trial court’s
assessment of $244 in court costs.
If a criminal action is appealed, “an officer of the court shall certify and sign a bill of
costs stating the costs that have been accrued and send the bill of costs to the court to which the
action or proceeding is . . . appealed.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 103.006 (West 2006).
Costs may not be collected from the person charged with the costs until a written bill, containing
the items of cost, is produced and signed by the officer who charged the cost or the officer
entitled to receive payment for the cost. Id. art. 103.001.
The clerk’s record in this case does not contain the bill of costs. We, however, ordered
the Dallas County District Clerk to file a supplemental record containing a certified bill of costs
associated with this case, and the clerk did so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.5(c)(1) (rules of appellate
procedure allow supplementation of clerk’s record if relevant item has been omitted).
Appellant’s complaint that the evidence is insufficient to support the imposition of costs because
the clerk’s records did not contain a bill of costs is now moot. See Coronel v. State, No. 05-12-
00493-CR, 2013 WL 3874446, at *4 (Tex. App.––Dallas July 29, 2013, pet. ref’d); Franklin v.
State, 402 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). We overrule his first issue.
In response to the Court’s order requiring supplementation of the records, appellant filed
an objection that the bill of costs in the supplemental record is not “proper bill[s] of costs” and
the bill of costs was not filed in the trial court or brought to the trial court’s attention before costs
were entered in the judgment. The Court rejected these objections and arguments in Coronel.
See Coronel, 2013 WL 3874446, at *4–5. We likewise reject them here, and conclude the cost
bills contained in the supplemental clerk’s record is sufficient to support the assessment of costs
in the judgment. See id. We overrule appellant’s objection to the supplemental clerk’s record.
-2-
In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing
him to ten years’ imprisonment because that punishment violates the objectives of the penal
code. Appellant asserts he expressed remorse and took responsibility for committing the offense
and, thus, should have been given probation and drug treatment, not imprisonment. The State
responds appellant has waived his complaint that the trial court assessed an unduly harsh
sentence.
Appellant did not complain about the sentence either at the time it was imposed or in his
motion for new trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). Thus, appellant has not preserved this issue for appellate
review.
Moreover, punishment that is assessed within the statutory range for an offense is neither
excessive nor unconstitutionally cruel or unusual. Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1997, pet. ref’d); see also Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App.
1984). Burglary of a habitation is a second-degree felony, punishable by imprisonment for two
to twenty years and an optional fine not to exceed $10,000. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 12.33, 30.02(c)(2) (West 2011). Appellant’s ten-year sentence is within the statutory
punishment range. We resolve appellant’s second two issues against him.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/
ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
130434F.U05
-3-
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
REGINALD R.W. COLEMAN, Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District
Appellant Court of Dallas County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No.
F12-24792-W).
No. 05-13-00434-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Lang-Miers,
Justices Francis and Lewis participating.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered January 17, 2014.
/Elizabeth Lang-Miers/
ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS
JUSTICE
-4-