Wilson, Branden Keith Taylor v. State

Reverse and Remand and Opinion Filed January 14, 2014
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-12-01019-CR
No. 05-12-01020-CR
BRANDEN KEITH TAYLOR WILSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 296-80602-2012 & 296-80603-2012
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices FitzGerald, Francis, and Myers
Opinion by Justice Francis
Branden Keith Taylor Wilson appeals his convictions for unauthorized use of a vehicle
and evading arrest with a vehicle. After finding him guilty, the trial court sentenced him to 180
days in a state jail facility and eight years in prison, probated for six years, and a $500 fine,
respectively. In a single issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support
his convictions and the trial court erred by failing to approve in writing his waiver of certain
rights and consent to stipulate. We agree the stipulation was improper, conclude the error was
trial error, and reverse and remand each case to the trial court for new trial.
Appellant appeared for trial on June 12, 2012. Appellant said he knew he was there “for
[his] charges,” and the trial court told him they were having a “trial by paper,” specifically that
his lawyer and the lawyer for the State had “submitted briefs to the Court and evidence to the
Court, and the Court is just going to go back to its chambers and read everything. And you’re
either guilty of it or you’re not.” Appellant indicated he understood.
During arraignment, appellant’s attorney affirmed that appellant “knows and understands
he has certain rights, and to the extent that this case is being submitted to the Court, he is
waiving those rights although he understands he is presenting evidence to the Court by
stipulation from both the state and on his behalf.” He entered a plea of not guilty to each charge.
The trial court then asked the attorney for the State, “Do you have anything?” and he replied,
“No, Your Honor.”
While the trial court stated the parties had “submitted briefs to the court and evidence to
the court,” and agreed to review “everything” in making a decision, the State did not offer and
the trial court did not admit evidence during the hearing. No written agreement to stipulate or
written stipulation signed by any of the parties was admitted. Although appellant orally
stipulated the State was “presenting evidence,” he did not indicate what evidence was offered or
what that evidence would or would not show.
The trial court took the cases under advisement and told the parties it would notify them
when a decision was reached. A discussion was held on how punishment would be decided if
the trial court found appellant guilty, and the parties were excused. The next day, the trial court
issued a written “Memorandum” stating, “On June 12, 2012 the Court held a Trial Before the
Court by submission. The Court FINDS the Defendant GUILTY of the charges as alleged in the
indictments. Counsel shall agree to a date to hold a sentencing hearing instanter.”
Nine days later, appellant again appeared in court. Having entered into plea agreements
with the State on punishment, he waived his right to a punishment hearing. The trial court
admonished appellant who testified regarding punishment matters. Appellant was sentenced to
180 days in a state jail facility and eight years in prison, probated for six years, and a $500 fine.
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Appellant now challenges his convictions, claiming the State failed to introduce sufficient
evidence at trial establishing each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt and
the trial court erred by failing to approve in writing appellant’s waiver of rights and consent to
stipulate to the evidence.
Article 1.15 of the code of criminal procedure provides in part:
The evidence may be stipulated if the defendant in such case consents in
writing, in open court, to waive the appearance, confrontation, and cross-
examination of witnesses, and further consents either to an oral stipulation of the
evidence and testimony or to the introduction of testimony by affidavits, written
statements of witnesses, and any other documentary evidence in support of the
judgment of the court. Such waiver and consent must be approved by the court in
writing, and be filed in the file of the papers of the cause.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.15 (West 2005). Article 1.15 applies to pleas of not guilty
when a jury trial has been waived. Messer v. State, 729 S.W.2d 694, 699 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (op. on reh’g). The statute’s requirements must be strictly followed before a stipulation,
either oral or written, can be considered as evidence. McClain v State, 730 S.W.2d 739, 742
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987). The trial judge is not required to examine or approve the stipulated
evidence but must approve in writing the defendant’s consent to stipulate. Id. Only after the
defendant’s consent to stipulate is approved in writing by the trial court may the stipulation be
considered as evidence. See id. at 742‒43.
The trial court’s failure to approve in writing a stipulation of evidence does not constitute
reversible error if, excluding the stipulation, sufficient evidence exists to support the conviction.
See id. at 743; Johnson v. State, No. 05-04-01088-CR, 2005 WL 459052, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Feb. 28, 2005, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (no reversible error in admitting
stipulation when appellant admitted to prior convictions during testimony); Carter v. State, No.
05-98-00319-CR, 2000 WL 688214, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 22, 2000, pet. ref’d) (not
designated for publication) (no reversible error in admitting improper stipulation in light of
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arresting officer’s testimony of weight of cocaine and admission of actual cocaine at trial);
Stewart v. State, 12 S.W.3d 146, 148 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (no
reversible error in admitting improper stipulation when defendant judicially confessed to
offense). If, however, the trial court fails to approve the stipulation and the evidence presented at
trial consists solely of the stipulation, the evidence is insufficient and the judgment must be
reversed. McClain, 730 S.W.2d at 742. Here, because the trial court did not approve the
stipulation, and no evidence exists apart from the stipulation, the judgments must be reversed.
See id.
In reaching this conclusion, we reject the State’s argument that the error did not affect a
substantial right because appellant’s oral statements to the trial court are evidence of his intent to
waive certain rights and consent to a “trial by submission.” Evidence sufficient to overcome a
stipulation error, as outlined in the cases cited above, is actual evidence that is presented at trial
independent of the erroneous stipulation, not oral responses to a trial court’s admonitions. We
also reject the State’s claim we should consider documents contained in a supplemental
reporter’s record, including police and offense reports, a witness statement, an in-car DVD, and
trial briefs from both parties as sufficient to render the error harmless. An oral stipulation that
does not comply with the provisions of article 1.15 cannot be considered evidence. See id. To
the extent the State relies on the documents contained in the supplemental reporter’s record,
these documents were not admitted into evidence at trial nor were they specifically identified at
trial. Even if they had been admitted, they may not be considered evidence due to the stipulation
error. We sustain appellant’s issue.
Having concluded the convictions must be reversed due to stipulation error, the question
is whether to remand for new trial or acquit. Appellant contends we should acquit him of both
offenses, arguing that because the State failed to offer or otherwise “memorialize” the evidence
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forming the basis of the stipulation, no evidence exists on which the fact-finder could base a
verdict. Appellant cites McClain for the argument that acquittal is proper absent the admission
of some type of writing showing an agreement to stipulate or the admission of other evidentiary
documents. He says this was not a case of oversight but instead was a complete evidentiary
failure mandating acquittal. We disagree with appellant’s interpretation of McClain and with his
legal analysis.
The record in this case shows that both appellant and the State intended for the trial court
to decide these cases by stipulated evidence. Both sides submitted briefs and evidence for the
trial court to review. Appellant orally agreed to the stipulation; the trial court said it would
review the briefs and the evidence submitted by both sides and would decide if “you’re either
guilty of it or you’re not.” The parties treated the proceeding as a bench trial on stipulated facts,
and no objection was made to the procedure or to the trial court’s in-chamber review of the briefs
and the evidence submitted by the parties. See Ex parte Reagan, 549 S.W.2d 204, 205 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1977) (warrant that was neither formally introduced nor admitted into evidence, but
was treated by court and parties as if admitted, supported extradition order); Killion v. State, 503
S.W.2d 765, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (written stipulations that were not formally introduced
or read into evidence, but treated by the court and parties as if admitted, supported the
judgment); Baker v. State, No. 05-94-01760-CR, 1996 WL 156899, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas
May 29, 1996, no pet.) (competency report not admitted, but treated by parties as if admitted,
supported conclusion that defendant competent to stand trial). The trial court’s failure to
approve the stipulation in writing is trial error, not an evidentiary error or failure of proof. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals considers these “errors of omission” and has held “errors of
omission are only trial errors,” meaning “acquittals will not be entered” under such
circumstances. McClain, 730 S.W.2d at 743; see Messer, 729 S.W.2d at 700.
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Further, the court of criminal appeals addressed this issue when evaluating the double
jeopardy implications of a reversal by an appellate court of a conviction that was supported by
inadmissible evidence–that is, stipulations orally admitted into evidence without written approval
of the trial judge of the defendant’s waiver of rights and consent to stipulate. See Messer, 729
S.W.2d at 699. Citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) and Ex parte Duran, 581
S.W.2d 683, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979), the Messer court distinguished a reversal
based on trial error from one based on the failure of the State to prove its case. Messer, 729
S.W.2d at 699. A “reversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does
not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case. As such, it
implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” Id. (quoting Burks, 437
U.S. at 15). Rather, it is a determination that the judicial process was defective in some
fundamental respect, such as the incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions,
or prosecutorial misconduct. Id. at 699‒700. “When this occurs, the accused has a strong
interest in obtaining a fair readjudication of his guilt free from error, just as society maintains a
valid concern for insuring that the guilty are punished.” Id. (quoting Burks, 437 U.S. at 15).
Under these facts and existing case law, we cannot reverse on the stipulation issue and acquit.
We reverse the trial court’s judgments and remand these causes to the trial court for new
trial.
/Molly Francis/
MOLLY FRANCIS
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7
121019F.U05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
BRANDEN KEITH TAYLOR WILSON, On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District
Appellant Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 296-80602-2012.
No. 05-12-01019-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Francis,
Justices FitzGerald and Myers participating.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is REVERSED
and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment entered this 14th day of January, 2014.
/Molly Francis/
MOLLY FRANCIS
JUSTICE
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
BRANDEN KEITH TAYLOR WILSON, On Appeal from the 296th Judicial District
Appellant Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 296-80603-2012.
No. 05-12-01020-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Francis,
Justices FitzGerald and Myers participating.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is REVERSED
and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment entered this 14th day of January, 2014.
/Molly Francis/
MOLLY FRANCIS
JUSTICE
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