Frederick Anderson v. State

REFORM and AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed December 31, 2013.
Court of Appeals
S In The
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-13-00253-CR
FREDERICK ANDERSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F12-00400
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices O’Neill, Myers, and Brown
Opinion by Justice O’Neill
Appellant Frederick Anderson appeals his conviction for attempted capital murder. In
three issues, he argues (1) the evidence is legally insufficient to prove intent; (2) the trial court
erred by including a definition of reasonable doubt in the jury charge; and (3) the trial court erred
by informing the jury of good conduct time. In a counter-issue, the State contends the judgment
should be reformed to reflect a deadly weapon finding and a finding of true to the enhancement
paragraph. As reformed, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Background
On November 19, 1983, Mary Smith 1 drove to meet friends at a restaurant on McKinney
Avenue in Dallas to celebrate her birthday. She easily found parking in a well-lit area. As she
1
The victim elected to use a pseudonym because of the nature of the case.
was leaving her car, two men ran towards her with a gun. When they reached her, one of the
men hit her over the head with the gun and said, “White bitch, open up your car.” She screamed
and fell to the ground, but the man who hit her with the gun pulled her up by her hair and again
insisted that she open her car.
The men took her purse and emptied it looking for money. After the men did not find
any money, they threw Smith into the middle of the seats of her car and told her to stay down on
the floor. The men got into the car and then drove away with Smith in the fetal position on the
floor fearing for her life.
While they drove, the male passenger, who was later identified as appellant, held Smith
by her neck and said, “White bitch, you’re going to pay for this.” The male driver then gave
appellant a ski mask and the gun. Appellant put the ski mask over Smith’s head, pressed the gun
to her neck, reached down her dress, and forcefully squeezed her breast. He asked her if she
performed oral sex, and she said no. He said, “Well, white bitch, you’re going to do it tonight.”
The men drove her to what she thought was a deserted area and stopped the car. The
driver put down the seats in the cargo area of Smith’s car and threw her to the back. Appellant
continued to hold the gun to her head while the driver ripped off her pantyhose. The driver then
vaginally raped her. After the driver finished, appellant forced Smith to perform oral sex.
Appellant ejaculated in her mouth, and Smith spit it out onto her dress. The driver then raped
Smith again.
After he finished a second time, he left Smith in the cargo area and started to drive away.
Appellant also stayed in the cargo area and continued to hold the gun to Smith. Appellant asked
Smith if she could swim, which made her think they were going to drown her. She told them she
was an Olympic swimmer, which was a lie.
The driver eventually slowed the car down, and appellant pushed Smith out of the car
onto the concrete median. Smith took the opportunity to run away. She ran into a field
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surrounded by a barbed-wire fence. She jumped the fence, and laid down in the fetal position.
She heard a gunshot as she ran, but testified that because of the adrenaline rushing through her
body, she never felt the bullet hit her.
She waited until the men left before trying to get up. Her right leg would not support her
so she crawled to the road and eventually flagged down a driver that stopped and helped her.
The two men in the car drove her to the nearest police station, and she was immediately taken to
Parkland hospital for medical treatment because she was bleeding out.
While at Parkland, a doctor collected evidence for a rape kit, which included swabs from
her mouth and vagina. Smith’s dress was also collected as evidence. Smith underwent
approximately twelve hours of surgery to repair damage caused by the bullet when it entered her
left buttocks and traveled upward, injuring her colon, intestines, and reproductive organs. She
stayed in the hospital for ten days.
The two men originally found guilty of the offenses were later exonerated based on DNA
testing of the evidence collected. Appellant and another man were identified in 2012 as Smith’s
attackers. The DNA tested from Smith’s dress revealed that appellant was the passenger who
forced her to perform oral sex. Based on the DNA results, appellant went to trial and Smith
testified again regarding the 1983 sexual assaults. The jury convicted appellant of attempted
capital murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. This appeal followed.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first issue, appellant asserts the evidence is legally insufficient to prove his intent to
commit attempted capital murder because “had appellant harbored such intent he could have
simply shot her again,” as he was within ten feet of her. The State counters the jury could infer
intent from the evidence.
The Jackson v. Virginia legal sufficiency standard is the only standard a reviewing court
applies in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal
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offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks v. State, 323
S.W.3d 893, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307) (1979)); Bell v. State, 326 S.W.3d 716, 720 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. dism’d). This
standard requires the reviewing court to determine whether, considering all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict, the jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Bell, 326 S.W.3d at 720. We defer to the jury’s determinations of the
witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Id.
Appellant was charged with attempted capital murder under Texas Penal Code section
19.03(a)(2) and indicted as follows:
[Appellant] . . . unlawfully then and there, with the specific intent to commit the
offense of CAPITAL MURDER, while in the course of committing and
attempting to commit KIDNAPPING AND AGGRAVATED SEXUAL
ASSAULT of MARY SMITH (pseudonym), do an act, to-wit: attempt to cause
the death of MARY SMITH, an individual, by intentionally SHOOTING MARY
SMITH WITH A FIREARM, a deadly weapon; said act amounting to more than
mere preparation that tended but failed to effect the commission of the offense
intended. 2
The penal code defines criminal attempt as “ . . . an offense if, with specific intent to
commit an offense, he does an act amounting to more than mere preparation that tends but fails
to effect the commission of the offense intended.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01(a) (West
2011). In attempted capital murder, the defendant must have the intent to bring about the desired
result, specifically the death of the individual. Thus, a specific intent to kill is a necessary
element of attempted murder. Flanagan v. State, 675 S.W.2d 734, 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)
(op. on reh’g); Thompson v. State, 05-99-01189-CR, 2000 WL 1337170, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Dallas Sept. 18, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication). The specific intent to kill may be
inferred from the use of a deadly weapon, unless the manner of its use makes it reasonably
2
The State later abandoned the kidnapping allegation.
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apparent that death or serious bodily injury could not have resulted. Flanagan, 675 S.W.2d at
744. “Naturally, the most obvious cases and the easiest ones in which to prove a specific intent
to kill, are those cases in which a firearm was used and was fired or attempted to have been fired
on a person.” Godsey v. State, 719 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc); Robbins
v. State, 145 S.W.3d 306, 309 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, pet. ref’d). The jury may also infer
intent from appellant’s words or conduct. Robbins, 145 S.W.3d at 309.
The record is clear appellant held a deadly weapon to her head during the sexual assault
of Smith and that he shot her in the buttocks as she tried to escape. The jury could infer
appellant’s intent to kill her based on this evidence. Godsey, 719 S.W.2d at 581. Moreover,
prior to the shooting, appellant told Smith she was going “to pay for this,” she was taken to what
seemed like a remote area, and appellant asked her if she could swim, which made Smith think
the men planned to kill her. The jury could infer these words and actions also showed
appellant’s intent to kill. Accordingly, appellant’s argument that he did not harbor an intent to
kill because he was close enough to shoot her again, but did not, is without merit. See, e.g.,
Canty v. State, No. 14-05-00639-CR, 2006 WL 2827312, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] Oct. 5, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding evidence
was legally sufficient to support conviction for attempted capital murder despite defendant’s
argument that he was close enough to shoot officer again but only shot him in his hand).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude a rational jury could infer
appellant’s intent to commit capital murder. We overrule appellant’s first issue.
Inclusion of Reasonable Doubt Definition in the Jury Charge
In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court erred by including a definition of
reasonable doubt in the jury charge. He specifically complains about the following language: “It
is not required that the prosecution prove guilt beyond all doubt; it is required that the
prosecution’s proof excludes all reasonable doubt concerning the defendant’s guilt.” Appellant
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argues this language provides a definition of reasonable doubt in violation of Paulson v. State, 28
S.W.3d 580, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
This Court, however, has previously considered this instruction and concluded it does not
define “reasonable doubt.” See O’Canas v. State, 140 S.W.3d 695, 702 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2003, pet. ref’d). Instead, we determined the instruction “simply states the legally correct
proposition that the prosecution’s burden is to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt and not
all possible doubt.” Id. Thus, for the reasons stated in O’Canas, we reject appellant’s argument
and overrule his second issue.
Consideration of Good Conduct Time
In his third issue, appellant argues the trial court erroneously instructed the jury, during
punishment, on sentence credit for good conduct time. The court’s instruction, which tracked
article 37.07, section 4(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, reads in part as follows:
“Under the law applicable in this case, the defendant, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment,
may earn time off the period of incarceration imposed through the award of good conduct time.”
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07, § 4(a) (West Supp. 2013). Appellant does not
dispute that this instruction tracked the appropriate statutory language, but that he was prejudiced
and egregiously harmed by it because he is ineligible to receive good conduct time. The State
agrees appellant is ineligible for good conduct time credit, but argues the charge was proper or,
alternatively, did not cause egregious harm.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected appellant’s argument in Luquis v. State, 72
S.W.3d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). In that case, the court acknowledged that the instruction
dictated by the code of criminal procedure may appear to be misleading and inapplicable to some
defendants. Id. at 363. Nonetheless, it construed article 37.07, section (4) to be an absolute
command that the good conduct time instruction be given to the jury. Id. We have similarly
overruled this same argument based on Luquis. See Coppola v. State, No. 05-10-00704-CR,
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2012 WL 29318, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 6, 2012, no pet.) (not designated for publication);
Gates v. State, No. 05-11-00404-CR, 2012 WL 753647, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 9, 2012,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Accordingly, a trial court that gives the
instruction does not commit error. We overrule appellant’s third point.
Reformation of Judgment to Accurately Reflect Findings
The State raises a counter-point and asks this Court to reform the judgment to correctly
reflect a deadly weapon finding by the jury and a finding of true as to the enhancement
paragraph.
We may reform a judgment to correctly reflect the jury’s findings. Asberry v. State, 813
S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Thus, we reform the judgment to
show that the jury made a deadly weapon finding and that the jury found the enhancement
paragraph to be true.
Conclusion
As reformed, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Michael J. O'Neill/
MICHAEL J. O’NEILL
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
130253F.U05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
FREDERICK ANDERSON, Appellant On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District
Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-13-00253-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F12-00400.
Opinion delivered by Justice O’Neill.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Myers and Brown participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is REFORMED
to reflect a deadly weapon finding and a finding of true to the enhancement paragraph.
As REFORMED, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered this 31st day of December, 2013.
/Michael J. O'Neill/
MICHAEL J. O'NEILL
JUSTICE
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