Gracia, Jesus v. Davis, Curtis

Reverse and Remand and Opinion Filed February 13, 2014
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-12-01147-CV
JESUS GRACIA, Appellant
V.
CURTIS DAVIS, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-09-08253-A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Francis, Lang-Miers, and Lewis
Opinion by Justice Francis
In this lawsuit alleging injuries from an automobile collision, the trial court directed a
verdict for plaintiff Curtis Davis in the amount of $17,400 in past medical expenses and included
that amount in the designated blank in the jury charge. The jury then went on to award more
than $350,000 in other past and future damages.
On appeal, appellant Jesus Gracia argues the trial court erred in directing a verdict on past
medical expenses. Further, he argues that because the amount was included in the charge, the
error tainted the entire verdict. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and
remand for a new trial on damages.
On May 9, 2008, a car driven by Gracia rear-ended a Ford Explorer driven by Davis.
Evidence suggested Gracia was talking on his cell phone at the time. At trial, Gracia filed a
written stipulation to liability and also testified he caused the accident, leaving damages as the
only contested issue in the case. After the collision, Davis drove himself to the hospital
complaining of back, neck, and shoulder pain. He was given discharge instructions for a muscle
strain and prescriptions for Tramadol and Flexeril. About two weeks later, he went to Dr. Glenn
Smith, a chiropractor, where he received a series of chiropractic treatments, diagnostic
examinations, and tests related to his back, neck, and shoulder areas. An MRI taken in August
was normal and did not reveal any disc bulges or herniation. Davis continued treatments with
Dr. Smith for about four months, until September 8, at which time Davis said he reached a
“plateau” in his treatments.
For the next thirteen months, Davis received no treatment but continued to take pain
medication. In August 2009, he began working at a Wal-Mart distribution center warehouse
filling orders for stores. His official job description required, among other things, that he be able
to “lift, push, pull, and carry tools, objects or equipment above shoulder level without
assistance”; move, lift, carry, and place merchandise and supplies weighing up to 60 pounds
without assistance; and reach overhead and below the knees, including bending, twisting,
pulling, and stooping. He acknowledged the job was “physically demanding.” He worked
eleven-hour shifts, bending over and constantly lifting heavy objects on and off pallets. He said
he lifted items between two and fifty pounds all day, and there were times he could not go to
work the next day because “[i]t just gets to the point where it just starts to hurt.” Davis also said
that, when he was hired, he did not disclose that he had an injury from a car accident or that he
was taking pain medications. He explained he needed the job to support his family.
Shortly after he began the job, Davis stopped using his pain medications because Wal-
Mart policy precluded such use. In October 2009, more than two months after he began the job
at Wal-Mart, Davis returned to Dr. Smith to “get rid of the pain.” In Dr. Smith’s record of this
–2–
visit, he noted Davis “has suffered a re-exacerbation due to his increased activity at his new
job.”1 After this visit and up until the date of trial, Davis incurred additional medical expenses
related to treatments, medications, and diagnostic tests for back, neck, and shoulder pain. At
trial, he testified he continued to have pain in his back, neck, and shoulder. He also testified that
he did not have these problems before the accident.
Dr. Smith testified Davis suffered “soft tissue” injuries in the collision that likely would
get worse as he aged. He explained that when Davis was hit from behind, the lower part of his
body was pushed forward, but his head, because of its weight, stayed back, causing a “shearing
force” on the spine. Dr. Smith testified Davis suffered a spinal cord contusion and the ligaments
were stretched, causing muscle spasms, tingling, and facet problems. He treated Davis with laser
therapy, electrical stimulation, ultrasound, and deep tissue massage over a period of four months.
When Davis reached a plateau, meaning “he wasn’t getting any better than what he was at the
time,” he was released with instructions to follow up “for future exacerbations.” Davis returned
thirteen months later and Smith began treating him again. Dr. Smith was shown a summary of
all of Davis’s past medical expenses and was asked if they were all “proximately caused by the
automobile collision.” Davis said they were. When asked why he believed this, Smith said
Davis had pain after the accident and did not have pain before the accident.
After all of the evidence was presented, Davis’s counsel moved for an instructed verdict
on past medical expenses, arguing they were proven to be proximately caused by the collision
and there was no controverting evidence. Gracia’s counsel countered that the evidence raised an
issue as to what portion of the expenses were “reasonably related” to the accident and the injuries
sustained by Davis as a result of the accident. Specifically, counsel relied on evidence of the gap
in treatment, arguing his return to Smith “could have been related to his work at Wal-Mart.” The
1
In Davis’s medical records, another doctor noted the gap in treatment but that “recently pain returned.”
–3–
trial court granted Davis’s motion and included the full amount of past medical expenses in the
jury charge. The jury then awarded Davis the following: past pain, $6,000; future pain,
$58,000; past mental anguish, $8,500; future mental anguish, $60,000; past loss of earning
capacity, $3,185.65; future loss of earning capacity, $52,000; past physical impairment, $6,000;
future physical impairment, $60,000; and future medical expenses, $100,000.
On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred in directing the verdict on past medical
expenses when there was evidence of a “gap” in treatment, and the second treatment was
followed by appellant beginning a physically demanding job at the Wal-Mart distribution center.
He argues this evidence was sufficiently probative to allow the jury to consider whether the
second treatment was causally related to the accident.
In response, appellee makes three arguments. First, he contends appellant “affirmatively
conceded” the issue at trial by either his own testimony or his counsel’s representations in a
pretrial hearing. Second, if the issue was not conceded, he argues his chiropractor’s testimony
was uncontroverted and was therefore conclusive on the jury. Finally, he asserts that even if the
directed verdict was error, the error was harmless and can be “easily rectified with a modest
remittitur.”
The plaintiff is entitled to a directed verdict when reasonable minds can draw only one
conclusion from the evidence. Collora v. Navarro, 574 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex. 1978). Our task in
such a case is to determine whether there is any evidence of probative force to raise a fact issue
on the question presented, and we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the person
suffering the adverse judgment. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C., 348 S.W.3d 194,
217 (Tex. 2011). If no such evidence exists, the trial court may properly direct a verdict. Byrd v.
Delasancha, 195 S.W.3d 834, 837 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). However, if reasonable
–4–
minds could differ as to truth of the controlling facts, a trial court errs if it grants a directed
verdict and refuses to submit the issue to a jury. Id.
In assessing personal injury damages, the trier of fact has great discretion in fixing the
amount of the damage award. Ponce v. Sandoval, 68 S.W.3d 799, 806 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
2001, no pet.) (citing McGalliard v. Kuhlman, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986)). Opinions and
judgments of expert witnesses are not conclusive on the trier of fact. Id. A jury generally may
disregard a doctor’s testimony on both the necessity of treatment and on the causal relationship
between the accident and the plaintiff’s complaints. Id. at 806–07. Expert testimony as to
whether an accident caused a particular injury is not binding upon a jury. Id. at 807. And,
although such evidence regarding expenses incurred has evidentiary significance, it is not
binding on the jury. Id.
Here, the evidence showed appellant was treated for injuries for four months following
the accident. Then, for the next thirteen months, he received no medical treatment. Two months
after beginning a physically demanding job, in which he worked eleven-hour shifts lifting up to
fifty pounds, he returned to Dr. Smith for treatment. Dr. Smith’s record of that visit showed
Davis had suffered a “re-exacerbation due to his increased activity at his new job.” We conclude
this evidence was sufficiently probative to allow the jury to consider whether all of Davis’s
medical expenses were causally related to the accident. We find support for this conclusion in
this Court’s opinion in Bullard v. Lynde, 292 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.), and
our sister court’s opinion in Ponce, both of which involve a trial court granting a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict for the full amount of past medical expenses after a jury
awarded less than the plaintiff requested.
In Bullard, the plaintiff fractured her elbow in an automobile accident. An orthopedic
surgeon advised her to keep her arm in a sling for six weeks and do stretches. 292 S.W.3d at
–5–
143. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff left for college. After six weeks, she removed the sling and
began using light weights. She stopped because her elbow hurt when she used them. She also
tried to play sports but stopped because her elbow hurt. Id. at 144. A year after the accident, she
went back to the orthopedic surgeon, who recommended surgery. At trial, the orthopedic
surgeon testified the plaintiff’s participation in sports activities while at college “could have
aggravated the injury or made it worse.” Id. at 145.
After hearing the evidence, the jury awarded the plaintiff only a portion of the past
medical expenses she sought. The plaintiff then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
to recover her full amount of medical expenses. Id. at 144. The trial court granted the motion
and awarded the full amount of past medical expenses. Id. at 143. The defendant appealed.
This Court concluded more than a scintilla of evidence existed to support the jury’s
finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to all of the past medical expenses. Id. at 145. As we
stated, “The evidence supports a finding that, by participating in physical activities at college and
failing to seek medical care for more than a year, [the plaintiff] may have caused some of the
damage to her elbow for which she received medical treatment.” Id.
In Ponce, the defendant ran over the plaintiff’s foot and brushed her leg with her
automobile. 68 S.W.3d at 802. At the emergency room, medical personnel noted the injury
from the accident appeared to be “minimal,” but the plaintiff’s blood pressure was elevated and
she was diagnosed with hypertension. Id. at 802–03. Thereafter, the plaintiff returned to the
emergency room several times with symptoms of high blood pressure and was hospitalized at
one point.
At trial, a doctor testified that in his opinion, to a reasonable medical probability, the
plaintiff’s hypertension was caused by the accident. He said her medical expenses related to her
multiple visits to the emergency room, hospitalization, and prescriptions for blood pressure
–6–
medication were related to the accident and that she would incur additional medical expenses
related to high blood pressure in the future. Id. at 803. He also testified, however, there were
other causes for hypertension, the major being unknown. He agreed that although the plaintiff
did not report a prior history, there was no way of being certain whether she was hypertensive
before the accident without having had her blood pressure tested. Id. at 808.
After hearing the evidence, the jury awarded only a portion of what the plaintiff
requested for past medical expenses and awarded zero for future medical expenses. The trial
court granted plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and awarded the full
sum of past medical expenses as well as an amount for future medical expenses. Id. at 804.
The court of appeals reversed, explaining that the opinion of the doctor, as an expert
witness, was not conclusive on the issues of the causal relationship of all of the plaintiff’s
medical conditions or expenses to the occurrence, past or future. Id. at 808. Rather, the doctor’s
opinions were “only evidentiary” on those issues, and the jury was “free to disregard his opinion
on such matters as they considered and weighed all of the evidence and judged the appearance
and credibility of the witnesses, including [the doctor], and the weight to give the different parts
of the evidence and testimony.” Id.
We see no discernible difference between the facts presented in this case and those in
Bullard. Similar to the plaintiff in Bullard, Davis received no treatment for more than a year
and, during that time, took on a physically demanding job. When he returned to Dr. Smith,
Smith noted that Davis suffered a “re-exacerbation due to his increased activity at his new job.”
And for the reasons expressed in Ponce, we agree the chiropractor’s testimony as it related to the
causal relationship of Davis’s medical condition or expenses to the accident was not conclusive
on the jury. We therefore conclude the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict on
–7–
damages. In reaching this conclusion, we reject Davis’s argument that Gracia conceded the issue
of past medical expenses. Davis relies on the following excerpt of Gracia’s testimony:
[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: Now, on Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 2, you see the
summary of the past medical expenses, correct?
[GRACIA]: Okay.
[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: And you understand they’re already proven to be
reasonable and necessary, correct?
[GRACIA]: Yes, sir.
[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: And you heard Dr. Smith’s testimony that they
were all proximately caused by the automobile collision, correct?
[GRACIA]: Yes, sir.
[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL]: It would be reasonable to have a jury award those
expenses against you, wouldn’t it?
[GRACIA]: Yes, sir.
We do not read this testimony as broadly as Davis. Gracia did not testify the jury should
award Davis the entire amount in past medical expenses, only that it would be reasonable for the
jury to do so. While we agree it would be reasonable for the jury to award the full expenses, the
jury never had that opportunity. Rather, despite the fact there was other evidence, outlined
previously, to support an award of less than all the expenses, the trial court did not submit the
issue to the jury.
To the extent Davis asserts Gracia’s counsel agreed in pretrial conference that the past
medical expenses were not in dispute, we again disagree. During a discussion concerning the
admission of certain exhibits, Gracia’s counsel objected to the calculation of past lost wages.
When the trial court brought up past medical expenses, Davis’s counsel replied, “Well, they’ve
agreed to that.” This was not admission by Gracia’s counsel. Moreover, even if Davis’s counsel
was correct and Gracia’s counsel agreed to the amount of past medical expenses, it is not an
admission that all of the expenses were caused by the accident.
–8–
Having concluded the trial court erred, we must now determine the correct disposition of
the appeal. If the error affects part of, but not all, the matter in controversy and that part is
separable without unfairness to the parties, the judgment must be reversed and a new trial
ordered only as to the part affected by the error. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(b). The court may not
order a separate trial solely on unliquidated damages if liability is contested. Id.
Here, Gracia conceded liability at trial. He argues, however, that the error in this case
tainted the entire verdict and we must therefore reverse for an entirely new trial on damages. In
his response, Davis argues the error “could easily be rectified by a small remittitur” and offered
to “remit” the amount of expenses related to the second round of treatment. He relies on rule of
appellate procedure 46.3, which provides that a court of appeals may suggest a remittitur. TEX.
R. APP. P. 46.3. Alternatively, Davis argues if we deem it necessary to reverse for a new trial,
we should limit the scope to the discrete issue of past medical expenses.
First, we note that suggestion of remittitur is not an appropriate remedy in this case. It is
well-established that the proper appellate remedy for an error in granting a directed verdict is
reversal and remand. Qantel Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Custom Controls Co., 761 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex.
1988) (“If the appellate court finds that there is any evidence of probative value which raises a
material fact issue, then the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for the jury’s
determination of that issue.”). The question we decide is the scope of the remand for new trial.
When the trial court granted the directed verdict on past medical expenses, it had the full
amount typed into the blank designated for “[m]edical care expenses incurred in the past.”
When reading the charge to the jury, the court instructed as follows, “medical care expenses
incurred in the past. That amount has already been determined. That is $17,400[.]” The amount
was equal to all past medical expenses claimed by Davis, including those after which there was a
thirteen-month gap in treatment. Thus, the trial court effectively told the jury that all of Davis’s
–9–
injuries and medical expenses resulted from the accident. We cannot conclude this error did not
impact the jury’s remaining answers to other elements of past and future damages. We sustain
Gracia’s first and second issues. Our disposition of these issues makes it unnecessary to address
his third issue.
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial on all damages.
/Molly Francis/
MOLLY FRANCIS
121147F.P05 JUSTICE
–10–
S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
JESUS GRACIA, Appellant On Appeal from the County Court at Law
No. 1, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-12-01147-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. CC-09-08253-A.
Opinion delivered by Justice Francis;
CURTIS DAVIS, Appellee Justices Lang-Miers and Lewis participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
REVERSED and this cause is REMANDED to the trial court for a new trial on all damages.
It is ORDERED that appellant JESUS GRACIA recover his costs of this appeal from
appellee CURTIS DAVIS.
Judgment entered February 13, 2014
/Molly Francis/
MOLLY FRANCIS
JUSTICE
–11–