Citation Numbers: 136 S.W. 1159
Judges: Dunkhin
Filed Date: 3/4/1911
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
G. G. Houston sued Mrs. J. E. Koonce in trespass to try title to recover two tracts of land designated as surveys Nos. 17 and 16, and, from a judgment rendered in defendant’s favor upon a verdict returned in obedience to a peremptory instruction by the court, plaintiff has appealed.
The evidence of title upon which the plaintiff relied was .a purported purchase from the state under and by virtue of section 8, c. 103, p. 164, Acts of the Hegislature of 1905. Prior to the purported sales of the two surveys to the plaintiff by the Commissioner of the General Hand Office, plaintiff had already purchased from the state the following four surveys of public school land designated as surveys Nos. 12, 13, 14, and 11. Plaintiff applied for the purchase of said sur-ivey 12 for the purposes of a home on condition of settlement and for the purchase of surveys 13, 14, and 11 as additional to survey 12, his home section. These four tracts were surveyed under section 8, c. 103, of the act of 1905, and no sale of any of these four surveys has been canceled.
Section 3, c. 125, p. 294, Acts of the Hegis-lature of 1901, provides that: “The commissioner of the General Hand Office is hereby prohibited from selling to the same party more than four sections of land, and all applications to purchase land shall also disclose the prior lands purchased by the applicant' from the state, if any, since the taking effect of this act, and the residence of the applicant at said time, and if it appears therefrom or from the records in the land office that said applicant has already purchased land aggregating four sections since the taking effect of this act, his application shall be rejected; provided this shall not apply to sales made to a purchaser and after-wards canceled as invalid for some reason other than abandonment and where the purchaser himself was not at fault. * * * ”
If the provision quoted above from the act of 1901 was repealed by section 8 of the act of 1905, then the judgment should have been in plaintiff’s favor; otherwise it was correct, and, as defendant introduced no evidence to prove title in herself, this is the only question presented for our decision.
As the attempted sale of the land in controversy was in violation of that inhibition, it conveyed no title to appellant, and, as there was no other evidence to support his claim of title, the judgment is affirmed.