Texas Department of Transportation v. Genaro Flores

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF §
TRANSPORTATION, No. 08-17-00047-CV
§
Appellant, Appeal from the
§
v. 171st District Court
§
of El Paso County, Texas
GENARO FLORES, §
(TC# 2014-DCV1263)
Appellee. §
OPINION
Genaro Flores sued the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT), his former
employer, for age discrimination under Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code. Following a jury
trial, the jury found in favor of Flores and the trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict.
TxDOT challenges the judgment based on (1) whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction
over this discrimination claim asserted against a governmental employer, and (2) whether the
evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. We affirm as modified.
BACKGROUND
Flores worked for TxDOT as an assistant supervisor assigned to the Maintenance Section
of the El Paso office. In 2013, when he was terminated from his employment, Flores was 46 years
old. The maintenance section was supervised by Hector Granados, who in turn, was supervised
by Tim Twomey, the West El Paso Area Engineer for the West Area Office. As the District
Engineer, Bob Bielek supervised Twomey and generally oversaw the El Paso District.
TxDOT initially hired Flores in 1994 as a “Tech 1,” an entry-level position. After years of
continuous employment, Flores was promoted to assistant maintenance supervisor in 2004. Flores
loved his job and felt proud to be promoted to a position where he supervised more than twenty
crew members. In 2011, he was temporarily promoted to maintenance supervisor when the
previous supervisor retired, and he performed well. On several occasions, Flores was rated on
evaluations as an employee who performed at the exceptional level who frequently exceeded
expectations. His record also showed he was never formally disciplined during this period.
Circumstances changed, however, after Granados was selected as permanent supervisor of
the section and Flores began working under his supervision. Soon after his promotion, Granados
initiated disciplinary action against Flores for which Flores eventually received a written
reprimand based on his alleged failure to meet performance standards and follow TxDOT
procedures. Flores received another written reprimand for allegedly taking a TxDOT work truck
into New Mexico to visit a bank ATM, which purportedly violated TxDOT’s policies regarding
out-of-state use of official vehicles for non-state business purposes.
Following issuance of his second written reprimand, Flores received further disciplinary
actions. After additional instances of purported malfeasance, Granados recommended to TxDOT’s
Human Resources Department that Flores be issued another written reprimand. Human Resources,
however, recommended probation—a higher level of discipline—and Flores was in fact placed on
probation. In April 2013, Granados disciplined Flores again because Flores allegedly took a
TxDOT truck to a local store to purchase supplies for his personal business, which purportedly
2
violated TxDOT’s policy on the use of state vehicles for personal activities. After this latest
allegation, Granados again submitted disciplinary action paperwork to Human Resources.
Although Human Resources and Bielek recommended terminating Flores, Granados claimed that
he and Twomey persuaded Bielek not to terminate Flores. Flores was given probation and five
days’ suspension without pay. Granados additionally issued a formal warning describing policies
Flores had purportedly violated and warning that future violations could result in termination.
On June 25, 2013, a vehicle traveling on a highway struck and killed a TxDOT employee
who was working on an exit sign alongside another worker. As a result of this incident, TxDOT
held a meeting at which District Engineer Bielek gave a verbal order requiring use of an attenuator1
whenever TxDOT had “boots on the ground.” On July 11, 2013, Flores assigned two teams to
pick up litter on highways and ordered another employee to request two attenuators from a
contractor, one for each crew. After making these assignments, Flores left the yard to perform his
own duties and assumed the two attenuators had been ordered and obtained. Although the
contractor only provided one attenuator, Flores was not initially aware. When Flores saw that one
of the crews was working without an attenuator, he immediately pulled over and called one of the
crew members, Pablo Ramirez, on the radio to ask him about the absence of an attenuator. Up
until that time, Flores was not aware that the crew had been working without an attenuator. When
Granados overheard Flores calling Ramirez on the radio, Granados called Flores on his cell phone
and directed him to return to the office.
At a meeting held with crew and Granados, Pablo Ramirez admitted it had been his fault
that he worked without an attenuator and accepted responsibility for the incident. Nonetheless,
1
An attenuator is a large truck with warning signals and a crash cushion used to protect workers on roadways.
3
Granados filed a report with Human Resources with a recommendation that Flores receive another
written reprimand. Human Resources in Austin, however, recommended that Flores be
terminated. District Engineer Bielek testified that he eventually made the decision to terminate
Flores for the three previous disciplinary actions and because of the attenuator incident. On July
31, 2013, TxDOT issued termination paperwork to Flores signed by Granados and Twomey.
Flores later testified at trial that he had met with Bielek prior to his termination and told
Bielek that Granados was treating him and the “older guys” in his section unfairly. Bielek
responded that Flores needed to follow Granados’s instructions, and that perhaps it was time for
Flores to get another job. Flores also testified that he told a Human Resources representative,
Carmela Magallanez-Aguilar, about Granados treating him and other older employees unfairly but
she merely responded that Granados and Twomey were his supervisors. Further, another
employee, Javier Castillo, made a formal complaint of age discrimination about Granados, but
Granados was unaware of the complaint until the time he was deposed and Magallanez-Aguilar,
the TxDOT Human Resources representative, was not questioned about Granados’s treatment of
employees.
Following his termination, Flores filed a verified charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC),
alleging that Granados terminated him because of his age. After both organizations issued notices
of his right to sue, Flores sued TxDOT pursuant to Texas Labor Code, Chapter 21, alleging that
he was terminated based on his age. TxDOT filed a plea to the jurisdiction and motion for summary
judgment, both of which the trial court denied.2 The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Flores
2
The trial court denied TxDOT’s motion to stay the proceedings pending its interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s
summary judgment order, and we denied mandamus relief in In re Texas Dep’t of Transp., 510 S.W.3d 701 (Tex.
4
finding that Flores’s age was a motivating factor in TxDOT’s decision to terminate his
employment. Following a hearing on TxDOT’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
and Flores’s motion for entry of judgment, the court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict.
TxDOT subsequently filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law and a motion for
a new trial, but the trial court did not grant a new trial or file findings or conclusions. This appeal
followed.
DISCUSSION
TxDOT appeals the trial court’s judgment in eight issues, arguing that (1) Flores’s case
should be dismissed because there is no evidence establishing a prima facie case of age
discrimination, and there is no evidence that age was a motivating factor in TxDOT’s decision to
terminate him; (2) there is insufficient evidence that age was a motivating factor in TxDOT’s
decision to terminate him; (3) the jury charge contained two erroneous instructions, one of which
was an improper “permissive pretext” instruction, and both of which constituted an improper
comment on the weight of the evidence; (4) the trial court erred by excluding documents pertaining
to Flores’s disciplinary actions; (5) the trial court erred by finding reinstatement feasible without
entering the requested findings of fact and conclusions of law; (6) the trial court erred by granting
reinstatement; (7) the evidence is factually and legally insufficient to sustain the compensatory
damages award; and (8) the trial court erred in awarding Flores the right to execute. In the interest
of efficiency, we address the issues simultaneously where possible.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
App.—El Paso 2016, orig. proceeding). The trial proceeded prior to the rendering of decision on TxDOT’s
interlocutory appeal, and we dismissed the appeal as moot in Texas Dep’t of Transp. v. Flores, 513 S.W.3d 826 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.).
5
Applicable Law
In its first two issues, TxDOT argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the case
because the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the judgment. Flores sued
TxDOT under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). See generally TEX. LAB.
CODE ANN. §§ 21.051–.556. Among other protections, the TCHRA prohibits an employer from
terminating or discriminating against an employee because of the employee’s age. Id. § 21.051(1).
TCHRA provisions referring to discrimination because of age or on the basis of age apply only to
discrimination against an individual 40 years of age or older. Id. § 21.101. Because the Legislature
intended to correlate state law with federal law addressing discrimination by enactment of the
TCHRA, we may look to federal case law to inform our analysis. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Canchola, 121 S.W.3d 735, 739 (Tex. 2003) (citing TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.001); see also
Specialty Retailers, Inc. v. DeMoranville, 933 S.W.2d 490, 492 (Tex. 1996). To establish a
violation of the TCHRA, the plaintiff must show that he or she was (1) a member of the class
protected by the TCHRA; (2) qualified for his or her position; (3) terminated by the employer; and
(4) treated less favorably than similarly situated members of the opposing class, such that age was
a motivating factor in the decision to terminate the plaintiff. AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d
588, 592 (Tex. 2008) (citing Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Monarrez, 177 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex.
2005)); Canchola, 121 S.W.3d at 739; Moreno v. Texas Dept. of Transp., 440 S.W.3d 889, 895
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, pet. denied).
Texas courts recognize two alternative methods of proof in discriminatory treatment cases.
Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 634 (Tex. 2012). The first method
involves proving discriminatory intent via direct evidence of what the defendant said and did. Id.
6
Recognizing, however, that motives for terminating employees are often more covert than overt,
the Supreme Court of the United States established a second method of proof which employs a
burden-shifting framework once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973). Although the precise elements
of this showing will vary depending on the allegations, id., the plaintiff’s burden at this stage of
the case “is not onerous.” Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
The burden of going forward then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the complained-of action or decision. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 802. The offer of a legitimate reason eliminates the presumption of discrimination created by
the plaintiff’s prima facie showing. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. The burden then shifts back to the
complainant to show that the employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805-07; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
In discrimination cases which have not been fully tried on the merits, we apply the burden-
shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–03; Canchola, 121 S.W.3d
at 739 (citations omitted). Where a discrimination case has been fully tried on the merits, however,
a reviewing court does not engage in a burden-shifting analysis. Canchola, 121 S.W.3d at 739
(citing Rubinstein v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 402 (5th Cir. 2000)). Instead,
we only inquire whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s ultimate finding.
Id. (citing Rutherford v. Harris Cty., Texas, 197 F.3d 173, 180–81 (5th Cir. 1999)). At trial, the
burden of proving that age was a motivating factor in the employee’s termination belongs to the
plaintiff claiming discrimination. See id. (citing Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d
473, 480 (Tex. 2001)).
7
TxDOT argues in its first issue that there is no evidence that Flores’s age was a motivating
factor in his termination, and that the case should therefore be dismissed for want of jurisdiction
based on TxDOT’s sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction. Texas Dept. of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26
(Tex. 2004). Where a jurisdictional challenge under the TCHRA is raised after a trial on the merits,
the prima facie case is no longer relevant; instead, we must determine on review whether the
evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s ultimate finding. See San Antonio Water Sys. v.
Nicholas, 461 S.W.3d 131, 136 (Tex. 2015); City of Houston v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., No. 01-16-
00734-CV, 2017 WL 3262131, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 1, 2017, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (citing Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Brooks, 180 S.W.3d 694,
704 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.)). Because TxDOT challenges the legal and
factual sufficiency of the jury’s determination that age was a motivating factor in Flores’s
termination, we consider both the legal sufficiency of TxDOT’s immunity together with TxDOT’s
second issue regarding the legal and factual sufficiency of the jury’s determination that age was a
motivating factor in Flores’s termination.
Under the legal sufficiency standard, we must credit evidence favorable to the judgment if
a reasonable fact finder could, disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could
not, and reverse the fact finder’s determination only if the evidence presented in the trial court
would not enable a reasonable and fair-minded fact finder to reach the judgment under review.
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We sustain a legal sufficiency
challenge if the record demonstrates (1) the complete absence of a vital fact; (2) that the court is
barred by rules of law or evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital
8
fact; (3) that the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla; or (4) that the
evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact. Id. at 810. More than a scintilla of
evidence exists if the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people
to differ in their conclusions. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004).
When considering a factual sufficiency challenge brought by a party without the burden of proof
at trial, we consider all the evidence and set aside the judgment only if it is so contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. City of El Paso v.
Parsons, 353 S.W.3d 215, 225 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (citing Cain v. Bain, 709
S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986)).
Under either standard, we acknowledge that the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Id. (citing McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722
S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1986)). The jury may choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another,
and we must not impose our opinion to the contrary. Id. (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819).
The inferences drawn from the evidence is also within the province of the jury, and thus we must
assume that the jurors made all inferences in favor of the verdict if reasonable minds could do so
and disregard all other inferences not so drawn. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 820–21. “If the
evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions,
then jurors must be allowed to do so. A reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of
the trier-of-fact, so long as the evidence falls within this zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id. at
822.
Analysis
We now determine whether Flores satisfied his burden at trial to present sufficient evidence
9
to support the jury’s finding that age discrimination was a motivating factor in TxDOT’s decision
to terminate him. See Claymex Brick and Tile, Inc. v. Garza, 216 S.W.3d 33, 36 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2006, no pet.) (citing City of Austin Police Dep’t. v. Brown, 96 S.W.3d 588, 596 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2002, pet. dism’d)); Canchola, 121 S.W.3d at 739. The parties do not dispute that
Flores met the threshold burden of establishing that he was discharged from employment, though
qualified for the job, at a time when he met the age requirement of the protected class. At issue,
we must determine whether legally sufficient evidence exists to establish that Flores’s age was a
motivating factor in TxDOT’s decision to terminate his employment. See El Paso Healthcare
Sys., Ltd. v. Carmona, 160 S.W.3d 267, 274 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. granted), vacated
pursuant to settlement (Tex. Dec. 2, 2005).
Here, TxDOT first argues that there is no evidence that its stated reason for the termination
was a pretext or that age was a motivating factor in Flores’s termination but, rather, that Flores
was terminated because of his disciplinary history. In particular, TxDOT argues Flores’s
testimony that Granados made comments related to age does not serve as competent evidence that
age was a motivating factor in his termination because (1) Flores could not recall the last time
Granados made a comment about age; (2) no such comments were made leading up to his
termination, or on the day he was terminated; and (3) nobody at TxDOT told him that he was being
terminated because of his age and no witness testified to that effect. To the extent that Flores
presented evidence of derogatory comments about age, TxDOT contends these comments were
“stray remarks” which cannot serve as evidence of discrimination because they were not made
close in time to Flores’s termination or related to the employment decision at issue. See AutoZone,
Inc., 272 S.W.3d at 592–93.
10
Flores responds that evidence in the record supported the jury’s finding that his age was a
motivating factor in TxDOT’s decision to discharge him. Flores testified that Granados made
comments during meetings and in response to specific incidents that Flores and other older
employees were “just old guys.” Moreover, Granados told these workers, “You know, you’re
almost out of here.” Flores described Granados as stating, “well, you’re almost retirement. You
[are] just going to leave here in [a] little bit. You know, I’ll get you there. It’s coming around.”
He further testified that Granados remarked that older workers were “forgetting things.”
Additional to testimony about Granados, Flores points to his testimony that he personally
witnessed Bielek “target[ed] the older guys . . . many times,” by cutting them off in conversation.
Flores argues that while these comments are not direct evidence of discrimination, they
nonetheless constitute circumstantial evidence that TxDOT intended to discriminate against older
employees including himself. Flores also points to Bielek’s testimony that he participated in
discussions during TxDOT meetings about how to prepare employees to replace older employees
who were nearing retirement. Finally, Flores argues that his and other employees’ reports to Bielek
and Magallanez-Aguilar that the older employees were being discriminated against went unheeded
and did not result in further investigation, which likewise suggested that TxDOT engaged in
discriminatory treatment of this protected class. In sum, Flores argues that the jury could have
reasonably inferred that TxDOT intended to discriminate because “TxDOT threatened older
workers, criticized older workers, planned to terminate older workers, and tolerated age
discrimination when reported[.]”
After construing all conflicts and inferences from the evidence in favor of the jury’s verdict,
including credibility determinations, we find legally sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s
11
finding that Flores’s age was a motivating factor in his termination from employment at TxDOT.
In support of this notion, Flores testified that Bielek was constantly “targeting the older guys [in
the Maintenance Section]. . . . many times.” Flores also stated that Granados made these comments
both in group meetings and in response to specific events. Likewise, Flores testified that Granados
stated that the older employees were “forgetting things” and that they were “almost out of here”
and were “almost retirement.” Although the record does not indicate with particularity when these
comments were made in relation to Flores’s termination, nevertheless the evidence qualifies as
competent, circumstantial evidence when considered with other evidence. See Goudeau v. Nat’l
Oilwell Varco, L.P., 793 F.3d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 2015). Likewise, the record suggests that Bielek
attended meetings at TxDOT during which he had discussions regarding “succession planning” to
encourage the replacement of older workers at TxDOT. Further, the evidence suggested that there
were a large number of retirees under Granados’s supervision. Flores also testified that when he
approached Bielek with complaints about Granados’s discrimination against himself and other
workers, Bielek replied that it was time for Flores to get another job; when Flores approached
Magallanez-Aguilar with complaints about his treatment at work, she simply reminded him that
he worked under Granados’s and Twomey’s supervision. Likewise, TxDOT did not investigate
Flores’s EEOC charge of discrimination by questioning Bielek, Granados, or Magallanez-Aguilar,
nor did it question Castillo’s formal complaint of age discrimination against Granados. Finally,
Flores’s employment record suggests that he was an excellent employee for many years up to the
time Granados became his supervisor, and it was only afterward that disciplinary issues began to
surface. Based on the foregoing, the jury could have reasonably found that age was a motivating
factor in TxDOT’s decision to terminate Flores.
12
Further, we hold that there is legally sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s finding that
TxDOT’s stated reasons for terminating Flores were pretextual and not credible. If an employer
gives a non-discriminatory reason for the employee’s termination, the employee may show that
the stated reason was false by revealing weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistences, or
contradictions that a fact finder could find unworthy of credence. See EEOC v. Horizon/CMS
Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1198 (10th Cir. 2000). As such, a jury may infer that
discrimination was the real reason for the employer’s decision from evidence that the termination
was pretextual. See id. Here, TxDOT argues that Flores was terminated because he failed to
follow TxDOT policy including the policy that required use of an attenuator when road crews
worked on highways. Yet, as Flores points out, there was no written TxDOT policy to that effect.
In any event, the record also shows that Flores directed Soto to obtain an attenuator on the morning
leading up to his termination. And once he discovered the absence of an attenuator, he radioed the
workers to inquire about them working without one. Granados then called in Flores and the work
crew to meet in his office. Ramirez openly admitted he was responsible for the incident not Flores.
Flores testified that Granados had pre-judged him as being “guilty,” and that he was determined
to punish him for the incident. Further, Karen Garza testified that Flores did not violate TxDOT
policy during the attenuator incident.
Giving deference to the jury’s determination of the witnesses’ credibility, the jury could
have reasonably inferred from the evidence that Flores attempted to comply with TxDOT’s oral
instruction regarding the use of attenuators, and that TxDOT’s reliance on this reason for
terminating him was false. Likewise, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Flores’s
performance, which was satisfactory for many years and suddenly declined when Granados
13
became his supervisor, is indicative of Granados’s poor treatment of the older employees,
especially when considered in conjunction with derogatory statements he made to older workers.
The evidence also suggested that the other disciplinary actions taken against Flores were
false or exaggerated, and thus supporting the jury’s finding that they were a pretext for age
discrimination against Flores. See Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 580–83 (5th Cir. 2003). For
example, TxDOT claimed that Flores was terminated in part because of his use of a TxDOT vehicle
to travel into New Mexico and to stop at a local plumbing supply store to purchase supplies for his
personal business. Nevertheless, TxDOT’s policy allowed employees to use TxDOT vehicles for
personal use if it was done in conjunction with business operations, and it was likewise permitted
for TxDOT employees to take work vehicles across state lines to go to lunch. Again, when viewed
in context with the other evidence, this evidence tends to support the jury’s finding that TxDOT’s
stated reasons for Flores’s termination were pretextual for age discrimination against him.
Bearing in mind that we do not sit as a “thirteenth juror” and we may not substitute our
view of the evidence for that of the jury’s, we hold that the jury could have reasonably found that
Flores’s age was a motivating factor in TxDOT’s decision to terminate him and that TxDOT’s
stated reasons for terminating Flores were pretextual. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 820–22;
Parsons, 353 S.W.3d at 225. We therefore conclude that legally sufficient evidence supports the
jury’s verdict in favor of Flores. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 820–22. Likewise, the jury’s
finding cannot be said to be so against the great weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or
unjust, and we hold that TxDOT’s challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence must also
fail. See Parsons, 353 S.W.3d at 225. TxDOT’s first and second issues are overruled.
Jury Charge
14
In its third issue, TxDOT argues that the trial court reversibly erred by issuing two
erroneous jury instructions. In particular, TxDOT contends that the first instruction was a
“permissive pretext” instruction which confused the jury about the ultimate issue Flores had the
burden of proving, and further constituted an impermissible comment on the weight of the
evidence. TxDOT likewise argues that a second jury instruction constituted an impermissible
comment on the weight of the evidence.
Preservation
As a preliminary matter, we address Flores’s contention that TxDOT has not preserved this
issue for our review. “A party objecting to a charge must point out distinctly the objectionable
matter and the grounds of the objection. Any complaint as to a question, definition, or instruction,
on account of any defect, omission, or fault in pleading, is waived unless specifically included in
the objections.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 274. As such, an objection does not satisfy Rule 274’s
requirements unless “the defect relied upon by the objecting party and the grounds of the objection
are stated specifically enough to support the conclusion that [the] trial court was fully cognizant
of the ground of complaint and deliberately chose to overrule it.” Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Baker, 355
S.W.3d 375, 383 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (citation omitted); see also TEX.
R. APP. P. 33.1. To preserve charge error for appellate review, an appellant must “clearly designate
the alleged error and specifically explain the basis of its complaint in its objection to the charge.”
Baker, 355 S.W.3d at 383 (citation omitted). Objections to the charge and requests for instructions
must comport with the arguments made on appeal. Id. (citation omitted).
During a charge conference prior to submitting the case to the jury, the trial court afforded
the parties an opportunity to discuss Flores’s proposed jury charge. The proposed jury charge
15
contained the following instruction:
You are instructed that GENARO FLORES is not required to produce direct
evidence of an unlawful motive. Discrimination, if it exists, is a fact which is
seldom admitted, but is a fact which you may infer from the existence of other facts.
TxDOT objected that this instruction was “an improper comment on the weight of the evidence,”
which the trial court overruled. Because TxDOT objected to the proposed instruction at trial for
the same reason it does on appeal, we hold that TxDOT properly preserved this issue for our review
as the objection at trial comports with its argument on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; TEX. R.
CIV. P. 274; Baker, 355 S.W.3d at 383.
Flores also submitted the following proposed instruction:
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence that an employer’s stated reason for an
employment action is false is ordinarily sufficient to permit you to find that the
employer was actually motivated by discrimination.
TxDOT also objected to this instruction, arguing that the instruction was “a comment on the weight
of the evidence.” Citing Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers., L.P., 363 F.3d 568, 575–76 (5th Cir.
2004), TxDOT also disagreed with Flores’s argument that under Ratliff v. City of Gainesville, Tex.,
256 F.3d 355, 359–60 (5th Cir. 2001), a trial court reversibly errs to fail to advise the jury that
inferred discrimination may be established from evidence of pretext. The trial court overruled this
objection as well. Again, given that (1) TxDOT objected to the instruction on the basis of it
constituting a “permissive pretext” which could potentially confuse the jury, (2) the trial court
overruled the objection, and (3) TxDOT’s trial objection comports with its appellate argument, we
hold that it has preserved this instruction for our review as well. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; TEX. R.
CIV. P. 274; Baker, 355 S.W.3d at 383.
Applicable Law and Analysis
16
We now consider whether the two instructions were erroneous. A trial court must submit
“such instructions and definitions as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a verdict.” TEX.
R. CIV. P. 277. A jury instruction is proper if it (1) assists the jury; (2) accurately states the law;
and (3) finds support in the pleadings and evidence. TEX. R. CIV. P. 278; Union Pacific R. Co. v.
Williams, 85 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex. 2002). We review the trial court’s submission of jury
instructions for an abuse of discretion. City of Houston, 2017 WL 3262131, at *5 (citing
Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1995)). A trial court abuses its
discretion when it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles,
or when it misapplies the law to the established facts of the case. Id. (citing Beaumont Bank, N.A.
v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991)). When an incorrect jury instruction was given, we
reverse only if the instruction “was reasonably calculated to and probably did cause the rendition
of an improper judgment.” Id. (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1); Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc. v.
Urista, 211 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Tex. 2006) (citation omitted)). We examine the entire record to
determine whether the instruction probably caused the rendition of an improper verdict. Id. (citing
Urista, 211 S.W.3d at 757).
Again, the trial court gave the following instruction to the jury:
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence that an employer’s stated reason for an
employment action is false is ordinarily sufficient to permit you to find that the
employer was actually motivated by discrimination.
TxDOT argues that this was an improper “permissive pretext” instruction because “it allowed the
jury to find TxDOT liable if it believed TxDOT’s reason for termination was false without a
finding on the ultimate issue that TxDOT was actually motivated by improper discrimination.” In
support of this contention, TxDOT cites previous decisions which state that an employee claiming
17
discrimination by an employer must show that the reasons for termination are “false, and that
discrimination was the real reason [for the termination].” Canchola, 121 S.W.3d at 740 (quoting
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515 (emphasis in original)); Moreno, 440 S.W.3d at 895;
Carmona, 160 S.W.3d at 276. TxDOT also cites Kanida, 363 F.3d at 575–76, for the proposition
that the jury can only be instructed on the ultimate issue and that “permissive pretext” instructions,
such as the one above, could confuse the jury about the ultimate issue the plaintiff must prove.
TxDOT also argues that the instruction amounted to an impermissible comment on the weight of
the evidence because it “emphasized a determination of whether TxDOT’s conclusions regarding
Flores’s conduct and the attenuator incident were wrong, instead of the real issue of whether age
was a motivating factor in Flores’s termination[,]” which likely caused the rendition of an improper
judgment. TxDOT further contends that the instruction “nudged” the jury to find that age was a
motivating factor in his termination.
In response, Flores argues that this instruction mirrors the Supreme Court’s decision in
Toennies, 47 S.W.3d at 476. There, the Court stated that “[p]roving the employer’s stated reason
for the firing is pretext is ordinarily sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find that the employer
was actually motivated by discrimination.” Id. at 481-82 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147–48 (2000)). Likewise, Flores points to the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Ratliff, 256 F.3d at 359–62, which he argues stands for the proposition that the omission
of a permissible-pretext instruction3 is reversible error. There, the Fifth Circuit upheld its
precedent that in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147–48, the trial
3
A “permissive pretext only” instruction allows the jury discretion to enter judgment for a plaintiff if the plaintiff
establishes that the defendant’s reasons for terminating the plaintiff are pretextual. Ratliff, 256 F.3d at 361. In contrast,
a “pretext plus” instruction is a stricter burden which requires a plaintiff to not only disprove an employer’s proffered
reasons for the discrimination, but also to introduce additional evidence of discrimination. Id.
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court’s inclusion of a “pretext-plus” instruction was erroneous. Id. at 361–62 (citing Russell v.
McKinney Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 223 n.4 (5th Cir. 2000)). Flores also argues that the
instruction did not constitute a comment on the weight of the evidence, but rather was a proper
explanation that the jury was permitted to infer discrimination from a particular form of
circumstantial evidence.
In its reply brief, TxDOT counters that in Canchola the Supreme Court of Texas clarified
its holding in Toennies by stating that an employee attempting to establish discrimination through
pretext must show both that the reasons for the termination were “false, and that discrimination
was the real reason.” 121 S.W.3d at 740 (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515)
(emphasis in original). TxDOT also points to the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Kanida, 363 F.3d at
573–78, which criticized its prior decision in Ratliff while acknowledging that it was bound by that
prior decision.
We note the jury instruction’s language is largely present in Toennies, with only slight but
irrelevant difference in presentation. In Toennies, 47 S.W.3d at 481–82, the Texas Supreme Court
explained that “[p]roving the employer’s stated reason for the firing is pretext is ordinarily
sufficient to permit the trier of fact to find that the employer was actually motivated by
discrimination [emphasis added].” In contrast, the jury instruction provided here states: “Proof by
a preponderance of the evidence that an employer’s stated reason for an employment action is false
is ordinarily sufficient to permit you to find that the employer was actually motivated by
discrimination [emphasis added].”
We find that this difference in the instruction from Toennies did not render the issued
instruction erroneous or relieve the plaintiff of his burden of proving that age discrimination was
19
a motivating reason for the termination. The instruction correctly sets out the law and merely
explains that the jury is permitted to infer discrimination from a particular form of circumstantial
evidence. In Ratliff, 256 F.3d at 359–60, the Fifth Circuit found that omission of a permissible
pretext instruction is reversible error and explained that jurors are not likely aware of the
permissibility of drawing an inference of discrimination from proof of pretext. Likewise, the
relevant 2018 amendment to the Texas Pattern Jury Charge (PJC) includes a “permissive pretext”
instruction.4 As such, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by including this
instruction in the charge.
Also over TxDOT’s objection, the trial court issued the following instruction:
You are instructed that GENARO FLORES is not required to produce direct
evidence of an unlawful motive. Discrimination, if it exists, is a fact which is
seldom admitted, but is a fact which you may infer from the existence of other facts.
TxDOT argues that although this instruction is a correct statement of the law, it also constituted
an improper comment on the weight of the evidence because there was no direct evidence that age
was a motivating factor in Flores’s termination. Like the other instruction complained of, TxDOT
also contends that this instruction “nudged” the jury to find that age was a motivating factor. We
disagree. It is well settled in Texas that it is not error to give an instruction on circumstantial
evidence. See, e.g., Larson v. Ellison, 217 S.W.2d 420, 422 (Tex. 1949). We therefore conclude
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving a circumstantial evidence instruction, and
4
The 2018 amendment to PJC 107.6 reads as follows:
If you do not believe the reason [the employer] has given for [failing or refusing to hire, discharge,
or (describe other discriminatory action)], you may, but are not required to, infer that [the employer]
was motivated by [the employee’s] [race, color, disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age].
See Comm. on Pattern Jury Charges, State Bar of Tex., Texas Pattern Jury Charges: Business, Consumer, Insurance
& Employment, PJC 107.6 (2018).
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the instruction did not constitute an impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence.
TxDOT’s third issue is overruled.
Exclusion of Evidence
In its fourth issue, TxDOT argues that the trial court erred by excluding six exhibits which
documented Flores’s disciplinary actions while he was a TxDOT employee. We review the trial
court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. Hernandez v. Moss, 538
S.W.3d 160, 167 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) (citations omitted). We will not reverse a
trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence unless the erroneous decision probably caused
the rendition of an improper judgment. Id.; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a). The test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial court acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, or without reference to
guiding principles or rules. Hernandez, 538 S.W.3d at 167 (citations omitted). We uphold the
trial court’s ruling if there is any legitimate basis in the record supporting the ruling. Id. (citations
omitted).
At trial, TxDOT offered the following documents: Defendant’s Exhibit 3, which was a
written reprimand issued to Flores on July 27, 2012; Defendant’s Exhibit 13, which was a written
probation issued to Flores on December 6, 2012; Defendant’s Exhibit 18, which was a written
probation and five-day suspension issued on April 5, 2013; and Defendant’s Exhibit 24, which
was a written termination issued on July 31, 2013. Flores objected to the admission of these
records on the basis that they constituted hearsay and because these records contained out-of-court
statements constituting hearsay-within-hearsay. TxDOT responded that these documents were not
offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but were instead offered for some other purpose.
In particular, TxDOT argued that (1) Defendant’s Exhibits 3 and 18 were offered to prove that it
21
was a formal disciplinary action against Flores, and that Defendant’s Exhibit 13 was offered as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason of showing formal discipline. TxDOT did not argue that
Defendant’s Exhibit 24 was offered for any purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted.
TxDOT did not provide an argument at trial regarding Flores’s hearsay-within-hearsay objections
to the admission of the exhibits. The trial court sustained Flores’s objections and excluded these
documents.
TxDOT also offered two exhibits containing TxDOT policies: Defendant’s Exhibit 2,
which was a section of the TxDOT Human Resources Manual describing disciplinary action, and
Defendant’s Exhibit 12, which was the TxDOT Use of Department Property Statement signed by
Flores. Flores again objected to these documents on the basis of hearsay and hearsay-within-
hearsay, and TxDOT did not argue that the documents were offered for some purpose other than
the truth of the matter asserted. The trial court sustained the objections and excluded the evidence.
On appeal, TxDOT argues that the trial court erred by excluding the disciplinary records
on the basis that they contained hearsay because they were not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted, but rather “to show the formal disciplinary actions that had been taken leading up to and
culminating in Flores’s termination.” See TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). Yet, as Flores points out, TxDOT
did not provide a basis at trial for overcoming Flores’s hearsay-within-hearsay trial objections, and
does not do so on appeal; as such, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the documents on this basis. See TEX. R. EVID. 801(d), 805. TxDOT further argues on
appeal that the disciplinary records were admissible under the hearsay exception for public records
pursuant to TEX. R. EVID. 803(8); however, this argument was never made at trial and does not
comport with TxDOT’s complaint on appeal, and it is therefore waived. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
22
Even if the trial court erred in excluding the evidence, we agree with Flores’s assertion that
such action was nonetheless harmless. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1). Granados, Magallanez-
Aguilar, Bielek, and Flores all testified at length about the disciplinary actions taken against Flores
that were recounted in the excluded documents while using the documents to refresh their
recollections, and thus, we find the documents themselves were cumulative of properly admitted
evidence. Likewise, TxDOT was able to examine witnesses about the excluded TxDOT policies,
again using the documents to refresh recollections when needed. As such, we hold that even if the
trial court erred by excluding the proffered evidence, these actions were nonetheless harmless. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1); see also Morale v. State, 557 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. 2018) (“exclusion
[of evidence] is likely harmless if the evidence was cumulative [of other properly admitted
evidence]”) (quoting Caffe Ribs, Inc. v. State, 487 S.W.3d 137, 145 (Tex. 2016)). TxDOT’s fourth
issue is overruled.
Failure to Enter Findings and Conclusions
In its fifth issue, TxDOT argues that the trial court erred by finding reinstatement of
Flores’s employment feasible without entering findings of fact or conclusions of law, despite
TxDOT’s post-verdict request for findings and conclusions. In any case tried in the district court
without a jury, any party may request the court to state in writing its findings of fact and
conclusions of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 296. A trial court, however, is not entitled to make findings
of fact and conclusions of law regarding issues tried to a jury. Casa El Sol-Acapulco, S.A. v.
Fontenot, 919 S.W.2d 709, 719 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ dism’d by agr.); see
also TEX. R. CIV. P. 279. Here, Flores pleaded for reinstatement as a remedy in his petition.
Following a jury trial, the jury found that Flores’s age was a motivating factor in the termination
23
of his employment. As such, TxDOT was not entitled to findings or conclusions from the trial
court on the issue of reinstatement. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 279, 296; Fontenot, 919 S.W.2d at 719.
TxDOT’s fifth issue is overruled.
Granting Reinstatement
In its sixth issue, TxDOT argues that the trial court erred in granting reinstatement,
contending that Flores is estopped from obtaining reinstatement because “[s]ubmission of the jury
question on front pay assumed a finding by the court that reinstatement was not feasible.” The
trial court ordered TxDOT to reinstate Flores within thirty days “to the same position he last held
as an employee of Defendant . . . in the same district in which he was last employed,” with the
same pay, benefits, and responsibilities Flores would have as his employment had never been
terminated.
Citing Hansard v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., Inc., 865 F.2d 1461, 1469 (5th Cir.
1989), TxDOT argues that Flores waived the remedy of reinstatement because he submitted the
jury question on front pay, which implies a finding by the court that reinstatement was not feasible.
TxDOT further argues that reinstatement is not feasible because (1) Flores had found employment
elsewhere between the time he was terminated and the trial; (2) animosity between TxDOT and
Flores exists, as shown by the “mutual dislike and distrust between himself and local TxDOT
leadership” and Flores’s deposition testimony that he would not like to work for his former
supervisors at TxDOT; and (3) no comparable positions at TxDOT exist, and Flores’s
reinstatement would require TxDOT to displace the employee who TxDOT hired to replace Flores.
Flores responds that Hansard, 865 F.2d at 1469–70, does not stand for the proposition that
submitting an issue to the jury waives reinstatement, but rather that a federal court should not have
24
submitted the issue of front pay to the jury without first finding reinstatement infeasible, and that
submitting one remedy to the jury results in waiver of another remedy is unfounded. Citing TEX.
R. CIV. P. 279, Flores also argues that TxDOT waived its defense to reinstatement because the
burden is on the party seeking to avoid reinstatement to prove that it is infeasible, and that TxDOT
waived its argument by failing to request a jury finding on the issue. Finally, Flores argues that
TxDOT did not prove that reinstatement was infeasible because (1) notwithstanding Flores’s
employment at another job, he is not required to remain unemployed to obtain reinstatement; (2)
the evidence shows that Flores attempted to get his job back before filing the lawsuit, and TxDOT’s
references to “instances of animosity” refer to Flores’s reaction to the trial testimony of TxDOT
employees, an invalid litigation-related basis to deny reinstatement; and (3) that the fact that
TxDOT hired another person to fill Flores’s position does not provide a basis to deny reinstatement
because reinstatement would be precluded in virtually every case “by hiring an innocent third party
after the retaliatory purpose was achieved.”
We first address Flores’s waiver argument. Under TEX. R. CIV. P. 279, “[u]pon appeal all
independent grounds of recovery or of defense not conclusively established under the evidence
and no element of which is submitted or requested [in the jury charge] are waived.” Here, TxDOT
did not request a jury finding on its defense to reinstatement. Thus, it has waived its defense to
reinstatement. See id. TxDOT’s sixth issue is overruled.
Compensatory Damages
In its seventh issue, TxDOT argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s
award of compensatory damages. The various components of compensatory damages must be
supported by evidence in the record. Saenz v. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607,
25
614 (Tex. 1996). The evidence must show that the amount awarded is fair and reasonable
compensation, and an appellate court must conduct a meaningful evidentiary review of those
determinations. Id. An appellant must address all the elements of a multi-element damages award
and show that the evidence is insufficient to support the entire damages award considering all the
elements. G.T. Mgmt., Inc. v. Gonzalez, 106 S.W.3d 880, 885 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.)
(citations omitted).
For example, mental anguish damages must be supported by either “direct evidence of the
nature, duration, or severity of [the plaintiff’s] anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption
in the plaintiff[’s] daily routine, or other evidence of a high degree of mental pain and distress that
is more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger.” Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 614
(quoting Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Conclusory statements regarding mental anguish are not sufficient to support a jury’s
award. Gonzalez v. Temple-Inland Mortg. Corp., 28 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2000, no pet.); see also Gunn Infiniti, Inc. v. O’Byrne, 996 S.W.2d 854, 861 (Tex. 1999).
Here, the components of the compensatory damages awarded by the jury included
“emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
noneconomic losses” in the amount of $100,000. TxDOT argues that the only evidence supporting
the jury’s award of compensatory damages was Flores’s trial testimony that his termination was
“devastating” to him, that he had lost his “pride” and “dignity,” and that the termination had
“affected [him] so much where, your [sic] know, it’s not [him] no more. It’s just not the same,
you know, and it’s not something that I can take, and okay, let’s come back. No, sir. It’s gone.
It’s—you’re reminded of it every day.” He also testified that the “damage [was] done” and “could
26
not be undone,” that what had been done to him was “unfair, unjust, and [that he did not] wish that
upon nobody.”
TxDOT contends that this evidence is too conclusory to support the compensatory damages
awarded. We do not agree. Under the TCHRA, compensatory damages that are recoverable
include emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and
other nonpecuniary losses. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.2585. The jury was instructed on the
statute’s provision. On review, the record supports the jury’s award as Flores testified he was
dedicated to his job and proud of his performance ratings and reviews. For over twenty years,
Flores dedicated himself to his work with TxDOT and took pride in what he was doing. He
testified that he felt his twenty years of service had been thrown down the drain when he learned
of his termination. Flores testified he not only lost his pride and dignity, but the loss of his job
also affected his self-image. He explained that his termination had “broken” him. This evidence
allowed a reasonable jury to conclude that Flores experienced emotional pain and suffering, loss
of enjoyment of life, inconvenience, and mental anguish. Accordingly, we conclude that the record
supports the jury’s award of compensatory damages. TxDOT’s seventh issue is overruled.
Right to Execute
Finally, we consider TxDOT’s eighth issue in which it argues that the trial court erred by
including language in the judgment which allowed Flores to pursue “such writs and processes as
may be necessary to the enforcement and collection of this Judgment, for all of which let execution
issue.” Flores responds that this issue is not preserved for our review because TxDOT first raised
this argument in its post-judgment motion to modify the judgment, and because TxDOT did not
request or obtain a hearing on the motion. TxDOT responds in turn that its issue is not waived
27
because it was raised in a timely motion to modify judgment that was overruled by operation of
law. We agree with TxDOT’s position on preservation and will address the issue on the merits.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(c).
TxDOT argues that it is exempt from execution because it is a state agency, citing TEX.
CONST. art. 11, § 9 for that proposition. That section of the Texas Constitution only prohibits the
property of counties, cities, and towns from being exempt from forced sale and taxation. Other
cases stand for the proposition that political subdivisions of the State performing governmental
functions are exempt from execution. See, e.g., Fort Bend Cty. v. Martin-Simon, 177 S.W.3d 479,
486 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); see also Delta Cty. Levee Improvement Dist.
No. 2 v. Leonard, 516 S.W.2d 911, 912 (Tex. 1974) (public policy exempts political subdivisions
of the state from execution or garnishment proceedings, and mandamus is the correct remedy by
which judgments can be enforced against a political subdivision). We find this situation to be
sufficiently analogous, and thus we hold that the judgment erroneously provided for the right of
execution against TxDOT, a recognized entity of the state. TxDOT’s eighth issue is sustained.
CONCLUSION
Having sustained TxDOT’s eighth issue, we modify the trial court’s judgment to excise the
language in the judgment granting Flores the right to execute. Because we overrule the remainder
of TxDOT’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.
GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice
May 15, 2019
Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ.
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