Palanza, Laura

PD-1460-15 PD-1460-15
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 11/9/2015 8:55:07 AM
Accepted 11/10/2015 4:06:57 PM
ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK
PD-____________
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Petitioner
v.
LAURA PALANZA,
Respondent
State’s Petition from the 13th District Court of Appeals
(Cause #13-13-00528-CR), on State’s Appeal from the 347th District Court of
Nueces County (Cause #12-CR-1505-H)
STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
A. Cliff Gordon
Tex. Bar #00793838
Asst. Dist. Atty., 105th Dist.
Nueces County Courthouse
901 Leopard St., Rm. 206
Corpus Christi, TX 78401
361.888.0410 phone
361.888.0399 fax
November 10, 2015
cliff.gordon@nuecesco.com
Attorney for Petitioner
IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL
Trial Court Judge: Honorable Missy Medary, Presiding Judge of the 347th
District Court of Nueces County
Petitioner: The State of Texas, District Attorney for the 105th Judicial
District, represented by
Appellate counsel:
A. Cliff Gordon, Asst. Dist. Atty.
901 Leopard St., Rm. 206
Corpus Christi, TX 78401
Trial and appellate counsel:
Mark Skurka, District Attorney
Jacqueline Rae, Asst. Dist. Atty.
901 Leopard St., Rm. 206
Corpus Christi, TX 78401
Respondent: Laura Palanza, represented by
Trial and Appellate Counsel:
Lisa Greenberg
James Granberry
622 S. Tancahua St.
Corpus Christi, TX 78401
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL ......................................... i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. iii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .......................................... iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................................. iv
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ................................................... iv
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ........................................................... v
1. Whether the implied consent and mandatory blood draw
provisions of the Texas Transportation Code are a
constitutionally valid alternative to the warrant requirement ........... v
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................1
PRAYER ....................................................................................................................1
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ......................................................................2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................3
APPENDIX ...............................................................................................................4
1. Opinion of the 13th Court of Appeals .....................................................4
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
State v. Villarreal, No. PD-0306-14, 2014 WL 6734178 (Tex. Crim. App.
Nov. 26, 2014), reh’g granted (Feb. 25, 2015) ............................................1
Rules
Tex. R. App. P. 66.3 .................................................................................................1
iii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The State does not believe that oral argument would be helpful to
determine this appeal because the issue has already been argued in State v.
Villarreal, No. PD-0306-14, 2014 WL 6734178 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 26,
2014), reh’g granted (Feb. 25, 2015).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A grand jury indicted Laura Palanza for Intoxication Assault.
Opinion at 2. The trial court granted her motion to suppress evidence
relating to the warrantless draw of her blood pursuant to TEX. TRANSP.
CODE § 724.012(b). Opinion at 2. The 13th Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that § 724.012 is not a constitutionally recognized alternative to the
warrant requirement. Opinion at 5.
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Date court of appeals’ Opinion handed down October 8, 2015
Date State filed Motion for Rehearing n/a
Date Motion for Rehearing overruled n/a
iv
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the implied consent and mandatory blood draw provisions
of the Texas Transportation Code are a constitutionally valid
alternative to the warrant requirement.
v
ARGUMENT
Although this issue was initially decided against the State in State v.
Villarreal, No. PD-0306-14, 2014 WL 6734178 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 26,
2014), reh’g granted (Feb. 25, 2015), the Court has yet to issue a final
decision. Thus, the State respectfully requests that cases like the present
one, with similar or identical issues, be held under consideration until
Villarreal does become final and binding.
The State continues to argue that the implied consent and mandatory
blood draw provisions of the Texas Transportation Code are a
constitutionally valid alternative to the warrant requirement, and that the
decision of the Thirteenth Court of Appeals to the contrary decides an
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled
by the Court of Criminal Appeals. See Tex. R. App. P. 66.3(b).
PRAYER
For these reasons, the State requests that the Court grant this petition
for discretionary review, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, and grant
the State all other proper relief.
1
Respectfully Submitted,
/s/ A. Cliff Gordon
A. Cliff Gordon
Tex. Bar #00793838
Asst. Dist. Atty., 105th Dist.
Nueces County Courthouse
901 Leopard St., Rm. 206
Corpus Christi, TX 78401
361.888.0410 phone
361.888.0399 fax
cliff.gordon@nuecesco.com
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
According to the word count of the computer program used to
prepare this document, it contains 727 words.
2
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On November 9, 2015, a true copy of the foregoing was served via
eServe on the following:
Ms. Lisa Greenberg
lisagreenberglaw@gmail.com
Mr. James Granberry
jgranberrylaw@sbcglobal.net
622 S. Tancahua St.
Corpus Christi, TX 78401
Appellate Counsel for Appellee
/s/ A. Cliff Gordon_______________
A. Cliff Gordon
3
APPENDIX
1. Opinion of the 13th Court of Appeals
4
NUMBER 13-13-00528-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant,
v.
LAURA PALANZA, Appellee.
On appeal from the 347th District Court
of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
By one issue, the State appeals the trial court's granting of appellee Laura
Palanza’s motion to suppress a warrantless blood sample under the Fourth Amendment.
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
After being involved in a car accident that injured another person, Palanza was
arrested for intoxication assault and transported to a hospital. At the hospital, a sample
of Palanza’s blood was taken without her consent and without a warrant. Thereafter,
Palanza filed a motion to suppress evidence of the blood sample under the Fourth
Amendment. The trial court held a hearing on Palanza’s motion to suppress.
At the hearing on Palanza’s motion to suppress, the arresting officer testified that
he instructed the phlebotomist at the hospital to draw Palanza’s blood “because of serious
bodily injury to the other [person] involved in the accident.” The arresting officer also
testified that although he did not attempt to obtain a warrant on the night of Palanza’s
arrest, it would have taken between forty-five and ninety minutes to get one. When asked
why he failed to obtain a warrant, the arresting officer could provide no reason other than
to say that his agency had no policy requiring police officers to obtain a warrant in blood-
draw cases at the time of Palanza’s arrest.
Citing Missouri v. McNeely, Palanza argued at the suppression hearing that no
exigent circumstance existed to permit the arresting officer to obtain a sample of her blood
without a warrant. See 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013) (holding that, absent a showing of exigent
circumstances, warrantless blood draws in drunk-driving cases violate the Fourth
Amendment). At the end of the suppression hearing, the trial court agreed with Palanza
and granted her motion to suppress. This appeal followed.
II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS
By its sole issue, the State contends that the trial court erred when it suppressed
evidence of the warrantless blood sample.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
2
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress for an abuse of
discretion. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under our abuse
of discretion analysis, we use a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d
853, 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (en banc) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc)). We give almost total deference to the trial court’s
findings of historical fact that are supported by the record and to its resolution of mixed
questions of law and fact that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Amador
v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Guzman, 995 S.W.2d at 89).
We “review de novo ‘mixed questions of law and fact’ that do not depend upon credibility
and demeanor.” Id. (quoting Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 107 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006)).
“To suppress evidence on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, the defendant
bears the initial burden of producing evidence that rebuts the presumption of proper police
conduct.” Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “A defendant
satisfies this burden by establishing that a search or seizure occurred without a warrant.”
Id. Once a defendant establishes there was no warrant, the burden shifts to the State to
prove the warrantless search was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.
Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 672–73. The State satisfies this burden if it proves an exception
to the warrant requirement. See Gutierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 685.
One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement applies “when the
exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” McNeely,
133 S. Ct. at 1558. A variety of circumstances may give rise to an exigency sufficient to
3
justify a warrantless search, including the imminent destruction of evidence. Id. Courts
look to the “totality of circumstances” to determine whether a law enforcement officer
faced an emergency that justified acting without a warrant. Id. at 1559. In McNeely, the
United States Supreme Court recently clarified the exigency exception in the context of
warrantless blood draws in drunk-driving cases. Id. In that case, the State sought a per
se rule for blood testing in drunk-driving cases, contending that “whenever an officer has
probable cause to believe an individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol,
exigent circumstances will necessarily exist because [blood alcohol concentration (BAC)]
evidence is inherently evanescent.” Id. at 1560. As such, the State claimed that “so long
as the officer has probable cause and the blood test is conducted in a reasonable manner,
it is categorically reasonable for law enforcement to obtain the blood sample without a
warrant.” Id. The Court rejected the per se rule advocated by the State, concluding:
[W]hile the natural dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of
exigency in a specific case . . . it does not do so categorically. Whether a
warrantless blood test of a drunk-driving suspect is reasonable must be
determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances.
Id. at 1563. Thus, the United States Supreme Court held that in drunk-driving
investigations, “the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute
an exigency in every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.”
Id. at 1568. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed its long-standing totality-of-the-
circumstances approach to determine whether a law enforcement officer faces an
emergency that justifies acting without a warrant under the exigency exception. Id.
Section 724.012 of the Texas Transportation Code states in pertinent part that “[a]
peace officer shall require the taking of a specimen of the person's breath or blood under
any of the [listed] circumstances if the officer arrests the person for an offense under
4
Chapter 49, Penal Code, involving the operation of a motor vehicle . . . and the person
refuses the officer's request to submit to the taking of a specimen voluntarily.” See TEX.
TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 724.012(b) (West, Westlaw current through 2015 R.S.). The
applicable subsection states that an officer must take the person's blood if “the person
was the operator of a motor vehicle . . . involved in an accident that the officer reasonably
believes occurred as a result of the offense and, at the time of the arrest, the officer
reasonably believes that . . . an individual other than the person has suffered serious
bodily injury” as a direct result of the accident. Id. § 724.012(b)(1)(B).
B. DISCUSSION
The State argues on appeal that the arresting officer was authorized to obtain a
sample of Palanza’s blood pursuant to section 724.012(b)(1)(B) because Palanza was
arrested for an intoxication offense where an accident occurred and another person
suffered serious bodily injury. According to the State, this circumstance—serious bodily
injury to another person—will always be sufficient to supply an exigency that justifies
warrantless blood draws in drunk-driving cases. In other words, the State contends that
section 724.012(b)(1)(B) creates a per se exigent circumstance, which authorizes blood
draws in every case falling within that section. We disagree.
Similar to the State’s argument in McNeely, the State’s categorical approach to
determining whether an exigency exists is inconsistent with McNeely’s holding that each
case be evaluated on a case-by-case basis under the totality of the circumstances. See
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1563 (holding that “whether a warrantless blood test of a drunk-
driving suspect is reasonable must be determined case by case based on the totality of
the circumstances”). Furthermore, the court of criminal appeals has rejected the State’s
5
argument, holding that “the provisions in the Transportation Code do not, taken by
themselves, form a constitutionally valid alternative to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement” and “a nonconsensual search of a DWI suspect's blood conducted pursuant
to the mandatory-blood-draw and implied-consent provisions in the Transportation Code,
when undertaken in the absence of a warrant or any applicable exception to the warrant
requirement, violates the Fourth Amendment.” See State v. Villarreal, No. PD–0306–14,
2014 WL 6734178, at *20–21 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 26, 2014) (reh’g granted); see also
State v. Montes de Oca, No. 13-14-00289-CR, 2015 WL 4504927, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi July 23, 2015, no. pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing
Villarreal and holding that section 724.012 of the transportation code does not by itself
form a constitutionally recognized alternative to the warrant requirement); State v.
McClendon, No. 13-13-00357-CR, 2015 WL 4116695, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
July 2, 2015, no. pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (same); State v. Ruiz,
No. 13-13-00507-CR (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 27, 2015, no. pet. h.)(mem. op.)
(holding the same as it relates to sections 724.011(a) and 724.014(a) of the transportation
code). Accordingly, we conclude that section 724.012(b)(1)(B) of the transportation code
does not, by itself, form a constitutionally recognized exception to the warrant
requirement.1 See id. Having rejected the State’s argument concerning the exigency
exception and section 724.012(b)(1)(B), we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
1 The State does not argue on appeal that even if section 724.012(b)(1)(B) does not provide the
required exigency alone, other evidence presented at the suppression hearing nonetheless established an
exigent circumstance.
6
discretion by granting Palanza’s motion to suppress.2 See id. We overrule the State’s
sole issue.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
/s/ Rogelio Valdez
ROGELIO VALDEZ
Chief Justice
Do Not Publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
8th day of October, 2015.
2 For the first time on appeal, the State argues that even if the exigency exception does not apply
to justify warrantless blood draws in every case falling under section 724.012(b)(1)(B), warrantless blood
draws might nonetheless be constitutionally permissible under three other exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement, including: (1) the automobile exception; (2) the consent exception; and
(3) the search incident to arrest exception. The State also argues that warrantless blood draws are
constitutional under the general Fourth Amendment balancing test, even if they do not fit into an established
exception to the warrant requirement. Finally, the State argues that the United States Supreme Court has
“mislabeled” warrantless blood draws as Fourth Amendment searches when they more properly fit the legal
definition of Fourth Amendment seizures, which, according to the State, “generally do[] not require a
warrant.” However, the State made none of these arguments to the trial court. An appellant may not raise
an argument for the first time on appeal if it could serve as a basis for reversing the trial court's ruling on a
motion to suppress. Alford v. State, 400 S.W.3d 924, 928–29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); State v. Mercado,
972 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc). We therefore hold that the State has waived these
arguments by failing to present them to the trial court.
7