Sandra Kay Embesi v. Charles Ray Hall

ACCEPTED
09-17-00254-CV
NINTH COURT OF APPEALS
BEAUMONT, TEXAS
12/13/2017 4:52 PM
CAROL ANNE HARLEY
CLERK
Cause No. 09-17-00254-CV
IN THE FILED IN
9th COURT OF APPEALS
NINTH COURT OF APPEALS BEAUMONT, TEXAS
at Beaumont, Texas 12/13/2017 4:52:15 PM
________________________________________________
CAROL ANNE HARLEY
Clerk
SANDRA EMBESI, APPELLANT
V.
CHARLES RAY HALL, APPELLEE
_________________________________________________
On Appeal from the
th
279 Judicial District Court of Jefferson County, Texas
Cause No. F-204,290
__________________________________________________
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
___________________________________________________
SMITH & SHIPLEY, L.L.P.
Jolei Shipley
Texas Bar No. 24041909
2750 IH-10 East, Suite 200
Beaumont, Texas 77703
Tel: (409) 899-1046
Fax: (409) 899-2648
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT,
SANDRA EMBESI
NO ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED.
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IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellant - Sandra Embesi
Attorney for Appellant - Jolei Shipley
SBN: 24041909
Smith § Shipley
2750 IH-10 East, Ste. 200
Beaumont, Texas 77703
Tel: (409) 899-1046
Fax: (409) 899-2648
Appellee - Charles Ray Hall
Attorney for Appellee - Clint Lewis
SBN: 12275250
The Lewis Law Firm
8445 Gladys Ave.
Beaumont, Texas 77706
Tel: (409) 899-5600
Fax: (409) 899-5682
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identity of Parties and Counsel ................................................................................. ii
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………….iii
Index of Authorities .................................................................................................iv
Statement Regarding Oral Argument ........................................................................ v
Statement of the Case ...............................................................................................vi
Issues…………………………………………………………………………….....1
Statement of Facts………………………………………………………………….1
Summary of the Argument…………………………………………………………3
Arguments and Authorities …………………………………………………..........3
Issue One: The trial court abused its discretion by denying former Wife’s
petition for post-divorce division of assets because wife proved that the
property requested to be divided was not divided by the Final Decree of
Divorce.
A. Standard of Review………………………………………………………4
B. Pertinent Facts………………………………………………………........4
C. Applicable Law………………………………………………………......6
D. Argument………………………………………………………………...8
Conclusion and Prayer for Relief............................................................................. 10
Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................ 11
Certificate of Service .............................................................................................. 12
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
In Re Marriage of McDonald, 118 S.W.3d 829, 832 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2003,
pet. denied)…………………………………………………………………………………..4
Mann v. Mann, 607 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1980)………………………………………4
Bishop v. Bishop, 74 S.W.3d 877, 879 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 2002, no
pet.)……………………………………………………………………………………………7
Mayes v. Stewart, 11 S.W.3d 440, 448 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet.
denied)………………………………………………………………………………………..7
Stephens v. Marlowe, 20 .W.3d 250 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 2000)…..……………..7
Allen v. Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. 1986)……………………………………….7
Thompson v. Thompson, 500 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1973)……………..7,8
Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983)…………………………………….7
Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 889, 901-02 (Tex. 2009)……………………………….7
Stirling v. Stirling, 02-10-00329-CV (Tex. App. – Forth Worth 2011)……………..9
Statutes
Tex. Fam. Code §9.201.………………………………………………………..…6
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellant believes that the issues presented are clear and can be resolved by
this Court without hearing oral argument from either party.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment denying a request for a division of
undivided property. The divorce decree was silent as to the division of the former
husband’s pension plan. The trial court nevertheless denied former wife’s request to
divide the pension plan.
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ISSUE
Issue One
The trial court abused its discretion by denying former Wife’s petition
for post-divorce division of assets because wife proved that the property
requested to be divided was not divided by the Final Decree of Divorce.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sandra Embesi (hereinafter “Sandra”) and Charles Ray Hall (hereinafter
“Charles”) were married on November 20, 1974. In January 1982, Charles started
working for Mobil Oil Corporation, now ExxonMobil. (RR 26) Charles eventually
retired from ExxonMobil with pension and 401(k) benefits in February 2017. (RR
17-18) On November 4, 2008, Charles and Sandra were divorced. Charles was
represented in that action by Karen Bennett. Sandra Embesi was unrepresented by
counsel.
Sandra filed a bill of review on October 19, 2012 under Cause Number
C216,691 in the 317th District Court of Jefferson County, Texas asserting that
Charles’ conduct prevented her from obtaining a greater share of the community
estate. By agreement, Sandra’s bill of review was granted. Sandra and Charles
entered settlement negotiations. A sworn inventory of community assets and debts
was never made by either party. (RR 27) No discovery was conducted. However,
Sandra and Charles reached a settlement reflected in the Final Decree of Divorce
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(hereinafter “2013 Decree”) entered by the trial court on September 23, 2013. The
2013 decree was silent as to the award of the community property ExxonMobil
Pension Plan. The specific language of the decree awarded Charles the following:
H-5. A portion of Charles Ray Hall’s retirement benefits in
ExxonMobil Savings Plan arising out of Charles Ray Hall’s
employment with ExxonMobil as of March 11, 2013, that portion being
a sum certain, together with any interest, dividend, gains, or losses on
that amount arising since that date and more particularly defined in a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order signed by the Court on the day this
Final Decree of Divorce is signed.
H-6. All individual retirement accounts, simplified employee
pensions, annuities and variable annuity life insurance benefits in the
husband’s name.
The specific language of the decree awarded Sandra the following:
W-5. A portion of Charles Ray Hall’s retirement benefits in
ExxonMobil Savings Plan arising out of Charles Ray Hall’s
employment with ExxonMobil as of March 11, 2013, that portion being
ExxonMobil, together with any interest, dividend, gains, or losses on
that amount arising since that date and more particularly defined in a
Qualified Domestic Relations Order signed by the Court on the day this
Final Decree of Divorce is signed.
The Qualified Domestic Relations Order awarded Sandra as Alternate Payee
the sum of $150,000.00.
On March 19, 2014, Sandra filed a Petition for Post-Divorce Division of
Property after discovering that Charles had not disclosed to her that he had an
ExxonMobil Pension Plan. This appeal from the trial court denying Sandra’s
petition.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue 1. The trial court abused its discretion by denying Sandra’s petition for
post-divorce division of assets because she proved that the property requested to be
divided was not divided by the Final Decree of Divorce. The 2013 Decree was silent
as to a division of the ExxonMobil Pension Plan. Because the 2013 Decree is
unambiguous in its silence, the language of the 2013 Decree must be interpreted
according to contract law. Contract law requires that the trial court look only at the
intentions of the parties as manifested by the contract itself.
ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
Issue one: The trial court abused its discretion by denying former Wife’s petition for
post-divorce division of assets because wife proved that the property requested to be
divided was not divided by the Final Decree of Divorce.
A. Standard of Review
A trial court’s ruling on a post-divorce division of assets is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. In Re Marriage of McDonald, 118 S.W.3d 829, 832
(Tex.App. – Texarkana) 2003, pet. denied). A clear abuse of discretion is shown
when the division of property is manifestly unjust. Mann v. Mann, 607 S.W.2d 243,
245 (Tex. 1980).
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B. Pertinent Facts
The 2013 Decree specifically award the ExxonMobil Savings Plan but does
not mention in the awards to either Sandra or Charles the pension plan, either simply
as “pension plan” or ExxonMobil Pension Plan. Charles further testified that at the
time of his retirement, the ExxonMobil Pension Plan was worth about $900,000.00.
(RR 20)
The testimony of Tim Satre, a certified divorce financial planner when
questioned during the hearing by Sandra’s counsel stated that the 2013 Decree did
not specifically address either pension. (RR 44). He further stated that the pension
plan could not have been described or defined as an individual retirement account, a
simplified employee pension, an annuity or variable annuity life insurance. (RR 44).
Under questioning by the trial court, Tim Satre could not identify where the
pension plan was awarded under any of the awards made to Charles:
Q. All right. So, there’s – so, a pension plan, would it ever be
– would a pension plan ever be considered a financial
institution?
A. Where are you looking?
Q. I’m looking at H-3 actually.
A. No.
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Q. Okay. All right. And, then, let’s see. All right. So, there is
– there is a difference, a significant – I mean there’s an
identifiable difference between annuity and a pension
plan?
A. Yes. And this reflects most of the time in these divorce
decree I see that an annuity would a separate contract you
buy, insurance company generally never referred to as a
pension.
Q. Okay.
(RR-51)
Q. All rights. And H-8, the pension plan would never – could
never be defined as a brokerage account or fall into any of
those categories, or could they?
A. Not a brokerage account, no. I mean, they wouldn’t
generally be referred as a brokerage account, stocks,
bonds, mutual funds, securities. No. They would be
referred to as some type of qualified retirement plan.
Q. Okay.
(RR-52)
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Under cross examination by Charles’ counsel, Tim Satre denied that the
ExxonMobil Pension Plan could be characterized, defined or described as an
individual retirement accounts or a simplified employee pension. (RR 54).
C. Applicable Law
The Texas Family Code provides that former spouses may file a suit to divide
property not divided or awarded in a final decree of divorce. T.F.C §9.201. Post-
divorce partition is an appropriate vehicle to address an undivided or overlooked
asset. Bishop v. Bishop, 74 S.W.3d 877, 879 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.);
Mayes v. Stewart, 11 S.W.3d 440, 448 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet.
denied). Post-divorce division is appropriate where the divorce decree does not
consider, contemplate or purport to dispose of the property, or where the property
has been overlooked and as a result has gone undivided. Stephens v. Marlowe, 20
S.W.3d 250 (Tex.App. – Texarkana 2000).
To interpret the property award in an agreed divorce decree, the language of
the decree will be interpreted according to contract law and not the law of judgments.
Allen v Allen, 717 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. 1986).
Because an agreed final decree of divorce case is a contract, the court must
look to the intentions of the parties as manifested in the four corners of the document.
Thompson v. Thompson, 500 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. App-Dallas 1973). A contract is
ambiguous when its terms are susceptible to more than one meaning. Coker v. Coker,
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650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983.) Whether a divorce decree is ambiguous is a
question of law, and the court must adhere to the literal language of an unambiguous
decree. Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899, 901-02 (Tex. 2009).
D. Argument
Divorce decree language is often drafted broadly enough that it includes
property not specifically awarded. In many cases, residuary clauses awarding
undivided property to the person in possession and language such as “any and all
sums” and “any other rights” is enough to show that the award was contemplated or
considered. However, in the present decree, it is telling that the award of the
ExxonMobil Savings Plan was specific, but the decree omits any mention of even
the generic term pension plan. The only expert to testify in at the final hearing
unequivocally testified under direct examination, cross-examination and questioning
by the court that the award of the pension plan did not fall under any of the other
awards to Charles under the 2013 Decree. The court contrasted the language of the
2013 Decree with the language of the prior decree for which the bill of review was
granted and wherein the pension plan was mentioned, but only as the generic award
of the pension plan to Charles. RR 53
In Thompson, the parties entered an agreed divorce decree that purported to
dispose of all community property. However, the decree failed to mention a joint
venture entered by husband. The Court of Appeals, after examining the decree and
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the summary judgment evidence, decided that the parties did not effectively carry
out the intention by dividing all their property. Id at 207. The decree is binding, and
it is res judicata only as to the property awarded and brought within the jurisdiction
of the court. If property was omitted from such consideration, it might authorize the
opening of the decree as to property. Id at 208. If the decree can be given a certain
or definite legal meaning or interpretation, then it is not ambiguous, and the court
will construe the contract as a matter of law.
In Stirling v. Stirling, 02-10-00329-CV, (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2011), the
award of property to husband included “any profit-sharing plan, retirement plan,
Keogh plan, pension plan, employee stock option plan, 401(k) plan, employee
saving plan, accrued unpaid bonuses, disability plan, or other benefits existing by
reason of the husband’s past, present, or future employment…” Wife filed a petition
for post-divorce division. The trial court awarded wife fifty percent of the
community property interest in husband’s pension plan. The court of appeals
reversed. The decree expressly awarded the pension plan to Husband.
If the decree is silent as to an award, then it remains undivided and is subject
to a just and right division by the Court. The 2013 Decree is utterly silent as to the
ExxonMobil Pension Plan that is part of the ExxonMobil benefits package.
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CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Because the language of the decree is unambiguous and fails to divide the
ExxonMobil Pension Plan, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Sandra
Embesi’s Petition for Post-Divorce Division of Property.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED Appellant, Sandra Embesi,
prays this Court to, in all things, affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
SMITH § SHIPLEY, LLP
Attorneys at Law
2750 IH-10 East, Suite 200
Beaumont, Texas 77703
Tel: (409) 899-1046
Fax: (409) 899-2648
By:
Jolei Shipley
State Bar No. 24041909
jshipley@smithshipley.com
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this document brief/petition was prepared with Microsoft Word
2010, and that, according to that program’s word-count function, the sections
covered by TRAP 9.4(i)(1) contains 2333 words.
Respectfully submitted,
SMITH § SHIPLEY, LLP
Attorneys at Law
2750 IH-10 East, Suite 200
Beaumont, Texas 77703
Tel: (409) 899-1046
Fax: (409) 899-2648
By:
Jolei Shipley
State Bar No. 24041909
jshipley@smithshipley.com
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
served on Appellant’s counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Court
on this 13th day of December, 2017, as follows:
Via Electronic Service
Mr. Clint Lewis
The Lewis Law Firm
8445 Gladys Ave.
Beaumont, Texas 77706
By:___________________________
Jolei Shipley
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