Ex Parte Rachael Ann Sheridan

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-16-00254-CR
EX PARTE RACHAEL ANN
SHERIDAN
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FROM THE 16TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. F-2010-2104-A
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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In one issue, Appellant Rachael Ann Sheridan appeals the denial of her
application for writ of habeas corpus. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
11.072 (West 2015). We affirm.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Background
I. Appellant’s relationship and the underlying charges
Appellant testified that she fell in love with “Ryan Webb” and married him,
only to discover that he had deceived her into believing he was someone he was
not. As the record reveals, this was not a figurative claim. It was literally true.
To begin with, he was not Ryan Webb. His real name was Joshua
Mitchell. And although the record is unclear as to his true occupation, he also
was not a member of the “International Investigation Agency” (IIA), a “black ops,”
top-secret government agency, as he had claimed.
This much was revealed to Appellant on August 24, 2010, the night that
Mitchell was arrested, after Plano police officers found guns, explosives, and
bomb-making materials in the bed of the family pickup that Appellant, Mitchell,
and their children occupied. Along with the firearms and ammunition the police
officers discovered, they also found containers of “metal shavings and BBs,
bottles of smokeless black powder, metal pipes with threaded ends, end caps for
the pipes, several containers with unknown powders, 2 hollowed out grenades
and a blasting cap.” According to a police report, as the officers uncovered the
explosives, Appellant’s six-year-old daughter pointed to the bottles of gunpowder,
told an officer, “[T]hose are my daddy’s explosives,” recalled how Mitchell had
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once thrown them in a pool while she was present, and demonstrated how they
had exploded by “thr[owing] up her hands as if she was showing an explosion.” 2
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) was called to the
scene because of the nature of the items found. Police reports also indicate that
at the time of his arrest Mitchell told the police that he worked for “Black Ops,” did
“top secret” work that he could not discuss, that he “had contacts around the
world,” and that he did “government work.”
Appellant was not arrested at the scene but voluntarily went to the police
department with her two children. After both she and her six-year-old provided
statements to Beesley, Appellant’s two children were placed in the custody of
CPS. Appellant was charged with two counts of endangering a child, see Tex.
Penal Code Ann. § 22.041(c) (West 2011), and placed in jail.3 The Department
of Family and Protective Services (the Department) also initiated proceedings to
terminate the parental rights of Appellant and Mitchell, and on September 3,
2010, Appellant was provided a service plan to complete.
After it became apparent that Appellant could not successfully complete
the requirements of her service plan to avoid the termination of her parental
rights while incarcerated, Appellant and her attorney came up with a “plan” to get
2
Later that evening, when asked by Child Protective Services (CPS)
investigator Jamie Beesley what devices Mitchell had used to “blow things up,”
the child drew a picture of what appeared to be a grenade.
3
According to Appellant, it was not until they were arrested that she
learned Mitchell’s name was not Ryan Webb.
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her out of jail. First, they tried to get Appellant’s bond reduced. But they were
unsuccessful. Then they tried to find someone who could pay her bond. This
proved unsuccessful as well. So, they tried to set a jury trial on the criminal
charges as soon as possible.
According to Appellant, the first jury trial setting available was January 31,
2011, by which time she would have been in jail for five months without the ability
to work on her service plan in the interim. Unsatisfied with the option of waiting
in jail for a January 2011 trial, Appellant “instructed her attorney to work on a plea
bargain that would get her out of jail as soon as possible.”
On December 2, 2010, Appellant entered a plea of guilty, was convicted of
both counts of endangering a child, and was sentenced to two years’
confinement. The trial court suspended imposition of her sentence, however,
and placed her on five years’ community supervision. The plea paperwork
signed by Appellant expressly stated that she had been advised of her rights,
including being warned of the consequences of a guilty plea and her right to a
jury trial, that her plea was “made freely and voluntarily and [was] not influenced
by any consideration of fear or any persuasion or any delusive hope of pardon”
and that the waivers, consents, agreements, and statements made in the
paperwork had been explained to her by an attorney and were made “voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently.” Likewise, the judgment of conviction recited as
follows:
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Defendant waived the right of trial by jury and entered the plea
indicated above. The Court then admonished Defendant as required
by law. It appeared to the Court that Defendant was mentally
competent to stand trial, made the plea freely and voluntarily, and
was aware of the consequences of this plea.
The plan worked. On September 26, 2011, the trial court terminated
Mitchell’s parental rights but did not terminate Appellant’s, instead agreeing with
the Department’s recommendation to return the children to Appellant. And on
June 26, 2013, the trial court granted early termination of Appellant’s community
supervision.
II. Appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus
Appellant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus under article 11.072
in April 2016 seeking relief from her conviction for child endangerment. See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072. In it, she argued that she was innocent and
that she pleaded guilty under duress “so that she could be released from jail
more quickly than if she had awaited trial.” In essence, Appellant argued that her
inability to procure pretrial release from jail, when combined with the immediate
need to begin working on the service plan to avoid termination of her parental
rights and the impossibility of completing the service plan while incarcerated,
created a circumstance of duress which led to her plea of guilt.
In Appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus, she placed the blame
for the child endangerment charges on Mitchell. Appellant denied any
knowledge that he had placed weapons and materials that could be used to
construct an explosive device in the pickup. Appellant further pointed to the
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following conclusion of law entered by the trial court in the termination
proceeding:
Clear and convincing evidence shows that no reasonable juror
would have convicted [Appellant] of child endangerment in light of
the overwhelming affirmative evidence of her innocence at trial.
Clear and convincing evidence shows that termination of the parent-
child relationship between [Appellant] and [her children] is not in the
best interest of the children.
Appellant attached the complete findings of fact and conclusions of law entered
in the termination proceeding to her application, as well as the judgment of
conviction, an affidavit by the attorney ad litem for the children in the termination
proceeding that expressed his opinion that Appellant “had no knowledge of the
facts which brought the children into care, being that the father of the younger
child was portraying himself as a ‘Special Agent’ and that he had duped not only
[Appellant], but many law enforcement agencies,” and the opinion of this court
affirming the termination of Mitchell’s parental rights.
III. The State’s response
In answering the application for writ of habeas corpus, the State argued
that (1) Appellant did not show duress, but rather that she made a conscious
choice to enter a plea of guilty to benefit her chances of avoiding termination of
her parental rights, (2) Appellant did not present any new evidence in support of
her argument that she was innocent of the endangerment charges, and (3) there
was sufficient evidence to support Appellant’s conviction. In support of its
arguments, the State provided (a) the plea paperwork signed by Appellant, (b) a
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police report from the night of Appellant and Mitchell’s arrests, (c) the report of
the detective that investigated the endangerment charges, and (d) the indictment
of child endangerment charges against Appellant.
IV. The trial court’s denial
On May 6, 2016, the trial court denied Appellant’s request for relief without
an evidentiary hearing. The trial court adopted the State’s proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law, which included the following findings:
1. Applicant judicially confessed and pleaded guilty to two
counts of endangering a child in return for a sentence of two years’
confinement probated for five years with no fine.
2. After she was indicted, Applicant and her criminal attorney
came up with the following plan in order to try to start her services in
her parental termination case: try to get a bond reduction; try to get
someone to help her pay her bond; and then set the case for a jury
trial.
3. Applicant was unable to reduce or post her bond and the
first jury trial date was January 31, 2011.
4. Applicant claims the trial could not have started on that
date, but provides no evidence supporting her assertion.
5. Applicant complains that she would have “lost precious
time to work on her service plan,” but provides no evidence that her
parental rights would have been terminated had she been confined
for five more months.
6. Applicant does not bring forth any newly discovered
evidence—her statements in support of her application were known
to her at the time she pleaded guilty.
7. On the night of the offense Applicant claimed there were no
guns in the vehicle, then said they were in the glove box, but one
gun was found in plain view and the other was in a backpack.
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8. Applicant claims she did not know her husband J.M.’s real
name until after she was arrested, but she admitted she previously
saw a document with a different name for him, she admitted she
knew his family had a different last name, and Applicant’s mother
thought J.M. was using a false name.
9. Applicant claimed she did not know of J.M.’s probation in
North Carolina, first saying they had been together for three years,
then saying they had been together for four years, but then admitted
she might have met him just after he was released from
incarceration in North Carolina.
10. Applicant considered herself and J.M. ‘hobbyists,’ knew
J.M. was fascinated with gunpowder and homemade rockets, and
testified that J.M. started ‘amassing’ the explosive materials found in
the truck in the past six months.
11. Considering Applicant’s knowledge of J.M.’s explosive
materials, and considering she, J.M., and her two children were
living a nomadic lifestyle, it is reasonable to believe that Applicant
would have knowledge of J.M.’s explosives in the back of the truck.
12. Applicant’s older daughter, A.S., was familiar with J.M.’s
explosives that were in the back of the vehicle to the point she could
identify them to law enforcement, and recalled witnessing J.M. set
off an explosive in the backyard of their old house creating a ‘boom’
while Applicant was inside the house.
13. Applicant told Detective Salazar that she knew it was
‘stupid’ to drive around with the explosives in the back of the truck
because it was dangerous and could explode.
14. Applicant consistently admitted that she at least knew that
gunpowder, which is an explosive material, was in the vehicle.
Among its conclusions of law, the trial court concluded that (1) the
application could be resolved through the exhibits, affidavits, and declarations
offered by Appellant and the State and did not require a hearing, (2) Appellant’s
guilty plea was a “knowing, intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences,” (3) Appellant appeared to
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make a Herrera-type4 claim of actual innocence but presented no newly
discovered evidence, (4) Appellant did not show by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable juror would have convicted her of child
endangerment so as to support a claim of actual innocence, (5) “[t]he findings in
the parental termination suit should have no bearing in this collateral attack on a
criminal case in a different trial court,” (6) nothing presented to the trial court
nullified the presumption that Appellant’s conviction was valid, and (7) Appellant
had not carried her burden of proof to warrant relief.
Discussion
I. Standard of Review
In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a habeas corpus application under
article 11.072, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the habeas
court’s ruling and afford great deference to the habeas court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law that are supported by the record. Ex parte Mello, 355 S.W.3d
827, 832 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d). This deferential review
applies even when the findings are based on affidavits rather than live testimony.
Ex parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 325–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Absent an
abuse of discretion, we must affirm a habeas court’s decision to deny the relief
requested in the habeas corpus application. Mello, 355 S.W.3d at 832.
4
See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993). Appellant’s
brief denies having made any such claim of actual innocence based upon newly-
discovered evidence. We therefore will not address any such claim.
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II. Trial court’s failure to conduct a hearing
Article 11.072 provides that the trial court “may order affidavits,
depositions, interrogatories, or a hearing.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
11.072 § 6(b) (emphasis added). We have previously held that nothing in article
11.072 requires the trial court to conduct a hearing. Ex parte Cummins, 169
S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.); see also Ex parte
Gonzales, No. 13-11-00135-CR, 2012 WL 2928924, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi July 19, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(holding evidentiary hearing was not required in article 11.072 proceeding
alleging that guilty plea was made involuntarily); Ex parte Franklin, 310 S.W.3d
918, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (collecting cases holding a
hearing was not required in article 11.072 proceeding presenting a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel).5 In so holding, we explained,
While section 6(b) clearly indicates that in making its determination
the trial court may order affidavits, depositions, interrogatories, or a
hearing, it does not require that a trial court do so. See [Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.072 § 6(b)] In addition, we find nothing in
article 11.072 prohibiting the trial court from considering evidence
filed with the application or with the State’s response. See id. art.
5
Some of our sister courts have held that an evidentiary hearing is required
under article 11.072 if the habeas applicant makes a claim of actual innocence
on the basis of newly-discovered evidence. See Ex parte Gonzalez, 323 S.W.3d
557, 559 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, pet. ref’d); Franklin, 310 S.W.3d 918 at 923
(holding additionally that a hearing is required for a claim of actual innocence if
the trial judge considering the habeas application is not the same judge that
presided over the original trial). This caselaw is inapplicable here as Appellant
acknowledges that she did not make a claim of actual innocence based on
newly-discovered evidence.
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11.072. In that regard, section 7 of article 11.072 refers to the trial
court’s consideration of “documents attached to the application,”
albeit in determining if the application is frivolous, but that language
combined with the permissive language found in section 6 leads us
to conclude that the legislature did not intend to prohibit the trial
court from considering such evidence without [a] hearing. See id.
art. 11.072 §§ 6, 7.
Cummins, 169 S.W.3d at 757. Appellant has not persuaded us to reconsider our
prior holding. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not holding
an evidentiary hearing, we overrule this part of Appellant’s sole issue.
III. Burden of proof
The trial court was presented with documents by both sides to consider in
ruling on Appellant’s application. In her brief, Appellant complains of the State’s
provision of “limited information from which the court could make a decision,” and
particularly its alleged failure to provide testimony from the termination
proceeding “that validates Applicant’s application for writ of habeas corpus.”
Assuming this general complaint constitutes an attempt on Appellant’s part to
raise this issue as an issue on appeal, Appellant’s argument misconstrues the
applicable burden.
Once the State presented evidence that Appellant was admonished in
writing as to her rights and the consequences of her plea—which it did, in the
form of the “Waiver of Jury” form and the “Waiver and Judicial Confession” form
signed by Appellant—it made a prima facie showing that Appellant’s guilty plea
was entered knowingly and voluntarily. See Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195,
197 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Thereafter, the burden—and a heavy one at that—
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shifted to Appellant to defeat the presumption that her plea was made voluntarily.
See Acosta v. State, 160 S.W.3d 204, 211 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no
pet.); see also State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)
(“When a person attacks the validity of his prior guilty plea as that plea is
reflected in the written judgment, he bears the burden of defeating the normal
presumption that recitals in the written judgment are correct.”).
The burden was not on the State to provide testimony from the termination
proceeding. If Appellant believed such testimony would assist her in proving the
involuntary nature of her plea, she bore the burden of producing it. And while
she provided us with such testimony on appeal, she has offered no explanation
for her failure to provide the trial court with this evidence. Absent “compelling
and extraordinary circumstances” we cannot consider evidence that was not first
submitted to the trial court. See Ex parte Whisenant, 443 S.W.3d 930, 932 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014) (holding that supplemental evidence supporting an article 11.07
application for writ of habeas corpus should be filed in the trial court, not the
reviewing court).6 Because Appellant has made no showing of compelling or
extraordinary circumstance, we therefore decline to consider this evidence.
6
See also Ex parte Simpson, 136 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
(noting that although the reviewing court in a habeas proceeding “might have the
implicit authority to consider evidentiary materials filed directly with [the reviewing
court], normally the jurisprudential considerations of efficiency, effectiveness, and
comity to the habeas court counsel against such consideration”).
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Assuming Appellant’s complaint was properly raised and adequately briefed, we
overrule this part of her sole issue.
IV. Voluntariness of Plea
The remainder of Appellant’s arguments attack the factual basis of
individual findings by the trial court in broad terms and without support in the
record or reference to applicable caselaw. Even assuming these arguments
were adequately briefed, none of the evidence shows that Appellant pleaded
guilty unknowingly or involuntarily—in fact, the evidence supports the opposite
conclusion.
No doubt Appellant was in a predicament. If she did not timely complete
her service plan, she risked termination of her parental rights. Continued
incarceration would impair—perhaps prevent—her from completing the service
plan. She had exhausted her options to obtain pretrial release. And although
her case was set for trial in January, there was no guarantee that it would
actually go to trial as scheduled. Appellant’s options were limited and imperfect.
But the evidence shows that she and her attorney considered her options, and
she ultimately chose to plead guilty to the charges.
Appellant’s decision was calculated to achieve the best result in a grim
situation. The evidence shows that in reaching her decision, she considered all
options and circumstances known to her at the time. The evidence also shows
that her decision to plead guilty was made with awareness of the direct
consequences of her plea. As the court of criminal appeals has explained,
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[A guilty plea] cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant
possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. This
means that the defendant must have sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances. The standard is whether the plea is a
voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of
action open to the defendant.
Ex parte Mable, 443 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (internal citations
omitted). Neither her circumstances nor her options were ideal, but the evidence
shows that Appellant was aware of the possible ramifications of a guilty plea and
that she made a voluntary and intelligent choice considering her options. See Ex
parte Palmberg, 491 S.W.3d 804, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“The reality is that
every defendant who enters a guilty plea does so with a proverbial roll of the
dice.”).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
determination, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
Appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Ex parte Parker, No.
09-06-00077-CR, 2006 WL 1965666, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 12, 2006,
no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding appellant’s
allegations of duress caused by jail conditions and alleged harassment by
immigration agent did not support involuntary plea claim); Quintanilla v. State,
No. 04-00-00197-CR, 2001 WL 220054, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 7,
2001, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (holding appellant did not show
his plea was rendered involuntary by his fear of not being able to see his
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daughter again or alleged duress imposed by attorney). We therefore overrule
the remainder of Appellant’s sole issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s denial of
Appellant’s application for writ of habeas corpus.
BONNIE SUDDERTH
JUSTICE
PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and SUDDERTH, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: April 27, 2017
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