Chester Wilder and Carolyn Wilder v. Johnston Custom Homes, Inc. and Jerold B. Johnston

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-19-00265-CV
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CHESTER WILDER AND CAROLYN WILDER, Appellants
V.
JOHNSTON CUSTOM HOMES, INC. AND JEROLD B. JOHNSTON, Appellees
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 3
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2017-005058-3
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Gabriel and Kerr, JJ.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Appellants Chester and Carolyn Wilder filed a notice of appeal
attempting to appeal three interlocutory trial court orders: (1) “Order Granting
Defendants’ Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Recently-Asserted Cause of Action or, in the
Alternative[,] Rule 70 Motion for Continuance”; (2) “Order Granting Defendants’
Motion for Protection/Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment”;
and (3) “Order Granting Motion to Withdraw as Counsel [for the Wilders].” By letter
dated July 19, 2019, we informed the Wilders of our concern that we may lack
jurisdiction to consider their appeal due to the apparently interlocutory nature of the
orders. We requested a response showing grounds for continuing the appeal be filed
by Monday, July 29, 2019.
In response to our letter, the Wilders argued that the trial court’s orders striking
a late-added cause of action and striking their motion for summary judgment
effectively dismissed their case as a whole. But we have already rejected these
arguments in the Wilders’ previous attempt to appeal those two orders. Wilder v.
Johnston Custom Homes, Inc., No. 02-19-00169-CV, 2019 WL 3436606, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth July 30, 2019, no pet. h.) (per curiam) (mem. op.). As we noted
then, “the trial court has disposed of some of the Wilders’ claims but has left others
pending, including claims for breach of contract, fraud in the inducement, and
violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act,” and the Appellees’
counterclaims still remain. Id. In their response to our jurisdictional inquiry, the
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Wilders provide no explanation for how the trial court’s order allowing their attorney
to withdraw (1) changed the interlocutory nature of the first two orders or (2)
constitutes an appealable final judgment. It does neither of those things—the order
allowing their attorney to withdraw does not state that it is a final judgment and does
not dispose of the Wilders’ remaining claims. See In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d 824, 828
(Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (stating that an order or judgment is final if it finally
disposes of all pending claims and parties or if it states that it does).
“Texas appellate courts have jurisdiction only over final orders or judgments
unless a statute permits an interlocutory appeal.” In re Roxsane R., 249 S.W.3d 764,
774–75 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, orig. proceeding). The trial court has not
rendered a final judgment or an appealable interlocutory order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. &
Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014 (listing orders from which interlocutory appeals may be
taken). We therefore dismiss the Wilders’ attempted appeal for want of jurisdiction.
See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f).
Per Curiam
Delivered: August 15, 2019
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