Jairen Delano Peterson v. State

Opinion issued November 20, 2018
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-17-00954-CR
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JAIREN DELANO PETERSON, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 405th District Court
Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 16-CR-1888
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury found Jairen Delano Peterson guilty of the offense of cruelty to a non-
livestock animal for stabbing to death a dog, and the trial court sentenced him to five
years’ confinement. Peterson appeals, contending that the trial court erred in
(1) denying his motion for directed verdict because the State failed to prove that he
was not engaged in depredation control, which is an exception to criminal liability;
and (2) allowing evidence that he was under the influence of PCP at the time he
committed the offense. Finding no error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
A grand jury indicted Peterson for intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
torturing or killing, in a cruel manner, a female dog, by stabbing the dog with a knife.
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.092. The indictment further alleged that Peterson did
not kill the dog for depredation control; that is, to prevent “the loss of or damage to
agricultural crops, livestock, poultry, wildlife, or personal property.” Id.
§ 42.092(a)(5); TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE § 71.001(10).
A passing motorist observed a man, later identified as Peterson, who was in
the road and bending over a dog making stabbing motions. The motorist called for
emergency assistance. The State introduced a recording of the 911 telephone call.
Several officers of the Dickinson Police Department, including Officers F.
Gonzales and H. Smith, responded to the scene. Gonzales testified that Peterson was
“covered in blood.” Peterson “appeared disoriented, confused” and “was sweating
profusely.” Peterson “wouldn’t really communicate” in a lucid manner, and this
prompted Gonzales to ask whether Peterson was intoxicated. Peterson eventually
told Gonzales that he had killed his dog. Gonzales detained Peterson for safety
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reasons, at which point Gonzales discovered that Peterson had two knives on his
person. Peterson told him that he had used one of these knives to kill the dog.
Gonzales wore a body camera, and a recording of his encounter with Peterson
was played for the jury. The recording showed Peterson telling Gonzales that he had
killed his dog because he “tripped out.” Peterson explained that he had smoked PCP
“the other day” and was still under the influence of the drug. The recording also
showed Peterson’s interaction with one of the other responding officers. Peterson
told this officer that he had owned the dog “for a couple of months” and that he “had
to” kill it. The officer then asked whether the dog had been aggressive toward
Peterson and Peterson replied, “Yes, sir.”
Gonzales and Smith found the dog in front of Peterson’s garage. The dog was
still alive but “covered in blood.” The dog “appeared to be in a lot of pain,” and was
“struggling to breathe.” When Gonzales approached her, she attempted to get up
and fell down but did not growl. Smith also testified that the dog did not growl or
act aggressively. A brief video recording from Smith’s body camera showed the
dog struggling to stay on its feet. In addition, Gonzales took photographs of a nearby
puddle of blood in the road, a blood trail or drag marks leading from the puddle to
the dog’s location, the dog, and its doghouse. These photographs were admitted into
evidence and published to the jury.
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M. Trover, the managing animal control officer at the city’s animal shelter,
also responded to the scene. By the time he arrived, the dog had died. He collected
the dog’s corpse and held it in the shelter’s freezer for evidentiary purposes. A
veterinarian, C. Smith, subsequently performed a necropsy. The dog had sustained
37 knife wounds, ranging in depth from one millimeter to five centimeters. Her
abdominal cavity had been punctured and intestines protruded from that wound. She
had multiple wounds that punctured her chest cavity. Smith testified that the dog
most likely died because her lungs collapsed or filled with blood because of these
chest wounds. Smith also testified that the dog’s death would have been a painful
one. Smith took photographs of the dog’s wounds and these were introduced into
evidence.
When the State rested, Peterson moved for a directed verdict. Peterson
contended that the State was required to prove that his actions did not fall within a
statutory exception to the offense for the purpose of “wildlife or depredation
control,” and he urged that the State had failed to introduce any evidence negating
this exception. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.092(f)(1)(B). The trial court denied
Peterson’s motion.
The defense called a single witness, Dr. Michael Fuller, a professor of
psychiatry and a practicing psychiatrist, to testify as an expert in support of an
insanity defense. Fuller opined that Peterson suffered from a severe mental disease
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or defect, possibly a delusional disorder, schizoaffective disorder, or schizophrenia.
Fuller opined that Peterson did not appreciate the wrongfulness of killing the dog.
Peterson reported to Fuller that Satan had possessed him earlier that day and that he
later transferred Satan into the dog by staring into its eyes. With Satan trapped in
the dog, Peterson killed it to banish Satan from the world. Fuller also testified that
Peterson told him that he had smoked PCP at some point before the day he killed the
dog.
In rebuttal, the State called Dr. Victor Scarano, a forensic psychiatrist.
Peterson told Scarano that the Illuminati had infected him with a manufactured
disease and that he sacrificed the dog to cure himself. According to Scarano,
Peterson said that “he wasn’t sure what he was doing was right” when he stabbed
the dog. Peterson also said that he regretted doing so afterward because he felt that
the Illuminati had tricked him into killing his dog. Scarano concluded that Peterson
has a psychotic disorder but that Peterson knew that stabbing the dog was wrong
when he did so and thus was not insane. Scarano further concluded that Peterson
was intoxicated at the time, presumably on PCP.
The jury found Peterson guilty. Peterson then pleaded true to two
enhancement paragraphs alleging prior state jail felony convictions for possession
of a controlled substance and evading arrest, respectively. The jury found that these
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allegations were true and assessed Peterson’s punishment at five years’
incarceration.
DISCUSSION
I. Directed Verdict
Peterson contends that the trial court should have directed a verdict of
acquittal because the State did not introduce evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he did not kill his dog in the exercise of “wildlife or depredation control.”
A. Standard of review
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for directed verdict as a challenge
to the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 905 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011). In a legal-sufficiency review, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury’s verdict to determine whether rational jurors could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Gear v. State,
340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We defer to the jury’s resolution of
conflicts in testimony, weighing of the evidence, and drawing of reasonable
inferences from basic to ultimate facts. Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010).
B. Applicable law
The statute criminalizing cruelty to non-livestock animals makes it an offense
for a person to intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly torture an animal or in a cruel
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manner kill it or cause it serious bodily injury. TEX. PENAL CODE § 42.092(b)(1).
Torture includes any act causing unjustifiable pain or suffering; cruel manner
includes a manner causing or permitting unjustified or unwarranted pain or suffering.
Id. § 42.092(a)(3), (8). The statute contains an exception for “conduct occurring
solely for the purpose of or in support of . . . wildlife or depredation control.” TEX.
PENAL CODE § 42.092(f)(1)(B). “‘Depredation’ means the loss of or damage to
agricultural crops, livestock, poultry, wildlife, or personal property.” Id.
§ 24.092(a)(5); TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE § 71.001(10). Like the essential
elements of the crime, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Peterson’s conduct did not fall within this statutory exception. TEX. PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(b). Circumstantial evidence is as probative in proving his guilt as direct
evidence. Issasi, 330 S.W.3d at 638; accord Dixon v. State, 455 S.W.3d 669, 677
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d).
C. Analysis
Peterson does not contest that he intentionally killed his dog. Nor does he
dispute that his method of doing so—stabbing it 37 times with a knife—was cruel.
Peterson contends that the State did not prove that he did not kill his dog to control
the loss of or damage to crops, livestock, poultry, wildlife, or personal property.
From the evidence adduced at trial, however, rational jurors could find beyond
a reasonable doubt that Peterson did not kill this animal for the sole purpose of
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depredation control. It was undisputed that Peterson kept the dog as a pet. Officers
who encountered the dog after it already had endured terrific violence at Peterson’s
hands testified that it was neither aggressive nor defensive. Peterson admitted that
he was under the influence of PCP and the jury viewed body camera video footage
of his demeanor immediately after he stabbed his dog. Further, Dr. Fuller testified
that Peterson told him that he killed the dog because it was inhabited by the Devil.
Dr. Scarano testified that Peterson told him that he ritually sacrificed the dog to cure
himself of a disease inflicted on him by a sinister secret society. From Peterson’s
admissions and the video footage, and the absence of any indication of damage to
crops, livestock, poultry, wildlife, or personal property, rational jurors were entitled
to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Peterson did not kill the dog as a means of
depredation control. Accordingly, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Peterson’s conduct did not come within this
statutory exception to the offense.
II. Evidentiary Error
Peterson contends that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of his use of
PCP because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice in violation of Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence. But he did not
raise this objection in the trial court and therefore did not preserve this issue for our
review. TEX. R. EVID. 103(a)(1); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1).
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CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Jane Bland
Justice
Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Bland.
Do Not Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
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